Judgment : We have before us a reference which has arisen out of an appeal by the Government from a judgment of acquittal passed by a Sessions Judge in a case under section 302 of the Penal Code. The appeal came up for hearing before a Bench of two Judges and, when the case was called, the learned counsel for the accused opposite parties presented a petition on behalf of his clients which is as follows:— "The undersigned begs to submit the following for Your lordships kind consideration:— (1) That the present High Court of Rajasthan is not properly constituted High Court under section 3 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949. (2) That Jaipur City has not been properly fixed a place of sitting of the High Court either permanently or for a specified period under section 10 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949. (3) That the appointment of the Judges is invalid under section 7 (2) of the Ordinance. It is therefore prayed that these important constitutional points may be decided before hearing of the case." 2. After hearing the counsel, the learned Judges composing the Bench came to the conclusion that the petition raised questions of sufficient importanc to justify a reference to a larger Bench. Mr. C. L. Agrawal who appeared for the accused petitioners submitted four points or questions which the learned Judges referred for decision by a larger Bench. Those points, or questions, are as follows:- 1. Whether the constitution of the High Court of Rajasthan is in conformity with Section 3 of the High Court Ordinance, in so far as there have not been appointed any permanent Judges other than the Chief Justice ? 2. Whether the appointment of Acting Judges under Section 3 (3) of the High Court Ordinance is valid ? 3. Whether the place of sitting of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur has been property fixed in conformity with the provisions of Section 10 (1) of the High Court Ordinance, in as much as Notification No. 155 A./J.D./U.S.R., dated the 25th August 1949 does not specify that the High Court shall sit permanently or for specified period at Jaipur. 4. 4. Whether work has been distributed in accordance with the provisions of Section 44 (2) of the High Court Ordinance in as much as the Chief Justice does not appear to have determined which Judge in each case will sit alone and which Judges of the Court shall constitute a Bench? The present Bench was accordingly constituted and lengthy arguments have been addressed to us on both sides. 3. It will be convenient at this stage to state certain facts. The present United State of Rajasthan was inaugurated on the 30th of March, 1949, and started functioning on and from the 7th April, 1949. The component units were the former State of Rajasthan, the Matsya Union, the Jaipur State, the Jodhpur State, the Bikaner State and the Jaisal-mer State. Barring Jaisalmer, each of these units had a High Court of its own. As the result of the formation of the Union, it became necessary to abolish the High Courts in the various integrating units and to establish a High Court for the whole of the United State of Rajasthan. Accordingly, His Highness the Raj Pramukh, on the 21st day of June 1949, promulgated an Ordinance, being No. XV of 1949, to provide for the establishment of a High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. The relevant portions of those sections of this Statute which are required for our present purpose may be quoted here. They are as follows: — 1. Short title, extent and commencement.— (1) The Ordinance may be called the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. (2) It extends to the whole of Rajasthan. (3) It shall come into force on the date which the Raj Pramukh may appoint by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette for the inauguration of the High Court erected and established by and under this Ordinance. 2. Definitions. —In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:- (d) "Judge" includes the Chief Justice, a Judge other than the Chief Justice, an Additional Judge and an Acting Judge of the High Court. 3. Composition of the High Court.— (1) The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such number of other Judges as the Raj Pramukh may deem necessary to appoint. (2) The first Chief Justice of the High Court shall be Shri Kamalakanta Verma, at present Chief Justice of the High Court of the former Rajasthan State. 3. Composition of the High Court.— (1) The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such number of other Judges as the Raj Pramukh may deem necessary to appoint. (2) The first Chief Justice of the High Court shall be Shri Kamalakanta Verma, at present Chief Justice of the High Court of the former Rajasthan State. In future, the Chief Justice shall be appointed by the Raj Pramukh in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. (3) Other Judges of the High Court shall be appointed by the Raj Pramukh in consultation with the Chief Justice. (4) Every appointment of the Chief Justice or other Judges shall be by a warrant under the hand and seal of the R?.j Pramukh. 4. Qualifications of a Judge.—(i) A person shall not be qualified to be a Judge of the High Court unless he (III) Notwithstanding any thing herein-before contained no person who has attained the age of 60 years shall be entitled to be appointed a Judge of the High Court. 5. Oath of Office.—Every person appointed to be a Judge of the High Court shall, before he enters upon his office, make and subscribe before the Raj Pramukh, or some person appointed by the Raj Pramukh in this behalf, a declaration in the following form. 6. Tenure of Judges.