JUDGMENT : K.S. GOVINDA PILLAI, J. 1. Defendants 4 and 17 are the appellants. The plaintiff’s suit was for a decree to realise the principal amount due under Ext. A hypothecation bond of 21.3.1104 executed by one Kumara Pillai in favour of Kuncheria Skaria. The first plaint was filed on the assumption that this Kesava Pillai and defendants 1 to 40 were members of an undivided tarwad. This was subsequently amended conceding that Kesava Pillai was only the branch Karnavan of defendants 2 to 38 and 40. 1 to 40 originally belonged to the Koikkal tarwad. The plaintiff stated that under Ext. D Udampady of 1055 in that tarwad the branch consisting of Kesava Pillai and his mother Kunjipennamma had to discharge certain debts of the tarwad. This branch did not discharge the same. Eravi Krishnan (of another branch) who is the 1st defendant in this case had discharged the entire debt and filed a suit for contribution in O.S. 655 of 1089 of the Thiruvella Munsiff’s Court and obtained a decree. Ext. K is copy of the file book in that case. To discharge this debt Kunjipennamma on 9.10.1092 executed Ext. L hypothecation bond to a stranger. The interest due on the bond till 1099 was paid by borrowing money from one Kuncheria Eapen who is the plaintiff’s brother and who had been examined in this case as D.W. 2. To pay the amount due to D.W. 2 and the principal due under Ext. L Kesava Pillai had executed the plaint hypothecation bond Ext. A. He had in addition received Rs. 800 to discharge the debt on account of the decree in O.S. 369 of 1094 obtained by the 41st defendant. Kesava Pillai had further received on prior occasions a sum of Rs. 203-27 chs. to meet the expenses in connection with tarwad litigation. Since Kesava Pillai was stated to have received all these amounts to meet the necessities of his branch a decree was prayed for against the hypotheca and the branch tarwad of defendants 2 to 38 and 40. No amount due under Ext. A had been paid and in spite of demand the defendants did not discharge the same. The 41st defendant was impleaded as it was understood that, he had some subsequent charge over plaint item 1. Similarly the 42nd defendant was stated to have some subsequent charge over plaint item 3. No amount due under Ext. A had been paid and in spite of demand the defendants did not discharge the same. The 41st defendant was impleaded as it was understood that, he had some subsequent charge over plaint item 1. Similarly the 42nd defendant was stated to have some subsequent charge over plaint item 3. Defendants 4 and 17 contested the plaintiff’s claim. They stated that Kesava Pillai was never the Karnavan of Koikkal Tarwad and that he was therefore incompetent to deal with the tarwad properties. The plaint hypothecation bond is not supported by consideration and tarwad necessity. The necessities recited in Ext. A were not binding on their tarwad. There was an Udampadi in the tarwad in 1055 under which the several branches were allotted properties for maintenance. It had been clearly provided for therein that the allottees were in no way competent to encumber or alienate any of the properties. These several branches were conducting themselves as members of an undivided tarwad. The debt mentioned in that Udampadi not been discharged by any member of the tarwad. The properties on which that debt had been charged had been sold in execution of a decree obtained for realising that debt. The decree in O.S. 655 of 1089, i.e., the decree in Ext. K case was not binding on their tarwad or their tarwad properties. It had been obtained fraudulently and collusively. Ext. L mentioned in the plaint was not supported by consideration or tarwad necessity. The 41st defendant had no right over any of the plaint properties. There was a suit in O.S. 93 of 1100 of the Kottayam District court for partition, pending at the time of Ext. A and so Ext. A was vitiated by lis pendens. The plaintiff was therefore stated to be not entitled to a decree against the defendants, the plaint properties, or their other tarwad properties. 2. The guardian appointed by court for the minor defendants supported defendants 4 and 17. The 41st defendant contended that for money due to him under the decree in O.S. 369 of 1094 he had attached in execution plaint item 1 even before Ext. A, that he had purchased that property in court auction on 20.12.1106 and obtained delivery of possession on 9.3.1107, that the plaintiff could not have paid the amounts stated in Ext. A, that Ext. A, that he had purchased that property in court auction on 20.12.1106 and obtained delivery of possession on 9.3.1107, that the plaintiff could not have paid the amounts stated in Ext. A, that Ext. A had been executed fraudulently and kept as a secret for 13 years, that there was no bona fides in the suit filed on the last day of limitation and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. 