Judgments Kania, C.J.-The relevant facts in these two appeals are these By a registered agreement dated the 15th August, 1938, three brothers, Kunja Lal, Tirtha Lal and Nanilal, members of a Dayabhaga joint Hindu family appointed Dr. Nanilal Bhattacharjee, their family physician, as an arbitrator for partitioning the family properties. The arbitrator was authorised to make allotments in favour of the brothers as he considered proper, upon a consideration of the convenience and accommodation, so far as possible, of each one of them and, if necessary, by making provisions for payment of money to equalise values. The reference paper further stated that none of the parties or their representative in succession could object to the arbitration. The arbitrator was authorised to make his award in instalments. He was authorised to make his award within six months, but if more time was necessary to complete the work of partition, the arbitrator was entitled to extend the time by giving the three brothers intimation or notice. The family owned lands in different districts in Bengal, a residential house and certain shares in joint stock companies. On the 3rd September, 1938, the arbitrator asked the co-sharers to furnish to him, within three months, their individual estimates of the valuation of all the buildings and lands and the dwelling house. They were also asked to supply within the same period their suggestions regarding the allotments of the dwelling house and the contiguous lands. The three brothers complied with this direction and furnished their suggestions in writing to the arbitrator. From the record it appears that the suggestion of each brother was not communicated to the others and the views of one were not discussed also with the others. In effect, therefore, each party was heard on this point in the absence of the others. These written documents have been destroyed by the arbitrator. In the course of a year some meetings were held, but barring receipts of lists and estimates, no progress was made towards making the award. Kunja Lal died on the 3rd October, 1939, leaving him surviving five sons and a widow. Under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, the widow became entitled to the same share as each of the sons of the deceased in all his properties, other than the agricultural lands. Kunja Lal died on the 3rd October, 1939, leaving him surviving five sons and a widow. Under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, the widow became entitled to the same share as each of the sons of the deceased in all his properties, other than the agricultural lands. Under the Dayabhaga system of Hindu law, each heir became the owner of a defined share in the estate of the deceased. The arbitration was for the division of the family estate in three shares only. On the death of Kunja Lal, therefore, the only thing which was necessary for the further progress of the arbitration was to so arrange the proceedings that they became binding on the heirs of Kunja Lal. The widow is an illiterate pardanashin lady and lives with her sons. On the 1st January, 1940, a meeting was held by the arbitrator. In the minutes book of that date, it is stated that Kunja Lal had died and that his sons and heirs Babu Sudhir Kumar Dey, Surat Kumar Dey, Sudhansu Kumar Dey, Subodh Kumar Dey and Suriti Kumar Dey, all of whom are majors, expressed their willingness to abide by the terms contained in the agreement of reference to arbitration accepted by their late father. The existence of the widow was ignored and the fact that she was an heir was also not noticed, because neither the arbitrator nor the parties were aware of the fact that she was an heir of Kunja Lal. After January. 1940, at the meetings held by the arbitrator, the two sons and five nephews were treated as parties. On the 10th February, 1940, there was a meeting and the minutes book contains a note in these terms: “I hereby give you all the parties notice of extension of time for a further period of six months to complete the partition of all the properties as stated in the arbitration deed.” The expression “all the parties” evidently meant the two uncles and the five nephews only. Nothing further was done but on the 14th August, 1940, the time to make the award was further extended by two months, by a note made in similar terms. It appears from the record that the arbitrator prepared a draft of a partial award, making allotment of the residential house, and consulted a lawyer to put it in proper shape. Nothing further was done but on the 14th August, 1940, the time to make the award was further extended by two months, by a note made in similar terms. It appears from the record that the arbitrator prepared a draft of a partial award, making allotment of the residential house, and consulted a lawyer to put it in proper shape. On the advice of the lawyer the portion of the residential house, which the arbitrator had alloted to the five sons of Kunja Lal, was stated to be allotted to the five sons and the widow. All this appears to have been done only as a result of a consultation between the lawyer and the arbitrator and the parties themselves had no voice in the matter. On the 2nd October, 1940, the arbitrator published this partial award regarding the residential house. He apportioned it in three lots, as indicated in the plan annexed to the award. It was registered on the 2nd October and became known to Tirtha Lal and Nanilal shortly thereafter. The awards inter alia, contains the following statement: “I have heard all the owners about what they had to say and have carefully studied the requirements and having regard to all their points of view and to their suitability of accommodation in keeping with their rank and status, I have, so far as I have considered best, divided the property.” Having regard to the persons who had appeared before the arbitrator, it is obvious, that the word “owners” only includes the two brothers and the five nephews. The time to make the award being about to expire on the 15th October, a notice of a further extension of time for six months was given on the 6th October, 1940, as noted in the minutes book of that day. That book was signed by the five sons of Kunja Lal on the 7th October and by the two brothers. It also bears the thumb impression of the widow Bhusan Moyee Dasi. Nothing further has been done in the matter of this arbitration. According to the arbitrator, no notice of any extension of time was necessary to be given to the widow and the sons got the mother’s thumb impression on the last minute of their own initiative. It also bears the thumb impression of the widow Bhusan Moyee Dasi. Nothing further has been done in the matter of this arbitration. According to the arbitrator, no notice of any extension of time was necessary to be given to the widow and the sons got the mother’s thumb impression on the last minute of their own initiative. The High Court on this point accepted the widow’s evidence to the effect that on the seventh day of the Puja her son Surat Kumar asked her to put her thumb impression upon the book and while she was busy with the Durga Puja she did so. When the sons of Kunja Lal became aware of the allotment made under the partial award, they were dissatisfied with the same. On the 22nd October, 1940, a notice was issued to the arbitrator on behalf of Bhusan Moyee Dasi, the widow of Kunja Lal, alleging that as she was no party to the arbitration proceedings and had no opportunity to urge her view point before the arbitrator, the award was not binding on her. It was alleged that her thumb impression on the proceeding book was taken without explaining the purport of it and she was not bound by the same. Another notice was issued on behalf of the five sons challenging the award on the ground of misconduct of the arbitrator. These notices culminated in two suits. The widow instituted Title Suit No. 34 of 1940 on the 9th December, 1940, for a declaration that the award was void and made without juridiction. Tirtha Lal and Nanilal denied the various allegations made by the widow in her suit and filed, an application under paragraph 20, schedule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for filing the award. This was registered as T.S. No. 4 of 1941. The contesting defendants in the widow’s suit contended that the sons and the widow lived together that the widow was aware of everything and had expressed her views before the arbitrator through her sons. They further alleged that at the meeting of the 1st January, 1940, when the five sons expressed their desire to continue the arbitration, they did so with the knowledge and consent of their mother and that the sons attended the arbitration procceedings on their behalf and also on behalf of their mother. They further alleged that at the meeting of the 1st January, 1940, when the five sons expressed their desire to continue the arbitration, they did so with the knowledge and consent of their mother and that the sons attended the arbitration procceedings on their behalf and also on behalf of their mother. They urged that they did all they could do on behalf of all the six. It may be noted that it was not pleaded that even if the widow had been completely ignored, the award was binding on her as she had common interest with the sons and even if she were present before the arbitrator, she would have left the conduct of the proceedings to her sons. Several isssues were raised in each suit in the trial court. Both the suits were decided by one judgment. In effect, the trial judge rejected the widow’s contentions and ordered a decree to be passed in terms of the award. Against that decision three appeals were taken to the High Court two by the widow and one by the sons The High Court in disposing of these appeals by one judgment in effect allowed the widow’s contention about notice not having been given to the parties, as provided in the reference paper. The learned Judges held that there was therefore no valid extension of time and the award being made beyond the time permitted by the reference paper was void. As regards the widow’s knowledge of the proceedings they held that she was aware of the proceedings before the death of her husband and also after his death. Against this decision leave was granted to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Appeals XXXII and XXXIII of 1948 were thus admitted in the High Court and consolidated. They have come before us under the extended jurisdiction of this Court. On behalf of the appellant it was first contended that the view of the High Court about the award being void, as time was not extended in accordance with the reference paper, was erroneous, because the notice of extension was given strictly in accordance with the agreement between the parties. On behalf of the appellant it was first contended that the view of the High Court about the award being void, as time was not extended in accordance with the reference paper, was erroneous, because the notice of extension was given strictly in accordance with the agreement between the parties. In the alternative it was argued that the omission to give notice otherwise than as provided in the reference paper was a mere irregularity on the part of the arbitrator and did not go to the root of his jurisdiction. It was argued that the High Court was in error in holding that the giving of notice was a condition precedent to the enlargement of the time. In the alternative it was urged that all parties who were before the arbitrator were given notice and the sons of Kunja Lal represented their mother. Therefore, notice to them was sufficient notice to the mother also. It was argued that by putting her thumb impression on the minutes book on the 7th October, the widow had accepted and ratified all that had taken place previous to that day. It was also urged that SudhirBabu was the karta of Kunja Lal’s branch and his appearance before the arbitrator was a sufficient representation of the one-third share of Kunja Lal. Finally, it was urged that the time to make the award could be extended ex post facto and this was a proper case in which the Court should exercise its discretion and extend the time. