Thadani C. J. - This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, A. V. D., dated 22.9-1944 who set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court which had dismissed the plaintiff appellant's suit for declaration of title and khas possession to the land in suit. The trial Court had decreed the plaintiff's title to certain houses standing upon the land and awarded compensation for the defendants' failure to vacate them. This part; of the judgment and decree of the trial Court was affirmed by the lower appellate Court. [2] The facts material to the appeal are these: On 20-1-1943 the plaintiff purchased from defendant 1 by two registered sale deeds the lands i in suit and certain houses standing thereon. On the same day, (20-1-43) defendants 1, 2 and 3 executed a kabuliyat in favour of the plaintiff, by which they were permitted by the plaintiff to live in the houses rent-free for three months and on the expiry of the period, they were to vacate them. On the strength of the purchases, the plaintiff applied for mutation of his name in the municipal register, but his application was successfully resisted by defendants 1, 2 and 4. The plaintiff thereupon brought the present suit. [3] The defence to the -suit was that the land and houses were the ejmali paternal properties of defendants l and 2; that they were in possession of them as co-sharers; that the land was held by defendant 1 under an annual patta from Government and as such could not be the subject-matter of a sale; that the annual patta was renewed by the Government in favour of defendant 1 even after the alleged sale. Defendant 4 further contended that 13 lessas out of the land in suit were given to him by gift from his grandfathers Mahnur and Pahnur and that he had been in possession of this land for 25-30 years. [4]. Upon the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties? 2. Whether adequate court-fees have been paid in respect of the claim in the suit ? 3.
[4]. Upon the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues : 1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of parties? 2. Whether adequate court-fees have been paid in respect of the claim in the suit ? 3. Whether defendants 1 and 2 sold and delivered possession of the land and houses in suit to the plaintiff, and whether the plaintiff has acquired valid right and title to the said properties by her said purchase ? 4. Whether defendants 1, 2 and 3 stayed on the properties in the suit by a kabuliyat and whether they are holding over after the expiry of the period stipulated ? 5. Whether the defendants are liable to pay the compensation claimed and if so, to what extent ? 6. Whether defendants 2 and 4 have any subsisting right and title to the properties in suit as alleged in their written statements, and if so, whether the plaintiff's' claim is affected in any way ? 7. Whether the plaintiff's claim is barred by limitation as alleged in the written statement ? 8. Whether defendant 2 has acquired any prescriptive right as alleged in his written statement ? 9. What relief or reliefs, if any, the parties are entitled ? 10. Whether the land in suit is covered by annual patta and whether such land can be sold ? 11. Whether there can be any lease of the land or the house ? 12. Whether the suit lands are ancestral properties of the defendants and whether the co-sharers are made parties in this suit ? 13. Whether the suit is maintainable ? [5] On issue 8, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had not acquired a valid title to the land in suit inspect of his purchase by sale deed Ex. 1, but had acquired a good title to the houses by virtue of his purchase by Ex. 2- The lower appellate Court reversed the finding of the trial Court in so far as it held that the plaintiff had not acquired any title to the land in suit by EX. l. [6] Two points only have been argued before us: (l) Whether the transfer of the land in suit, which was sold by Ex. l and which was covered by an annual patta confers title upon the plain, tiff transferee.