3. The plaintiff in the replication stated as follows:- Ext. A was supported by consideration and tarwad necessity. By the udampady of 1055, the several branches were enjoying the properties absolutely. A debt due to one Kunnappalli Aiyappan Aiyappan had been mentioned in Ext. D of 1055. For that a decree in O.S. 525 of 1084 had been obtained and tarwad properties were sold in execution of that decree. One of the branches discharged that debt and filed the suit Ext. K for contribution and obtained a decree. Since Ext. L was executed to discharge that debt it was supported by consideration and tarwad necessity. The defendant’s contention that O.S. 655 of 1089 would not be binding on the tarwad was untenable. There was bar by limitation also in raising such a contention. The suit in O.S. 93 of 1100 mentioned in the written statement had been dismissed and so the plaint hypothecation bond is not vitiated by the principle of lis pendens. The contentions of the 41st defendant are all false. To discharge the debt due to the 41st defendant Kesava Pillai had received Rs. 800 from him under Ext. A and his information was that that debt had been completely discharged. With the object of defeating his claims the 41st defendant in collusion with Kesava Pillai had brought to sale plaint item 1 and purchased it in court auction. The plaint properties had been allotted to the share of Kunjipennamma under Ext. D and so it was open to him to proceed against those properties to realise the plaint debt. He prayed for a decree as mentioned in the plaint. 4. The lower court found that Ext. A was supported by consideration and necessity except to the extent of Rs. 203-27-0. According to the lower court the Koikkal tarwad had become divided into several branches under Ext. He prayed for a decree as mentioned in the plaint. 4. The lower court found that Ext. A was supported by consideration and necessity except to the extent of Rs. 203-27-0. According to the lower court the Koikkal tarwad had become divided into several branches under Ext. D Udampady of 1055 so that the hypotheca had come to the absolute disposal of the branch consisting of Kunjipennamma and her children. The plaint item 1 was held to have been purchased in court auction by the 41st defendant and so the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief as against that property. The suit was therefore decreed allowing the plaintiff to realise Rs.2797-1-8 with interest and proportionate costs from the plaint properties except item 1, and the assets of the tarwad of defendants 2 to 38 and 40. The appeal is against the above decree. 5. The plaintiff has filed a cross appeal claiming the sum of Rs. 203-27-0 disallowed by the lower court. While the appeal was pending here the 42nd defendant filed C.M.P. 2902 of 1121 stating that he had no information of any sort about the suit while it was pending in the District Court, Kottayam, that he was interested in plaint item 3, that it was outstanding on mortgage with the tarwad of defendants, that he had obtained a decree for redemption of the above property in O.S. 441 of 1101 of the Changanacherry Munsiff’s Court, that he had executed that decree and obtained delivery of possession, and that this court might be pleased to declare that the lower court decree was not binding on plaint item 3. The appellants had produced certain additional records in this court and when this appeal came up before us on a previous occasion we were inclined, after hearing both sides, to admit the records. We were however not prepared to read them in evidence without giving an opportunity to the other side to examine the parties with reference to these records and to give rebutting evidence if any. We therefore sent back the case to the lower court under O. XL R. 21 C.P.C. to record such evidence as the parties wish to offer with reference to these documents and to submit the same to this court. According the 4th defendant was again examined in the lower court and Exts. VIII to XI proved in the case. 6. We therefore sent back the case to the lower court under O. XL R. 21 C.P.C. to record such evidence as the parties wish to offer with reference to these documents and to submit the same to this court. According the 4th defendant was again examined in the lower court and Exts. VIII to XI proved in the case. 6. One of the main questions for decision is whether Kesava Pillai the executant of Ext. A was competent to encumber the plaint properties for meeting the necessities mentioned in it even if those recitals were true. Ext. A contains three items of properties, which according to all parties originally belonged to the Koikkal tarwad. One Eravi Kumaran was the Karanavan of that tarwad in 1055. On 15.5.1055 he executed an Udampady, copy of which is Ext. D by which he allotted the tarwad properties to the branches of seven females in the tarwad. He also took some properties for his maintenance. The ladies to whom the allotments had been made were Chacki Kochupennu, Chacki Lekshmi, Parvathi Kunjukutty, Parvathi Kunjipennu, Parvathi Kaliyani, Parvathi Narayani and Parvathi Lekshmi. The properties included there were those acquired by Eravi Chacki the mother of the first two executees and the grandmother of the remaining executees and the executant. It also included other properties belonging to the common tarwad and