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that strict compliance with the provisions contained in the reference paper, relating to the extension of time, was essential to give the arbitrator jurisdiction to make his award beyond the six months time. As that was not done the award was void. It was also argued that the mother had been completely ignored, had not become a party to the proceedings and the award was therefore not binding on her and was therefore void as an award. Having regard to the agreed translation of the clause relating to the extension of time by giving notice to the parties, it appears that a previous intimation to the parties of the arbitrator’s intention to extend time may not be strictly necessary, although it is clear that the intention of the parties was to that effect. Having regard to the agreed translation of the clause relating to the extension of time by giving notice to the parties, it appears that a previous intimation to the parties of the arbitrator’s intention to extend time may not be strictly necessary, although it is clear that the intention of the parties was to that effect. I do not think the parties, when signing the reference paper, contemplated that the fact of extension of time was only to be intimated to the parties. The appeal, however, in my opinion, could be decided on a stronger ground. The widow was not made a party to the arbitration proceedings. It is equally clear that no notice even of the type which was given to the two brothers and five nephews was given to her. She could be considered to have been given notice in accordance with the terms of the reference only if her sons could be treated as representing her before the arbitrator. This contention of the appellant must be rejected because it is common ground that the fact that she was an heir was not known to the arbitrator or the parties till the last meeting was held before the 2nd October, 1940. If she was not known to be an heir, she could not be represented by her sons. In the absence of such knowledge this argument loses all force. It is therefore clear that no notice of the extension of time was given to her and there was no valid extension of time to make the award, so far as she was concerned. It was argued that without the widow being in fact represented, the five sons substantially represented the interest of Kunja Lal’s branch and therefore the widow was bound by the award. I am unable to accept this contention because in respect of the allotment of a portion of the residential house she was entitled to be heard about her own convenience also. Indeed on this point her interest may be in conflict with the wishes and interest of the sons. In this connection her convenience is not necessarily the same as the convenience of the five sons. Therefore, the fact that the view point of the five sons was considered is not sufficient to make the award binding on her. Indeed on this point her interest may be in conflict with the wishes and interest of the sons. In this connection her convenience is not necessarily the same as the convenience of the five sons. Therefore, the fact that the view point of the five sons was considered is not sufficient to make the award binding on her. The five sons were not the representatives in interest of the widow under the Dayabhaga school of Hindu Law. It is obvious that ordinarily if there are two or more legal representatives of a deceased person, all must be impleaded to make the representation of the estate complete. It was argued that in arbitration proceedings this rule need not be strictly adhered to, if the estate was subtantially represented. Assuming this to be correct, it is clear that in the present case the estate of Kunja Lal was not substantially represented because the widow, who was left out, had a separate, distinct and perhaps conflicting interest from those who are treated as representing the estate of Kunja Lal. The finding of the two lower courts that the widow was aware of the arbitration proceedings does not get over the difficulty because her knowledge of the proceedings during the lifetime of her husband is immaterial. Her knowledge that the arbitration proceedings were pending after the death of her husband does not lead to the conclusion that she or her interest was represented before the arbitration proceedings. There is no evidence at all to support the view that before the arbitrator at any time the sons represented the interest of the widow. The fact that in the award the one-third share of Kunja Lal is allotted to the five sons and the widow cannot cure the error because the widow till then had been given no opportunity to put forth her views before the arbitrator and the sons being ignorant of her share could not have represented her view point before the arbitrator. Under the circumstances it seems to me that the failure to giver her notice of the extension of time is fatal to the award. I do not think the cases relied upon by the appellant are relevant or applicable to the facts before us. Under the circumstances it seems to me that the failure to giver her notice of the extension of time is fatal to the award. I do not think the cases relied upon by the appellant are relevant or applicable to the facts before us. The five sons of Kunja Lal when they appeared before the arbitrator had put themselves forward as the sole heirs and legal representatives of the deceased and did not claim to represent any one else but themselves. It is immaterial to consider whether she could have secured something better for the share of Kunja Lal if she was given an opportuity to appear before the arbitrator. She had the absolute right to be given notice of the extension of time and an opportunity to be heard before the arbitrator. The contention that Sudhir was the karta of the Dayabhaga joint Hindu family of the sons of Kunja Lal and therefore sufficiently represented his estate has not been pleaded nor put in the issues. The point does not appear to have been argued before the lower courts and from stray statements in the evidence a new case cannot be permitted to be made out in this Court. It is evident that Sudhir never put forward himself as the karta, otherwise the presence of the five sons before the arbitrator was not necessary. The further contention based on the thumb impression of the widow on the minutes book put on the 7th October, 1940, must also be rejected. That thumb impression, to put it at its highest, can only fasten knowledge to the widow of what is contained in that document. The thumb impression cannot amount to a ratification of all that had been done before that day, as contended on behalf of the appellant. I am unable to consider that by putting that thumb impression she accepted the award or ratified the award which had already been made on the 2nd October. Such thumb impression cannot validate the award when she was no party to the previous extensions of time. The last contention that the court, in its discretion, should extend the time even after the award is made must also be rejected. This request was not made before the High Court. The proceedings show that barring this partial award, which is limited to the residential house, nothing has been done in the matter of partition. The last contention that the court, in its discretion, should extend the time even after the award is made must also be rejected. This request was not made before the High Court. The proceedings show that barring this partial award, which is limited to the residential house, nothing has been done in the matter of partition. Over ten years have elapsed since the reference paper was signed and I do not think we are justified under the circumstances in exercising our discretion to extend the time now. In my opinion, therefore, the appeals fail and are dismissed with cost. Mahajan, J.-The discussion in these appeals has led to some rather complicated consideration, but, in my opinion the answer to them is comparatively simple. By a registered agreement dated, the 15th August, 1938, three brothers, Kunja Lal, Tirtha Lal and Nanilal, sons of one Madan Mohan Dey, and members of a Dayabhaga joint Hindu family, appointed Nanilal Bhattacharjee, their family physician, a local doctor of some eminence, as an arbitrator for effecting a partition of all their ejmali paternal properties. He was authorised to make allotments of properties in favour of the brothers in such a way as he considered proper upon a consideration of the convenience and accommodation as far as possible of each one of them and if necessary, by making provisions for payment of owalty money of as much small amount as possible. In the reference paper it was further stated that none of them or their representatives in succession shall be competent to raise any objection and that any objection, if raised, shall.be void and rejected absolutely. A provision was made authorizing the arbitrator to deliver his award in instalments. The arbitrator was directed to give his award within a period of six months but provision was made for enlargement of the time if the convenience of the arbitrator so demanded. A provision was made authorizing the arbitrator to deliver his award in instalments. The arbitrator was directed to give his award within a period of six months but provision was made for enlargement of the time if the convenience of the arbitrator so demanded. This clause is in the following terms: “If in future more lime be necessary to complete the said work of partition, you will be entitled to extend the time by giving to us the three brothers intimation or notice, etc.” A declaration was appended to this clause to the effect: “We down to our heirs and representatives have no objection and shall have none in future.” The immovable properties consisted of lands in different districts in Bengal and of a residential house and some sites in Serampore. There were certain shares in joint stock limited companies, belonging to the family, and they were also included in the schedule of divisible properties. The arbitrator, it seems, was not conversant with such work, and it appears from the record that he proceeded in this matter in an extremely unbusinesslike and slovenly manner. On the 3rd September, 1938, shares belonging to the family were distributed amongst the three brothers but no formal award of this allotment has so far been made and even when a partial award was delivered later on as regards the ancestral house, this allotment of shares was not included therein. On the same day the arbitrator asked the co-sharers to furnish within three months their individual estimates of the valuation of all the buildings and lands comprised and the dwelling house. They were also asked to supply within the same period their suggestions regarding the allotments of the dwelling house and the contiguous lands. The brothers complied with this direction and furnished their suggestions in writing to the arbitrator. These, however, were destroyed by him for no ostensible reason. The minute book maintained by the arbitrator shows that the second meeting in these proceedings was held on the 1st February, 1939. On that day dividends already earned on the shares were distributed among the co-sharers. The time originally fixed to give the award was about to expire and as measurement of the area occupied by the dwelling house was yet not complete and an assessment of valuation had not been made, time was enlarged for a further period of six months. On that day dividends already earned on the shares were distributed among the co-sharers. The time originally fixed to give the award was about to expire and as measurement of the area occupied by the dwelling house was yet not complete and an assessment of valuation had not been made, time was enlarged for a further period of six months. It appears that meetings were held by the arbitrator on the 13th and 14th February, 1939 and 17th April, 1939. In these meetings the buisness