JUDGMENT R.C. Mitter, J. - The respondent Krishna Chandra Ganguli (hereinafter called the mortgagee) is the executor of his father Protap Chandra Ganguli and the appellant Shib Krishna Das (hereinafter called the mortgagor) is the son of Jogendra Nath Das; he was also appointed Receiver in the mortgage suit to which we will refer hereafter. 2. Jogendra Nath Das carried on the business of milling rice, but ultimately became involved in debts. He was adjudicated an insolvent on 6th September 1946 and Sri Beni Madhab Chatterji, a pleader of the Alipore Court, was appointed Receiver in insolvency. A composition scheme was sanctioned in September or October 1929. By the composition scheme, the creditors agreed to take twelve annas in the rupee in full satisfaction of their claims against the estate of the insolvent. Thereafter, the Receiver in insolvency was given permission to raise a loan of Rs. 43,000 for the purpose of paying up all the creditors of the insolvent in accordance with the terms of the composition scheme. In pursuance of that permission, the Receiver in insolvency borrowed a sum of Rs. 43,000 from Protap Chandra Ganguli on 20th November 1929 on the security of a number of properties which had belonged to the insolvent including two rice mills and his dwelling house at 29/1 Chetla Road. To this mortgage, Jogendra Nath Das as also his wife joined as mortgagors. It is unnecessary to state other facts except the fact that after the insolvent had obtained his discharge, Protap entered into a partnership, first with Jogendra and after Jogendra's death with his son Shib Krishna. 3. Two suits were brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge-one by the Shib Krishna against the respondent Krishna Chandra being Title Suit No. 42 of 1937 instituted on 30th June 1937 for accounts in the partnership business which he carried on for some time with the said defendant; the other suit, viz., Money Suit No. 47 of 1937 was instituted by Krishna Chandra (hereafter called the mortgagee) against Shib Krishna (hereafter called the mortgagor) on 12th July 1937; this suit was valued at Rs. 80,000 and was a suit to enforce the mortgage which the Receiver in insolvency along with Jogendra and his wife had executed in favour of his father Protap to secure the said loan of Rs. 43,000 advanced by the latter on the date which we have mentioned above. 80,000 and was a suit to enforce the mortgage which the Receiver in insolvency along with Jogendra and his wife had executed in favour of his father Protap to secure the said loan of Rs. 43,000 advanced by the latter on the date which we have mentioned above. Both these suits were compromised. The compromise petition was filed in the Mortgage suit, viz. No. 47 of 1937 on 13th December 1938. The decree was passed in the mortgage suit by consent not on that date, but about a year later. In fact, the compromise decree in the mortgage suit was passed on 10th January 1940. Certified copy of the decree with the solenama petition has been marked Ex. 3 in this case. 4. The compromise decree is in these terms: It is ordered and decreed that the suit be and the same is hereby dismissed in terms of the petition of compromise which do form part of the decree. For the purposes of this suit, it would be necessary to refer only to five paragraphs, viz. 1, 2, 3, 13 and 14 of the petition of compromise. 5. The Bengal Money-lenders Act came into force on 1st September 1940. Thereafter the mortgagor against whom the mortgage decree had been passed on the aforesaid date by consent instituted this suit in which this appeal arises on 29th August 1941, under the provisions of S. 36, Bengal Money-lenders Act. In the plaint he prays for the reopening of the consent decree that had been passed in the mortgage suit on 10th January 1940 and for passing a new decree after the reopening of the said decree. The second prayer in his plaint is a prayer for general relief. The suit was resisted by the mortgagee decree-holder on two grounds, viz., (i) that the loan in respect of which the mortgage had been executed was a commercial loan, and (ii) that the suit was not maintainable. This is how the pleadings stand. 6. We will now recite the terms of the petition of compromise in their broad outlines in terms of which the consent decree in the mortgage suit was passed in order to indicate the real and the substantial controversy between the parties. This is how the pleadings stand. 