JUDGMENT Das, J. - In all the above matters, the Court of origin was a Court, which, as from the appointed date (August 15, 1947), was situate in East Bengal. The appeals to this Court were disposed of, the applications for leave to appeal to the Privy Council were filed and orders for final admission of the appeals were made before the said date. The paper-books were in course of preparation on the said date and are now ready. 2. In Privy Council Appeal No. 19 of 1944 the amount due on account of paper-book costs was not deposited in time; an office note, dated November 26, 1947, was put up before the Division Court taking Privy Council matters. 3. The Division Court, when the matter was put up before it, felt some doubt as to whether this Court had jurisdiction to make any order. The Court then heard the learned advocates for the parties on November 28, 1947 and December 1, 1947. 4. Meanwhile, an application for the appointment of a guardian-ad-litem of a minor Respondent in Privy Council Appeal No. 8 of 1945 had been directed to be put up before the Division Court taking Privy Council matters and had stood adjourned. This matter was also put up before the Court on November 28, 1947. The self-same question as to the power of this Court to pass orders in this matter was also heard along with the said Privy Council Appeal No. 19 of 1944. 5. Both the cases were disposed of by a judgment reported as Brojendra Kishore Ray Chaudhuri v. Mohini Mohan Chaudhuri ILR (1948) Cal. 381. In Privy Council Appeal No. 19 of 1944, this Court, by a separate order, extended the rime for making the required deposit. 6. In Privy Council Appeal No. 8 of 1945, by Order No. 40, dated December 12, 1947, the case was directed to be put up on January 16, 1948, for orders. By Order No. 41, dated January 16, 1948, this Court discharged the Deputy Registrar from the guardianship of the minor Respondents Nos. 1-7, 9-24 and 26-63 and appointed Mr. Serajuddin Ahmed, an advocate of this Court, as the guardian-ad-litem of the said minors. 7. By Order No. 41, dated January 16, 1948, this Court discharged the Deputy Registrar from the guardianship of the minor Respondents Nos. 1-7, 9-24 and 26-63 and appointed Mr. Serajuddin Ahmed, an advocate of this Court, as the guardian-ad-litem of the said minors. 7. Thereafter, in another case, Privy Council Appeal No. 48 of 1946, the printed record had been transmitted to the Federal Court in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, which had meanwhile come into force on February 1, 1948. 8. After the record was received, the Registrar of the Federal Court drew the attention of this Court to the fact that prima facie a question as to the jurisdiction of this Court to deal with the Privy Council matter was involved and directed that the matter be judicially determined by this Court. 9. On receipt of the letter, the above matter and similar other matters including Privy Council Appeals Nos. 19 of 1944 and 8 of 1945, where, as already stated, the question of jurisdiction of this Court had been decided by a Division Court, were put up before the learned Chief Justice and Chakravartti J for orders. 10. These matters were then heard in the presence of the learned advocates of all the parties in these cases. 11. The learned Chief Justice and Chakravartti J were of opinion that the cases reported in ILR [1948] Cal. 381 were wrongly decided and that the following questions should be decided by a Full Bench: (i) Whether this Court had, on or after August 15, 1947, jurisdiction over Privy Council matters, in which leave to appeal had been granted and the appeal admitted before August 15, 1947, where the Court of origin is now situate in Pakistan and the subject-matter of the dispute fell within the territories of East Bengal ? (ii) Whether the orders, dated December 22, 1947, made in Privy Council Appeals Nos. 19 of 1944 and 8 of 1945 were correctly made ? 12. Their Lordships, accordingly, directed that the above six Privy Council matters be referred to a Full Bench for decision. 13. They have now been argued before us by the learned advocates for the parties. 14. A preliminary objection was taken by Dr. 19 of 1944 and 8 of 1945 were correctly made ? 12. Their Lordships, accordingly, directed that the above six Privy Council matters be referred to a Full Bench for decision. 13. They have now been argued before us by the learned advocates for the parties. 14. A preliminary objection was taken by Dr. Sen Gupta that the References are all incompetent as the rules of this Court do not provide for a Reference to a Full Bench in Privy Council matters. It was submitted that Chap. VII, Rule (2) to (5) are exhaustive of cases where such a Reference can be made and these rules do not refer to Privy Council matters. In our opinion, Chap. VII, Rule (1) is wide enough to cover the present cases. Rules (2) to (5) merely define the course to be pursued by the Full Bench in certain specified cases. 15. In two of the cases, viz., Privy Council Appeal No. 19 of 1944 and Privy Council Appeal No. 8 of 1945, a further objection was taken. It was submitted that in these cases the jurisdiction of this Court to pass orders was decided by the Division Court as a preliminary point and that decision operated as res judicata and precludes the referring Judges from deciding the identical point at a later stage and that, as such, the Reference in these two cases was incompetent. 16. The argument is plausible, but does not bear examination. 