conducted was that Nanilal furnished a list of Serampore properties to the arbitrator and it was ordered that this list should be handed over to the other two brothers for inspection. The question of the valuation of the properties was taken up, and an agreed valuation of certain properties in the town of Serampore was noted. The record of this was also destroyed by the arbitrator and no opportunity was given to the parties to contest each other’s suggestions. According to the arbitration agreement, certain documents had to be signed by the parties before the arbitrator could function properly. It appears that Tirtha Babu had not signed these documents and on the 14th August, 1939, he was directed to do so and he was told to have them registered. The time already extended was about to expire and the arbitrator enlarged it for a further period of six months. All the parties agreed to this extension of time. Thus the first year of the life of the arbitration came to a close with nothing really achieved. Kunja Lal, the eldest brother, died on the 22nd October, 1939, leaving him surviving five sons and a widow. In view of the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, the widow was entitled to the same share as each of the sons of the deceased in respect to all the properties other than agricultural lands. Under the Dayabhaga system of Hindu Law, each heir on the death of Kunja Lal Babu became the owner of a defined share in his estate. The arbitrator however was not called upon to make any partition of properties amongst the heirs of Kunja Lal inter se. His sole function was to allot them in three shares only. Under the Dayabhaga system of Hindu Law, each heir on the death of Kunja Lal Babu became the owner of a defined share in his estate. The arbitrator however was not called upon to make any partition of properties amongst the heirs of Kunja Lal inter se. His sole function was to allot them in three shares only. All that was necessary was to make the heirs parties to the reference in order to make a binding award regarding this one-third share. The widow admittedly is an illiterate parda-nashin lady and lives jointly with her sons. Tirtha Lal Dey, the appellant, when examined as a witness, aptly describes the conditions of life of the ladies of his family in the following words: “The female members of the house are illiterate and pardanashin and my Boudidi Bhushan-moyee (Kunja Lal’s widow) is also illiterate. They do not appear before the public and they also do not take any interest regarding property matter. We do not also consult with the female members regarding the property matter.” Such women, when they have legal rights in property, obviously need protection even against their sons and co-owners. It appears that a meeting was held by the arbitrator on the New Year’s day of 1940. In the minutes book it is noted that Kunja Lal has died and that his sons and heirs, Babus Sudhir Kumar Dey, Surath Kumar Dey, Sudhansu Kumar Dey, Subodh Kumar Dey, Sukriti Kumar Dey, all of whom are majors, expressed their willingness to abide by the terms contained in the agreement of reference to arbitration executed by their late father. It was not mentioned that the widow of Kunja Lal was also an heir. The arbitrator in his evidence states: “I did not serve any notice on the mother (widow of Kunja Lal) and I had never any consultation with her.” This is in accord with what Tirtha Lal had said. According to the trial Judge and the High Court, it did not at all strike the arbitrator that the mother was also an heir along with her sons. The arbitration proceedings since January 1940, proceeded as between Nanilal Dey and Tirtha Lal Dey, the two brothers, and the five sons of the third brother Kunja Lal Dey. According to the trial Judge and the High Court, it did not at all strike the arbitrator that the mother was also an heir along with her sons. The arbitration proceedings since January 1940, proceeded as between Nanilal Dey and Tirtha Lal Dey, the two brothers, and the five sons of the third brother Kunja Lal Dey. These sons were treated as completely representing his one-third share, though as a matter of fact, they only partially represented his estate, and the one-sixth share belonging to the widow was left unrepresented. The sons never pretended that they were also representing their mother’s one-sixth share. The minutes book discloses that the next time the parties met before the arbitrator was on the 10th February, 1940. No business was transacted on that date except that the time to make the award was enlarged by another six months. The note was in these terms: “I hereby give you all the parties notice for extension of time for a further period of six months to complete the partition of all the properties as stated in the arbitration deed.” The expression “all the parties” in this notice evidently means those who were before the arbitrator at that stage, i.e., the two uncles and the five nephews. In spite of this extension of time nothing happened till 14th August, 1940, when time was extended for a further period of two months and notice of enlargement was given in the same terms as on the 10th February, 1940. It seems that a partial award allotment of the residential house was ready in the hands of the arbitrator before The 14th August, 1940 and he consulted a lawyer to give it a proper legal shape. Whatever decision he made regarding allotment of portions of the residential house in three lots had been taken by him before this date. This is evident from the arbitrator’s statement in the witness box, which is as follows: “I first consulted Kishore Babu, pleader, 5 or 6 months after the death of Kunja Lal Babu (i.e., April 1940). Then I again consulted him about a month before I gave the award (i.e., 2nd September 1940). I wrote the award some two months before the award was registered. It was typed at that time. I went to Kishore Babu with two copies of the typed award a month before it was registered. Then I again consulted him about a month before I gave the award (i.e., 2nd September 1940). I wrote the award some two months before the award was registered. It was typed at that time. I went to Kishore Babu with two copies of the typed award a month before it was registered. One typed copy was made over to Kishore Babu. He wrote in that copy and at his dictation I also wrote in the typed copy which was in my house. If I had not gone to Kishore Babu on that day, I would have published that award which was typed and according to me that was the correct award and that was my decision.” It must therefore be taken as established that the arbitrator had completed his award about the allotment of the ancestral residential house by the beginning of August 1940 and the widow of the deceased was not in the picture before him at that stage as one of the heirs and legal representatives of Kunja Lal and as such entitled to a sixth share in his estate. On the 2nd October, 1940, the arbitrator published his partial award regarding the residential house. He apportioned it in three lots, as indicated on the plan annexed to it. The award was registered on the 2nd October, 1940 and a gist of it was made known to Tirtha Babu that night and to Sudhir Babu on the 4th October, 1940. The award contains the following assertions: (1) “Sj. Kunja Lal Dey having died since, his heirs have ratified the same and agreed to abide by the award. (2) I have heard all the owners about what they had to say and have carefully studied their requirements and having regard to all their points of view and to their suitability of accommodation in keeping with their rank and status, I have, so fas as I have considered best, divided the property.” These assertions cannot obviously relate to the widow, as her existence as an heir was not known to the arbitrator up to the date when these assertions were made. The time to make the award was again about to expire on the 15th October. Notice of further extension of time for a period of six months was given on the 6th October, 1940. This was noted in the minutes book and it was also published. The time to make the award was again about to expire on the 15th October. Notice of further extension of time for a period of six months was given on the 6th October, 1940. This was noted in the minutes book and it was also published. The minutes book was signed on 7th October, 1940, by the five sons of Kunja Lal Dey and by his two brothers and it also bears the thumb impression of Smt. Bhushan Moyee Dasi, widow of Kunja Lal Dey. This is the last minute in the book. The extension of time ended in March, 1941 and as litigation ensued between the parties nothing further was done by the arbitrator and the matters stand to day as on the 7th October, 1940. As to how and why the thumb impression of the widow was taken appears from the following evidence. The arbitrator said: “The thumb impression of Kunja Babu’s widow was once given in my proceeding by the sons of Kunja Babu. On their own initiation the sons got the thumb impression of their mother. I gave the proceeding book to Sudhansu Babu who brought their mother’s thumb impression and the signature of the other brothers from their house. It is not true that I gave the proceeding book to Surath to get the mothers’ signatures.” In the arbitrator’s view, no notice of extension of time was necessary to be given to the widow and according to him, the sons of their own initiative got the mother’s thumb impression on the proceeding book. Surath Kumar Dey said as a witness that he simply asked his mother to affix her thumb impression and she did so without any question and he did not tell her why and on what paper her thumb impression was being taken. The widow in her evidence deposed to the same effect. The High Court on this material held as follows: “The lady’s evidence, which we accept, is that on the morning of the 7th October, 1940, which was the Saptami day of the Puja, that is to say, the first day of the Durga Puja, her son Surath asked her to put her thumb impression upon the proceedings book. The High Court on this material held as follows: “The lady’s evidence, which we accept, is that on the morning of the 7th October, 1940, which was the Saptami day of the Puja, that is to say, the first day of the Durga Puja, her son Surath asked her to put her thumb impression upon the proceedings book. At that time the Durga Puja was being performed in the house.” By reason of the existence of the thumb impression of the lady on the proceedings book on the 7th October, 1940, it is difficult to say that she became a party to the proceedings and ratified everything that had passed before and also agreed to the extension of time for pronouncing the final award. As soon as the sons of Kunja Lal Dey were apprised of the allotment of the house they felt that they had got a bad deal. Legal advice seems to have been immediatey taken and all possible devices to get out of the unfavourable award were thought of. Apart from other lines of attacks on the award, their mother, an illiterate pardanashin woman, was a very good tool in their hands. They, and the arbitrator had so far ignored her, and no one was keen to recognise that she had a one-sixth share in her husband’s estate. The arbitrator had arrived at his decision two months before the registration of the award, and had allotted the one-third share of Kunja Lal to his five sons. What belonged to six persons had been allotted to five in the following terms: “I do hereby award and direct that the sons as natural heirs to Sj. Kunja Lal Dey, deceased, be the owners of lot I.” When Kishore Babu pointed out that the widow was entitled to an equal share with the sons, he altered the award at his instance and declared the sons and the widow as natural heirs of Kunja Lal Babu and owners of lot No.1. This was done some time in the month of September. A two sided attack was launched on the award as soon as it was decided that steps should be taken to have it set aside. This was done some time in the month of September. A two sided attack was launched on the