This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the Additional Sub-ordinate Judge of the Assam Valley Districts, Gaubati, dated 30th January 1948, by which he Bet aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court which had dismissed the plaintiffs' suit as time barred. [2] The facts material to the appeal are these. The three plaintiffs are the sons of one Jatiram and grandsons of one Dehiram who had a brother "named Sishuram. The defendants 1 and 2 are the eons of one Nsvarsha and grandsons of Sishuram, and defendant 3 is a paternal uncle of defendants 1 and 2. [3] The plaintiffs' case was that the proper­ties in suit were joint family properties until the year 1939 when a family partition was effected of all the properties at which the plaintiffs were given as their share the lands in suit com­prising an area of 17-B-l-K-51/2L, being half of the entire joint family properties, after deduc­ting 4 bighas already sold to defendant 4t and that after the partition in 1939, the plaintiffs were in possession of the properties in suit and applied for mutation of their names in the re­cord of rights, but the revenue authorities refused to enter their names by an order dated 3rd June 1939, and instead recorded the name of defendant 1 as owner of the properties; that in spite of this entry, the plaintiffs continued to remain in possession of the disputed properties, but in view of the adverse entry, they have brought the present suit for declaration of their title and confirmation of possession. [4] The defence to the suit was that the suit was time barred. The defendants denied that there was a partition in 1939. They contended that the plaintiffs' father separated about 40 years ago, that the land in suit was bought by Nivarsba, the father of defendants 1 and 2, with his own money, and alleged that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the lands in suit, nor had they any title to it. [5] On the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues : (l) whether the suit is bad as being vague ? (2) whether the suit is barred under Arts. 120, 142 and 144, Limitation Act. (3) whether the lands of the patta in question were joint property of the parties? [5] On the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues : (l) whether the suit is bad as being vague ? (2) whether the suit is barred under Arts. 120, 142 and 144, Limitation Act. (3) whether the lands of the patta in question were joint property of the parties? If so, whether the suit land fell to the share of the plain-tiffs on separation, if any ? (4) whether defendant 4 had purchased the land from plain. tiffs and defendants 1 and 3 ? (5) whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration sought for? (6) To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled ? [6] On issue 2, the trial Court held that the suit was governed by Art. 120, Limitation Act, and that as the suit was brought after the period allowed by the law of limitation, it must be dismissed. On issue 3, the trial Court held that the lands in suit were originally part of the joint family properties and that the partition took place in 1939 ; that since the partition, the plaintiffs were in possession of the property in suit up to the date of the suit. [7] The lower appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court on all the issues except the issue of limitation, which it reversed, holding that the suit was not govern-ed by Art. 120, Limitation Act. [8] The only question argued before me was whether the suit was governed, for the purposes o£ limitation, by Art. 120 or Arts. 142 or 144, Limitation Act. The findings of fact that the plaintiffs were the owners of the properties in suit and were in possession thereof at the date of the institution of the suit in 1947 were not challenged; nor was the form in which the suit was brought challenged. [9] The suit, as brought, was for a declaration of the plaintiffs' title and confirmation of their possession, and the defence to the suit wag a denial of the plaintiffs' title and possession. Under the residuary Art. 120, time begins to run from the date on which the right to sue accrues. The defendants' contention is that time began to run in this case from June 1939 when the revenue authorities refused to enter the names of the plaintiffs in the record of rights. Under the residuary Art. 120, time begins to run from the date on which the right to sue accrues. The defendants' contention is that time began to run in this case from June 1939 when the revenue authorities refused to enter the names of the plaintiffs in the record of rights. The trial Court accepted this contention and dismiss­ed the suit. The lower appellate Court took the view that Art. 120 had no application, but did not say that the suit was governed by the pro­visions of Art. 142 or Art. 144, Limitation Act. It, however, made certain