Lodge C. J-_This is an appeal from a judg­ment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Assam Jalley Districts, delivered at Jorhat. The suit was instituted by one Balodev Khaund in the following circumstances. A society, known as the Bangala Pukhuri Gaolia Bank, was formed and was registered on 27th October 1913, under the Co-operative Societies Act (II [2] of 1912). Balodev Khaund was elected Chairman of the Society at a general meeting held on 27th August 1922, and continued to hold that office until 1934, except for a short interval. In 1934, a defalcation amounting to RS. 24,433-9 7 was detect­ed. On 2lst June 1933, the Managing Committee at meeting held that Rs. 13,768-6-3 was due from the ex. Chairman, Balodev Khaund, and passed a resolution to that effect, claiming the money from him. Thereafter the Managing Committee made a refence to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies for arbitration under cls. (l) and (2) of R. 32. The Assistant Registrar made an award to the effect that Rs. 13,768-6-3 was due from the ex-Chairman, who appealed against the award; but was unsuccessful in his appeal. Thereupon Balodev instituted a suit, being Suit No. 11 of 1938, to set aside the award, which suit was ultimately decreed in plaintiff's favour. While that suit was pending, the Registrar of Co­operative Societies cancelled the registration of the Bangala Pukhuri Gaolia Bank and ordered the dissolution of the society. A liquidator was appointed. The liquidator prepared a requisition for a certificate against Balodev Khaund, de­manding the sum of R8.12,91212-7. This sum was said to be due from Balodev Khaund under the Assistant Registrar's award referred to above, but the liquidator in preparing the requisition, described the claim as a contribution determined under S. 42 (2) (b), Co operative Societies Act. The Registrar countersigned the requisition which was then presented to the certificate officer, and signed by the latter under 8. 6, Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, and filed in big office. Balodev Khaund preferred an objection which wag dismissed by the certificate officer under s. 10, Public Demands Becovery Aet. Balodev Khaund appealed to the Deputy Com­missioner, who allowed the appeal and cancelled the certificate. The liquidator thereupon applied to the Revenue Tribunal under s. 53, Public Demands Becovery Act. The Bevenue Tribunal allowed the application, set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner and restored the certificate. Balodev Khaund appealed to the Deputy Com­missioner, who allowed the appeal and cancelled the certificate. The liquidator thereupon applied to the Revenue Tribunal under s. 53, Public Demands Becovery Act. The Bevenue Tribunal allowed the application, set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner and restored the certificate. [2] Balodev Khaund thereupon instituted the present suit praying for a declaration that the order of the certificate officer and the order of the Bevenue Tribunal were invalid, void and with­out jurisdiction, and praying further for an injunction restraining the liquidator from con­tinuing the proceedings in the certificate case. The suit was decreed on contest. [3] The liquidator has preferred this appeal. When the appeal came up for hearing, the only question argued was whether the Revenue Tribu­nal had jurisdiction under 8. 53, Public Demands Recovery Act, to revise the order of the Deputy Commissioner. It was conceded that if the order of the Revenue Tribunal was without jurisdiction and to be treated as a nullity, then the Deputy Commissioner's order would be in force, and the suit was rightly decreed. M The relevant portion of section 53, Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, reads: "The Com­missioner may revise any order passed by a Collector under this Act." When the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, became the law in Assam, there were two Commissioners of Divisions. Subsequently the post of one Commis­sioner, viz. the Commissioner, Surma Valley and Hill Division was abolished and an Act (Assam Act I [l] of 1939) was passed transferring 'the appellate and revisional powers in revenue matters' to the Assam Revenue Tribunal. Sec­tion 2 of this Act reads: "Subject to the next succeeding section, after the commencement of this Act, all powers and jurisdictions in Civil, Criminal and Revenue matters which have heretofore been exercised by the Commissioner, Surma Valley and Hill Division, shall be deemed to be trans­ferred to the Commissioner, Assam Valley Division, or to such other authority as the Governor may direct." Section 3 (2) of the same Act reads: "Notwithstanding anything in the preceding sub­section, the Commissioner, Assam Valley Division, shall not have jurisdiction to entertain appeals or to revise decisions in Revenue Case a arising in the Assam Valley Division, or in the Surma Valley and Hill Division. Any such jurisdiction as was immediately before the com­mencement of this Act, vested in the Commissioner of a Division, shall, after the commencement of this Act, be exercised by the Tribunal constituted under S. 296, Government of India Act, 1935." By Sch. B of this same Act, the definitions of 'Commissioner of a Division' in the General Clauses Act (Act X [10] of 1897), and in the Assam General Clauses Act (Assam Act II [2] of 1915) were amended by adding the words "and shall include the Assam Revenue Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction heretofore exercised by a Com­missioner in appeals and revisions in Revenue cases." The learned Subordinate Judge held that the jurisdiction ^exercised by the Collector in this particular certificate case was not jurisdiction in a revenue case, and that the certificate