award as soon as it was decided that steps should be taken to have it set aside. On the 22nd October, 1940, notice was issued to the arbitrator on behalf of Smt. Bhushan Moyee Dasi that as she was no party to the arbitration proceedings and had no opportunity to have her say before him, the award was not binding on her. It was asserted that her thumb impression had been taken without telling her anything and that she was completely ignorant of the arbitration proceedings. Allegations of partiality, misconduct and dishonesty were also made against the arbitrator. Another notice was issued on behalf of the sons, imputing to him various acts of omission and commission in the conduct of the proceedings which vitiated his award. These notices eventually culminated in two suits. On the 9th December, 1940 the widow instituted the Title Suit No. 34 of 1940 in the Second Court of the Subordinate Judge of Hooghly for declaration that the award dated 2nd October, 1940, was void and without jurisdiction and was not binding on her and in the alternative she prayed that it be set aside on the ground that the arbitration proceedings after the death of Kunja Lal Babu came to an end, and that the said proceedings were bad in law and without jurisdiction by reason of the omission to substitute and notify her after the death of Kunja Lal Dey and that the proceedings also became bad owing to the delay beyond one extension contemplated by the reference and that the arbitrator was guilty of misconduct. The defendants, Tirtha Lal Dey and Nanilal Dey denied these allegations and also made an application under paragraph 20, Schedule II of the Code of Civil Procedure for filing the award. This application was registered as T.S. No. 4 of 1941 and was actually presented to Court on 10th February, 1941. The defendants, Tirtha Lal Dey and Nanilal Dey denied these allegations and also made an application under paragraph 20, Schedule II of the Code of Civil Procedure for filing the award. This application was registered as T.S. No. 4 of 1941 and was actually presented to Court on 10th February, 1941. To the main attack launched by the widow on the award the contesting defendant’s answer is contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the written statement and is to the effect that the sons of the plaintiff are obedient to her, they live in joint mess with her and one of them is an advocate of the High Court, that the plaintiff has been aware of everything from the very lifetime of her husband and throughout has expressed her views before the arbitrator through her sons, that none of the plaintiff’s sons had any reason or motive to conceal the matter from her, that plaintiff, like their father, expressed their desire to continue the said arbitration work on behalf of their mother and on behalf of themselves and this was done with the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and that the sons attended to the arbitration proceedings on their own behalf and on behalf of their mother and did all they could do and submitted what they had to say. It was said that the plaintiff submitted what she had to say to the arbitrator through her sons and she got ample opportunity and facility to submit the same herself. It was not pleaded that even if the widow was completely ignored by the arbitrator and sons, still the award was binding on her as she had common interests with the sons and even if she were before the arbitrator, she would have left the conduct of the proceedings to her sons and would have been merely a dummy party, and that in those circumstances the one-third share of Kunja Lal Babu was substantially represented by the sons in the absence of the mother. On the pleadings of the parties as many as fourteen issues were framed in T. S. No. 34 of 1940, and eleven issues were framed in T.S.No. 4 of 1941. The trial Judge decided both the suits by a single judgment. He dismissed Suit No. 34 of 1940 with costs and decreed Suit No. 4 of 1941 with costs. On the pleadings of the parties as many as fourteen issues were framed in T. S. No. 34 of 1940, and eleven issues were framed in T.S.No. 4 of 1941. The trial Judge decided both the suits by a single judgment. He dismissed Suit No. 34 of 1940 with costs and decreed Suit No. 4 of 1941 with costs. A decree was directed to be prepared in accordance with the terms of the award. This decision was arrived at on the following findings: 1. The story of the plaintiff that she was quite ignorant of all the affairs about the arbitration till after the award was registered cannot at all be believed. 2. No doubt, the widow was not in fact substituted as an heir along with her sons, but the arbitrator is not bound to follow strictly the rules of procedure. No misconduct can be ascribed to the arbitrator for his failure to make her a party. In fact, it did not strike him that the mother was also an heir along with the sons. 3. The widow has not been prejudiced by the submission. The arbitrator had to divide the propertv in three shares among the three brothers. Kunja Lal Dey having died, his widow and sons would get one-third share collectively. The only point to be seen is whether the one-third share was properly represented. This query the Judge answered in the following words: " It is an arbitration in respect of one-third share of Kunja Lal Babu and not an arbitration between the sons of Kunja Lal Babu inter se, in which case the interest of the mother would have been affected, had she not been made a party. But when the arbitrator had to allot one-third share separately, I find nothing to prejudice the mother, when her sons collectively represented that shares. The mother is a pardanashin woman and whatever she had to say, was said through her sons. As I have already found that the mother and the sons were living in the same mess and in good terms with each other, the mother’s interest was fully represented by her sons and she was not in any way prejudiced.....Having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the mother’s interest has been properly and substantially represented and the award cannot be challenged on this ground. It was not necessary for (he arbitrator to make her a party." 4. The arbitrator could take more than one extension of time and could deliver his award in instalments. 5. The award was not that of Kishori Babu but was the decision of the arbitrator himself. 6. No doubt, the building in lot No.1 is the oldest one but it must be allotted to some party and considering the fact that the arbitrator had in view the existing possession of the parties and about the compactness of the allotment, the allotments do not appear to be unfair or inequitable. 7. No judicial misconduct or partiality is proved on the part of the arbitrator. 8. The arbitrator did not keep a record of his proceedings nor did he examine the valuer or get his valuation report checked but Dr. Nanilal is a medical practitioner and a private arbitrator and is not bound by the strict rules of evidence or procedure. Against this decision three appeals were taken to the High Court, two by the widow and one by the sons. They were all disposed of by one judgment in the High Court. The appeals were allowed, suit No. 34 of 1940 was decreed and suit No. 4 of 1941 dismissed. The arguments in the appeal were limited to three parts and on these the High Court arrived at the following decision: 1. No doubt, the allotment of Tirtha Lal is superior to the allotments made in favour of the heirs of Kunja Lal Dey; but from that fact we cannot come to the conclusion that there was conscious bias on the part of the arbitrator towards Tirtha Lal. The other oral evidence bearing on the point is inconclusive." 2. The submission did not become ineffective after the death of Kunja Lal. The reference itself contemplates the case of death of parties pending arbitration by providing that the award would be binding on the heir and legal representatives of the parties to the reference. 3. As the extensions of the period of arbitration made by the arbitrator on the 10th February, 1940, and the 14th August, 1940, were not strictly in terms of the submission there was no valid extension of time and therefore the award which was published by the arbitrator on the 2nd October, 1940, must be taken to be an award made beyond time. It is accordingly not a good award. The extension of time had been made without any intimation or notice to Bhushan Moyee Dasi, one of the heirs of Kunja Lal. 4. The widow knew and must have known that the arbitrator was proceeding with the work of arbitration and of partition before the death of her husband and after his death. 5. The arbitrator himself and the parties, two of whom are advocates of the High Court, did not know that she was an heir to her husband’s estate by reason of the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act and it may therefore be assumed that the lady also had the impression that she was not the heir of Kunja Lal, as under the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law, by which the parties are governed, a widow is not the heir of her husband’s estate. Against this decision Tirtha Lal Dey preferred Civil Appeals Nos. XXXII and XXXIII of 1948 to their Lordships of the Privy Council. These were consolidated in the High Court and in view of the enlarged jurisdiction of this Court, we have heard the appeals. On behalf of the appellant Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose contended that the High Court had placed an erroneous construction on the clause relating to the enlargement of time when it said, “The object is plain; that before extending the period of arbitration the arbitrator was required to have the viewpoint of the parties to the submission before he could extend the period of arbitration. That is the interpretation we give to this clause.” He further urged that the arbitrator had absolute discretion to enlarge the time and the consent of the parties and their viewpoints did not affect his authority to do so. All that the arbitrator was told to do was that after having enlarged the time he was to inform the parties about this extension and if he failed to give such intimation, it was a mere irregularity on his part and did not go to the root of his jurisdiction and affect the validity of the award in any manner whatsoever. It was argued that the High Court was in error when it held that the giving of the notices was a condition precedent to the enlargement of the time and that the decision that the notice was not given in the prescribed manner could not be sustained. It was said that as a matter of fact all the parties that were before the arbitrator had been given notice, that the expression “all parties” used by the arbitrator included all the heirs of Kunja Lal Dey, that the sons of Kunja Lal represented their mother, and notice to them was sufficient notice to the mother and that in any case she had by putting her thumb impression on the minutes book on the 7th October accepted and ratified what had taken place previous to that day. It was further contended that Sudhir Babu was the karta of Kunja Lal’s branch of the family and his appearance before the arbitrator was sufficient representation of the one-third share of Kunja Lal. Finally, it was urged that time to make the award could be extended ex post facto and this was a proper case in which this should be done. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that though the arbitrator had absolute authority to enlarge the time without the consent of the parties, he could only do so in the manner prescribed and he was literally bound to follow that procedure and the extension of time could only be valid if it was made after notice had been previously served on the parties. That being so, the extensions of time made without notice having been served on the parties were bad and this vitiated the award. It was also argued that the mother had been completely ignored by the arbitrator and had not become a party to the arbitration proceedings and the award was not binding on her and therefore the whole of the award had to be set aside. In my judgment the High Court has based its decision of the case on a very slender foundation. Whether the notice extending the time was to precede its actual extension or was to be simultaneous with or subsequent to it seems to be immaterial, because, as a matter of fact, notice was given to the parties that appeared before the arbitrator. Whether the notice extending the time was to precede its actual extension or was to be simultaneous with or subsequent to it seems to be immaterial, because, as a matter of fact, notice was given to the parties that appeared before the arbitrator. The clause dealing with this point was inserted in the submission, not with the idea that time could only be enlarged with the consent of the parties, but with the object of intimating to them that the arbitrator was exercising the authority given to him and if they wanted to suggest anything they could do so. Once notice was given, he could extend the time at once. I cannot subscribe to the contention of Mr. Sarat Bose to the effect that the notice intended to be given by the clause was meant only as a piece of information to the parties that the time had been enlarged. Such an interpretation of the clause would make it superfluous and redundant. The clause has to be given some meaning by treating it as an integral part of the reference. The enlargements of time in this case as and when made were made in the presence of the parties and with notice to them and it could not therefore be said that as regards the parties who were before the arbitrator there was any breach of the clause relating to it or that the award is void because it was pronounced after the expiry of the time fixed for delivering it. As regards the widow, she was no party to the proceedings of the arbitrator and was not even in his contemplation as an heir and hence no notice could be given to her. The real and substantial point for decision under the circumstances is whether in the absence of the widow the arbitrator could function and give an award so as to bind her. If the widow was represented in fact or in law by the sons, then the award would bind her. If, on the other hand, she was not so represented, then the award will not bind her. It is axiomatic that if a person is not a party to, or properly represented in any proceedings, he cannot be bound by those proceedings. If, on the other hand, she was not so represented, then the award will not bind her. It is axiomatic that if a person is not a party to, or properly represented in any proceedings, he cannot be bound by those proceedings. The ordinary rule of law is that in case of death of a party a valid award cannot be given which will bind the estate unless the legal representatives of the deceased are made parties to the reference. This can be done by giving notice to them where the reference is not through Court and where proceedings for substitution of the legal representatives is not necessary. As pointed out by that learned Judge, Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, in Manindra Nath v. Mohanunda Roy1, the submission to arbitration is not revoked by the death of one of the parties if the intention is that no merely the parties themselves should be bound by the decision of the arbitrator but also their representatives-in-interest; but if the hearing is not completed, it will be necessary to bring the representatives of the deceased party on the record or to make them party to submission. If, on the death of a party, his representative-in-interest proceeds with the arbitration and becomes a party to it, the award pronounced in the reference is binding on him. The principle that in a pending suit all parties must join in the reference also applies to arbitrations out of court. If one of the parties dies and his representatives do not join, the reference would be bad. It is needless to point out that in a suit for partition of joint family property or to recover properties in possession of third parties all co-owners are necessary parties and must join in the suit, though they may entrust the management of the property or the conduct of the suit to some or one of them. On these principles of law it is plain that the widow of Kunja Lal being entitled to a specified share in the property of her husband, was a co-sharer with the sons and represented the estate of the deceased to that extent, and in the matter of partition it was necessary to make her a party to the submission by giving her notice. The arbitrator was not entitled to make the award in her absence so as to bind her. The arbitrator was not entitled to make the award in her absence so as to bind her. If she did not herself appear before the arbitrator, it was for the other parties to take requisite steps to bring her by notice before the arbitrator. In the present case no steps were taken by the parties or the arbitrator to give notice to the widow as one of the legal representatives of the estate of Kunja Lal Dey. On the other hand, she was not recognized as such either by the arbitrator or by the brothers and sons of Kunja Lal. The sons of Kunja Lal claimed to be the sole heirs and legal representatives of his estate. All concerned were ignorant of the law under which the widow had become an equal co-sharer with the sons in the estate of her husband and none of them was interested in recognizing her rights if conveniently these could be ignored. In the original award what belonged to the widow was decided to belong to the sons. Even after the error was corrected, the arbitrator did not change his mentality because after the discovery of the mistake he gave no notice to the widow though he delayed announcing the award by a month. Even after announcing the award he did not notify it to her. The primary question for consideration is whether the one-third share of Kunja Lal was sufficiently represented before the arbitrator by the five sons in the absence of the sixth co-sharer. Ordinarily if there are two or more legal representatives of a deceased person, all must be impleaded to make the representation of the estate complete, otherwise, the suit or appeal abates. The expression “legal representatives” must when there are two or more legal representatives be read in the plural. All legal representatives must be brought on the record and if some one refuses to join as plaintiff, he should be joined as a defendant. As pointed out by Sir Shadi Lal, C.J., in Md. Hassan v. Inayat Hussain1: “These words mean the representation before the Court of the plenary interest of the deceased party. Sometimes that interest may be represented by a single individual, but it may also be represented by a number of persons as the case may be. As pointed out by Sir Shadi Lal, C.J., in Md. Hassan v. Inayat Hussain1: “These words mean the representation before the Court of the plenary interest of the deceased party. Sometimes that interest may be represented by a single individual, but it may also be represented by a number of persons as the case may be. But there should be a complete representation of the interests of the deceased person, whether through a single individual or through a number of persons, so that there cannot be a partial representation of that interest. In other words, the expression ‘legal representative’ means and includes one person as well as several persons according as they represent the whole interest of the deceased person.” Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Khiarajmal v. Daim2 expressed a similar view. In that case one Naurez had died and in a suit brought against his estate, Amirbaksh by a guardian Alah Nawaz was impleaded as the legal representative. Amirbaksh was one of the heirs of Naurez but in no other sense his legal representative. Alah Nawaz was not in any legal sense his guardian. It was contended that Naurez’s heirs were bound by the proceedings in the suits and that his share of the property, whatever it was, was effectually sold in the suit, or at any rate that the share of Amirbaksh himself passed by the sale. Their Lordships held that the estate of Naurez was not represented in law or in fact in either of the suits and the sale of the property was without jurisdiction and null and void. It was further held that the share of Amirbaksh in his father’s estate was not bound. Their Lordships expressed the opinion that this was not a mere question of form, but one of substance. Naurez in this case had left a number of heirs and the suit was laid against one of those heirs. Suppose in this case, instead of the five sons only two of the sons had appeared before the arbitrator. Could it be said that the estate was represented by those two sons, though their interests were the same as of the others? This would be a case of partial representation. Suppose in this case, instead of the five sons only two of the sons had appeared before the arbitrator. Could it be said that the estate was represented by those two sons, though their interests were the same as of the others? This would be a case of partial representation. Ordinarily therefore it is necessary to implead all the legal representatives of a deceased person on the record and a few of them do not represent the whole interest of the deceased and if all are not made parties to the suit or appeal, it results in an abatement of those proceedings. On similar principles, before an arbitrator can proceed further with the reference and give a binding award he should give notice to all the legal representatives of the deceased party and attempt to make them parties to the reference by notice though he may not be bound to follow the strict procedure of law required for substitution of parties under Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure. As I have said already, the learned counsel for the appellant wants to get round the difficulty in his way by contending inter alia that the estate of Kunia Lal was sufficiently and substantially represented by his five sons, and as the widow was aware of the arbitration proceedings as has been held by both the courts below and left the conduct of the same to her sons, she would be bound by the award particularly in view of the fact that Sudhir, her eldest son and karta of the family representing the heirs of Kunja Lal, did take part in the proceedings on behali of the whole family and she herself by putting her thumb impression on the minutes book of the arbitration waived all objections to the irregularities, if any. In my view, these contentions are of no validity whatsoever in the circumstances of the case and have no relevancy in a situation where the very existence of the widow as one of the heirs of the deceased is not recognized and the arbitrator arrives at his final decision in ignorance of her rights and makes an allotment of her share to the five sons. The rectification of this error subsequently by the arbitrator without notice to her does not affect the question. The rectification of this error subsequently by the arbitrator without notice to her does not affect the question. The arbitrator ordinarily has to follow the rules of natural justice and generally the enquiry before him is assimilated as near as may be to the proceedings or trial in a Court. In my view, the failure to treat the widow as one of the heirs of the deceased and the failure to give her notice till after the award had been pronounced is fatal to the award that was delivered on the 2nd October, 1940. Mr. Bose in support of his contention relied strongly on certain observations of the Calcutta High Court in Binayakdas v. Sashi Bhusan1 which run as follows: “It is true as a general principle that a person who is not a party to or properly represented in any proceedings should not be bound by those proceedings. But proceedings before arbitrators are not intended to be carried on according to the rules of procedure contained in the Civil Procedure Code. If there is a binding reference to arbitration all that is necessary to be seen is that there is a substantial representation of the different interests