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), every Judge of the High Court shall hold office until he attains the age of 60 years. (2) A Judge may by resignation...... (3) A Judge may be removed from his office...... 7. Temporary and Additional Judges.- (1) If the office of the Chief Justice becomes vacant or if the Chief Justice is by reason of absence, or for any other reason, unable to perform the duties of his office, those duties shall, until some person appointed by the Raj Pramukh to the vacant office has entered on the duties thereof, or I until the Chief Justice has resumed his duties as the case may be, be performed by such one of the other Judges of the High Court as the Raj Pramukh may think fit for the purpose. (2) If the office of any other Judge of the High Court becomes vacant or if any such Judge is appointed to act temporarily as the Chief Justice, or is by reason of absence, or for any other reason, unable to perform the duties of his office, the Raj Pramukh may appoint a person duly qualified for appointment as a Judge to act as a Judge of the High Court and the person so appointed shall, unless the Raj Pramukh thinks fit to revoke his appointment, be deemed to be a Judge of the High Court until some person appointed by the Raj Pramukh to the vacant office has entered on the duties thereof or until the permanent Judge has resumed his duties. 10. Place of sitting.-(1) The High Court shall sit at Jodhpur and such other place or places, if any, as the Raj Pramukh may from time to time appoint, either permanently or for a specified period. (2) One or more of such Judges of the High Court, as the Chief Justice may nominate, shall thereupon sit at such place or places accordingly. 44. Distribution of business and administrative Control.— (1) The High Court may, by its own rules, provide as it thinks fit for the exercise by one or more Judges, or by Division Courts constituted by two or more Judges of the High Court, of its original and appellate jurisdiction. (2) The Chief Justice shall be responsible for the distribution and conduct of the business of the High Court, and shall determine which Judge in each case will sit alone and which Judges of the Court will constitute a Bench. (3) The administrative control of the High Court shall vest in the Chief Justice who may exercise it in such manner and after such consultation with the other Judges as he may think fit or may delegate such of his functions as he deems fit to any other Judges of the High Court. 4. In pursuance of sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance, a notification, dated August 25, 1949, was published in a Gazette Extra-Ordinary, announcing that His Highness the Raj Pramukh was pleased to appoint the 29th day of August, 1949, to be the date for the inauguration at Jodhpur of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. 4. In pursuance of sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance, a notification, dated August 25, 1949, was published in a Gazette Extra-Ordinary, announcing that His Highness the Raj Pramukh was pleased to appoint the 29th day of August, 1949, to be the date for the inauguration at Jodhpur of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. Another notification, which is reproduced below, was also published in the same issue of the Gazette: — "Jaipur, August 25, 1949. No. 155A/J. D./U. S. R.—In pursuance of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (No. XV of 1949), His Highness the Raj Pramukh is pleased to direct that until further orders the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan shall also sit simultaneously— (i) at Jaipur to dispose of the work arising in the Jaipur and Kotah Divisions, and (ii) at Udaipur to dispose of the work arising in the Udaipur Division." 5. Eleven other notifications, bearing the same date, viz., August 25, 1949, announcing the appointment of eleven Acting Judges, were also published in the same issue of the Gazette. It will be sufficient to reproduce one of them to show the nature of these eleven notifications. "In pursuance of sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, His Highness the Raj Pramukh is pleased to appoint Shri Amar Singh as an Acting Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan with effect from the 29th day of August, 1949, until further orders." 6. The inauguration of the High Court took place at Jodhpur on the appointed date, viz., August 29, 1949, and His Highness the Raj Pramukh administered the oath of office first to the Chief Justice and thereafter to the eleven Judges, whose names had been announced, as mentioned above. 7. Although it is not necessary for the purpose of this case, it may be mentioned that by a subsequent notification, issued in the Gazette, His Highness the Raj Pramukh directed that the High Court would also sit at Bikaner and Kotah for the disposal of the cases which were pending at those places on the 28th of August, 1949. 8. Although it is not necessary for the purpose of this case, it may be mentioned that by a subsequent notification, issued in the Gazette, His Highness the Raj Pramukh directed that the High Court would also sit at Bikaner and Kotah for the disposal of the cases which were pending at those places on the 28th of August, 1949. 