l. [6] Two points only have been argued before us: (l) Whether the transfer of the land in suit, which was sold by Ex. l and which was covered by an annual patta confers title upon the plain, tiff transferee. (2) Whether defendant 4 was, in any case, liable to be evicted. [7] The lower appellate Court in a careful judgment has come to the conclusion that the sale as evidenced by Ex. 1 conferred a good title upon the transferee-plaintiff and that defendant 4 was liable to be evicted and we are in agreement with these conclusions. [8] The suit in so far it related to title to the property was between the transferor defendant 1 and the transferee plaintiff. It is not disputed that defendant 1 had received consideration of B3. 3650 from the plaintiff for the sale of the property to the latter. In a suit between a transferor and a transferee arising out of a sale of property held by the transferor on annual patta from Government, the rights of the parties to the sale are governed by the T. P. Act in the absence of a statutory provision prohibiting transfer. Section H, Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, says : "A settlement holder, who is not a land-holder, shall have no rights in the land held by him beyond such as are expressed in this settlement lease." The settlement lease is not before us. The learned advocate for the appellant has, however, relied upon B. 1 (c) of the Rules framed under the Land and Revenue Regulation, which says: "An annual lease means a lease granted for one year only and confers no right in the soil beyond a right for user for the year for which it is given. It confers no right of transfer, or of inheritance beyond the year of issue, or of subletting." [9] It is clear that R. 1 (c) does not prohibit transfer of annual pattas. Indeed, it permits transfers but transfers are limited in their duration to the period covered by the annual patta.
It confers no right of transfer, or of inheritance beyond the year of issue, or of subletting." [9] It is clear that R. 1 (c) does not prohibit transfer of annual pattas. Indeed, it permits transfers but transfers are limited in their duration to the period covered by the annual patta. The correct interpretation, in our view, of s. 11 and B. l (e) framed under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation is that when an annual patta holder purports to transfer his ownership in such land for consideration, the transferee takes good title to the property subject only to the paramount title of the Government, that is to say, if the Government so chooses it may, at the expiry of the period of the annual patta, refuse to grant an annual patta to the transferee. That, however, is a matter between the Government and the transferee and not a matter between a transferor and a transferee. [9a] This view appears to be supported by a decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court reported in Chandra Binode Kundu v. Ala Bux, 24 c. w. N. 818 : A. i, R. (8) 1921 Cal. 15 (F. B.). It is true that the decision in that case dealt with an involuntary transfer of an occupancy holding. But, in the body of the judgment it is clearly stated that their Lordships saw no reason to make a difference between a voluntary transfer of an occupancy holding and an involuntary transfer. Before the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court gave its decision, reported in Chandra Binode Kundu v. Ala, Bux, 24 0. W. N. 818 : (A. I. B. (8) 1921 Cal. 15 F. B.), there was a controversy in regard to the validity of an involuntary transfer in execution of a decree of an occupancy holding. That controversy was due to a decision of a prior Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of three Judges, The Full Bench in the later case reported in Chandra Binode Kundu v. Ala Bux, 24 0. W. N. 818 : (A. I. H. (8) 1921 Gal. 15 F. B.), was composed of 7 Judges and they refused to follow the previous Full Bench decision of the same Court and held that involuntary transfer of an occupancy holding was to be treated on the same footing as a voluntary transfer.
W. N. 818 : (A. I. H. (8) 1921 Gal. 15 F. B.), was composed of 7 Judges and they refused to follow the previous Full Bench decision of the same Court and held that involuntary transfer of an occupancy holding was to be treated on the same footing as a voluntary transfer. There is no doubt then that a voluntary transfer of an occupancy holding confect a good title. We think, therefore, the lower appellate Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the rights of a transferee arising out of a voluntary transfer of land covered by an annual patta are to be determined with reference to the general law. [10] As to the point, namely, that defendant 4 could not be evicted, the lower appellate Court has dealt with it and has come to the conclusion that defendant 4, who is a son of defendant l, is not in possession of the property in his own right but is in possession of the property through his father, defendant 1. The allegation of gift was negatived by the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court observed : "This defendant 4 has his own residence not far from the suit premises in Jorhat town, and it is obvious that if he is living on the suit land, he is there with the purpose of obstructing the delivery of possession to his father's transferee; his defence is manifestly false and he deserved to be mulcted in compensatory costs for filing such a defence at all," [11] We agree with the view of the lower appellate Court that the alleged possession of defendant 4 was not in his own right but was merely as an obstruction in the way of the plaintiff to obtain possession. We see no reason to interfere in the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. The appeal is dismissed with costs. [12] Ram Labhaya J. - I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learn-ed brother. I agree with him that the appeal be dismissed with costs. But, I wish to add a few words. [13] The main question in the case is whether plaintiff acquired any valid title in that part of the suit property, which was held by defendant 1 on an annual patta from the Government, and which was sold by him to the plaintiff.