case was not a revenue matter. He, therefore, held that the power to revise the order of the Collector under S. 53, Public Demands Recovery Act, was not conferred on the Revenue Tribunal. Hence the order of the Revenue Tribunal was without jurisdiction and void. [5] Mr. Barua for the (appellant?) argued ; Firstly, that under Assam Act 1 [ll of 1939, jurisdiction has been conferred on the Revenue Tribunal in matters other than revenue matters, and that the Revenue Tribunal had jurisdiction to revise an order of the Collector, if it be held that that order was not passed in a 'revenue' case. [6] He argued secondly, that all cases arising under the Public Demands Recovery Act must be regarded as revenue cases and that therefore, the Revenue Tribunal had powers of revision, even if their jurisdiction is confined to revenue cases. [7] Thirdly, he contended that even if the Revenue Tribunal had, strictly speaking, no jurisdiction to revise the Collector's order, and that that power of revision vested in some other authority, the order of the Revenue Tribunal was not a nullity. [8] Mr. Barua sought to support his first contention by a reference to the language used in Sob. B of Assam Act I [1] of 1939, and contend­ed that the definition of the terms 'Commissioner of a Division' bad been extended to include the Revenue Tribunal. We can see no force in this contention. In Sch. [8] Mr. Barua sought to support his first contention by a reference to the language used in Sob. B of Assam Act I [1] of 1939, and contend­ed that the definition of the terms 'Commissioner of a Division' bad been extended to include the Revenue Tribunal. We can see no force in this contention. In Sch. B of Assam Act of 1939, it is clearly provided that the extension of the defini­tion only includes the Revenue Tribunal while exercising jurisdiction in appeals and revisions in revenue cases. It does not include the Revenue Tribunal when the latter purports to exercise a jurisdiction in cases which are not revenue cases, I, therefore, (hold?) the case with which we are concerned, was not a 'revenue case' in the sense in which that phrase is used in Assam Act I [l] of 1939, the Revenue Tribunal, while purporting to exercise jurisdiction in the case, did not do so as a Commissioner. [9] We are of opinion that unless the case was a revenue case in the sense in which that item is used in Assam Act I [1] of 1939, the 'Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction. [10] Mr. Barua contended that all certificate cases are to be treated as revenue cases. He con­tended in the first place that the Public Demands Recovery Act was pissed to deal with arrears of revenue, and that, therefore, all dues which can be realised under the Act ate to be regarded as arrears of revenue. [11] We can find no support for this argu­ment. Whatever the earlier forms of the Act. the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act of 1913 provides for realisation of dues which are describ­ed as 'public demands.' But the phrase 'public demands' is not used in the ordinary sense, but has been given a special meaning. According to the definition in the Act, "public demand" means any arrear or money men­tioned or referred to in Sch.I, and includes any interest which may, by law, be chargeable thereon up to the date on which a certificate is signed under Part. II." [12] Schedule I includes sums due which can­not be regarded as money due to the state in any sense: it includes many items which are not arrears of revenue and which are not even stated to be deemed to be arrears of revenue. II." [12] Schedule I includes sums due which can­not be regarded as money due to the state in any sense: it includes many items which are not arrears of revenue and which are not even stated to be deemed to be arrears of revenue. In our opinion, the mere fact that the money with which we are concerned, is defined as a 'public demand' in the Public Demands Recovery Act, does not mean that the money is to be regarded as an arrear of revenue. [13] Mr. Barua then contended that the phrase 'revenue case' in Assam Act I [1] of 1939, has a special meaning and is not confined to cases in which the revenue is concerned. He pointed to the fact that in numerous decisions of the High Court and even of the Judicial Committee, the Courts of the Certificate Officer and of the Collector have been referred to as Revenue Courts; and he contended that the phrase 'revenue case' merely means a case disposed of by a Revenue Court. As the Certificate Officer and the Collector have been described as Revenue Courts by the very highest authorities, it follows that their decisions must be regarded as given in revenue cases. [14] In this connection also he drew our atten­tion to the definition of a Collector in the General Clauses Act, as the officer in charge of the revenue administration of a District, and from this definition also he argued that any jurisdiction exercised by a Collector must be regarded as jurisdiction exercised in a revenue matter. [15] The fallacy in the latter part of the argument is apparent if the definition of a Com­missioner is also considered. The Commissioner of a Division is defined as the officer in charge of the revenue administration of a Division, yet the Commissioner undoubtedly exercised jurisdiction in civil, criminal and revenue cases: vide 8. 2 of Assam Act I [1] of 1939. It seems to us that where a special jurisdiction is conferred upon an officer who is also a revenue officer, it does not follow that that special jurisdiction is to be regarded as jurisdiction in a revenue matter. 