6. We will now recite the terms of the petition of compromise in their broad outlines in terms of which the consent decree in the mortgage suit was passed in order to indicate the real and the substantial controversy between the parties. We have already stated that the compromise petition was filed on 13th December 1938, but the consent decree was passed more than a year later, viz., on 10th January 1940. Paragraph (1) of the compromise petition runs as follows: 1. The plaintiff (mortgagee) will got a final mortgage decree for Rs. 70,000 including costs against the defendant (mortgagor) after deducting the remissions made by amicable settlement. Paragraph 2 has not been correctly translated. We do not propose to retranslate the said paragraph, but only state the substance thereof. That paragraph states that the mortgagor, viz., the appellant before us, had executed in favour of the respondent mortgagee a conveyance of three items of property included in the mortgage for a sum of Rs. 72,500 free from any defect; that out of the said consideration money, Rs. 70,000 which was settled as the dues of the mortgagee and for which the mortgage decree was to be passed was to be paid off by way of set-off, and the remaining Rs. 2500 of the consideration money which was payable by the mortgagee qua purchaser to the mortgagor qua seller had been paid in cash by the former to the latter. Paragraph 3 dealt with the the Chetla residential house which wag freed from the claims of the mortgagee. Paragraph 13 deals with the possession of the title deeds in respect of the Chetla residential house and the properties sold by the said conveyance. The title deeds of the residential house were to remain with the mortgagor. The title deeds of the properties sold by the conveyance mentioned in para. 2 by the mortgagor to the mortgagee are to be retained by the mortgagee purchaser. Paragraph 14 of the solenama has also been wrongly translated. The correct translation is as follows: The kobala as mentioned in para 2 aforesaid having already been executed the present suit (mortgage suit) will be dismissed on full satisfaction. 2 by the mortgagor to the mortgagee are to be retained by the mortgagee purchaser. Paragraph 14 of the solenama has also been wrongly translated. The correct translation is as follows: The kobala as mentioned in para 2 aforesaid having already been executed the present suit (mortgage suit) will be dismissed on full satisfaction. Paragraph 15 states that the terms mentioned in the solenama will be deemed to be the consideration of the solenama filed in Title suit No. 42 of 1937 and the terms in the solenama of the said Title Suit No. 42 of 1937 will be deemed to be the consideration of the solenama of this suit. 7. A question would have arisen whether the mortgage decree could at all have been reopened in view of the terms of para. 15 of the solenama in view of the second proviso to S. 36(1), Bengal Money-lenders Act, but this question need not be decided in the view that we are taking of the point which we would presently indicate, coupled with the statement of the learned advocate for the appellant that if that point be answered against him, he would not argue any other point involved in the case. 8. Although the prayers in the plaint are in the form which we have stated above the real object of the mortgagor for reopening the mortgage decree is to get rid of the conveyance recited in para. 2 of the petition of compromise. That conveyance was executed on the same day on which the petition of compromise was signed, viz., 13th December 1938 and is Ex. L in the case. From the expressions used in para. 2 of the solenama, it would appear that the conveyance, Ex. L, was first executed and then the solenama was signed, although the two transactions were of the same date. Paragraphs 1 and 14 of the petition of compromise are not happily worded, and there is some defect in the language of the mortgage decree which had been passed. Paragraph 1 says that the plaintiff will get a final mortgage decree for Rs. 70,000. Paragraph 2 proceeds upon the footing that the mortgage decree, which the mortgagee was to get for the sum mentioned in para. Paragraph 1 says that the plaintiff will get a final mortgage decree for Rs. 70,000. Paragraph 2 proceeds upon the footing that the mortgage decree, which the mortgagee was to get for the sum mentioned in para. 1 of the solenama, was to be deemed to be satisfied from out of the price of the properties already conveyed by the mortgagor to the mortgagee by way of setoff. Paragraph 14 of the solenama proceeds on the footing of the satisfaction of the mortgage claim during the pendency of the mortgage suit, for it says that the kobala having been already executed the mortgage suit is to he dismissed; the conveyance of the properties being by way of accord and satisfaction. Probably in the decree in the mortgage suit, as passed, the word "dismissed" was used by following the wording of para. 14 of the solenama. Paragraph 14 of the solenama along with the conveyance, Ex. L, would lead to this position, viz., that the parties stated in the solenama that the mortgage claim had been satisfied during its pendency, and on that footing the only thing that could be done in the mortgage suit would be to pass a decree for dismissal of the suit on the ground that before the decree the mortgagee had been paid out. If, however, greater stress is laid on para. 1 of the solenama anal some of the words used in para. 2 thereof, the position would be that in accordance with the terms of the solenama the mortgagee was to get a final mortgage decree for Rs. 70,000 which is to be taken to be satisfied as the mortgagor had executed conveyance in favour of the mortgagee decree-holder of some of the items of the mortgaged properties, - the price being sufficient to cover the mortgage decree. These are the two possible constructions of the compromise and of the decree that followed on the basis of that compromise. 