JUDGMENT Chatterjee, J. - This is an application u/s 66(5) of the income tax Act, whereby we are asked to hold that the Appellate Tribunal wrongly rejected an application for stating a case as time barred. 2. One order was passed by the Appellate Tribunal on appeal u/s 19 of the Excess Profits Tax Act on July 22, 1945, in respect of the chargeable accounting periods ending on the last dates of the years 1939, 1940 and 1941. The points involved were the same in these chargeable accounting periods. 3. On August 1, 1946, the company received plain copies of the orders from the department. On September 18, 1946, applications for certified copies of the order were sent by post from Calcutta to Bombay which was the headquarters of the Appellate Tribunal at that time. 4. Our attention was drawn to the relevant rules then in force. Under Rule 19 and Rule 45 of the rules regulating the procedure of the Appellate Tribunal, a certified copy of the order in question has to be submitted unless the Tribunal dispensed therewith. These rules came into operation on February 15, 1944, as a result of a notification and continued in force till November 25, 1946. These rules were operative during the relevant period and certified copies of the orders were necessary for making an application u/s 66(1) of the Indian income tax Act, as adopted by Section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. 5. On September 23. 1946, a letter was addressed to the Registrar, Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, which was really an application u/s 66(1) of the Indian income tax Act, as adopted by Section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act in respect of the assessment for 1939 for reference of the High Court. The company sent no certified copy of the order, as it had not got any. On December 4, 1946, a reminder was sent to the Tribunal headquarters again at Bombay for granting the certified copies, which had been applied for on September 18, 1946. On December 7, 194:0, two more applications u/s 66(1), identical with the one dated September 23, 1946, were sent by post to the Tribunal Office at Bombay for the periods ending December 31, 1940 and December 31, 1941. The petitions were accompanied by treasury receipts for Rs. On December 7, 194:0, two more applications u/s 66(1), identical with the one dated September 23, 1946, were sent by post to the Tribunal Office at Bombay for the periods ending December 31, 1940 and December 31, 1941. The petitions were accompanied by treasury receipts for Rs. 100 each, being the requisite fees payable under the law, but no certified copies were forwarded, as none had been received by the company. On December 14, 1946, the Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, informed the Assessee that the letter or application of the company dated December 7, 1946, had been forwarded to the income tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, at Patna and that all correspondence should be made with the Assistant Registrar of the Calcutta Bench. 6. Then came the letter of December 17, 1946, from the Assistant Registrar of the Calcutta Bench at Patna, intimating the amount and manner of depositing certain fees. In the last sentence of the letter it was stated as follows: "The application "dated September 18, 1945, does not appear to have been "received in this office". 7. On January 6, 1947, the letter dated December 17, 1946, of the Assistant Registrar, Calcutta Bench of the Tribunal was received by the company. On the same day, Mr. A. Clause Sen, learned advocate for the insurance company, wrote to the Assistant Registrar, Calcutta Bench at Patna, asking for certain chalns and also requesting the Assistant Registrar to make enquiries in respect of the applications dated September 18, 1946. 8. On April 25, 1947, the applications u/s 66(1) in respect of the periods ending December 31, 1940 and December 31, 1941, were rejected by the Calcutta Bench of the Tribunal on the ground that they were time-barred, inasmuch as the applications were filed beyond sixty days from the service of the notice of an order u/s 33(4) and the Assessee was not entitled to deduction of time requisite for obtaining certified copies of the orders. 9. In our opinion, the grounds set forth in the order are untenable. The order recites that Mr. Sen, appearing in support of the application, contended that, u/s 67A of the Act, he was entitled to a deduction of time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the Tribunal's order. 10. 9. In our opinion, the grounds set forth in the order are untenable. The order recites that Mr. Sen, appearing in support of the application, contended that, u/s 67A of the Act, he was entitled to a deduction of time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the Tribunal's order. 10. Section 67A is in the following terms: In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal under this Act or for an application u/s 66, the day on which the order complained of was made and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of such orders shall be excluded. 11. In view of the mandatory provisions of this section, the insurance company was clearly entitled to the time taken for obtaining a copy of that order. The Appellate Tribunal rejected this contention on a somewhat extraordinary ground. They pointed out that the Applicant had been given a plain copy of the order and therefore Section 67A could not apply. They added that Section 67A did not permit a deduction of time requisite for obtaining another copy of such order. 12. In our opinion, the Appellate Tribunal was clearly wrong. The Applicant was entitled to an allowance of time as indicated in that section. Even if no certified copy was or is required to be filed the company is entitled to this allowance u/s 67A. Moreover, the department cannot possibly take advantage of its own default so as to take away the substantive right of appeal which the insurance company enjoyed under the statute. 13. One significant fact I should record. The application in respect of the chargeable accounting period ending December 31, 1939, has been allotted by the Appellate Tribunal and a statement of case has been drawn up and a Reference to this Court has been ordered. Inasmuch as the same questions covered all the three orders, the Tribunal ought to have held that the applications in respect of the other two periods were in order. It erred in computing the period of limitation as it did. 14. Before we conclude we ought to make one further observation. Mr. Sen, the advocate for the company, asserted before the Tribunal that he had applied for a certified copy of the order in each case on September 18, 1946. It erred in computing the period of limitation as it did. 14. Before we conclude we ought to make one further observation. Mr. Sen, the advocate for the company, asserted before the Tribunal that he had applied for a certified copy of the order in each case on September 18, 1946. The Tribunal refers to the letters wherein it was stated that the application "for certified copies had not been received by the Patna Office The Tribunal further added that there was no proof of posting of the applications and therefore they could not proceed on the assumption that such applications had in fact been made. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal ought to have accepted the statement of the learned advocate, specially as there was really no material on the strength of which the Tribunal could possibly refuse to accept the statement of counsel. All that the letter from the Patna Office said was that the application of September 18, 1946, did not appear to have been received in that office. But there is nothing to show that Bombay ever forwarded all the papers to Patna. On the other hand, the correspondence that had passed between the Calcutta advocate and the Bombay office, specially the letter which is referred to in para. 14 of the petition, shows that Bombay accepted the position that the applications for certified copies had in fact been made by the learned advocate. 15. We are satisfied that the Appellate Tribunal's decision was not correct in this case and in our opinion the Appellate Tribunal was wrong in holding that the applications in question were time barred. 16. We direct that the applications be received as made within time and proceeded with in accordance with law. The Assessee is entitled to the costs of these applications. There will be one set of costs for these two applications, the hearing fee being assessed at three gold mohurs. Harries C.J. 17. I agree.