2 of Assam Act I [1] of 1939. It seems to us that where a special jurisdiction is conferred upon an officer who is also a revenue officer, it does not follow that that special jurisdiction is to be regarded as jurisdiction in a revenue matter. [16] With regard to the first part of the argu­ment, we are not satisfied that because in the highest Courts the Courts of the Certificate Officer and of the Collector have been described as Re-venue Courts, to distinguish them from the ordi-nary civil Courts, it must be assumed that they are to be regarded as Courts dealing only with revenue cases or revenue matters. [17] It should be noted that the jurisdiction conferred on the Revenue Tribunal is not a juris­diction to hear appeals and revise orders passed by revenue Courts, but to hear appeals and revise orders passed in revenue cases. In our opinion, before the jurisdiction can be exercised, it must be shown that the case is a 'revenue case' in the ordinary meaning of the phrase, that is to say, a case in which matters of revenue are involved or matters which, by law, are deemed to be matters of revenue. It is not sufficient that the case has been disposed of by an officer who ordinarily exercises jurisdiction only in revenue matters. [18] It is interesting to note that when the second post of a Commissioner of a Division was abolished, an Act (Assam Act XII [12] of 3917), was passed for the transfer of the powers pre­viously exercised by the Commissioner, Assam Valley Division, and in exercise of the powers conferred under S. 3 of that Act, an order was passed by the local Government transferring the powers of the Commissioner under s. 53, Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, to an officer designated the Development Commis­sioner: vide Notification No. R.L.12.46 8 dated 8th May 1918. If Mr. Barua's contention were well founded, the Commissioner, Assam Valley Division, had no jurisdiction under s. 53, Public Demands Recovery Act, after the passing of Assam Act I [1] of 1939. [19] This order does show that the local Government did not consider that the powers of the Commissioner under S. 63, Public Demands Recovery Act, had been transferred to the Re-venue Tribunal, and that they did not under. [19] This order does show that the local Government did not consider that the powers of the Commissioner under S. 63, Public Demands Recovery Act, had been transferred to the Re-venue Tribunal, and that they did not under. stand the phrase 'revenue cases' in Assam Act I []] of 1939 to include all cases decided in what, for convenience, are sometimes described as revenue Courts. [20] In our opinion, the learned subordinate Judge was right in holding that this was not a revenue case and that the Revenue Tribunal had no power under 8. 53 of the Act to revise the order of the Collector. [21] Mr. Barua lastly contended that even if the Revenue Tribunal had, strictly speaking, no jurisdiction, their order was not a nullity as the Revenue Tribunal would have had power to revise whatever order might be passed by the authority which had jurisdiction to revise the Collector's order. In other words, the Revenue Tribunal exercised its jurisdiction prematurely and, therefore, its order should not be treated as a nullity. We are unable to accept this argu­ment. The Collector had jurisdiction to pass the order which he did pass. The Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction to revise his order. It is by no means certain what view the Revenue Tribunal would have taken if orders had been passed by the proper authority on an applica­tion for revision of the Collector's order. [22] In our opinion, the order of the Revenue Tribunal must be regarded as having been passed wholly without jurisdiction, and void. [23] In this view, we order that the appeal be dismissed with costs. [24] Thadani J. - This is a first appeal from the judgment and decree of the Addl. Sub­ordinate Judge, A. V. D., Jorhat, dated 10th December 1945, by which he decreed the plain­tiff's suit brought under the following circum­stances. [25] The plaintiff, Balodev Khaund, was the Chairman of Co-operative Village Society in Jorhat, called the Bongalo Pukhuri Gaolia Co­operative Bank, duly registered under the Co­operative Societies Act, The plaintiff held the office of the Chairman of the Bank from 1922 to 1934. The Secretary of the Co-operative Bank was one Binanda Chandra Baruah. In 1934, it was dis­covered that a large sum of money belonging to the Bank was missing. The plaintiff' and the Secretary were arrested. The Secretary of the Co-operative Bank was one Binanda Chandra Baruah. In 1934, it was dis­covered that a large sum of money belonging to the Bank was missing. The plaintiff' and the Secretary were arrested. The plaintiff was sub-sequently released, but the Secretary was prose­cuted for misappropriating the Bank's monies. The Secretary pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced. [26] Shortly afterwards, the old Directors of the Bank were replaced by new Directors, and the latter made a reference to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Assam, claiming Bs. 13,000 odd against the plaintiff as compensation for gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a trustee of the Bank's monks. On 1st October 1936, the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies issued a notice to the plaintiff calling upon him to submit to the Inspector of Co-ope­rative Societies, Jorhat Circle, within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, a statement in writing showing cause why a decree should not be passed against him in accordance with his decision, and that upon the plaintiff's failure to comply with the terms of the notice, an ex parte decree would be passed against him. The plaintiff in due course, submitted an explanation which the As­sistant Registrar, Mr. K. Shome, regarded as unsatisfactory, and on 16th February 1938 he passed an order in the following terms: "Now, therefore, I, in accordance with E. 32 of the Rules framed by the Local Government under S. 43, Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (Act II [2] of 1912) hereby make the following decision against the said Baladev Khaund, viz., that ho do pay to the Bangala-Pukburi Gaolia Bank Kg. 13,768-6 3, which was due on 9th April 1934, and further interest on the principal sum adjudged at the rate of 6| per cent, per annum from 16th February 1938, together with all cost till the date of realisation. It is further ordered that the order of attachment before award passed on 10th July 1936, do continue. This decision is enforceable as a decree of civil Court having local jurisdiction." [27] Against the decision of the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, the plaintiff appealed to the Registrar of Co-operative Socie­ties, Assam, who intimated to the plaintiff that an appeal against the decision of the Assistant Registrar of Co operative Societies lay to the local Government and not to him and returned the petition to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed an appeal to the local Government but his appeal was dismissed, as a result of which he instituted a suit on 19th September 1938, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Sibsagar, for a declaration that the award passed by the Assistant Registrar was illegal, ultra vires, and without jurisdiction. The Additional Subordinate Judge A. V. D., decreed the plaintiff's suit, thereby setting aside the award passed by the Assistant Registrar. [28] During the pendency of this suit instituted by the plaintiff on 19th September 1938, the Co­operative Bank went into liquidation, and the Inspector of Co-operative Societies, Jorhat Cir­cle, was appointed Ex-Officio Liquidator of the Bank. The Liquidator defended the suit institu­ted by the plaintiff, to which we have referred. At the conclusion of the trial, the judgment was to be pronounced on 13th July 1940. On 5th July 1940, however, the Liquidator prepared a requisition for a certificate against the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 12,942-12-3, had it countersign­ed by the Registrar on 9th July 1940 and filed it before the Certificate Officer under 8.5, Public Demands Recovery Act. The plaintiff filed objections which were dismissed by the Certifi­cate Officer. A certificate was issued against the plaintiff on 12th July 1940, certifying that the sum mentioned in the requisitioned certificate was recoverable from the certificate-debtor (the plaintiff) and that the suit was not time-barred. [29] The plaintiff appealed to the Collector under s, 51, Public Demands Recovery Act, against the decision of the Certificate Officer, and the Collector, by his order dated 30th May 1941, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Certificate Officer passed on 12th July 1940, including the Requisition made by the Liquidator on 5th July 1940. Against the decision of the Collector, the Liquidator took pro­ceedings before the Revenue Tribunal, Assam, and the Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Collector and restored the Certificate by its order dated 11th October 1943. As a result of the decision of the Revenue Tribunal, the plaintiff brought the present suit. Against the decision of the Collector, the Liquidator took pro­ceedings before the Revenue Tribunal, Assam, and the Revenue Tribunal set aside the order of the Collector and restored the Certificate by its order dated 11th October 1943. As a result of the decision of the Revenue Tribunal, the plaintiff brought the present suit. [30] The plaintiff's case is that the certificate Officer had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the claim, as the claim was not a claim for contribution, that the claim, purpor­ting to be a claim for contribution, was barred by limitation, that the order passed by the Cer­tificate Officer was ultra vires and without jurisdictions that the Requisition of the Liqui­dator dated 5tb July 1940, and the order of the Certificate Officer, dated 12th July 1940, were un-enforceable in law; that the order of the Collector passed in appeal on 30th May 1941, was a final order, that no appeal or revision lay . against that order to the Revenue Tribunal ; that the order passed by the Revenue Tribunal on 11th October 1943, was ultra vires, and un-enforceable in law. [31] The defence to the suit was that the civil Court had no jurisdiction, that the suit was bar­red by limitation, that the order passed by the Liquidator was an order for contribution, that the order of the Certificate Officer and that of the Revenue Tribunal were in accordance with law, validly passed and, therefore, enforceable. [32] Upon the pleadings the Trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try this suit ? 2. Whether the suit is maintainable ? 3. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? 4. Whether the suit and the consequential relief prayed for have been properly valued and adequate court-fee has been paid ? 5. Whether the order of contribution passed by the Liquidator on 5th July 1940, and the order of the Certificate Officer passed on 12th July 1940, were legal and valid and enforceable? Whether the appellate order of the Collector, dated 30th May 1941, wag final, and whether an appeal lay before the Revenue Tribunal ? 6. To what relief or reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? [33] From the judgment of the Trial Court, it appears that issues Nos. 3 and 4 were not pressed. The Trial Court disposed of issues Nos. 1, 2 and 5 together. 