17. Admittedly, Section 11 of the CPC does not in terms apply. The question is whether the principles of finality in litigation as enunciated by the Privy Council in Ram Kirpal's case ILR (1883) All. 269 : L. Rule 11 I.A. 37 apply. 18. Mr. Gupta, however, submitted that what is res judicata is the point directly decided or the order passed and not the reason thereof. 19. In the above two cases, the question before the Court was whether time should be extended for making a deposit or whether an order appointing a guardian-ad-litem for a minor Respondent should be made. The point whether the Court had power to pass any order in cases like the present was gone into for a limited purpose. The question which has now arisen, viz., whether the printed record should go to the East Bengal High Court or to the Privy Council or to the Federal Court did not then arise. The point whether the Court had power to pass any order in cases like the present was gone into for a limited purpose. The question which has now arisen, viz., whether the printed record should go to the East Bengal High Court or to the Privy Council or to the Federal Court did not then arise. In fact, the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 (I of 1948), had not then come into force. The ambit of the enquiry before us is much wider. The order which was passed did not conclusively determine the matter which is now before us. In the case of Tarini Charan Bhattacharya v. Kedar Nath Haldar ILR (1928) Cal. 723, 737 Rankin C.J. said: What is made conclusive between the parties is the decision of the Court and that the reasoning of the Court is not necessarily the same thing as its decision. The object of the doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon parties special principles of law as applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directly and substantially depend and to prevent this ascertainment from becoming nugatory by precluding the parties from re-opening or recontesting that which has been finally decided. 20. An abstract question of law, dissociated from and unconnected with the rights claimed or denied as between the parties to the litigation, is of no importance or value to them or to the decision of the case itself and cannot be said to be substantially in issue and is not eadem questio and the principles of res judicata cannot apply: Broken Hill Proprietory Company Limited v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill (1926) A.C. 94. 21. It is not every decision of a question of law between the parties which is binding, but only that decision on such a question which affects the subject-matter or creates a legal relation between the parties or defines the status of either of them, which is binding. 22. The specific matters then before the Court are binding between the parties, but the general question on which this Reference has been made, was not directly and substantially in issue and is not so binding. In our opinion, it was open to the referring Judges to go into the matter and to make an order of Reference to a Full Bench. In our opinion, it was open to the referring Judges to go into the matter and to make an order of Reference to a Full Bench. The point now raised does not appear to have been raised at the time when the order for Reference was made. 23. The References are, therefore, competent. The preliminary objection is overruled. 24. We now proceed to consider the questions referred to us. 25. Article 3 of the High Court (Calcutta) Order, 1947, provides: The High Court in Calcutta shall continue to exist on and after the appointed day and shall, save as expressly provided by the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, have all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as it had immediately before that day. 26. This Court, therefore, retains all its original, appellate and other jurisdictions, except where such jurisdiction has been taken away by the High Court (Bengal) Order 1947. 27. Article 3 of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, set up a High Court of Judicature for East Bengal from August 15, 1947, to be called the High Court of East Bengal. 28. Article 5 of the High Court (Bengal) Order vested in the East Bengal High Court, in respect of the territories in the province of East Bengal, all such original, appellate and other jurisdictions which were exercised by the High Court at Calcutta in respect of the said territories before August 15, 1947. 29. Article 13(1) of the High Court (Bengal) Order runs as follows: Subject as hereinafter provided, the High Court in Calcutta shall have no jurisdiction in respect of the territories for the time being included in the province of East Bangal. 