observations in its judgment, from which it would appear that it had the provisions of Arts. 142 and 144 in view. The lower appellate Court stated in its judgment: "The statement in the plaint that the cause of action arose on 3rd June 1939 would only mean that since then there was a cloud cast on the title of the plain­tiffs. The plaintiffs' suit was not one for correction of the record of rights, but it was essentially one for declaration of their exclusive title to the suit land, of which they were in possession. Since there was yet no clear infringement of the plaintiffs' rights or a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe those rights by the defendants, time had not yet run against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs' suit was not, therefore, time barred under Art. 120, Limitation Act. In these circum­stances, the plaintiffs were entitled to the decree asked for in the suit. I, therefore, set aside the learned Mun­siff's finding that the plaintiff's suit was time-barred under Art. 120, Limitation Act, on which the dismissal appealed against has been based. It is hereby, there­fore, ordered that the plaintiffs' suit do stand decreed with coats, with the result that right and title of the plaintiffs to the suit land, 17B-1K-51/2L, is declared and their possession of the same is confirmed. Precept will also issue for mutation of the names of the plain-tiffs in respect of this land in the estate in question. [10] In my opinion, these observations made by the lower appellate Court mean that the plaintiffs' right to sue did not accrue on 3rd June 1939 from the mere fact that an adverse entry was made against the plaintiffs in the record of rights. [10] In my opinion, these observations made by the lower appellate Court mean that the plaintiffs' right to sue did not accrue on 3rd June 1939 from the mere fact that an adverse entry was made against the plaintiffs in the record of rights. The adverse entry at the most is capable of being regarded as an attempt at denial of the plaintiffs' title and possession, which might attract the provisions of Art. 142 or 144, Limitation Act. [11] The learned advocate for the appellants has cited a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Francis Legge v. Bam Baran Singh, 20 ALL. 35: (1897 A.w. N. 193 F B.) in support of his contention that Art. 120, Limi­tation Act applies to the present suit. As I understand the facts of that case, the suit was not one for a declaration of title and confirma­tion of possession, but a suit for a declaration of right to possess and possession of certain pro­perties. In the case before me, the plaintiffs set up title to the properties and prayed for confir­mation of their possession, and the defence was a denial of their title and possession. The Courts below found that the plaintiffs were the owners of the properties and were in possession at the date of the suit. On the pleadings in this case, the plaintiffs haying established their title, they could be non-suited only if the defendants suc­ceeded in showing that the plaintiffs had not brought the suit within 12 years of their dispose session or discontinuance, or that they themselves were in adverse possession for the statutory period. [12] It is true the plaintiffs in this case did not allege that they had been dispossessed by the defendants or that they had discontinued pos­session. But the defendants in their written statement alleged that they, and not the plain­tiffs, were in possession of the properties in suit since 40 years-an allegation which was rejected by the Courts below. I will assume that Art. 142 has no application to the facts of the case before me. But the suit being one for confirmation of possession based upon title, and the defence to the suit being a denial of the plaintiffs' title and assertion of possession for the statutory period, the article applicable to the suit, in my opinion, is Art. 144, and not Art. 120, Limitation Act. But the suit being one for confirmation of possession based upon title, and the defence to the suit being a denial of the plaintiffs' title and assertion of possession for the statutory period, the article applicable to the suit, in my opinion, is Art. 144, and not Art. 120, Limitation Act. The decision of Baza and Smith JJ., in Moham­mad Mahmud v. Muhammad Afaq and others, A. I. E. (21) 1934 Oudh 21 : (147 I. 0. 