8. It will be noticed that one striking feature of the Ordinance, governing the matter before us, which differentiates it from similar statutes, promulgated from time to time in British India, is that it contains a definition of the word "Judge", which has been declared to include, among others, an Acting Judge of the High Court. The argument, advanced on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Agra-wal, is that the word "Judges" in subsection (1) of section 3 of the Ordinance does not include Acting Judges. The contention is that it was necessary for His Highness to appoint, first, permanent Judges, and that an Acting Judge could be appointed only when a vacancy occurred in the office of one of these Judges. It is argued that section 7 (2) is the only provision in the Ordinance which authorises the appointment of an Acting Judge, and that, unless one of the things mentioned in that sub-section happens, there is no power to appoint an Acting Judge. In other words, the contention is that the word "Judges" in sub-section (1) of section 3 must be construed as meaning permanent Judges. Mr. Agrawal frankly stated that, if the word "Judges" in sub-section (1) of section 3 can be construed as including Acting Judges he, to quote his own words, "would be out of Court". The main question that, thus, arises is whether there is any valid reason for inserting the word " permanent " before the word "Judges" in sub-section (1) of section 3, and for ignoring the definition given in clause (d) of section 2. 9. The argument of Mr. Agrawal was that, if the word "Judges" in sub-section (1) of section 3 included Acting Judges, it was unnecessary to enact section 7. After putting forward the interpretation, which according to him,should be put upon the word "Judges" in section 3, Mr. 9. The argument of Mr. Agrawal was that, if the word "Judges" in sub-section (1) of section 3 included Acting Judges, it was unnecessary to enact section 7. After putting forward the interpretation, which according to him,should be put upon the word "Judges" in section 3, Mr. Agrawal argued that sections 4,5, and 6 were what be called corollaries of section 3, and that in all these four sections, viz., 3, 4, 5 and 6, the words "Judge" or "Judges" meant only a permanent Judge or permanent Judges. He laid particular stress on subsection (1) of section 6, and argued that the word "Judge" there could not possibly include an Acting Judge because, otherwise, it would have to be held that an Acting Judge also could hold office until he attained the age of sixty years. He laid some emphasis on the word "every" occurring before the word "Judge" in that sub-section. He sought, further, to derive some support for his argument from the words "and the person so appointed shall......be deemed to be a Judge of the High Court......" occurring in sub-section (2) of section 7. He laid stress on the word "deemed" and argued that persons appointed to act as judges were not judges "properly so called", but were according to him, "merely deemed to be so by a legal fiction". He also relied on the power to revoke the appointment of a person appointed to act as a Judge conferred upon His Highness the Raj Pramukh by sub-section (2) of section 7. 10. In order to maintain the position that Acting Judges were really not Judges in the proper sense of the word, and that section 7 was entirely independent of the preceding sections of the Ordinance, Mr. Agrawal had to go to the length of contending that in the appointment of an Acting Judge it was not necessary for the Raj Pramukh to consult the Chief Justice as laid down in sub-section (3) of section 3, that it was not necessary for an Acting Judge to take any oath of office, ias required by section 5, and that an Acting Judge was not subject to any age limit either for the purpose of appointment or for retirement. 11. Mr. 11. Mr. Agrawal also read what he considered to be the corresponding provisions in the relevant statutes promulgated from time to time in British India, beginning with the Statute2 4 and 25 Victoria C. 104, enacted by the British Parliament in the year 1861 (hereafter referred to in this judgment as the Indian High Courts Act), and contended that the provisions of those Statutes had been acted upon in a certain manner in India, and that the same rule or practice, should be followed in Rajasthan also, because the language, for the most part, was similar. 12 As we have stated above, the essential question which falls for consideration is whether there is any justification for the contention that the word "Judges" in sub-section (1) of section 3 should be held to mean only permanent Judges", and not to include! Acting Judges. Having given our careful consideration to the arguments put forward by Mr. Agrawal for the petitioners and by Mr. Modi for the State, we have come to the conclusion that there is no| justification for accepting the contention of Mr. Agrawal. 13 As we have pointed out above, the statute, with which we are concerned, differs from other similar statutes in one important and material particular, namely, that it gives a definition of the word "Judge" in section 2 (d), and definitely lays down that, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, that word includes, besides others, an Acting Judge. The first question that we have, therefore, to consider is whether there is anything in subsection (1) of section 3 to show that it would be repugnant to the subject or context to bold that the word "Judges" there also includes Acting Judges. It may be stated at once that throughout his elaborate arguments Mr. Agrawal was unable to point to any repugnancy that would arise by holding that the word "Judges" in sub section (1) of section 3 was used in accordance with the definition given in the section immediately preceding, and therefore included Acting Judges. 14. There being no repugnancy, it remains for us to consider whether the arguments of Mr. Agrawal was unable to point to any repugnancy that would arise by holding that the word "Judges" in sub section (1) of section 3 was used in accordance with the definition given in the section immediately preceding, and therefore included Acting Judges. 