JUDGMENT Das Gupta, J. - On April 16, 1949, an information was lodged at the Rampurhat police station in the district of Birbhum of an offence u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code by causing the death of Bipin Mandal. On September 23, 1949, the final report u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was submitted by the police, in which it was said that, while it was true that an offence u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code was committed, there was no evidence available to connect Jiban Krishna Samanta or any of the other persons whose names were given out as culprits during the investigation, with the crime. The police recommended, accordingly, that this Jiban Krishna and other persons might be discharged from bail. Accordingly, an order was signed on the final report on that date, viz., September 23, 1949, by the subdivisional officer in these words: G.R. 144/49--Enter true Section 302, Indian Penal Code, discharge accused persons from Court bail. Disposal of properties as prayed for by the investigating officer. 2. It appears that, in the order-sheet of the record, the order that was passed by the learned Magistrate was in these words: 23/9--Final Report submitted with case diary. Put up tomorrow. Accused as before. 3. On September 24, 1949, there is this order: I had no time to go through the diary. Court Sub-Inspector to prepare a brief and put up on 11/10. 4. Then finally on October 11, 1949, is the order which is responsible for the present proceedings: Perused diary. In the interest of justice, there should be a judicial trial in this case of the following accused persons, viz.-- (1) Jiban Krishna Samanta, (2) Satya Mal, (3) Anwar, (4) Kokila Mal. They are all summoned u/s 304, Indian Penal Code. Accused Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are present and they should remain on same bail as before. As for Anwar, he is absconding and proclamation and attachment have been served against him. So the trial may proceed without Anwar. The case is transferred to the file of Sri B.K. Bhattacharjya, Magistrate, First Class, for disposal. Other accused persons are discharged. 5. The present Rule was obtained by Jiban Krishna Samanta for quashing the proceedings pending against him. 6. Mr. So the trial may proceed without Anwar. The case is transferred to the file of Sri B.K. Bhattacharjya, Magistrate, First Class, for disposal. Other accused persons are discharged. 5. The present Rule was obtained by Jiban Krishna Samanta for quashing the proceedings pending against him. 6. Mr. Narendra Kumar Basu, appearing for the Petitioner, contends that once the subdivisional Magistrate had signed the order directing the discharge of the accused persons from Court bail, he had no authority to issue process against the Petitioner except on a further report from the police, or on a petition of complaint. 7. It appears that, though the learned Magistrate had signed the order mentioned above directing the discharge of the accused from Court bail, the signature was thereafter cancelled. The learned Magistrate has in his explanation to the Sessions Judge stated that he himself cancelled this order immediately after he had passed it. Mr. Basu has asked us to believe that this is not very likely, specially in view of the fact that the order directing the final report to be put up on October 11, 1949, was signed by the Magistrate on September 24, 1949. He suggests that if is likely that the learned Magistrate may have cancelled his previous order not earlier than September 24, 1949. 8. His main contention, however, is that, whether the learned Magistrate cancelled his order within a few minutes after he had signed it, or more than twenty-four hours or even later, the position in law is that he had signed the order and the effect of that order was that the accused persons had been discharged from Court bail and without fresh proceedings being started, process could not be issued. 9. I agree with Mr. Basu that the question whether the signature was cancelled immediately after it had been affixed, or some time later, is of little consequence. The real point for determination is that whether after having on a final report submitted by the police u/s 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directed the discharge of the accused persons in accordance with the report, a Magistrate has in law any authority to issue process u/s 204 of the Code. 10. The first question is whether the Magistrate did take any cognizance of any offence u/s 190(2)(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. The first question is whether the Magistrate did take any cognizance of any offence u/s 190(2)(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is quite clear that, in this present case, he cannot be said to have taken any cognizance either u/s 190(1)(a) or u/s 190(1)(6) of the Code. As has been pointed out in many cases, the wording of Section 190(2) of the Code does not contemplate cognizance to be taken as against an offender. All that is contemplated is that cognizance should be taken of an offence. In the present case, when the Magistrate passed the order "Enter true, Section 302, Indian Penal Code", I can see no reason for thinking that he did not take cognizance of the offence. The fact that at that stage he felt that no process need issue does not, in my opinion, alter the fact that by ordering "Enter true, Section 302, Indian Penal Code", he was taking cognizance of the offence. 11. The next question is, if, when at the time he took cognizance of the offence, he decided that no process need issue, he was precluded thereby from coming to a different decision later, on a perusal of the police diary, in the absence either of proceedings on a petition of complaint or of a fresh report from any police officer. Mr. Basu contends that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for any such issue of process when once the Magistrate had decided that process should not issue. Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the issue of process is in these words: (1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is a sufficient ground for proceeding and the case appears to be one in which, according to the fourth column of the second schedule, a summons should issue in the first instance, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused. If the case appears to be one in which, according to that column, a warrant should issue in the first instance, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has not jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. 12. 12. While it is true that there is no specific provision in the Code dealing with the case where once the Magistrate has decided that process need not issue, there is nothing in the wording of Section 204 to prevent the Magistrate who has taken cognizance from issuing such process if and when he conies to the conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding. I am prepared to agree that it would be odd if, without any new material before him, the Magistrate would once decide that there was no case for further proceeding and then again would change his mind and say that there is ground for proceeding. In the present case, however, we have to take note of the fact that according to the Magistrate's own explanation, which we have no reason to doubt, when he had first decided that there was no ground for issuing process and discharged the accused from Court bail, he had no opportunity of going through the case diary. Thereafter, he went through the case diary, and after going through the case diary, he changed his mind. If there was any thing in law that he could not change his mind, the position would certainly be as Mr. Basu has said that without any petition of complaint or further report from the police, the Magistrate would have no authority to issue any process. I am, however, unable to see that such a meaning should be read into the law when there is no express provision for the same. 13. In my opinion, the learned Magistrate did not act without any authority in issuing process against the present Petitioner, after having once decided that process should not issue and inspite of the fact that the police reported that there was no evidence to connect the accused person with the crime. 14. I would, accordingly, discharge this Rule. Lahiri J. 15. I agree.