those acquired by a deceased Karnavan Eravi Kesavan and by the executant himself with the income of the tarwad properties. It is definitely stated there that the properties were allotted for maintenance. It says thus:- “Ct¸mÄ \n§-fpsS Nne-hp-h-I-bv¡mbn {]tXyIw Xncn¨p Xn-«pÅ \new ]pc-bn-S-§-fpsS hnhcw Xmsg ]d-bp-p.” Thus the several schedules containing the properties allotted to the branch of each of the females were given. It was subsequently stated that this allottment was only for maintenance and that none of these properties was to be encumbered or alienated. The direction ran thus:- “...... Cu FÃm-`m-K-¯n-te¡pw Xncn-¨n-cn-¡p hkvXp-¡Ä \Sp Nnehp Ign-¨p-t]m-Ip--Xn-\p-am{Xw AÃmsX BbXp bmsXmcp hn{I-b-¯n\pw EW-§Ä¡pw CXn Hcp-`m-K-¡mÀ¡pw kzmX-{´ys¸-Sp-¯n-bn«pw CÃ. AXn-\m A§s\ GsX-¦nepw Dm-bm BbXv Cu hkvXp-¡tf Npa-¯p-Xpw AÃm Fp CXn-\m {]tXyIw Icm-dp-sN-bvXn-cn-¡p-p.” Then mention of a paddy land called Charakkanilam, 60 paras in extent is made. It was stated to belong to the tarwad. It had been hypothecated to one Kunnappalli Veettil Aiyappan Aiyappan for 2000 Razis. The Karnavan had borrowed Rs. 100 from each of the ladies Parvathi Kunjikutti, Parvathi Kunjipennu and Parvathi Lekshmi. It was stated to belong to the tarwad. It had been hypothecated to one Kunnappalli Veettil Aiyappan Aiyappan for 2000 Razis. The Karnavan had borrowed Rs. 100 from each of the ladies Parvathi Kunjikutti, Parvathi Kunjipennu and Parvathi Lekshmi. In lieu of the sum and interest thereon, this Charakkanilam had been given to these females with the direction to discharge the hypothecation debt due to Aiyappan Aiyappan. This property was allowed to be with these three ladies alone and they were to enjoy the same. Subsequently some other tarwad debts had been mentioned and these were directed to be discharged by the other females from the income of the properties allotted to them. The religious ceremonies relating to the family dieties were directed to be performed by the senior member of the branches (aq¸p-ap-d¡v \n§-Ä Xs \S-¯p-Ibpw sN-bvXpsIm-ÅWw). The expenses for the payment of taxes and Michavaram and for effecting mutuation of names and renewals were to be met by the parties in possession out of the income of the properties. Then provision is made for the residence of the several females. They were given some houses mentioned there. The expenses to be met, but which were not specifically provided for in the deed, were to be had under the direction of the executant as before. The ladies were allowed to obtain patta for the properties. Subsequent to this, the properties taken by the Karnavan for his maintenance were mentioned. Lastly it was provided that if any of the branches became extinct the properties allotted to those branches and the properties taken by him for maintenance will be taken equally by the remaining branches. Once again it was stressed that if any debt was due from any member of the tarwad except those mentioned in the Udampadi then those debts would not be binding on any of the tarwad properties. After this affirmation the Charakkanilam is described with reference to its boundaries. The lower court thinks that this evidences an outright partition and not a maintenance allotment. 7. One argument was that there was no provision for re-allottment owing to changed circumstances. According to it that was an indication of an absolute partition. It is very seldom that such a provision would appear in maintenance allotments executed in Marumakkathayam tarwads. The lower court thinks that this evidences an outright partition and not a maintenance allotment. 7. One argument was that there was no provision for re-allottment owing to changed circumstances. According to it that was an indication of an absolute partition. It is very seldom that such a provision would appear in maintenance allotments executed in Marumakkathayam tarwads. The intention of the parties would be expressed in the document and nobody can say that the intention of the parties by executing Ext. D was to create an absolute severance of interest. The Karnavan in more places than one, had emphasised that Ext. D was only an allotment for maintenance, that nobody was competent to encumber or alienate the properties, that the debts of individual members would not be binding on the properties, and that the debts themselves, except the one relating to the Charakkanilam were to be discharged out of the income of the properties allotted to the parties. The provision allowing the parties to obtain separate patta was taken by the lower court to be an indication to hold that absolute severance of interest was intended. 