14. There being no repugnancy, it remains for us to consider whether the arguments of Mr. Agrawal furnish any other valid reason for holding that the word" Judges" in sub section (1) of section 3 does not include Acting Judges, in other words, for ignoring for— that is what it really amounts, to—the definition given in Sec. 2 (d). When a Court has to interpret a statute it is not right for it to ignore any of the provisions in that statute, much less to shut its eyes to a provision which is really one that is clearly intended to be a governing provision. It is also well settled that the Court has to take the language used by the legislative authoritve and not to insert words which are no there. That being so, there is, in our opinion, no justification for the argument that the word "permanent" must be read into sub-section (1) of section 3. 15. One of the reasons given by Mr Agrawal for the view contented for by him was, as mentioned above, that, if hi; argument was not accepted, it would have to be held that Sec. 7 was redundant. On answer to that argument is that; if Mr Agrawals arguments are accepted and it i held that Sections 3,4,5 and 6 deal only with permanent Judges, that sec. 7 is the only section under which a non-permanen Judge can be appointed and that when the Ordinance uses the expression "Acting Judge" all that it means is a Judge< appointed under Sec. 7 (2), then the inclusion of an "Acting Judge" in the definition in sec. 2 (d) becomes redundant in fact, worse than redundant. But other reasons can also be given for showing that the argument is unsound. We consider is sufficient to mention one reason why i was necessary to enact a provision like that contained in Sec. 7. It is laid down in sub-section (1) of section 3 that the High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and a certain number of other Judges. If sec. We consider is sufficient to mention one reason why i was necessary to enact a provision like that contained in Sec. 7. It is laid down in sub-section (1) of section 3 that the High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and a certain number of other Judges. If sec. 7 was not incorporated in the statute, whenever a vacancy occurred in the office, not only of the Chief Justice, but also of any one of the other Judges, the High Court would be unable to function until the vacancy was filled, as its composition would offend against the mandatory pro-vision in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3. By the first two sub-sections of Sec. 7 the legislative authority makes it clear that, in the case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice, the appointment of one of the other Judges of the Court to perform the duties of the office of the Chief Justice was essential, but that in the case of a vacancy in the office of one of the other Judges, it was open to the Raj Pramukh either to fill it or to leave it unfilled. The reasons under-lying such a provision are obvious. 16. It is really not necessary for us in this case to consider the argument that Sec. 7 is entirely independent of the preceding sections and the various other arguments that have been based upon the language of Sec. 7, for the case before us is not concerned with any appointments made under Sec. 7 but with appointments made under sec. 3 (1). We propose, however, to deal with Mr. Agrawals arguments and to show that they are incorrect. Mr. Agrawals attention was drawn to sec. 5 and, as stated above, he had to go to the length of arguing that it was not necessary for person appointed to act as a Judge to take any oath. That is an argument which must be rejected, for it is clear that no Judge can take upon himself the execution of his office without taking the prescribed oath. As a matter of fact, no appointment of any Judge is effective until he has taken the oath. The arguments that, when making an appointment under sec. That is an argument which must be rejected, for it is clear that no Judge can take upon himself the execution of his office without taking the prescribed oath. As a matter of fact, no appointment of any Judge is effective until he has taken the oath. The arguments that, when making an appointment under sec. 7 (2) the Raj Pramukh was not required to consult the Chief Justice as required by sub-section (3) of section 3, and that a person who has attained the age of 60 years can be appointed as an Acting Judge or that an Acting Judge can continue in office even after he has attained the age of 60 years, are clearly untenable. They are entirely against the whole scheme of the statute. It may further be pointed out that the acceptance of Mr. Agrawals arguments will lead to the startling result that a Judge appointed under sec. 7 (2) cannot resign bis office and cannot be removed from his office on one of the grounds mentioned in section 6 (3). 