before the arbitrators. In this case the reference was binding on the representatives of Nilmany. There is no rule of procedure by which the arbitrators could substitute those representatives or appoint guardian ad litem for infants. If we were to hold that the arbitrators could not go on with the arbitration as the representatives or some persons on their behalf did not choose to come before the arbitrators, the result would be that although the reference would not abate on the death of a party under the law the arbitrators would in fact be unable to make an award and the arbitration would come to an end. We are therefore of opinion that the proposition urged by the appellant cannot be of universal application. The question whether the award would be binding or not must depend upon the circumstances of each case. Here all the investigations had been finished and all documents had been produced before the arbitrators when the parties were alive. The arguments for the 2nd party were addressed by the pleader who also represented the first and fourth parties as their interest was the same. Here all the investigations had been finished and all documents had been produced before the arbitrators when the parties were alive. The arguments for the 2nd party were addressed by the pleader who also represented the first and fourth parties as their interest was the same. Nagendra of the second party was there and he represented all the minors in the proceedings in the Court below as their guardian and is also now appearing as their guardian in this Court. There were also other adult persons of the second party. Then it must also be borne in mind that the whole interest of the second party, including that of the minors in the property had been let out in patni to the fourth party, and the first and the fourth party are really the persons who are directly interested in the matter of arbitration and the second party who are entitled to receive a fixed rent for their share of the property from the fourth party, have only a remote interest in the controversy.” This decision has apparently no application to the facts of this case. As pointed out in the above quotation, the investigation had all been finished and the death of the party took place at the argument stage. Moreover, the persons really interested in the controversy were already before the arbitrator. This case therefore does not touch the point that arises in the present case. Reference was also made to decisions of certain High Courts in India which have expressed the view that in cases where some legal representatives are unwilling to join as parties or one or more of them are unknown, a bona fide application by those who are willing to join in making the application will be sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order XXII, rules 3 and 4 and a decree passed in a suit binds the whole estate. The ratio of these exceptional cases is that for making the partial representation effective against the true representatives the plaintiff or the decree-holder must have acted bona fide, the decree obtained must have been free from fraud or collusion, the person impleaded must have been impleaded in a representative capacity and the decree or order must have been passed against him as a representative of the estate of the deceased. None of these conditions are satisfied in the present case. None of these conditions are satisfied in the present case. It is not even arguable that the parties and the arbitrator in ignoring the widow acted bona fide, i.e., with due care and caution. Ignorance of law is no excuse. Moreover, by the exercise of due care and caution such ignorance could have been dispelled. The five sons when thev appeared before the arbitrator put themselves forward as sole heirs and legal representatives of the deceased and did not claim to represent any one else but themselves. The award that was made was not given as against the five in a representative capacity but was given originally in favour of the five as sole representatives of the one-third share and later on in favour of six in the same capacity. The principle underlying such exceptional cases has no application, as already pointed out, to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is indeed true that it has been concurrently held that the widow had knowledge of the arbitration proceedings during the lifetime of the husband as well as after his death, but in my opinion, this knowledge on the part of the widow does not advance the case of the appellant in any manner. Mere knowledge of proceedings pending before an arbitrator is not of much assistance in the decision of legal rights. During the lifetime of the husband the widow had no legal rights in the property, the subject-matter of partition, and her knowledge of pending proceedings is not material. After the death of the husband her knowledge of the arbitration proceedings does not prove that she was a party to those proceedings. The husband died by the end of October, 1939. Within three months of his death, the sons of the deceased appeared before the arbitrator and represented themselves as sole heirs of the estate. A month later they agreed to extension of time. The widow must be in mourning and it is in evidence that even the sons when they appeared before the arbitrator on 1st January, 1940, had not fully recovered from the shock caused to them by their father’s death. Whatever knowledge therefore the lady had of rhe proceedings cannot lead to the conclusion that she had notice of the extension of time granted by the arbitrator, and was a party to the reference and had permitted her sons to represent her. Whatever knowledge therefore the lady had of rhe proceedings cannot lead to the conclusion that she had notice of the extension of time granted by the arbitrator, and was a party to the reference and had permitted her sons to represent her. She was certainly entitled to an opportunity to say what allotment should be made of the residential house towards her husband’s one-third share. She might well have a different point of view than that of her sons. The sons may be interested in taking allotment in consideration of its value, while she may be interested in an allotment which may give her a comfortable living. Whether she could by appearing before the arbitrator achieve something substantial or not is not relevant. She had a right to that opportunity and no decision can be made binding on her until she was given that opportunity. As already pointed out, she was completely out of the picture in those proceedings and no question arises of her leaving their conduct to her sons. It may be that her position of vantage benefits the sons but such results happen when proceedings before an arbitrator are conducted irregularly and proper steps are not taken in time to cure irregularities. Tirtha Lal himself is to blame for this. He could very well have after proper inquiries asked the arbitrator to make the widow a party to the proceedings by giving her notice. The contention of the learned counsel that as Sudhir was the karta of the Dayabhaga joint Hindu family of the sons of Kunja Lal he sufficiently represented his estate before the arbitrator cannot be very seriously considered. This case was neither pleaded nor put in the issues. It was not argued in either of the courts below. A new case cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in this Court, particularly when the question is not purely one of law but is a mixed question of fact and law. It is plain that Sudhir never put himself forward as karta before the arbitrator and the award was not pronounced by treating him as such. In the pleadings it is clearly stated that all the five sons appeared before the arbitrator and represented their mother. It is plain that Sudhir never put himself forward as karta before the arbitrator and the award was not pronounced by treating him as such. In the pleadings it is clearly stated that all the five sons appeared before the arbitrator and represented their mother. The further contention of the learned counsel that the widow by putting her thumb impression on the minutes book on 7th October, 1940, retrospectively ratified all the irregularities in the proceedings and condoned them is also without force in view of the finding of fact given by the High Court that the story of the widow on this part of the case is correct, and that when Durga Puja was going on in the house she was asked by Surath to put her thumb impression on the book and she did so without enquiry. By putting her thumb impression on’ the minutes book, she did not in any way accept the award already announced. At best this thumb impression amounts to an acknowledgment of the notice of extension of time given by the arbitrator. But such an acknowledgment after the award had been delivered cannot validate that award when she was no party to the previous extensions of time. The last contention raised by the learned counsel that time for making the award could be extended ex post facto by the Court has only to be stated to be rejected. This request was not made before the High Court. Moreover, in view of the slovenly manner in which the arbitration proceedings were conducted and in view of the lapse of so much time after award it is rather late to ask for the exercise of the discretionary powers of this Court. In deciding this case I am fully conscious of the proposition that when an arbitrator has acted within the terms of his submission and has not violated any rules of what is so often called natural justice the courts should be slow indeed to set aside his award. But when an arbitrator ignores the existence of an interested party and goes to the length of awarding her share to others and then corrects his error and allots to her along with others a share but without notice to her, this conduct is not such as is in accordance with the rules of natural justice. But when an arbitrator ignores the existence of an interested party and goes to the length of awarding her share to others and then corrects his error and allots to her along with others a share but without notice to her, this conduct is not such as is in accordance with the rules of natural justice. The rule that in certain circumstances omission to implead some heirs may not vitiate a decree and it may be held binding on the whole estate while represented by some of them cannot be applied on logical grounds in each case. Every proposition however general in form, must in law be viewed in the light of its pattern of circumstances. In law, as in real life, there is always an element of choice and in this case my choice is against the application of the doctrine of representation to the facts of this case. The result therefore is that the decision of the High Court is upheld, though on grounds different from those on which that decision was arrived at. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs. Mukherjea, J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice and my learned brothe Mahajan, J., that these appeals should be dismissed with costs. Patanjali Sastri, J.