8. The Government on 30.12.1054 had issued certain rules for registering transfers of properties and for granting Pokkuvaravu Pattayams. They are given at pages 670 to 679 of the Travancore Land Revenue Manual Vol. V published in 1916. Under R. IIIA Pokkuvaravu or transfer of registry was allowed to be made when a person occupies any land by inheritance, gift, purchase, stridhanam, ookunthudama or other settlements, mortgage, redemption, reversion etc. mediately or immediately from a registered landlord. When a mortgagee or other person obtains a derivative title from a land lord he is entitled to get Pokkuvaravu Pattayam. It was abundantly clear that the said Pattayam was never intended to indicate the title but only one showing the annul land revenue payable by the party in possession. The definition of a Pokkuvaravu Pattayam in R. I, E to this effect is instructive. Thus the provision in Ext. D allowing the ladies to obtain Patta was of no significance, for even if there was no such provision they would be entitled to get Patta under the rules in force then. So this direction in Ext. D is of little consequence. 9. The wording in the document under consideration is to be the sole and safe guide for determining the nature of the document. So this direction in Ext. D is of little consequence. 9. The wording in the document under consideration is to be the sole and safe guide for determining the nature of the document. As observed in Sankara Pillai v. Parameswaran Nair (22 T.L.J. 40) “no definite and certain rules can be laid down for the construction of deeds of this nature. A document is not to be construed with reference to authorities as to how a similar document was construed in other cases. ‘Any ruling as to interpretation of a document can only be applied in its entirety to a document absolutely identical in language, and in a case, the several circumstances of which are substantially the same. Where these conditions are not satisfied, an appellant or respondent relying upon previous rulings of the court and putting them forward as guides to the correct interpretation of the particular document in which the case under appeal actually turns can do nothing more than ask the court to take into consideration the general principles which have been applied by the Honourable Judges in similar cases and to derive from them what ever assistance it can towards arriving at a correct conclusion”. 10. A similar document was the subject matter of consideration in the Full Bench ruling in Atchuthan v. Mathevan (23 T.L.J. 1031). The document there was styled a Nischayapatrom. The properties were allotted to the different branches of an undivided tarwad separately, such allotment being more or less of an enduring character. Limited powers of alienation were conferred on some of the members, but at the same time, care was taken to see that the properties were not frittered away by independent dealings. All alienations not expressly authorised by the document were declared invalid. Provision had also been made for the maintenance of a common Kalari and the performance of the ceremonies connected therewith by all the branches, and also for conducting ceremonies in the tarwad. After considering the ruling governing documents of such import it had been held that this document when read as a whole constituted only a maintenance allotment and not a deed of partition. After considering the ruling governing documents of such import it had been held that this document when read as a whole constituted only a maintenance allotment and not a deed of partition. It was pointed out there that the intention of the parties to a document must be gathered from the words, and when such words were definite and unambiguous the court could not travel outside the words, and unless there were decisive provisions in family Udampadies pointing to division, the indivisibility of the tarwad would be maintained wherever it was possible. As pointed out in Krishnan v. Kesavan (21 T.L.J. 652) it is possible in a deed of allotment to give properties to several branches and at the same time impose restrictions on the right of alienation for the benefit of the tarwad as a whole. Such restrictions cannot be considered to be repugnant to the interests created in favour of the branches. But there are rulings which hold that if other provisions indicating a clear and unambiguous intention of division existed the restraint on alienation can be ignored. But in a case like this where the Karnavan had stated that the properties were allotted only for maintenance, that none was to encumber or alienate the properties, and that the separate debts of the individual members would not be charged on the tarwad properties, the intention to create a document as a maintenance allotment could not be expressed in more clear and definite terms. In one of the earliest decisions reported at page 178 of T.L.R. (Karthiyayani Pillai v. Govindan) it was pointed out that the absence of the word “Nne-hn-\mbn’’ , or for maintenance anywhere in the document was in indication that the allotment was an absolute one. There was provision in that document for enjoyment of the property for ever. At page 180 it was observed that in a deed of allotment for maintenance there would be a prohibition against alienation of tarwad properties. The absence of such prohibition and expressions indicating a maintenance allotment coupled with the direction for enjoyment of the properties for ever were considered to be in favour of the view that the document evidenced an absolute partition deed. I was referring to this to show that in