17. The reliance on the words "shall .. be deemed to be a Judge of the High Court" in sub-section (2) of section 7 is also of no assistance to Mr. Agrawal. In the statutes promulgated from time to time in British India there was no definition of the word "Judge" and it was, therefore, necessary to make it clear that a person appointed to act as a Judge was entitled to be treated in every respect (e. g. in the matter of emoluments) as a Judge appointed by Letters Patent and had to perform the same duties and was subject to the same obligations. The word "Judge" having been defined in the statute which we have to consider, it was, possibly, not necessary to use those words in sub-section (2) of section 7. Their use, however, can in no way lead to the conclusion that persons appointed to act as Judges were Judges only "by a sort of legal fiction". Mr. Agrawal had to concede that a person appointed to act as a Judge possessed all the powers, authority and jurisdiction and could perform all the functions, judicial as well as administrative, which the Judges whom he described as permanent Judges possessed and performed. It is difficult, in these circumstances, to see how any question of a legal fiction arises. Mr. Agrawal had to concede that a person appointed to act as a Judge possessed all the powers, authority and jurisdiction and could perform all the functions, judicial as well as administrative, which the Judges whom he described as permanent Judges possessed and performed. It is difficult, in these circumstances, to see how any question of a legal fiction arises. The power to revoke the appointment of a person appointed to act as a Judge conferred upon the Raj Pramukh by sub- section (2) of section 7 also does not lend any support to Mr. Agrawals arguments. The statute having left it to the discretion of the Raj Pramukh whether, on one of the contingencies mentioned in that sub-section arising, a person should or should not be appointed to act as a Judge, the power had to be given to the Raj Pramukh to revoke any appointment made under that subsection whenever he considered that the appointment was no longer necessary. 18. We come now to the argument based on Sec. 6. As stated above, the argument is that, unless sections, 3, 4, 5 and 6, on the one hand, and section 7, on the other, are kept in separate watertight compartments, sub-section (1) of section 6 would lead to the inevitable result that a Judge appointed under Sec. 7 (2) also would hold office until he attained the age of 60 years. The learned counsel, however, targets the important words, "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context", with which sec. 2 opens. If the word "Judge" in sub-section (1) of section 6 is interpreted to include a non-permanent Judge, a clear repugnancy arises. Section 6 deals with the tenure of Judges. A Judge whose tenure is determined by the very terms of his appointment cannot obviously come within the purview of sub-section (1) of section 6. The emphasis on the word "every" is also of no avail to Mr. Agrawal because, even if the words had been "a Judge", the result would have been the same. 19. A Judge whose tenure is determined by the very terms of his appointment cannot obviously come within the purview of sub-section (1) of section 6. The emphasis on the word "every" is also of no avail to Mr. Agrawal because, even if the words had been "a Judge", the result would have been the same. 19. We come back now to the question which arises in the case before us, namely, whether, in view of the provisions, laid down in the Ordinance taken as a whole and upon the plain language used, it is clear that it was intended to confer upon the Raj Pramukh the power to appoint Acting Judges even in the first instance, if he chose so to do. As we have pointed out above, this Ordinance is different from other similar statutes in that it gives a definition of the word "Judge". That definition having been deliberately incorporated in the statute, it must be held that the legislative authority had a definite object in view and wanted to make its intention clear by incorporating that definition in the statute. It appears tous that that object and intention were that the appointing authority, viz., the Raj Pramukh, should have the power to appoint Acting Judges even in the beginning if he chose to do so. 20. In our judgment the language of the Ordinance with which we are concerned is so plain and the intention of the legislative authority appears so clearly from that language that no question of the interpretation of the statute really arises. 21. Mr. Agrawal cited the case of Queen Empress V. Ganga Ram, I.L.R. 16 All., 136. He conceded that the question which arose in that ease was different from the question that arises in the present case, but argued that there were observations in the judgment which supported his contention that a person appointed to act as a Judge was not a "Judge" properly so called. Now, in the first place, the learned Judges there were concerned with the provisions of a statute which was not similar to the statute which we have to consider. Secondly, the facts out of which the questions debated in that case had arisen were of a very special and peculiar nature. The essential facts were these. Now, in the first place, the learned Judges there were concerned with the provisions of a statute which was not similar to the statute which we have to consider. Secondly, the facts out of which the questions debated in that case had arisen were of a very special and peculiar nature. The essential facts were these. In Sec. 2 of the Letters Patent, dated March 17, 1866 by which a High Court was established at Allahbad for what was then called the North Western Provinces, it was laid down that the High Court shall, until further or other provisions were made, consist of a Chief Justice and five Judges. The proviso to Sec. 2 of the Indian High Courts Act required, among oilier things, that not less than one-third of the Judges of the High Court shall be barristers. The High Court so established did begin with a Chief Justice and five Puisne Judges but, as the result of various retirements and deaths the first of which occurred in 1867-and the necessary number of appointments not being made, the High Court went on working for many years with a Chief Justice and less than five Judges. At least one vacancy remained unfilled, according to one view of the matter for over 20 years and, according to another, for at least