-The question for determination in these appeals is whether a partition award made at a private arbitration is liable to be set aside. I have come to the conclusion that it is not. Kunja Lal Dey, Nanilal Dey and Tirtha Lal Dey were brothers and members of a family governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law. Disputes having arisen regarding the partition of the family properties, the brothers referred the matter to the arbitration of their “family physician and earnest well-wisher” Dr. Nanilal Bhattacharjee by means of a registered Ekrarnama dated 18th August, 1938. The said document provided, inter alia, that the arbitrator was to effect a partition “in equal shares amongst us the three brothers” of all the joint properties mentioned therein, with the help, if necessary, of “technical experts, i.e., any lawyer, engineer, overseer or draftsman” and to “make such allotment in favour of such of us as you like”. None of the parties “down to our heirs and representatives in succession shall be competent to raise any objection”. None of the parties “down to our heirs and representatives in succession shall be competent to raise any objection”. The partition was to be completed within a period of six months but “if more time be necessary to complete the said work of partition you will be entitled to extend the time by giving to us the three brothers intimation or notice”. The arbitrator was also authorised to make his award “by instalments and in different lots”. The arbitrator entered upon the reference in September 1938, but as the work could not be completed within six months he extended the time for making his award on 13th February, 1939, by six months by giving notice to all the parties, and again on the 14th August, 1939, he similarly extended the time for a further period of six months. In the meantime Kunja Lal died on 22nd October, 1939, leaving him surviving his widow Bhusan Moyee Dasi, the first respondent in these appeals, and five sons, respondents 2 to 6, as his heirs. On 1st January, 1940, all the sons as well as the two surviving brothers of Kunja Lal appeared before ‘the arbitrator and expressed their willingness to abide by the terms of the agreement or reference, and a memorandum to that effect was recorded by the arbitrator in his “proceedings book” and signed by the parties aforesaid. But here the arbitrator was running against an unsuspected snag which has given rise to certain difficulties to be presently noticed. Under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, then recently passed, the widow of Kunja Lal became entitled on his death to the same share as a son in his properties other than agricultural lands, and she was thus a co-heir with her sons entitled to 1/6th of Kunja Lal’s share in the family properties. This statutory change in the Hindu law was overlooked by the arbitrator as well as by all the parties concerned although some of them were professional lawyers, and the arbitration was proceeded with as if the sons were, as they undoubtedly would be but for the statute, the only heirs and representatives of Kunja Lal to the exclusion of his widow until the mistake was discovered shortly before the award in question was made. As the partition could not be completed within the 15th February, 1940, the arbitrator again extended the time for a further period of six months on 10th February, 1940, by giving notice to all the parties concerned (excepting Kunja Lal’s widow) who appeared before him on that day and signed the arbitrator’s memorandum in his proceedings book. Another extension for two months was made on 14th August, 1940, the same procedure as on the previous occasion being followed. Within the extended period, on 2nd October, 1940, the arbitrator delivered the first instalment of his award dividing the family dwelling house and the adjoining sites into three lots as delineated in a plan annexed to the award and providing for paymgnt of compensation to equalise the value of the lots and for certain additions and alterations therein to facilitate separate enjoyment by the three branches of the family. The award directed that “the sons and widow as natural heirs of Sj. Kunja Lal deceased be the owners of lot No.1, Sj. Nanilal be the owner of lot No. 2 and Sj. Tirtha Lal be the owner of lot No. 3 and each party shall be in enjoyment of the portions and rights allotted heretofore in his own rights.” The award was registered on the same day. On 6th October, 1940, the arbitrator recorded in his proceedings that he delivered the first instalment of the award on 2nd October, 1940, and extended the time for completing the partition of the other properties by a further period of six months. The memorandum was signed by all the parties except Bhusan Moyee who affixed her thumb impression. Before, however, any further steps could be taken in the matter, Bhusan Moyee repudiated the award and impugned its validity, denying all knowledge of the arbitration, and commenced the present proceedings on 9th December, 1940. The memorandum was signed by all the parties except Bhusan Moyee who affixed her thumb impression. Before, however, any further steps could be taken in the matter, Bhusan Moyee repudiated the award and impugned its validity, denying all knowledge of the arbitration, and commenced the present proceedings on 9th December, 1940. In her plaint she alleged, inter alia, that she was an illiterate and pardanashin lady having no knowledge or experience regarding the properties left by her husband, that she had no knowledge of the arbitration proceedings, that her thumb impression was taken without explaining anything or giving any information to her, that the arbitrator acted in contravention of the terms of the agreement to refer in extending the time repeatedly and such extensions without obtaining her consent were unauthorised, and that the award made on 2nd October, 1940, without making her “a party to the agreement executed by her husband or to the arbitration proceedings” after his death and “without giving her an opportunity to express her views before the arbitrator” was void and not binding on her. She also impreached the award as being unjust, inequitable and tainted with partiality. She impleaded Nanilal and Tirtha Lal as defendants 1 and 2, her five sons as defendants 3 to 7 and the arbitrator as defendant 8 pro forma, and prayed for a declaration that the award of 2nd October, 1940, was void, inoperative and not binding on her and, in the alternative, for setting aside that award. The suit was contested by Tirtha Lal, the appellant in these appeals, who traversed the allegations in the plaint and averred that Bhusan Moyee had full knowledge of the arbitration proceedings and had every opportunity of expressing her views through her sons who fully represented her in the proceedings and that she accepted and ratified the award which was valid and binding on all the parties concerned. On substantially the same averments he applied on 10th February, 1941, in the same Court under the Indian Arbitration Act and paragraph 20 of the Second Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for filing the award in Court and pronouncing judgment according to it. On substantially the same averments he applied on 10th February, 1941, in the same Court under the Indian Arbitration Act and paragraph 20 of the Second Schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, for filing the award in Court and pronouncing judgment according to it. The application was registered as a suit and all the parties in the earlier suit except the arbitrator were made parties to this suit which was contested by Bhusan Moyee (defendant No. 9) on the same lines as in her plaint in the earlier suit. Her sons as defendants 2 to 6 filed a separate written statement in which, while fully supporting her, they attacked the award on certain additional grounds of corruption and misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. As the matters in controversy were substantially the same, the two suits were tried together by the Subordinate Judge, Second Court, Hooghly. The learned Judge found, inter alia, that the arbitrator was not guilty of any misconduct or partiality, that the extensions of time for making the award were authorised by the terms of the agreement to refer and were made in accordance therewith, and that the award was not unfair or inequitable On the question of want of notice to Bhusan Moyee, the learned Judge had no hesitation, in all the circumstances of the case, in rejecting her story that she was kept quite in the dark till 7th October, 1940, when her thumb impression was taken and found that she was, as a matter of fact, aware of the arbitration proceedings throughout. As no division of Kunja Lal’s share among his heirs was contemplated and as Bhusan Moyee was an illiterate pardanashin woman living amicably with her sons who had no adverse interest, the learned Judge held that her interest was substantially and adequately represented bv her sons and she was not in any way prejudiced. Accordingly, he upheld the award and pronounced judgment according to it, dismissing Bhusan Moyee’s suit with costs. From that decision appeals were preferred to the High Court by Bhusan Moyee and her sons directed against the decree of dismissal and the order filing the award. The appeals were heard by Mitter and Akram, JJ., and disposed of by a common judgment. From that decision appeals were preferred to the High Court by Bhusan Moyee and her sons directed against the decree of dismissal and the order filing the award. The appeals were heard by Mitter and Akram, JJ., and disposed of by a common judgment. The learned Judges state that only three grounds were urged before them in support of the appeal, namely, (1) that the submission ceased to be operative on Kunja Lal’s death, (2) that the extensions of time for giving the award were not valid extensions and so the award given out of time was void, and (3) that there was misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. They overruled the first and third grounds. On the second, they held that “as the extensions of the period of arbitration made by the arbitrator on the 10th February, 1940 and the 14th August, 1940, were not strictly in terms of the submission there was no valid extension of time and, therefore, the award which was published by the arbitrator on 2nd October, 1940, must be taken to be an award made beyond time. It was accordingly not a good award. On this ground we allow the appeal and set aside the award of 2nd October, 1940.” The reason for holding that the two extensions of time referred to were not strictly in terms of the submission was thus explained: “The object (of the provision relating to extension of time) is plain; that before extending the period of arbitration the arbitrator was required to have the view point of the parties to the submission before he could extend the period of arbitration. That is the interpretation we give to this clause.” As the arbitrator did not, before extending the time, give intimation to the parties that he proposed to do so, he was held to have acted in contravention of the terms in the clause of the Ekrarnama. The learned Judges also pointed out that no intimation regarding the extension of time having been given to Bhusan Moyee before 6th October, 1940, the award could not bind her. It may be observed at this point that want of notice to Bhusan Moyee was brought in only in connection with the second ground urged, namely, that there was no valid enlargement of the period of arbitration and therefore the award was void as made out of time. It may be observed at this point that want of notice to Bhusan Moyee was brought in only in connection with the second ground urged, namely, that there was no valid enlargement of the period of arbitration and therefore the award was void as made out of time. The finding of the Subordinate Judge that it was not necessary to make Bhusan Moyee a party to the arbitration proceeding and that her sons sufficiently represented her interest in Kunja Lal’s estate in the circumstances of the case was not questioned before the learned Judges. In the result, they allowed the appeals and sef aside the award. From that decision Tirtha Lal has brought these two consolidated appeals. Mr. Sarat Chandra Bose on behalf of the appellant contended that the interpretation placed by the learned Judges of the High Court on the clause authorising extension of time was incorrect and unsound and their decision was, in consequence, unsustainable. It appears clearly from the terms of that clause that the arbitrator had power to extend the time for making the award and that no consent of the parties was required for the purpose. Such extension was to be made “by giving to us the three brothers intimation and notice”. That was precisely the manner in which the arbitrator extended the time whenever he found it necessary to do so; for he said “I hereby give you all the parties notice for extension of time, etc.”