6. To what relief or reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? [33] From the judgment of the Trial Court, it appears that issues Nos. 3 and 4 were not pressed. The Trial Court disposed of issues Nos. 1, 2 and 5 together. Before us, issues Nos. 1 and 2 have not been argued. The only issue argued before us was issue 5. [34] There is no doubt that no appeal lay against the order of the Collector, but it is argued that having regard to the provisions of S. 53, Public Demands Recovery Act, the Revenue Tribunal had jurisdiction to revise the order of the collector. 1 and 2 have not been argued. The only issue argued before us was issue 5. [34] There is no doubt that no appeal lay against the order of the Collector, but it is argued that having regard to the provisions of S. 53, Public Demands Recovery Act, the Revenue Tribunal had jurisdiction to revise the order of the collector. For a proper construction of S. 53, with reference to the facts of this case, it is necessary to refer to Assam Act I of 1939 called the Assumption of Commissioner's Powers Dis­tribution Act of 1939, The preamble to the Act says: "Whereas the Secretary of State has sanctioned the abolition of the poat of Commissioner, Surma Valley and Hill Division ; And whereas the Governor of Assam has appointed the Commissioner, Assam Valley Division, to exercise jurisdiction in certain matters in the Surma Valley and Hill Division ; And whereas, as a measure of relief to the Commis­sioner, Assam Valley Division, it is expedient to transfer his appellate and revisional powers in Revenue matters to the Assam Revenue Tribunal, and to distribute between the Provincial Government and the Deputy Commissioners or such other authori­ties as the Provincial Government may direct, certain Junctions hitherto exercised by the Commissioners under the Assam Local Self Government Act, 1915, and the Assam Municipal Act, 1923." Section 2 of the Act says : "Subject to the next succeeding section after the commencement of this Act, all powers and jurisdic­tion in Civil, Criminal- and Revenue matters, which have hitherto been exercised by the Commissioner, Surma Valley and Hill Division, shall be deemed to be transferred to the Commissioner, Assam Valley Divi­sion, or to such other authority as the Governor may direct." Section 3 (2) of the same Act says : "Notwithstanding anything in the preceding sub­section, the Commissioner, Assam Valley Division, shall not have jurisdiction to entertain appeals or revise decisions in Revenue cases arising in the Assam Valley Division, or in the Surma Valley and Hill Division, Any such jurisdiction as was immediately before the commencement of the Act vested in the Commis­sioner of the Division, shall, after the com­mencement of this Act to be exercised by the Tribunal constituted under S. 296, Government of India Act, 1935." [35] On the material date in this case, the Commissioner, Assam Valley Division, had ceased to have revisional jurisdiction in revenue cases arising in the Assam Valley Division or in the Surma Valley and Hill Division. It was only the Revenue Tribunal which could exercise its revisional jurisdiction in revenue cases. The question, therefore, for our consideration is whether the subject-matter before the Revenue Tri­bunal was a revenue case. If it was not a reve­nue case, there can be no doubt that the order of the Revenue Tribunal setting aside the order of the Collector was without jurisdiction, [36] Mr. Barua for the appellant, contended that the matter before the Revenue Tribunal was a revenue case. His contention was that a Certificate Officer, under the Public Damands Recovery Act, was a revenue authority, and that in the exercise of his jurisdiction under the Act, he functions as a revenue Court, any matter, therefore, in which he functions as a revenue Court, must be regarded as a revenue case; the order of the Collector on appeal is also an order passed in a revenue case and as such it is sub­ject to the revisional jurisdiction o£ the Tribunal. The contention is plausible, but not convincing. [37] The expression "jurisdiction of the subject-matter" has been annotated in the "Law Lexicon of British India" by P. Eamanatha Iyer, at page 651 in these words: "Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to here and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs." ( Schedule I to the Public Demands Recovery Act enumerates cases of two classes which the Certificate Officer has power to hear and deter, mine. Article 12-A of Schedule I cites a particular case which the Certificate Officer has power to hear and determine. The question which arises is whether a case covered by Art. 12-A of Schedule I to the Public Demands Recovery Act, is a revenue case. Schedule I to the Public Demands Recovery Act enumerates certain cases which are indubitably Revenue cases, for instance, cases covered by Arts. 1 and 2 of the schedule. Schedule I in terms divides the subject-matter of the juris­diction of the Certificate Officer into two classes: (1) cases which are revenue cases, strictly so called, or by implication, and (2) others which are only money cases. In view of this division, we do not think it would be reasonable to say that a sum of money covered by Art. 12-A, is a Revenue case. It is, in our opinion, a money case over which a Certificate Officer has been given jurisdiction. In view of this division, we do not think it would be reasonable to say that a sum of money covered by Art. 12-A, is a Revenue case. It is, in our opinion, a money case over which a Certificate Officer has been given jurisdiction. It is not disputed that if the subject-matter covered by Art. 12-A is not to be regarded as a revenue case, a Commissioner of a Division before the appointment of the Revenue Tribunal, had no jurisdiction to exercise his revisional jurisdiction in the matter; of an order passed by a Collector on appeal. It follows then that if the Commissioner was not competent to exercise his revisional powers