30. The effect of Articles 5 and 13 is thus to give the High Court of East Bengal exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the territories in the province of East Bengal and to take away all such jurisdiction from the High Court in Calcutta, subject to Article 13, paras. (2) (a), (b), (c) and (3). Paragraph (2) (a) preserves the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of all matters pending before it on the Original Side on August 15, 1947, even though these may concern the territories in the province of East Bengal. Appeals from decrees and orders made in such proceedings are to be decided by this Court by virtue of para. (2) (b). Paragraph (2) (a) preserves the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of all matters pending before it on the Original Side on August 15, 1947, even though these may concern the territories in the province of East Bengal. Appeals from decrees and orders made in such proceedings are to be decided by this Court by virtue of para. (2) (b). Paragraph (2) (c) continues in this Court the power of review of orders made by this Court. Paragraph (3) deals with matters pending on the Appellate Side and reads as follows: Subject to the preceding provisions of this Article, all proceedings pending on the Appellate Side of the High Court in Calcutta immediately before the appointed day, shall, where the Court of origin is, as from that day, situated in the province of East Bengal stand transferred by virtue of this Order to the High Court of East Bengal. Paragraph (4) then provides: Subject to the following provisions of this Article with respect to appeals, any order made by the High Court in Calcutta either-- (a) before the appointed day; or (b) in any proceedings with respect to which the said High Court retains jurisdiction by virtue of para. (5), (2) and (3) of this Article: shall for all purposes have effect not only as an order of the High Court in Calcutta but also as an order made by the High Court of East Bengal. This paragraph is, therefore, intended to give extra-territorial effect to orders passed by this Court after August 15, 1947, in respect of matters dealt with in Article 13, paras. (2) (a), (b), (c) and (3). Paragraph (7) states as follows: And for the purposes of this Article, proceedings shall be deemed to be pending in a particular Court until that Court has disposed of all issues between the parties including any issues with respect to the taxation of the costs of the proceedings. 31. In Pyari Mohan Kundu v. Bejoy Singh Chopra ILR (1949) Cal. 271 a Special Bench of this Court had to construe Article 13(1) of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947. In that case, a suit had been filed in a Court in the District of Faridpur, which has, on and from August 15, 1947, been assigned to East Bengal, for levy of tolls in a market. The suit was decided by this Court on Second Appeal before August 15, 1947. In that case, a suit had been filed in a Court in the District of Faridpur, which has, on and from August 15, 1947, been assigned to East Bengal, for levy of tolls in a market. The suit was decided by this Court on Second Appeal before August 15, 1947. An application for leave to Appeal to His Majesty in Council was filed in this Court after August 15, 1947. A question arose whether the appeal could be entertained by this Court. 32. It was held that under Article 13(1) of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction in respect of any suit instituted in any Court situated within the territory of East Bengal and the exclusion of jurisdiction was not confined only to suits in respect of land or interest in land forming part of the territory of East Bengal. 33. Article 13 merely embodies the well-established principle of private international law enunciated by the House of Lords in British South Africa Company v. Companhia de Mocambique (1893) A.C. 602, where the Supreme Court of Judicature was held to have no jurisdiction to recover damages for trespass to land situate abroad. 34. The question which is now before us was expressly left open by the Special Bench (supra). 35. In the present order of Reference, the question is stated to be-- Whether the records should be despatched to the Federal Court in Delhi or to the High Court at Dacca for transmission to the Privy Council ? 36. In the view we have taken of these cases, the records should be despatched to the High Court at Dacca. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion as to the ultimate destination of the records. That will be a matter for the consideration of the High Court of East Bengal. 37. Article 13 (2) and (3) of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, deal with the question of transfer of cases pending in this Court on August 15, 1947. This High Court is known to possess an Original Side and an Appellate Side. Different sets of rules have, accordingly, been framed by the Court. It is significant that the expressions used are not "original jurisdiction" or "appellate jurisdiction". 38. The Letters Patent vests this Court with original, appellate, revisional and other jurisdictions, e.g., Admiralty, Divorce, Probate, Matrimonial, etc. 39. This High Court is known to possess an Original Side and an Appellate Side. Different sets of rules have, accordingly, been framed by the Court. It is significant that the expressions used are not "original jurisdiction" or "appellate jurisdiction". 38. The Letters Patent vests this Court with original, appellate, revisional and other jurisdictions, e.g., Admiralty, Divorce, Probate, Matrimonial, etc. 39. u/s 109 of the CPC (hereinafter called the Code) appeals lie to His Majesty in Council-- (a) from any decree or final order passed on appeal by the High Court or by any other Court of final appellate jurisdiction; (b) from any decree or final order passed by a High Court in the exercise of original jurisdiction; and (c) from any decree or order when the case is certified to be a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council. 40. In the case of Harish Chandra Acharja v. Nawbab Bahadur of Murshidabad (1911) 15 C.W.N. 879, it was held that a final order passed in a Civil Revisional case is an order passed on appeal within Section 109(a). 