. What the object of the parties was in providing for notice to themselves in the matter of enlarging time for making the award can be a matter of speculation. But, surely, the arbitrator cannot be held to have acted in contravention of the terms of the submission when he literally followed the direction given therein. I am clearly of opinion that the extensions of time were validly made, and that the award, having been given within the enlarged period, cannot be considered to have been made out of time. Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen for the respondents, however, sought to support the decree of the High Court by contending that the arbitrator’s failure to make Bhusan Moyee a party to the proceeding as one of the heirs of Kunja Lal deceased was fatal to the validity of the award. Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen for the respondents, however, sought to support the decree of the High Court by contending that the arbitrator’s failure to make Bhusan Moyee a party to the proceeding as one of the heirs of Kunja Lal deceased was fatal to the validity of the award. As has been stated, the Subordinate Judge overruled this point on the ground that Kunja Lal’s share in the family properties including the interest of Bhusan Moyee was sufficiently and substantially represented by his sons, and that finding was not challenged before the High Court. Mr. Bose, therefore, objected that the respondent should not be allowed to raise the question in this Court. As Mr. Sen, however, proposed to argue the question as one of pure law on the findings of fact made by the courts below, he was allowed to do so. While it is no doubt desirable that the enquiry in a private arbitration should conform generally to proceedings in a Court of law, the arbitrator is not bound to observe the strict rules of procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. He is not bound to make and retain notice of the proceedings, before him - (see Amir Begam v. Badr-ud-Din Husain1). Nor is he bound to effect a formal substitution of parties in case of death or devolution of interest pending the enquiry. Subject of course to any instructions contained in the agreement to refer which he must strictly follow and to any statutory directions which he must observe, he has greater freedom of action in conducting his proceedings, and any mere irregularity in procedure not amounting to a denial of a proper hearing or a deviation from the principles of natural justice cannot vitiate his award. Such principles undoubtedly require that he should give notice of his proceedings, where a party to the submission dies, to all such representatives of the deceased as may be brought to his notice, but whether his failure to notify any of them vitiates the award would depend on the circumstances of the particular case. In the present case, it is established that Bhusan Moyee was living jointly and amicably with her sons and that she knew all about the arbitration proceedings. In the present case, it is established that Bhusan Moyee was living jointly and amicably with her sons and that she knew all about the arbitration proceedings. The High Court agreed with the learned Subordinate Judge in coming to the conclusion that “the lady must have known that the arbitrator was proceeding with the work of partition before the death of her husband and also after his death” and went on to observe: “when the arbitrator himself and the parties to the submission, two of whom are advocates of this Court, did not know that the widow of Kunja Lal had become an heir by reason of the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, we may take it that the lady also had the impression that she was not the heir of Kunja Lal as under the Dayabhaga School of Hindu law, by which the parties are governed, a widow is not the heir of her husband’s estate in the presence of his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons”. It is important to remember in this connection what the Subordinate Judge rightly stressed, namely, that the arbitrator was not called upon and did not purport to effect a partition between the heirs of Kunja Lal inter se. All that he did and required to do was to divide the properties into three shares and allot one share to each of three branches of the family including Kunja Lal’s heirs who were thus to get one share collectively. The position, therefore, was that the sons, who considered themselves erroneously to have inherited Kunja Lal’s share in its entirety and who were taking part in the proceedings before the arbitrator throughout, collectively represented the estate of Kunja Lal including the unsuspected interest of their mother in that estate. It is difficult to imagine what additional representations could have been made or steps taken in the matter of the arbitration by the pardanashin woman even if she had been notified of those proceedings as a co-heir with her sons. It is difficult to imagine what additional representations could have been made or steps taken in the matter of the arbitration by the pardanashin woman even if she had been notified of those proceedings as a co-heir with her sons. A perusal of her evidence shows that she took little interest in the affairs of her family or of her husband’s estate, and there was no suggestion in the course of her lengthy examination that she had any particular representation to make apart from her sons or any view point of her own to present to the arbitrator or any interest in conflict with their in the matter of dividing the dwelling house into three shares and allotting one of them to her branch. In such circumstances, I am convinced that the learned Subordinate Judge is right in holding that Kunja Lal’s estate including the interest of Bhusan Moyee as one of his heirs was substantially represented by his sons and that she was not in any way prejudiced by the arbitrator’s failure to give her formal notice of his proceeding of which she was aware all along, or to record her willingness to abide by the agreement to refer which was already binding on her, as he did in the case of her sons and doubtless would have done in her case too, had he known that she was a co-heir with them in her husband’s estate. It was said that the sons could not have represented their mother as the fitter’s interest in her husband’s estate was unknown to them. This is a misconception. The relevant representation was of deceased Kunja Lal’s estate by his sons as against the claims of her surviving brothers in regard to the partition of the family dwelling house into three equal shares, and such representation did not depend for its efficacy on a knowledge of the widow’s heirship. The principle that, generally, where a party dies pendente lite his estate is sufficiently represented by one or more of his representatives substituted in his place, so as to make the entire estate, including the interests of others not made parties, bound by the outcome of that lis, provided the substitution was effected bona fide and the proceeding was continued without fraud or collusion, has often been acted upon by the courts in this country and has received the sanction of the highest authority. In Khairaiimal v. Dain1 one Nabibaksh who had mortgaged his share in a certain property was sued on the mortgage and the suit was referred to an arbitrator for final disposal. Shortly afterwards Nabibaksh died leaving two widows, an infant son and a daughter. The widows and the son alone were brought on the record. The arbitrator made his award that the plaintiff should recover a certain sum from the share of Nabibaksh and the Court passed a decree to that effect. In execution of the decree the property was sold. In a subsequent suit for redemption brought by the heirs of Nabibaksh impugning the validity of the decree and the sale in the earlier proceedings, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that: “Nabibaksh’s estate was sufficiently represented for the purpose of the suit although the name of his infant daughter was omitted and that his share of the equity of redemption in the property sold in execution of the decree in No. 372 of 1879 is therefore bound by the sale and irredeemable”. The position would be different if there was no representation at all as was held to be the case with reference to the share of Nawrez whose minor son though impleaded was not represented by a proper guardian. The principle must, I think, apply a fortiori here, and for two reasons: Suppose Tirtha Lal had sued for partition and the matter had been referred to arbitration through Court. If, on Kunjalal’s death pending such reference, his sons alone were brought on the record as his legal representatives, it would clearly not be open to the widow, in view of the decision referred to above, to say that the award was not binding on her. Is a stricter and more rigorous rule to be enforced regarding representation of a deceased party to a private arbitration? Furthermore, Kunjalal’s sons along with their mother formed a Hindu joint family of which Sudir Kumar, the second respondent, is admittedly the Karta competent under the Hindu law, to represent all the members of the family in a transaction concerning the family estate such as the arbitration in question undoubtedly was. He had an existing interest, the same as the others, to defend the estate, and there was no fraud or collusion in the proceedings. He had an existing interest, the same as the others, to defend the estate, and there was no fraud or collusion in the proceedings. He must therefore be taken to have fully represented the family including his mother Bhusan Moyee, none the less so because his brother also appeared before the arbitrator and took part in the proceedings. The principle was rightly applied by the Calcutta High Court in Bina-vakdas Acharya Chowdhry v. Sasi Bhusan Chowdhry1 in upholding an award on facts more or less similar in essential particulars to those of the present case. It was next argued that the award could not stand as the arbitrator decided to give to the sons the entire share of Kunjalal in the property to the exclusion of his widow and the latter’s name was only included in the award at the last moment at the instance of an advocate Mr. Kishorilal Ghosal. There is no force in this argument. The arbitrator was not deciding who was entitled to Kunjalal’s share as between his sons and his widow. As has been stated, he was concerned only with dividing the family properties into three shares and allotting one to each branch. He assumed erroneously in common with all the parties concerned that the widow was not an heir of Kunjalal and accordingly proposed to allot his share to his sons in the draft award which he had prepared. Before, however, finally delivering his award he consulted a lawyer, as he was expressly authorised to do under the terms of the agreement to refer, and, finding out the mistake, he included the widow also among those who were to take lot No.1 allotted to Kunjalal’s share. I fail to see how a bona fide misconception as to the heirship of the widow which could not have possibly affected her interest and which too was discovered and rectified before the award was finally pronounced, can be a ground for setting aside the award. I am convinced that Bhusan Moyee’s suit is but an attempt by her sons who are dissatisfied with the portion of the dwelling house allotted to them, to get rid of the award, and their mother is only a tool in their hands. I am convinced that Bhusan Moyee’s suit is but an attempt by her sons who are dissatisfied with the portion of the dwelling house allotted to them, to get rid of the award, and their mother is only a tool in their hands. There are no merits in their claim nor any substance in the complaint against the arbitrator who obviouslv could not satisfy all the parties, howsoever he might divide that house. I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the decree and order of the Subordinate Judge. By the Court.-In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. G.R./V.S ------ Appeals dismissed.