But, I wish to add a few words. [13] The main question in the case is whether plaintiff acquired any valid title in that part of the suit property, which was held by defendant 1 on an annual patta from the Government, and which was sold by him to the plaintiff. The contention raised by the defendants is that defendant 1 was merely entitled to the use and occupation of the land for one year and could not transfer anything more than he had at the time of sale. That year of the lease having expired, plaintiff is not entitled to possession of the property. The contention rests on 8.11, Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, which provides that: "A settlement holder, who la not a landholder, shall have no rights in the land held by him beyond such as are expressed in his settlement lease." Rule 1 (c) of the Settlement Bales framed under the Land and Revenue Regulation describes the rights of a person holding an annual lease. It states that an annual lease means a lease granted for one year only. It confers no right in the soil beyond a right of user for the year foe which it is given. It gives no right of transfer or of inheritance beyond the year of issue, or of [subletting. It is worthy of note that both S. II, and B. l (c) enact no positive prohibition. Section 11 of the Regulation merely indicates that the rights of a settlement holder are to be found in the settlement lease. Bale l (c) gives the description of the rights which generally appear in an annual lease. For finding out the rights of an annual lease holder, reference to the patta or the lease is necessary. It is, however, not disputed before us that the patta in this case is in conformity with the terms of an annual lease as described in B. 1 (c) of the Regulation. It may be taken as admitted, therefore, that the lease does contain a clause to the effect that it confers no right on the lease holder in the soil beyond the right of user for a year and that there is no right of transfer or inheritance in him beyond the year of issue. It is obvious, in these circumstances, that defendant 1 who held an annual patta could not transfer the property.
It is obvious, in these circumstances, that defendant 1 who held an annual patta could not transfer the property. He could merely transfer his limited right of user. On the date of sale to the plaintiff all that defendant l could sell and plaintiff acquire was the subsisting title and interest of defendant l. As defendant had no permanent title, he was mot in a position to convey it. The rights acquired by the plaintiff under the sale deed would, therefore, expire with the expiry of the lease in layout of defendant l. The lease, however, is being renewed by the Government in favour of defendant l, the transferor. Plaintiff, in these circumstances, urges that he is entitled to claim that the original contractual obligations between him and the defendant must be kept alive and be should be held entitled to the property as against his transferor. On his behalf we have teen referred to 8. 43, T. P. Act, and it seems to me that the case is covered by this section. It provides that : "Where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to transfer such property (or consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists." [I3a] The requirements of the section are that there should be either a 'fraudulent or an erroneous representation by the transferor, that he has got the authority to transfer the property' and then he should profess to transfer it for consideration. There is no doubt that the property has been transferred for consideration. Such a transfer would also necessarily involve a representation that the transferor had the power to transfer the property. The representation can be express or implied. The question then is whether the representation was fraudulent or erroneous. It is not contended that any fraud was intended. The representation, however, was obviously erroneous. The transferor had no authority to transfer the land. The power of transfer was extremely limited. His representation implied in the act of the transfer was, therefore, certainly wrong.