under S. 53, Public Demands Recovery Act, in this case his successor, the Revenue Tribunal, equally had no revisional jurisdiction in matters covered by Art. 12 a of schedule I. If the Revenue Tri­bunal had no jurisdiction to entertain this matter, being a money case, and not a Revenue case, it follows that the order of the Collector on appeal setting aside the order of the Certificate Officer, was final and must stand. [38] The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs. [39] Ram Labhaya J-I have hadt he ad-vantage of reading the judgment of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and I entirely agree with him. I have also read the judgment of my learned' brother Thadani and I wish to add a few words. [40] The decision of the case turns on the question whether the Revenue Tribunal could revise the order of the Collector dated 30th May 1941. [41] The Revenue Tribunal, it is contended, had been invested with the powers of the Com­missioner, Assam Valley Division, under S. 63,, Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, (herein­after called the Public Demands Act). Section 3(2), Assam Commissioners' Powers Distribution Act (Act I [l] 1939), (hereinafter called the Distribu­tion of Powers Act), lays down that the Commis­sioner, Assam "Valley Division, shall not have jurisdiction to entertain appeals or revise deci­sions in revenue cases arising in the Assam Valley Division or in the Surma Valley Division and all such jurisdiction shall, after the commence­ment of the Act, be exercised by the tribunal constituted under S. 296, Government of India Act. [42] The learned counsel argues that the appellate and the revisional jurisdiction of the Commissioner in revenue cases, which was trans­ferred to Revenue Tribunal included the powers of the Commissioner to revise orders of the Col­lector under S. 53, Public Demands Act, as certified proceedings under the Act -are revenue cases. As Commissioner's powers in revenue cases were transferred to the tribunal, it could revise the order of the Collector under S. 53, Public Demands Act. [43] The expression 'revenue cases' has not been defined any where. The word 'case' occurs in S. 115, Civil P. C. In that section, it has been held to include proceedings other than suits as well. In its dictionary meaning also, the word 'case' is not so limited in scope as the suit. It can include proceedings other than suits and a certificate proceeding may well be regarded as a case. The question is whether it can be regarded as a revenue case. This is the crucial point in the case. Mr. Barua insists that all matters or cases covered by the Public Demands Act should be treated as revenue cases. We find no warrant for a proposition so broadly stated. [44] The examination of the scheme of the Public Demands Act seems necessary for ascer­taining whether the contention that certificate proceedings are revenue cases in the sense in which the words occur in S. 3 (2) and Boh. B, Distribution of Powers Act. Section 3 (3), Public Demands Acts, defines 'certificate officer." Accord­ing to the definition given therein 'certificate officer' means a Collector, a Sub-divisional Offi­cer, and any officer appointed by a Collector, with the sanction of the Commissioner, to per­form the functions of a certificate officer under the Act. It is clear that while Collectors and Sub-divisional Officers are made certificate officers by virtue of their office, a Collector can, with the sanction of the Commissioner, appoint any other officer as a certificate officer. It is not necessary that the officer so appointed should be a Revenue Officer. [45] A public demand covered by the Act means any arrear or money mentioned or referr­ed to in sch. 1, and it includes any interest which may, by law, be chargeable thereon. Schedule l of the Act enumerates public demands. It is not necessary that the officer so appointed should be a Revenue Officer. [45] A public demand covered by the Act means any arrear or money mentioned or referr­ed to in sch. 1, and it includes any interest which may, by law, be chargeable thereon. Schedule l of the Act enumerates public demands. An exa­mination of the list of items discloses that any money, which is declared by an enactment for the time being in force to be a demand or a public demand, or to be recoverable as arrears of a demand, or public demand are public demands for the purposes of the Act. Money not payable on account of revenue to the Government, Central or Provincial, may be a demand for purpose of the Act. One such demand which has no connection at all with the revenues of the Government, Central or Provincial, and which may be permitted to be recovered as a public demand is the rent due to a landlord under s. 107, Assam (Temporarily Settled Dis­tricts) Tenancy Act. Similar provisions exist in the Bengal Tenancy Act for helping landlords to realise their dues from tenants under given circumstances. Arrears of rent or of any demand recoverable as rent by the Court of Wards in charge of any property are public demands (vide item 8 of sch.