805) is instructive on the question of the bearing of the pleadings on the applicability of the appropriate article of the Indian Limitation Act. [13] The appellants also contend that the decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Bajani Nath v. Manaram Mandal, 23 C.W.N. 883 : (A. I. E. (6) 1919 Cal. 151), governs the facts of this case, and that the Article applicable to the present case is Art. 120, Limitation Act. It is to be observed, however, that in the conclud­ing paragraph of his judgment, the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court observed: "It is unnecessary, however, to decide in the present case the question whether a suit for confirmation of possession is governed by Art. 120 or by the 12 years' rule of limitation. The plaintiff did not allege that his possession had in any way been disturbed or threatened to be disturbed by the Defendants. The only cause of action alleged in the plaint was the alleged-wrong entry in the record-of-rights. In 7th para, of the plaint, the plaintiff stated "For the purposes of the jurisdiction, the suit is valued at Rs. 40 being the market value of the disputed lands, but the suit being a declaratory one, the plaintiff instituted the same on payment of a court-fee of Rs. 10 only. Munsiff treated the prayer for confirmation of possession as a prayer for "declaration of possession" and the plaintiff himself stated, as point­ed out above, that the suit was a declaratory one. tinder the circumstances, we think the suit is governed by Art. 120, Limitation Act." [14] It is true the plaintiffs in the present case had referred to the alleged adverse entry in the record of rights as the cause of action, but at the same time the defendants in their written statement denied the plaintiffs' title and set up possession in their own right for more than the statutory period. The expression 'cause of action' does not necessarily mean the same thing as the expression 'right to sue' used in Art. 120, Limitation Act. An owner of property and in possession of it can ignore an adverse entry against him in the record of rights. I do not think, in view of the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ht. Bolo v. Mt, Koklan and others, 34 0. w. N. 1169: (A. I. E. (17) 1930 P. C. 270), an adverse entry in the re-cord of rights can be regarded as an accrual of a right to sue within the meaning of Art. 120, Limitation Act. [15] Having regard to the pleadings in this case, to which I have referred, the plaintiffs' suit is not liable to be dismissed unless the plaintiffs had failed to establish their possession within 12 years of the suit, or the defendants had succeeded in proving adverse possession, thereby extinguishing the title of the plaintiffs. The prayer for 'confirmation of possession' made by the plaintiffs in this suit must be regarded, in view of the pleadings, as a prayer for possession in a suit for possession, within the mean­ing of Art. 144, Limitation Act. [16] In Gobind Ojha and others v. Sitaram Ojha and others, A. i. E. (23) 1936 pat. 32i: (163 I. C. 408) the plaintiffs had filed a suit for de­claration of title and alleged exclusive posses­sion, as in this case. It was held that the period of limitation for such a suit was not 6 years. In Naubahar Singh and others v. Quadir Bux and others, A. I. R. (17) 1930 ALL. 753 : (1251.0. 14), the Court observed: "Where the declaration of title is necessary for the protection of interest, a cause of action may arise from the mere denial of title. Cases are conceivable, where title may be imperiled by the mere fact of denial and that fact may operate to produce serious effect on the quiet enjoyment of the right." [17] The decision of Allahabad High Court reported in Ali Hammed v. Ghurpattar Singh, A. I.E. (12) 1925 ALL. 454: (47 ALL. 389) appears to be directly in point. Cases are conceivable, where title may be imperiled by the mere fact of denial and that fact may operate to produce serious effect on the quiet enjoyment of the right." [17] The decision of Allahabad High Court reported in Ali Hammed v. Ghurpattar Singh, A. I.E. (12) 1925 ALL. 454: (47 ALL. 389) appears to be directly in point. Mukerji J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, observed: "It appears to us that the plaintiff having proved that he got the lands in suit in 1869, that fact should have been taken a9 the basis of decision. The plaintiff nowhere stated in the plaint that he bad been dispossessed. It has not been found as a fact that be was actually dispossessed on a certain date. In the circums­tances, according to the Privy Council cafe of The Secretary of State for India v. Ckethkani Rama Rao, 89 Mad. 617: 43 1. A. IS(2: 31 M. L J. 3i!4: 20 G. W. N. 1311 etc. ; (A. I. B. (3) 1916 P. C 21) followed in Jai Chand Bahadur v. Qirwar Singh, 41 All. 669. 52 I C. 366 : 17 A. L. J 814 : (A 1 K (6) 1919 All. 403) Article 144 would apply aod tbe learned Judge should have considered wbelher the defendants had completed a title in themselves by being in adverse possession for twelve years." [18] The lower appellate Court has, in my opinion, taken the correct view in refusing to apply Art. 120, Limitation Act to the facts of this case. I see no reason, therefore, to interfere in the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, which is hereby affirmed, and the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.