old documents whenever properties were allotted for maintenance there would the word ‘‘Nne-hn-\mbn’’ and also the prohibition against alienation. I was referring to this to show that in old documents whenever properties were allotted for maintenance there would the word ‘‘Nne-hn-\mbn’’ and also the prohibition against alienation. These two conditions are satisfied in the present case. 11. In Kunchi Amma v. Narayanan (28 T.L.J. 72) the important rulings on the subject till then were referred to and considered. It was held that when it was definitely clear from the terms of the document that the arrangement contemplated under it was of a permanent character and the allotment of properties was not capable of any re-adjustment at a future date, it was reasonable to conclude that the document evidenced a deed of partition. It was further held following 22 T.L.J. 40, that unless there were expressions which clearly or by necessary implication indicated that the parties intended the arrangement to continue for ever, it would not be reasonable to conclude that the right to re-adjust the allotment was extinguished, and that it would not be sufficient if the deed was silent about contingency of re-adjustment. After referring to the ruling in 13 T.L.J. 432 (Velayudhan v. Padmanabha Pillai) it was further laid down there that there were various stages through which a family might pass in its progress from a state of union to one of disintegration, that the arrangements might probably come up to the very verge of the divided status without actually falling within it, that so long as they fell short of what was required to establish a divided status the joint status of the family must be upheld with all the incidents that might follow therefrom. The reasoning adopted by Mr. Justice Sivasankara Pillai in 23 T.L.J. 1031 was quoted with approval in that case. It was also laid down that without intending complete severance of interest the members of a Marumakkathayam tarwad might allot properties for the maintenance of particular branches or Thavazhies with qualified or limited powers of alienation for temporary needs and that in other respect the powers of alienation might be restrained absolutely. In such circumstances the restraint on alienation could not be treated as altogether ineffective. To hold otherwise would virtually be to cancel the arrangement which might have been lawfully and deliberately entered into between members of the tarwad for regulating the management of the tarwad properties without terminating the corporate capacity of the tarwad. 12. In such circumstances the restraint on alienation could not be treated as altogether ineffective. To hold otherwise would virtually be to cancel the arrangement which might have been lawfully and deliberately entered into between members of the tarwad for regulating the management of the tarwad properties without terminating the corporate capacity of the tarwad. 12. The provisions of the document considered in the case cited above, where it had been held that this document evidenced only a maintenance allotment, were not even so clear as in the present case where it was expressed in emphatic terms that the allotment was only for maintenance and nothing else. The learned Judge of the court below thought that since there was no provision for re-allottment on a future date, Ext. D might be treated to be a partition deed. 28 T.L.J. 72 referred to above pointed out that the absence of such a provision did not conclude that the right to readjust the allotment was extinguished. It was very seldom that such a provision was introduced in maintenance allotments though this idea had been gradually incorporated in some of the rulings following the principles adopted in the case of Hindu Mitakshara families. The provision thus in Ext. D would therefore clearly indicate that it was only an allotment for maintenance and not a partition. 13. The branch of the executant of Ext. A hypothecation bond had all long considered Ext. D to be only an allotment for maintenance. The intention of the parties was also thus expressed even in the plaint document. In describing how the executant got the property, he had stated that he got it by the document of 1055 in an allotment for maintenance. The relevant sentence in Ext. A is to the following effect:- “1055þam-pv 797-þmw \¼À DS¼Sn-{]-Imcw (This is Ext. D) Fsâ imJm IpSpw-_-t¯¡p Nne-hn\v Xncn-¨p-In«n `c-W-¡mc-\mb Fsâ ssIhiw Ccn-¡p--Xpw”. The executant Kesava Pillai and the plaintiff who took Ext. A therefore understood Ext. D to be only an allotment for maintenance. It would therefore appear that the present contention of the plaintiff that by Ext. D the several branches got the properties absolutely was without any bona fides. Ext. D is therefore only an allotment for maintenance and it continued to be an allotment for maintenance even on the date of Ext. A. * * * * * 16. Eravi Kesavan while executing Ext. D the several branches got the properties absolutely was without any bona fides. Ext. D is therefore only an allotment for maintenance and it continued to be an allotment for maintenance even on the date of Ext. A. * * * * * 16. Eravi Kesavan while executing Ext. A for the plaint schedule properties had no right to encumber the same. He was enjoying those properties only for purpose of maintenance. He was not the Karnavan of the main tarwad for he was junior in age of Eravi Krishnan the 1st defendant. He had therefore no right to execute Ext. A so as to charge the plaint properties. Ext. A would not therefore be binding on the plaint properties and so the decree passed by the lower court allowing the plaintiff to realise portion of the plaint amount from the plaint properties or from the branch properties of Eravi Kesavan could not be sustained. 