-l), and so is any sum ordered by a liquidator appointed under sub-section of 8.42, Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, to be recovered as a contribution to the assets or as the cost of . liquidation (vide item 12A of the schedule). [46] Now, in all the aforementioned instances, sums recoverable have no manner of .semblance to the demands in the nature of revenue payable to Government. It is thus obvious that a certificate officer need not be a Revenue Officer and a public demand need not be a demand on ac­count of revenue due to Government. The Act includes within its scope demands in the recovery of which the State may have an interest for administrative reasons though they may not be payable to the Government, Provincial or Central, on account of revenues. [47] Section 5 of the Act makes it further clear that the Act includes within its scope de­mands recoverable by persons who may not be officers of the Government. [47] Section 5 of the Act makes it further clear that the Act includes within its scope de­mands recoverable by persons who may not be officers of the Government. It provides that if any public demand is payable to any person (not necessarily a Revenue Officer or an officer of the Government) other than the Collector, he shall send to the certificate officer a written requisi­tion in the prescribed form. Clause 2 of the sec­tion is even more significant. It lays down that such a requisition (requisition about a demand not due to Collector) must be signed and verified in the prescribed manner, and, except in such cases as may be prescribed, shall be chargeable with the fee of the amount which would be pay­able under the Court-fees Act in respect of a plaint for the recovery of a sum of money equal to that stated in the requisition as being due. Public demands recoverable by persons other than the Collector are thus placed on a par with claims in the Civil Courts in the matter of stamp duty. [48] On a requisition for a certificate, the certificate officer, if satisfied that the de­mand i3 recoverable and that recovery by suit is not barred by law, may sign a certificate in the prescribed form stating that the demand is due and shall include in the certificate the fee, if any, paid under 8. 5 sub-section (2) and shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office. On a certificate being so filed, the certificate-debtor has the 'right to contest his liability under 8. 9. [49] Part III of the Act deals with the execu­tion of certificates and is relevant as showing that the Act contains exhaustive provisions for the execution of certificates filed under the Act. [50] Part IV of the Act deals with references to the civil Court. Under s. 34, the certificate-debtor may institute a suit in a civil Court to have the certificate cancelled or modified after the decision of his petition (under S. 9) denying his liability and also after the disposal of his appeal under s. 51. Section 35 lays down the ground on which a certificate may be cancelled or modified. It can be cancelled if the amount demanded was not due or had been paid. Section 35 lays down the ground on which a certificate may be cancelled or modified. It can be cancelled if the amount demanded was not due or had been paid. [51] Every Collector, Certificate Officer, Assistant or Deputy Collector acting under the Act and every servant of the Crown making a requisition under S. 5, are in the discharge of their functions under the Act to be deemed as acting judicially within the meaning of the judicial Officers' Protection Act and all the officers mentioned above have the powers of a civil Court for purposes of receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents (vide 83. 48 and 49). [52] The summary remedy provided by the Act for recovery of public demands is in addition to and not in derogation of any power conferred by any other Act which may be in force for the recovery of a particular demand. The Act does not affect other legal remedies available to those by whom the demand may be recovered. The examination of the important provisions of the Act and its scheme as a whole yields the following results: (l) Any money (not necessar­ily due to Government) may be declared a public demand. Arrears of rent due to certain landlords and money due to Co operative Soci­eties are examples. (2) The Certificate Officer, who exercises original jurisdiction in certificate proceedings, which are initiated by a requisition need not be a revenue officer. (3) The manner of initiation of proceedings is different from that by which proceedings are initiated in civil and revenue Courts. The requisition under the Act takes the place of the plaint or the application. (4) The Act provides a speedy remedy for recovery of certain demands to which it applies and for this purpose creates a special jurisdic­tion and provides a complete machinery for its exercise. The summary character of the remedy is apparent. The certificate, debtor can take the dispute to the civil Court under s. 35 -and have it decided in a regular suit. It resembles the remedy given to a person whose property is wrongfully attached in execution of a decree. He can apply to the execution Court for its release in summary proceedings and can insti­tute a regular suit if he is not satisfied with the decision of the executing Court. It resembles the remedy given to a person whose property is wrongfully attached in execution of a decree. He can apply to the execution Court for its release in summary proceedings and can insti­tute a regular suit if he is not satisfied with the decision of the executing Court. The remedy under the Act is also in addition to and not in derogation of any other remedy available for the recovery of the demands under any other Act. The summary remedy is the creature of a special law under which certain officers are vested with special jurisdiction for making available the summary remedy that it brings into existence. (5) The certificate proceedings have not been described as revenue cases any­where in the Act. Some revenue officers may have been vested with powers under the Act but all officers acting under the Act need not be revenue officers. Officers exercising -jurisdic­tion under the Act, whether revenue officers or not, derive their jurisdiction from the express provisions of the Act. [53] On the basis of the above analysis of the important provisions of the Act, one may con. elude that there is no basis for the contention that all officers acting