The question then is whether the representation was fraudulent or erroneous. It is not contended that any fraud was intended. The representation, however, was obviously erroneous. The transferor had no authority to transfer the land. The power of transfer was extremely limited. His representation implied in the act of the transfer was, therefore, certainly wrong. The transferee, therefore, has the option to demand that the transfer should operate on any interest which the transferor acquired in the property after the sale as the contract of transfer in his favour is subsisting. The learned counsel representing the defendants, however, urged that it was not really a case of erroneous representation at all. The limitations on the powers of an annual lease-holder are very well known. The parties could not be unaware of them and in these circumstances plaintiff was not deceived or misled and could not claim any protection under 8. 43, T. P. Act. This argument does not appear to be well founded. Section 43 merely requires as erroneous representation from the transferor. If such an erroneous representation was made, the transferee may demand that the transfer should operate on the interest acquired by his transferor subsequently to the transfer, even though he himself shared the erroneous belief of the transferor. Section 43 does not make the protection that it allows to transferees conditional on their being misled or deceived by the fraudulent or erroneous representation. It is not said that the transferee should act on the faith of the erroneous representation. He may not be misled at all by that representation. But, if there is an erroneous representation, he becomes entitled to the rights which the section confers on persons to whom an erroneous representation is made. The language of the section indicates that the rule operates on the subsequently acquired interest independently of the effect of the representation on the transferee. He may even know the truth; the rule will still operate with reference only to the transferor, who having covenanted to part with a certain right, is bound to make good his promise when he becomes possessed of it. There is no justification for reading into the section what it-does not contain, and it does not lay down that the erroneous representation must mislead the transferee before he can claim the interest of the transferor acquired after the transfer.
There is no justification for reading into the section what it-does not contain, and it does not lay down that the erroneous representation must mislead the transferee before he can claim the interest of the transferor acquired after the transfer. The conduct of the transferor alone is to be considered. If he has received money on an erroneous representation, he can be made to perform his part of the contract so long as he is in a position to do so. The learned counsel are agreed that transfers of lands by annual pattaholders are common. This accounts for the erroneous belief of the transferor that he bad power to transfer and also of the acquiescence of the transferee in this belief. But the fact that the erroneous belief of the transferor was shared by the transferee does not take the case out of the ambit of S. 43, T. P. Act, under which plaintiff can insist that the transfer should operate on any interest that his transferor acquired subsequently to the transfer in his favour. This view of the law was also taken in Moh&ndra Nath v, Shayamlal, 18 o. w. N. 907: (A. I. B. (1) 1914 cal. 617). In that case the land was held under the Government, under a temporary settlement, during the currency of which the holders granted a permanent sub-lease to the plaintiffs, who before the expiration of the lease granted by Government, granted permanent lease to one of the grantors. Ever since then the sub-lessee and his suceessor-in-interest were in occupation of the land. The settlement was being renewed from time to time by Government in favour of the original settlement-holders; it was held that the rights and obligations of the parties were mutual. Plaintiffs were bound to make good the title of the defendants as soon as by virtue of the settlement they were placed in a position to continue the lease in favour of the defendants and the defendants were under a reciprocal obligation to continue as tenants under the plaintiffs notwithstanding the omission of the settlement authorities to make an entry in the settlement records in respect of the tenures and under-tenures. This omission could not affect the rights of the parties; and the re-settlement of the land by Government with the original settlement-holders had the effect of keeping alive the contractual obligation of the subordinate holders among themselves.
This omission could not affect the rights of the parties; and the re-settlement of the land by Government with the original settlement-holders had the effect of keeping alive the contractual obligation of the subordinate holders among themselves. [14] The principle stated in that case fully applies to the case before us. The re-settlement of the land on defendant 1 should have the effect of keeping the contractual obligation alive between the plaintiff and defendant 1. The rights of the Government in the land are not affected by a transfer in which the transferor is an annual lease holder. The Government has the -right not to renew the lease and to recover possession of the property. It may give the lease, at the expiry of the year, to another person. The transferee will acquire no interest in the land as against the Government or any new lease-holder but as against his own transferor, he is entitled to claim that he should perform his part of the contract so long as he-is the person on whom land is being settled by the Government. The rights of the Government are not in question in this case. All that we have got to decide in this case is whether plaintiff can enforce his rights under the sale deed as against his own transferee. We have no doubt that he can. The transfer is not forbidden by law. It contravenes no statutory prohibition. It merely violates a term of the lease. It is, therefore, enforceable against everybody except the Government. Defendant 4, a son of defendant 1, also cannot, therefore, resist the suit. He has been found not to possess any independent right in any part of the property. The appeal., therefore, must fail. Appeal dismissed.