over two years. That is how matters stood when, in October 1892, the Lieutenant Governor, purporting to act under the powers conferred upon him by sections 7 and 16 of the Indian High Courts Act, appointed Mr. W. R. Burkitt, a member of the Civil Service, as a Judge of the Court. It was stated in the notification making the appointment that the appointment of a fifth puisne Judge had been sanctioned temporarily for one year by the Secretary of State for India. By a subsequent notification, published in January 1893, it was made clear that Mr. Burkitt was "to officiate as" a Judge. When the period of one year for which the appointment had been made was about to expire, another notification was published in November 1893, announcing that the Lieutenant Governor was pleased to appoint Mr. W. R. Burkitt "to continue to officiate as a. Puisne Judge in the High Court of Judicature, North Western Provinces, until further orders". Upon these facts the question was raised whether the appointment of Mr. Burkitt had been validly made. W. R. Burkitt "to continue to officiate as a. Puisne Judge in the High Court of Judicature, North Western Provinces, until further orders". Upon these facts the question was raised whether the appointment of Mr. Burkitt had been validly made. The learned Judges considered the language of sec. 7 of the Indian High Courts Act, which empowered the authorities in India to appoint a person to act as a Judge upon the happening of a vacancy in the office of a. Judge. They laid particular stress on the word "upon" with which the relevant sentence began - ("Upon the happening of a vacancy...") - and held that the intention of the Imperial Parliament was that, if the authorities in India wanted to appoint a person to act temporarily as a Judge under sec. 7 of the Act, they must do so within a. reasonable time. They adverted to the state of telegraphic and postal communications then existing between India and England and pointed out that the object with which the section had been enacted was that, if the authorities in India considered that the work of the Court was likely to suffer on account of the delay that would occur in correspondence between India and England and the appointment of a Judge by Her Majesty when a vacancy was caused by the death or retirement of a Judge, these authorities should have the power to make a temporary appointment. They held that the intention of the Imperial Parliament could not be that the authorities in India could keep vacancies unfilled for a long period of time, then make temporary appointments for a certain period and thereafter go on continuing those temporary appointments from time to time. They pointed out that one mischief that could result was that the executive authorities in India could, by taking action as mentioned above, bring about a state of affairs in which, barring the Chief Justice, every other Judge was not. a barrister, and thus nullify the proviso to Sec. 2 of the Indian High Courts Act. There being no definition of the word "Judge" in that statute, that term was held to apply only to a person appointed as a Judge by Her Majesty by Patent. Thus the authorities in India, to whom the power to make temporary appointments was given, could bring about the result mentioned by the learned Judges. There being no definition of the word "Judge" in that statute, that term was held to apply only to a person appointed as a Judge by Her Majesty by Patent. Thus the authorities in India, to whom the power to make temporary appointments was given, could bring about the result mentioned by the learned Judges. They, therefore, held that, if the appointment of Mr. Justice Burkitt depended for its validity upon Sec. 7 and 16 of the Indian High Courts Act, the appointment was ultra vires and illegal. Having arrived at this finding, the learned Judges observed that in view of the gravity of the question and the responsible duties which a Judge of a High Court has to perform, they were compelled to see whether in some other manner Mr. Justice Burkitt might not have been legally appointed to act as a Judge of the Court. They next observed that they did not know whether there existed, outside of Sec. 7 and 16 of the Indian High Courts Act, any power under which Mr. Justice Burkitt could have been appointed, but that there remained the fact of the notifications in the Government Gazette, the fact that apparently the Secretary of State had sanctioned the appointment of a fifth Puisne Judge as a temporary appointment and the fact that Mr. Justice Burkitt had in fact, since November 1892, acted in all respects as a Judge of the Court. They held that the last fact was, according to a well-known principle of the law of evidence, presumptive proof, until the contrary was shown, of his due appointment. It is obvious that that was a very different case from the one before us and that the questions which arose in it fell to be considered under statutes and in circumstances which were very different from the statute which we have to consider and from the circumstances out of which the questions debated before us have arisen. 22. It is obvious that that was a very different case from the one before us and that the questions which arose in it fell to be considered under statutes and in circumstances which were very different from the statute which we have to consider and from the circumstances out of which the questions debated before us have arisen. 