Judgment This second appeal and these batches of civil revision petitions raise the same point for determination, namely, whether Medupalli Agraharam is an estate within the meaning of section 3 (2) of the Estates Land Act. It has now two landlords who originally belonged to the same family, Venkatarangacharyulu and Ramanujacharyulu. S.A. No. 2235 of 1946 arises out of a suit for rent filed by the latter claiming nearly Rs. 585 as rent from three tenants. The District Munsif holding that Medupalli Agraharam was not an estate decreed the suit. The civil revision petitions arise out of batches of suits for ejectment by these landlords in which on a finding that this agraharam was an estate and that the tenants had occupancy rights, the plaints were returned for presentation to the Revenue Court. The learned Subordinate Judge of Ellore heard all the resulting appeals along with other batches of appeals arising out of two other villages, Pentapadu Agraharam and Devaracheruvu Kandrika in a common judgment in which he held that these were all estates under section 3(2) of the Act. He accordingly dismissed all the Civil Miscellaneous Appeals as regards return of the plaints for re-presentation to the Revenue Court and allowed Appeal No. 246 of 1944 in which the District Munsif decreed the suit for rent out of which second appeal No. 2235. of 1946 arises. The learned Subordinate Judge saw no grounds for differentiating between these three Agraharams and treated them all on the same footing on the basis of Explanation 1 to section 3(2). As amended by Madras Act II of 1945, it reads as follows: "Where a grant as an inam is expressed of a named village, the area which forms the subjectmatter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes." There has been a complication as regards this omnibus finding by the learned Subordinate Judge as the tenants from these three Agraharams have filed separate revision petitions as regards which separate treatment was necessitated. In a batch of civil revision petitions (Nos. In a batch of civil revision petitions (Nos. 1432 to 1437 of 1946) arising out of this common judgment filed by the landlords of Pantepadu Agraharam and Devaracheruvu Kandrika, I held that they were not estates within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Act, holding myself bound by an unreported Bench decision by Patanjali Sastri and Bell, JJ., in Venkatarangacharyulu v. Mukku Ganganna1, in which Pentapadu Agraharam was held to be not an estate even within the meaning of Explanation 1 as amended by Act II of 1945. In that litigation the original grant of Pentapadu Agraharam was produced describing the subject-matter as "Patha Pentapad hamlet of Pentapad village". As regards Devaracheruvu Kandrika, it was an inam in Pentapad itself though not included in two Pentapad Agraharams, which were confirmed under two title deeds. The word Kandrika itself means -part of a village. In that batch of revision petitions the tenants of those two agraharams made no appearance, doubtless in view of the tenure of Pentapad Agraharam having been conclusively determined by the unreported Bench decision to which I have referred. It is now contended that on the basis of that Bench decision, Medupalli Agraharam is similarly not an estate under section 3(2)(d) of the Act. The inam register extract, however, shows the village described as Medupalli Agraharam consisting of 208 acres of land granted as inam for the personal benefit of the holder. It also shows 10 acres of poramboke lands "as included in the village site, etc" and other personal and service inams comprising 44 acres. Prima facte, there is therefore nothing in the description in the inam fair register extract which would take this village out of the definition of an "estate" under Explanation 1 in Act II of 1945, it being clearly a named village. It is, however, contended that this same Medupalli Agraharam has already been found by Panchapagesa Sastri, J., in an unreported decision in Rangacharyulu v. Venkanna2 to be not an estate. That decision has been placed before me. Panchapagesa Sastri, J., there considered himself bound by Venkanna v. Lakshmipathi Razu3, a Bench decision by Leach C.J., and Lakshmana Rao J. in which there was an extent of 90.45 acres described as "waste" "including the site of the village" out of which subsequently the zamindar granted 7.98 acres to an individual for his personal benefit. Panchapagesa Sastri, J., there considered himself bound by Venkanna v. Lakshmipathi Razu3, a Bench decision by Leach C.J., and Lakshmana Rao J. in which there was an extent of 90.45 acres described as "waste" "including the site of the village" out of which subsequently the zamindar granted 7.98 acres to an individual for his personal benefit. The ratio decidendi of that decision was that the earlier grant was not therefore of the whole village and therefore the amending Act of 1945 could not apply to make it an estate. Panchapagesa Sastri J., while applying this decision to Medupalli Agraharam gave leave to appeal but subsequently the landlord and the tenant concerned compromised, and any attempt to make that an authoritative test case failed in its objective. Ordinarily the finding of Panchapagesa Sastri J., in that decision following a principle laid down in a Bench decision would be binding on me. In a subsequent decision, however, Suryanarayana v. Venkatadu4, Panchapagesa Sastri J. himself in a precisely similar village of Cheru Chintala held it to be an estate covered by the amended Explanation 1, following another Bench decision in Lakshminarasimhacharyulu v. Ratnam5, also by Leach C.J. and Lakshmana Rao J., in which, it was clearly held that where the grant is of a named village the mere fact that the words "exclusive of poramboke" are used in that grant will not take it out of the category of an estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act; and this is irrespective of whether some of the lands in the village are already held under inam or service grants or whether there has been a reservation of part of the village for communal purposes. It was specifically observed there that the words "exclusive of poramboke" should not be read as reserving the poramboke. Panchapagesa Sastri, J., holding himself bound by this Bench decision accordingly found Cheru Chintala to be an estate though 44 acres of land was shown in that grant as “poramboke.” In the case of Medupalli Agraharam only 10 acres is shown as poramboke lands “including the village site, etc.” This description cannot possibly by itself take this Agraharam out of the definition of an estate under the amended Explanation. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge, therefore, on an interpretation of the amended Explanation 1, by itself, was correct so far as, Medupalli Agraharam was concerned that it is an estate within the meaning of section 3(2)(d) of the Act. It is interesting to note that in another case arising from this village even long prior to Explanation 1 as amended by Act II of 1945, Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. in Venkatarangachary v. Nagayyal upheld in revision the finding of the District Munsif that this Agraharam was an estate. I can see no grounds therefore for acceding to the request of the learned Advocate for the landlord either to refer the status and tenure of Medupalli Agraharam for determination by a Bench nor in fact, can I even see any reasons which could justify granting any leave for a further appeal. In the course of the argument I was asked to grant leave if I should find this Agraharam to be an estate following the precedent of Panchapagesa Sastri, J., in his first decision in Rangacharyulu v. Mukku Ganganna2. He however has clearly revised that opinion in his subsequent decision in Suryanarayana v. Venkatarao3. Nor can there be any doubt now as regards the correctness of the position that this Agraharam is an estate. Second Appeal No. 2235 of 1946 is dismissed with costs and the plaint in the suit will be returned by the District Munsiff or presentation to the Revenue Court. The batches of Civil Revision Petitions are also dismissed with costs and an Advocate’s fee in each Civil Revision Petition. Leave refused. V.P.S. ----- Second Appeal and Revision Petitions dismissed.