41. The six Privy Council matters which have been referred to us do not come within Clause (b) or (c) of Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We do not express any opinion on the question as to the destination of the records in such cases. 42. Ordinarily, the jurisdiction of a Court to deal with the subject-matter before it ceases with the disposal of the case, except for purposes of review u/s 114 or for correction of certain errors under Sections 151 and 152 of the Code. 43. We shall now consider the provision of Order XLV of the Code and the Judicial Committee Rules. 44. Under Order XLV, this Court receives the application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, exercises powers of consolidation of appeals, grants a certificate, accepts the required deposit or the security. 45. Under Rule 8, the Court declares the appeal to be admitted, gives notice to the Respondent, transmits a correct copy of the record to the Privy Council. 46. Before the admission of the appeal, the Court may revoke the security and make further orders. After the admission of the appeal this Court may order further security or deposit in case of deficiency and in case of failure, the consequences mentioned in Rule 11 follow. 46. Before the admission of the appeal, the Court may revoke the security and make further orders. After the admission of the appeal this Court may order further security or deposit in case of deficiency and in case of failure, the consequences mentioned in Rule 11 follow. Rules 12, 13 and 14 confer on this Court, even after the final admission, powers of stay of execution, refund of balance of deposit, appointment of receiver, increase of security in case of insufficiency, etc. 47. Rules 8 and 9 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1920, deal with the powers of this Court after the grant of the certificate. Rules 11, 12 and 13 deal with such powers after final admission of the appeal and before despatch of records. Rule 14 deals with powers of this Court after despatch of records. Rule 51 deals with a certificate of the Registrar as regards the person to be substituted. 48. The broad distinction is that, after the despatch of records, this Court merely makes a report to the Privy Council and final orders are passed by the latter. 49. Rule 19 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1925, provides for registry of the appeal in the Privy Council after the records are received. 50. Order XLV of the Code creates a special jurisdiction in the Court, whose decree is appealed from to His Majesty in Council, to entertain an application for leave to appeal and to pass various orders as already stated. The extent of the powers of this Court differs at the different stages of the said proceedings in this Court. 51. Dr. Sen Gupta contends that the jurisdiction so created is of a very special character and is exercisable only when occasion arises for such exercise. In support of his submission, he relies on the following observations of Rankin C.J. in Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya v. Ali Ahamad ILR (1927) Cal. 758, 762: Proceedings before this Court have terminated and the whole matter is before the Judicial Committee. 52. The observations have to be read with reference to the facts before this Court. A Privy Council appeal had been finally admitted and was proceeding ex parte before the Privy Council. An application was made on behalf of the guardian-ad-litem to be put in funds for contesting the appeal. A question of jurisdiction of this Court to make an order arose. A Privy Council appeal had been finally admitted and was proceeding ex parte before the Privy Council. An application was made on behalf of the guardian-ad-litem to be put in funds for contesting the appeal. A question of jurisdiction of this Court to make an order arose. The learned Chief Justice was of opinion that the powers of this Court were of a limited character depending on Order XLV of the Code and the Judicial Committee Rules and this Court had no power to make the order which was not covered by Order XLV of the Code or by the Judicial Committee Rules. The observations do not mean that no proceedings are pending in this Court after the final admission of the appeal. 53. Reference was also made to the following observations of Sulaiman J. in Lachmeswar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri ILR (1927) Cal. 758, 762: This obviously implies that after the admission of the appeal, it has passed out of the absolute control of the High Court. 54. The observations speak of cessation of absolute control of the High Court and do not support the submission of the learned advocate. 55. Dr. Sen Gupta referred us to Rule 2 to 6 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1920 and Rule 11 to 18 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1925 and submitted that, under the said rules, the Registrar of this Court has to perform certain duties and the exercise of such functions would not be possible if the records are transmitted to the High Court of East Bengal. Similar comments were made in regard to Rule 11 to 14 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1920. 56. It was also submitted that Clause 42 of the Letters Patent would be affected if these cases are transferred to the High Court, East Bengal. 57. The above argument ignores the effect of the setting up of two dominions and the establishment of a High Court in East Bengal. 