22. It may be pointed out that, if there had been any difficulty in the interpretation of the Ordinance governing the present case and if the facts before us had raised any difficulty similar to the one with which the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court were faced, we could have followed the same line of reasoning as was adopted by the learned Judges in that case and could have held, following that precedent, that the appointments impugned before us also were valid. That necessity, however, does not arise. 23. Mr. Agrawal relied particularly on that portion of the Judgment in Queen Empress V. Ganga Ram where a passage from Hallams Constitutional History of England is quoted and laid stress on the desirability of appointing Judges whose tenure of office did not depend on the whim or pleasure of any executive authority. The principle underlying the proposition put forward by Mr. Agrawal is obvious and has always been recognised in all civilised countries. We have no doubt that the authorities of Rajasthan also recognise that principle. The desirability of a certain course of action, however, is one thing, and the intention underlying a legislative enactment is another. It may further be pointed out that the reason why it was considered desirable to give the power to the Raj Pramukh to appoint Acting Judges even in the beginning is not very difficult to understand. The desirability of a certain course of action, however, is one thing, and the intention underlying a legislative enactment is another. It may further be pointed out that the reason why it was considered desirable to give the power to the Raj Pramukh to appoint Acting Judges even in the beginning is not very difficult to understand. The entire circumstances in which the United State of Rajasthan has come into existence, the exigencies of the situation arising from the integration of so many States having systems of administration and traditions which differ-ed in many respects from one another, the difficulty of coming to final decisions on many questions within the time available owing to the pressure of various urgent and complicated problems demanding immediate attention and many other similar factors apparently led the legislative authority to feel that, while, on the one hand, it was necessary to have the High Court established without delay -and enable it to start functioning, it was on the other, desirable to enable the Raj Pramukh to appoint only Acting Judges even in the beginning if he considered it fit to do so. We have no doubt that this is only a temporary phase and would not last long. 24. Mr. Agrawal raised two further arguments in support of the contention that the appointments of the Judges were invalid. They were as follows:- (1) The notifications, announcing the appointments of the Judges, were dated August 25 and were published in an issue of the Gazette dated August 23 As the Ordinance, establishing the High Court, did not. come into force until the 29th of August, the Raj Pramukh had no power on the 25th or 26th of August to make any appointments under Sections 3(3) of the Ordinance and so the appointments were Ultra vires. (2) Section 3 (3) requires that, the Judges should be appointed in consultation with the Chief Justice but, as the Chief Justice took the oath of office on the 29th of August, he was not the Chief Justice of this High Court before that date and so any consultation that might have taken place before that date did not fulfill the requirement of Section 3(3). Mr. Modi, for the other side, objected to Mr. Mr. Modi, for the other side, objected to Mr. Agrawal being allowed to raise these arguments on the ground that they were not covered by questions 1 and 2 which had been framed in the presence and with the concurrence of Mr. Agrawal. It seemed to us, however, that we should allow Mr. Agrawal to put forward whatever arguments occurred to him and so we allowed him to argue, these points. 25. It will be noticed that argument No. 2 is somewhat inconsistent with argument No. 1. Mr. Agrawal himself recognises that none of the appointments became effective until the oaths were administered. The Chief Justice was only Chief Justice designate until he took the oath. Similarly, the other Judges were Judges designate until they took their oaths of office. Thereforei in the eyes of the law, the appointments were really made when His Highness the Raj Pramukh administer -ed the oaths of office on the 29th August. We hold, therefore, that argument No. (1) is without force. As to argument No. (2), all that need be said is that, the oath having been administered to the Chief Justice first and to the other Judges afterwards in his presence, the Chief Justice obviously consented to their appointment and whatever consultations bad taken place with him before were confirmed by that consent. So argument No. (2) also fails. Mr. Agrawal also argued that the notifications appointing the Judges should have said that the Chief Justice had been consulted. The law does not require it and we have no hesitation in rejecting this argument. 26. The third point calling for determination is whether the place of sitting of the High Court for Rajasthan has not been properly fixed at Jaipur in as much as the notification dated August 25, 1949, does not mention whether it. has been done permanently or only for a specified period. 27. Section 10 (1) of the Ordinance provides that the High Court shall sit at Jodhpur and such other place or places, if any, as the Raj Pramukh may from time to time appoint, either permanently or for a specified period. has been done permanently or only for a specified period. 