17. Even assuming that Ext. D evidenced an absolute deed of partition, the plaintiff could not get a decree against the branch tarwad properties of Eravi Kesavan i.e. of the branch of defendants 2 to 38 and 40. It was mentioned already that under Ext. D Charakkanilam was given to the three ladies. The course of conduct adopted by the parties would show that the Karnavan intended these three ladies were to take that property in equal shares. After 1055 these ladies and their representatives alone were dealing with those properties. Those ladies along with the present 1st defendant executed a hypothecation bond in 1072 in renewal of the debt mentioned in Ext. D. That hypothecatee, as mentioned already, filed the suit only against those three ladies and the present 1st defendant. Ext. J is the file book. In execution of that decree Charakkanilam was sold in court auction and then to avert the sale, Kunjikutti one of those three ladies, and the present 1st defendant, executed Ext. V hypothecation bond to a stranger. The hypotheca was the Charakkanilam and also another paddy land within the boundaries of Charakkanilam . The description there is significant to show that the executants, though belonged to two different branches considered themselves to be undivided, for they said that the property hypothecated belonged to their own tarwad. It was stated there:- “....... V hypothecation bond to a stranger. The hypotheca was the Charakkanilam and also another paddy land within the boundaries of Charakkanilam . The description there is significant to show that the executants, though belonged to two different branches considered themselves to be undivided, for they said that the property hypothecated belonged to their own tarwad. It was stated there:- “....... R§-fp-sS IpSpw-_w hIbpw 55þam-pv hI 797-þmw \¼À DS¼Sn-{]-Imcw R§-Ä apX-emb imJ-bv¡v {]tXyIw Xncn-¨p-In«n A\p-`-hn¨p Icw an¨hmcw XoÀ¯p-h-cp-Xpw “. The expression “R§-fp-sS IpSpw-_w hIbpw” considerably supports the finding recorded above that Ext. D was only an allotment for maintenance. After executing Ext. V Eravi Krishnan the present 1st defendant filed Ext. K suit against Kunjipennu and her eldest son Nilacantan for 1/3 of the amount due under Ext. J case. This 1/3 claimed because the Karnavan had directed Kunjipennu to discharge 1/3 of the debt. He obtained a decree against Kunjipennu’s 1/3 share of Charakkanilam and also against the branch properties of Kunjipennu. As referred to already the decree thus obtained in a suit filed after the Nair Act of 1088 was void so far as Kunjipennu’s branch properties were concerned. The decree had not been obtained against the Karnavan and the senior Anandaravan of that branch. So it would not have been possible for the present 1st defendant to enforce Ext. K decree against the branch properties of Kunjipennu. In execution of Ext. K decree it was stated that Charakkanilam was sold in court auction. For discharging that debt Kunjipennu by herself executed Ext. L hypothecation bond in 1092. There she had also included one property allotted to her branch under Ext. D besides her share in Charakkanilam. She was not the Karnavathi of the tarwad then. She had absolutely no right to include any property other than her share in Charakkanilam. It could not be said that while executing Ext. L and raising money she was protecting the interest of her branch. She could be doing so only in case of emergent necessity if the branch properties wee in danger of being wrongfully sold or lost to the branch. It would not have been possible for Ext. K decree holder to proceed against any property belonging to the branch for Ext. K was void and unenforceable against the branch. Hence there was no emergent necessity to encumber the branch tarwad properties. 18. It would not have been possible for Ext. K decree holder to proceed against any property belonging to the branch for Ext. K was void and unenforceable against the branch. Hence there was no emergent necessity to encumber the branch tarwad properties. 18. The right of a junior member of encumber tarwad properties to save the tarwad from imminent loss was first recognised by the majority of the Judges in Bhagavathi v. Velayudhan (24 T.L.R. 195). When a junior member saves tarwad property from sale by spending his own money he is entitled to a salvage lien for that amount and interest on the properties. It was held that by the execution of a hypothecation bond to a stranger by that junior member to raise the monies spent by him it was to be treated that the junior member had transferred his right or lien in favour of the hypothecatee who could therefore be allowed to enforce the hypothecation charge against the tarwad. This was an exceptional night allowed to a junior member and it could be exercised only in case of emergent necessity. Vide the ruling in 18 T.L.J. 634 and 637. 