9. In either of the above views, the transaction represented by the conveyance, Ex. L, cannot in our judgment be reopened. The mortgagor's property was not purchased by the mortgagee in execution of the mortgage decree. These are the two possible constructions of the compromise and of the decree that followed on the basis of that compromise. 9. In either of the above views, the transaction represented by the conveyance, Ex. L, cannot in our judgment be reopened. The mortgagor's property was not purchased by the mortgagee in execution of the mortgage decree. The mortgagor made a voluntary conveyance of some of his properties to the mortgagee for the satisfaction either of the mortgage dues or of the mortgage decree according as the one or the other view of the solenama as indicated above is taken. 10. This question has been dealt with by the decision of the Federal Court in AIR 1949 15 (Federal Court) : 1 Union law Journal 14 which affirmed the decision of this Court reported in Jnanendra Narayan Vs. Naba Kumar Singha, AIR 1947 Cal 141 . That was a case where during the course of the execution of the decree passed on the loan, the judgment-debtor conveyed some of his properties to the creditor decree-holder in part satisfaction of the decretal amount. The decree was hit by the Bengal Money-lenders Act, and it was accordingly reopened, but the transaction represented by the said conveyance was not reopened. That was the view of a Division Bench of this Court, and that view was accepted by the Federal Court. Two reasons are given by Mukherjea J. who delivered the judgment of the Federal Court, and in our opinion, both these reasons are equally applicable to the case before us. The first reason that his Lordship gave is that such a transaction could not be reopened for: what the Act aims at is not to wipe out all transactions between the lender and the borrower and the rights flowing from them, but to reopen those transactions only which are necessary for adjusting and moulding the rights of the parties in accordance with the provisions of the Act and to substitute a statutory method of accounting in place of that based on contract between the parties. And, therefore, .....transaction which does not affect or impede the borrower's right to the relief provided for in the Act is not liable to be reopened under S. 36, Bengal Money lenders Act. In an earlier part of the judgment, his Lordship construed the word "relief" occurring in S. 36(1), Bengal Money-lenders Act. And, therefore, .....transaction which does not affect or impede the borrower's right to the relief provided for in the Act is not liable to be reopened under S. 36, Bengal Money lenders Act. In an earlier part of the judgment, his Lordship construed the word "relief" occurring in S. 36(1), Bengal Money-lenders Act. The relevant passage runs thus: By 'relief' again is meant not any kind of relief which the borrower might pray for or the Court might think fit to grant, but the relief that is provided for in the Act itself and which is to release the borrower of all liability for interest in excess of the limits prescribed by S. 30 of the Act. 11. The second reason Mukherjea J. gave in the last paragraph of the judgment. There his Lordship pointed out that restoration of possession of the property sold to the lender by the borrower can only be ordered where the property has passed out from the borrower to the lender by reason of not a voluntary sale, but of an involuntary or forced sale,-a sale in execution of the decree based on the loan. 12. We accordingly hold, as we are bound to hold, in view of the decision of the Federal Court in AIR 1949 15 (Federal Court) referred to above, that the transaction represented by the conveyance, Ex. L, by which the mortgagor voluntarily, i.e. by an act of his, conveyed some of his properties to the mortgagee for satisfying the loan cannot be reopened. 13. Mr. Sen appearing for the appellant stated that if we came to the conclusion that the said transaction represented by the conveyance, Ex. L could not be reopened, he would not proceed to argue any other point involved in the case and on which his client has got an adverse decision from the learned Subordinate Judge. 14. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs. P.N. Mitra, J. 15. I agree.