27. Section 10 (1) of the Ordinance provides that the High Court shall sit at Jodhpur and such other place or places, if any, as the Raj Pramukh may from time to time appoint, either permanently or for a specified period. By the notification dated August 25, 1949, referred to above, Jaipur is appointed as one such place where a bench of the High Court is to sit "until further orders." It is contended that the words "until further orders" do not specify the period and, therefore, the bench at Jaipur is not properly constituted. This argument, in our opinion, is founded on a misapprehension as to the correct meaning of the phrase "for a specified period." The learned counsel assumed that it meant "for a fixed period". According to the ordinary dictionary meaning, however, the word "specify" means, inter alia, to designate or show clearly, and, therefore, it cannot be said that the words "specified period" have been used in the section to mean necessarily a "fixed period." The question is whether the phrase "until further orders" is a sufficient compliance with the provisions of sec. 10 (1). Even though the period for which the Bench is to sit at Jaipur is not fixed in the Notification in question, it has been indicated in sufficiently clear terms in as much as the commencement and continuation of the period during which the Bench is to sit at Jaipur have both been specified. Further, it is clear that the period will terminate when another order to that effect is passed by the Raj Pramukh. It may also be pointed out that the phrase "Specified period" has been used in the Ordinance in contradistinction to "permanently" and, therefore, only signifies "non-permanently." This meaning in our opinion is fully conveyed by the phrase "until further orders". It would, possibly, have been better if the period during which the bench is to sit at Jaipur had been fixed, but that is a totally different thing from saying that, because that has not been done, Jaipur has not been properly appointed as a seat for a bench of the High Court. The reason is that the powers of the Raj Pramukh are not limited as it is open to him to appoint a bench at any place for any length of time. The reason is that the powers of the Raj Pramukh are not limited as it is open to him to appoint a bench at any place for any length of time. For all these reasons we are of the view that there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel. 28. The fourth and the last question turns on an interpretation of Sec. 44 (2) of the Ordinance which reads as follows:- "The Chief Justice shall be responsible for the distribution and conduct of the business of the High Court, and shall determine which Judge in each case will sit alone and which Judges of the Court will constitute a Bench." It is contended that the phrase "shall determine which Judge in each case will sit alone" means that the Chief Justice will, while distributing the business of the Court, allow each case either to a Judge in Single Bench or to Judges in Division Bench. This interpretation, in our opinion, is not possible without doing great violence to the language of the section. The phrase "in each case" qualifies the word "Judge." and the phrase "which Judge will sit alone" only means "which particular Judge will sit alone." In no case can it mean "for each case which Judge will sit alone" for, if this latter meaning were to be given to the phrase, the latter portion of the sentence viz., "which Judges of the Court will constitute a Bench" becomes incongruous. According to the plain grammatical construction of the sentence, the Chief Justice has to determine which particular Judge shall sit alone and which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench. It has nothing to do with the allotment of cases to a Judge or Judges. The learned counsel takes the word case to mean cause to be tried1, but that obviously is not the sense in which this word has been used in the section. If this were the meaning, it would reduce matters to an absurdity, for it is physically impossible for any one, having the onerous and multifarious duties which the Chief Justice has, specially when the head-quarters are at Jodhpur and the benches are sitting at Jaipur and elsewhere, to determine with reference to each case which Judge or Judges will hear it. It is not done in any High Court nor is it necessary to do so, as, after the framing of the roster and the rules for the constitution of benches and distribution of cases, it becomes only a matter of routine for the Registrar to prepare a list showing the allotment of cases to various Judges. In any case, it is a matter relating to administrative control and the Chief Justice, immediately after the inauguration of the High Court, delegated his functions in this respect to one of the Judges who were to sit at Jaipur. This argument also must, therefore be rejected. 29. We would like to mention that at the commencement as well as at the close of his arguments, Mr. Agrawal assured the court that the objections which he had raised were not raised in any spirit of obstruction or with the object of casting any reflection on any of the Judges but had been taken in an "academic spirit". We made it clear to Mr. Agrawal that the Court did not misunderstand his object in putting forward these objections. After all, it is one of the duties of the Bar and of the Court to consider if any defects exist in the laws of the realm and, if any defects are discovered, to point them out so that they might be rectified. 30. We desire to place on record our appreciation of the assistance which we have received from the learned counsel for the parties. Both Mr. Agrawal and Mr. Modi put forward their respective cases with ability and fairness. 31. For the reasons which we have stated above, our answers to all the four questions referred to this Bench are in the affirmative. The case will now be laid before the Bench concerned for hearing and disposal on the merits at an early date.