19. Thus the execution of Ext. L hypothecation bond by Kunjipennu did not create any liability so far as her branch was concerned. Any amount spent for discharging Ext. L debt could not also therefore be binding on the branch. The first two recitals in Ext. A relate to this Ext. L debt. One was to pay the debt incurred in discharging the interest on Ext. L amount till 1099 and the other to discharge the principal under Ext. L. These two recitals could not be binding on the branch tarwad of defendants 2 to 38 and 40. The third recital in Ext. A was a sum of Rs. 800 said to have been given to Kesava Pillai by the plaintiff for discharging a decree debt due to the 41st defendant. It had not been shown that this was a debt binding on the branch tarwad. Admittedly, this sum of Rs. 800 had not been paid by Kesava Pillai to the 41st defendant. The plaintiff as P.W. 3 had admitted that in clear terms. It had not been shown that this was a debt binding on the branch tarwad. Admittedly, this sum of Rs. 800 had not been paid by Kesava Pillai to the 41st defendant. The plaintiff as P.W. 3 had admitted that in clear terms. If the debt had been one binding on the branch and if the plaintiff had really paid the money to discharge that debt then it was not quite obligatory on his part to see to the application of the money. But in this case there was no evidence that it was a debt binding on the tarwad and as such the plaintiff could not get credit for this said sum. As regards the credit given for Rs. 203 and odd on account of prior payments there is no evidence except the interested testimony of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had admitted that he had kept no accounts for the amounts lent to Kesava Pillai, and under these circumstances, the view of the court below that consideration for this last recital had not been proved has to be upheld. Thus the plaintiff had not proved that Ext. A debt was binding on the branch tarwad even if that branch had attained the status of division by virtue of Ext. D Udampadi. 20. It is also necessary to mention here that the object of Kunjipennu in executing Ext. L hypothecation bond had not been achieved by her. The present 1st defendant and Kunjikutty a member of the collateral branch had executed Ext. V hypothecation bond charging Charakkanilam and another property lying within its boundaries. The hypothecatee filed O.S. 63 of 1102 in the Changanacherry Munsiff’s Court for the full amount due under Ext. V. Ext. V had included the 1/3 share which was due from Kunjipennu. While filing O.S. 63 of 1102 the hypothecatee had impleaded the representatives of the several branches existing then and obtained the decree binding on all the branches. Ext. VI is the decree in that case. In execution of Ext. VI decree Charakkanilam was sold in court auction on 2.7.1108. The present plaintiff’s elder brother’s son obtained an assignment of the right under Ext. VI decree, got himself impleaded and took delivery of possession on 14.11.1110. Ext. VII is the execution diary in that case and Ext. VIII is copy of the stal sannad issued to the plaintiff’s brother’s son. VI decree Charakkanilam was sold in court auction on 2.7.1108. The present plaintiff’s elder brother’s son obtained an assignment of the right under Ext. VI decree, got himself impleaded and took delivery of possession on 14.11.1110. Ext. VII is the execution diary in that case and Ext. VIII is copy of the stal sannad issued to the plaintiff’s brother’s son. Thus the object in executing Ext. L had been frustrated and defeated and no benefit was obtained by the branch tarwad. For this reason also the amount mentioned in Ext. L and the amounts said to have been paid under Ext. A for discharging Ext. L liability could not be charged on the branch tarwad properties of defendants 2 to 38 and 40. In any view of the case the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree against the plaint properties and the branch properties of defendants 2 to 38 and 40. 21. The decree of the lower court could not therefore be sustained. It is therefore set aside an this appeal allowed thereby dismissing the plaintiff’s suit with costs in both the courts. 22. The cross appeal filed by the plaintiff is therefore dismissed with costs. C.M.P. 2802 of 1121 filed by the 42nd defendant cannot he entertained here. He had not filed the petition to set aside the ex parte decree against him. He wanted a declaration that the decree passed by the court below would not be binding on the plaint item 3. As the evidence stands there is no reason to allow this petition though he might not be prejudiced as the plaintiff’s suit is being dismissed. This petition is dismissed. Appeal allowed.