58. The Judicial Committee Rules, 1920 and 1925 and Clause 42 of the Letters Patent have to be read so as to make the same applicable to the two High Courts. 59. Section 18 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, also supports this view and provides for contingencies like the present. 60. 58. The Judicial Committee Rules, 1920 and 1925 and Clause 42 of the Letters Patent have to be read so as to make the same applicable to the two High Courts. 59. Section 18 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, also supports this view and provides for contingencies like the present. 60. As already stated, by virtue of Order XLV of the Code and the rules of the Judicial Committee, 1920 and 1925 and the Rules of this Court, this Court exercises certain powers which, however, differ according to the stage of the proceedings commencing with the filing of the application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and ending with the taxation of costs of this Court after the disposal of the appeal. 61. These powers are exercised by this Court as ancillary to the due prosecution of the appeal before the Judicial Committee and to the carrying out of the orders of the Judicial Committee. The thread of continuity which runs through the different stages is that all such powers are exercised by this Court in relation to one and the same matter, viz., the appeal before the Privy Council. 62. By reason of Article 13, para. (7), the proceedings, which are initiated in this Court by the filing of a petition to this Court under Order XLV, Rule 2, remains pending till all issues between the parties including any issues with respect to the taxation of the costs of the proceedings, are disposed of. 63. Under Rule 45, Part II, Chap. VI of the Rules of this Court (Appellate Jurisdiction), the Deputy Registrar of this Court grants to the successful party in appeal to His Majesty in Council a certificate of the costs incurred in the appeal in this Court and places it on the record of the Privy Council Appeal. Dr. Sen Gupta suggests that the certificate granted by the Deputy Registrar is not taxation of costs. We do not agree. The amount of costs to be entered in the certificate may be a matter of doubt or dispute and the Deputy Registrar has to exercise his judgment in disposing of the matter. Till then, at any rate, the proceedings are pending. We do not agree. The amount of costs to be entered in the certificate may be a matter of doubt or dispute and the Deputy Registrar has to exercise his judgment in disposing of the matter. Till then, at any rate, the proceedings are pending. The mere fact that no active step may be required to be taken by a party after the final admission of the appeal and before the despatch of records to the Privy Council does not make the proceedings any the less a pending one. As Jessel M.R. observed in In re Clagett's Estate. Fordham v. Clagett (1882) 20 Ch. D. 637, 653: A cause is said to be pending in a Court of justice when any proceeding can be taken in it. That is the test. If you can take any proceeding it is pending. 64. There is a distinction between the words "appeal" and "proceeding": Section 645, Rule 11. We are concerned with the pendency of "proceedings" in this Court on August 15, 1947. 65. Under Chap. VI, Rule (2) of the Rules of this Court (Appellate Jurisdiction) matters connected with appeals to His Majesty in Council, except those which the Registrar, Appellate Side, is authorised to deal, shall ordinarily be heard by a Division Court appointed by the Chief Justice to deal with such matters. 66. The six matters before us are thus proceedings pending on the Appellate Side on August 15, 1947. 67. The above discussion leads us to hold that these matters are proceedings pending on the Appellate Side of the High Court at Calcutta immediately before the appointed date and as the Court of origin in all these matters is, as from the appointed day, situated in the province of East Bengal, they stood transferred by virtue of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, to the High Court of East Bengal. 68. As these matters stood transferred to the High Court of East Bengal, on and from August 15, 1947, they were not in the eye of law, pending in this Court on February 1, 1948 and thee Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 (I of 1948) is not attracted to these cases. 69. A contrary view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Brojendra Kishore Ray Chaudhuri v. Mohini Mohan Chaudhuri (supra). 69. A contrary view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Brojendra Kishore Ray Chaudhuri v. Mohini Mohan Chaudhuri (supra). In the order of Reference, the learned Chief Justice referring to this decision said: I might say that one of the learned Judges who decided those two cases has himself expressed considerable doubt as to the correctness of the decision. 70. We shall now proceed to examine the grounds on which the decision is based. 