under the Act are revenue officers and certificate proceedings at all stages are revenue cases. A demand for contribu­tion by the liquidator of a Co-operative Society from one of its members is not a revenue demand in any sense. An Act of the Legislature may even include it among revenue demands recoverable under the Land Revenue Regulation, but this has not been done. It has merely been declared to be demand recoverable by a special procedure of a summary character under the Public Demands Act without affecting other available methods of recovery. [54] All disputes of a civil nature, which are covered by s. 9, Civil P. 0., are cognisable by the civil Courts unless they are excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil Courts either expressly or by necessary implication. There are local and special laws which expressly exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in certain specified matters. Section 154, Land and Revenue Regu­lation, Assam, enumerates matters which are taken out of jurisdiction of civil Courts. In respect of these matters, it is further laid down that they shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue officers or revenue Courts which are created by the Regulation. Similarly, 8. Section 154, Land and Revenue Regu­lation, Assam, enumerates matters which are taken out of jurisdiction of civil Courts. In respect of these matters, it is further laid down that they shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue officers or revenue Courts which are created by the Regulation. Similarly, 8. 88, Assam Tenancy Act gives a list of matters taken out of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts and reserved for disposal by revenue Courts or officers. But for these provisions, these mat­ters would have been civil matters and cognisable by civil Courts. The law, by which civil matters are placed within the jurisdiction of certain officers or Courts defines or describes the status and the nature of the authority they are permitted to exercise. Local laws dealing with land revenue and its collection and also with certain matters between landlords and tenants are within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities. There may be other enactments also by which certain matters are placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities as such. All these matters could be described as revenue cases, but not matters, which under a special law can be disposed of by officers exerci­sing summary jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act, particularly when the exercise of that jurisdiction is subject to the supervision by the civil Court. A matter would be a revenue case if by statute it is included in the list of matters cognisable by revenue Courts or by revenue officers as such. If this test is app­lied to the facts of the case, the conclusion that it will lead to would be same which has been arrived at from the examination of the provi­sions of the Public Demands Act. [65] Act 1 of 1939 (Commissioner's Powers Distribution Act) refers in the preamble to three distinct jurisdictions, viz,, (l) Appellate and Revisional Jurisdiction in revenue cases. Juris­diction under (2) the Local Self-Government Act and (3) the Assam Municipal Act. Sec­tion 3 (2) read with schedule B transfers juris­diction of the Commissioner in appeals and revisions in revenue cases to the Revenue Tribunal. No such specific provision has been made in the Act itself about jurisdictions under the Local Self-Government Act and the Municipal Act. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner under the Acts was to be distributed between the Deputy Commissioners or other Officers and the Provincial Government. No such specific provision has been made in the Act itself about jurisdictions under the Local Self-Government Act and the Municipal Act. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner under the Acts was to be distributed between the Deputy Commissioners or other Officers and the Provincial Government. For this purpose, power was conferred on the Governor by s. 4, of the Act to amend, alter or repeal the provisions of any enactment so as to bring them in accord with the provisions of the Act. This would show that the use of the word 'revenue case' was not in such a comprehensive sense as to include all mat­ters in which the Commissioner could exercise jurisdiction. This was the interpretation which the Provincial Government also put on the provisions contained in the Act 1 of 1939. In its view also, the words 'revenue cases' as used in the Act did not include certificate cases under the Public Demands Act. When, therefore, the second post of the Commissioner was abolished and the Assam Act XII of 1947 was passed for the transfer of powers previously exercised by the Com­missioner, Assam Valley Division, in the exercise of the powers conferred under S. 3 of that Act, an order was passed by the Provincial Government transferring powers of the Commis­sioner under S. 53, Public Demands Act to the Development Commissioner (vide Notifi­cation No. B. L. 12-46 8 dated 8th May 1948). If these powers had been vested in the Revenue Tribunal in 1939, the transfer of these powers in 1947 to the Development Commis­sioner would not have been necessary. The view of the law, which Government took and gave effect to may not be binding on us, but we have independently arrived at the same result. The Notification under Act XII of 1947 does not indicate that certificate cases were not being considered as covered by the expression 'revenue cases' as used in. the Public Demands Act. [56] The conclusion is that certificate cases are not 'revenue cases' in the sense in which the expression was used in the 'Distribution of Powers Act'. Appeal dismissed.