71. The learned Judges rightly point out that under Art. 5 of the High Court (Calcutta) Order, 1947, this Court retains all its jurisdiction, original, appellate or otherwise, save as expressly provided by the High Court (Bengal) Order. Article 13 of this Order, which was relied on behalf of some of the parties in favour of the transfer of these cases to East Bengal, High Court, was held to be inapplicable on the following grounds: (i) The opening words subject to the proceeding provisions "of this Article" mean that the proceedings pending on the Appellate Side should be such on which an adjudication on the merits could be given as in Article 13(2)(a) to (c), i.e., appeals and revisions pending on the Appellate Side. (ii) Article 13(7) defines the word "pending" the definition implies an adjudication on some material question of fact or proposition of law and does not include matters which may arise for disposal after the certificate is granted and before the records are despatched. (iii) The phrase "proceedings pending on the Appellate "Side" is ambiguous and a wide construction, which includes Privy Council matters, should not be adopted, because: (a) such an interpretation would affect Clause 42 of the Letters Patent and (b) Rules 11, 13, 51 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1925 and would render the provision ultra vires. 72. We shall deal with, these reasons seriatim. As regards ground No. (i), we think that the opening words make para. (3) subject to paras. (1) and (2) and do not bear the meaning sought to be put upon them, by the learned Judges. The opening words were inserted with a view to impose a further limitation on Article 13(3) in cases which may come within Article 13 (1), (2). 73. (3) subject to paras. (1) and (2) and do not bear the meaning sought to be put upon them, by the learned Judges. The opening words were inserted with a view to impose a further limitation on Article 13(3) in cases which may come within Article 13 (1), (2). 73. As regards No. (ii), this Court retains various powers after the grant of a certificate and even after the final admission of the appeal, e.g., application for stay of execution, appointment of a receiver, substitution on death of party, taxation of costs of the High Court, etc. and adjudication may be necessary to decide any dispute which may arise at that stage. We have already held that the pendency of proceedings would not end with the grant of the certificate. 74. As regards ground No. (iii), neither Clause 42 of the Letters Patent nor the Judicial Committee Rules are affected by the interpretation we have put on Article 13, para. (3) of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947. It is true that, under Art. 3 of the High Court (Calcutta) Order, this Court continues to exist as before; and retains all such original, appellate and other jurisdictions save as otherwise expressly provided. Article 5 of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, however, vested the above jurisdictions of this Court in the High Court of East Bengal in respect of the territories now in East Bengal. The Letters Patent and the Judicial Committee Rules have to be read, in the changed circumstances, as referring to the High Court, East Bengal, in respect of the territories in East Bengal in cases like the present. 75. But, even if the effect of our interpretation to be affect Clause 42 of the Letters Patent and the Rules of the Judicial Committee, such power was vested in the Governor-General by the Indian Independence Act, 1947. The Act was passed by the Houses of Parliament and approved by the King's Most Exalted Majesty and came into force on July 18, 1947. The Act was passed by the Houses of Parliament and approved by the King's Most Exalted Majesty and came into force on July 18, 1947. Section 9 provides: (1) The Governor-General shall by order make such provision as appears to him to be necessary or expedient-- (a) for bringing the provisions of this Act into effective operation; (d) for removing difficulties arising in connection with the transition to the provisions of this Act; (i) sO far as it appears necessary or expedient in connection with any of the matters aforesaid for varying the constitution, powers or jurisdiction of any legislature, Court or other authority in the new Dominions and creating new legislatures, Courts, or other authorities therein 76. The above-quoted provisions, in our opinion, conferred on the Governor-General plenary powers to provide for all matters consequential on or connected with the setting up of two independent Dominions in India. 77. The High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947 and the High Court (Calcutta) Order, 1947, were promulgated by the Governor-General in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf. 78. In our opinion, Art. (13) of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, as construed by us, is not ultra vires and is not in excess of the powers of the Governor-General by virtue of which the order was made. 79. The grounds on which the decision of this Court in Brojendra Kishore Ray Chaudhuri v. Mohini Mohan Chaudhuri ILR (1948) Cal. 381 is based are not tenable. 80. We, therefore, hold that the above case was wrongly decided. 81. Our answers to the two questions referred to us are as follows: (1) This Court has, on or after August 15, 1947, no jurisdiction over Privy Council matters, in which leave to appeal had been granted and the appeal admitted before August 15, 1947, where the Court of origin is now situate in East Bengal and the subject-matter of the dispute fell within the territories of East Bengal. (2) The orders, dated December 22, 1947, in Privy Council Appeals Nos. 19 of 1944 and 8 of 1945 were not correctly made. 82. Certificate u/s 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, is granted. R.P. Mookerjee, J. 83. I agree. Lahiri, J. 84. I agree.