Judgement Ray, C. J. :- It arises out of an order of the Munsif of Cuttack refusing to grant a temporary injunction to the pltfs.-petnrs. by way of restraining the deft. 1 (O. P. 1), Hindu Religious Endowments Comr. from levying contribution from the pltf. under the provisions of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act. 2. The Comr. in exercise of the powers under the Act declared the endowment a public one, and accordingly, is going to levy the usual contribution which, in this case, amounts to Rs. 80 annually, the aggregate of the claim, at the time the petn. was filed, amounting to Rs. 240. The prayer for injunction has been rejected on two grounds, namely, (i) that the suit having been stayed under S. 3. (Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Amendment Act (Orissa Act (XXXI [31] of 1947), the Ct. has no power to issue injunction; and (ii) that according to the balance of convenience, the petn. has no merits, 3. We have to consider two very important questions of law (i) Whether the suit is one within the purview of S. 3 of the Act, and (ii) Whether the statutory stay of the suit deprive the Ct. in which a suit of the specified nature is pending of this usual jurisdiction and power to protection to the parties by interlocutory preventive orders, such as, issue of injunction, appointment of receiver, and attachment of properties before the judgment and c. 4. The present suit was instituted in the year 1948, that is, after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act. Section 3 reads : 3. (i) Subject to the provisions of sub-s. (2), all suits instituted under the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 64 of the said Act and pending on the date of the commencement of this Act shall be stayed for a period of two years from the said date. (ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1) the Provincial Govt. may direct that any suit or class of suits stayed under sub-s. (1) shall be proceeded with from the stage which had been reached when the suit was stayed, 5. (ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1) the Provincial Govt. may direct that any suit or class of suits stayed under sub-s. (1) shall be proceeded with from the stage which had been reached when the suit was stayed, 5. The plain grammatical meaning of the language in which the subs, (1) has been enacted leads to only one construction, to wit, that the class of suits specified for the purpose of the Act includes those which had been instituted before the commencement of the Act and were pending at the time. It has been very strenuously contended by Mr. Advocate-General who represents the Comr. that the section must be so interpreted as to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as gathered from the preamble and the scopes and object of the Act. The part of the preamble material for the purpose is: "Whereas it is expedient to provide for the stay of certain classes of suits pending further legislation, ......." The preamble does not at all indicate that all suits under S. 64 (2), Hindu Religious Endowments Act, and intended to be the target of the legislation for the purpose of stay. The class of suits referred to in the preamble must be those specified in that behalf in S. 3. That the intention of the Legislature was to stay all such suits instituted either before or after the commencement of the Act does not appear from the preamble, It does not proceed to say what further the legislation was going to be nor how the trial of such suits was injurious or harmful to the due administration of the Act. Had there been any such indication that could have been prayed in aid to find out the intention of the Legislature as to what class of suits were intended to be stayed. So the preamble is quite unuseful in this respect. We have, therefore, to confine ourselves to the language in which S. 3 has been enacted. The material words are: "all suits instituted ........ and pending on the date of the commencement of this Act. In order to include suits to be instituted after the commencement of the Act in the class of suits specified in the section, one must read "all suits to be instituted "or" all suits whenever instituted". The material words are: "all suits instituted ........ and pending on the date of the commencement of this Act. In order to include suits to be instituted after the commencement of the Act in the class of suits specified in the section, one must read "all suits to be instituted "or" all suits whenever instituted". I am unable to introduce these words into the section which would amount to creating a new section or usurping the functions of the Legislature. Besides, the words "all suits instituted" are further controlled by the words "and pending on the date of the commencement of this Act". In order that a suit may come within the purview of the class, it must be one not only instituted but also pending on the date of the commencement of the Act. By any stretch of imagination and without replacing the present section by a new one, it is difficult to conceive that the section, as expressed, can, at all, be construed to include all future suits. Mr. Advocate General referred us to certain passages from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes in support of his contention that and can be read as or. That too will not improve the position. That would be reading the section as : "all suits instituted "or" (all suits) pending on the date of the commencement of this Act". The meaning of the section remains as it is, even if and is substituted by or or is deemed equivalent thereto. Unless you introduce certain language to the section which would amount to say "all suits when so instituted under the provisions of S. 64 (s) including those pending on the date of the commencement of this Act", you cannot give effect to the contention raised by the learned Advocate General. Besides, as rightly pointed out by my learned brother, in course of argument, sub-s. (2) fortifies our view that the construction we have put upon sub-s, (1) is the only admissible one. Sub-s (2) is an enabling provision empowering the Provincial Govt. to direct that any suit shall be proceeded with from the stage which had been reached when the suit was stayed. This could hardly be translated into action in its application to a suit not instituted on or before the commencement of the Act. Sub-s (2) is an enabling provision empowering the Provincial Govt. to direct that any suit shall be proceeded with from the stage which had been reached when the suit was stayed. This could hardly be translated into action in its application to a suit not instituted on or before the commencement of the Act. Any suit which is instituted, if at all, after the commencement of the Act, should never reach any stage so as to be proceeded with from that stage. It is a still-born suit which never breathed nor moved and it is beyond conception that it should, even notionally, reach any stage. That stage is not intended to refer to merely the stage of filling is clear from the language of sub-s. (2) that is the stage which had been reached when the suit was stated. Can it be predicated of a suit filed after the date of commencement of the Act that a stage had been reached before its filing? Could it be reasonably construed that the Legislature intended that the Govt. should exercise the power contemplated in the subsection only in pre-amendment cases and not in the past, amendment ones? Sub-Ss. (1)and (2) of the section must be taken as co-extensive as to their respective fields of operation, and, in that contingency, sub-s (2), which is clear in its expression, must be prayed in aid of construction of sub-s. (1). I shall try to read sub-s. (1) as divisible into two mutually exclusive or disjuncted parts divided by disjunctive or. In doing so I shall omit the words subject to the provisions of sub-s. (2), as they are common to each of the parts. One part will read; "All suits instituted under the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 64 of the said Act shall be stayed for a period of two years from the said date." The other part will read "all suits pending on the date of the commencement of this Act shall be stayed". Looking at the two parts severally, the first part may cover-assuming instituted to mew either to be instituted or whenever instituted-post-amendment suits; but what about the second part? The latter contains no words of limitation so as to specify the class of suits but refers to all suits irrespective of any characteristic features. Looking at the two parts severally, the first part may cover-assuming instituted to mew either to be instituted or whenever instituted-post-amendment suits; but what about the second part? The latter contains no words of limitation so as to specify the class of suits but refers to all suits irrespective of any characteristic features. Did the Legislature intend to paralyse the civil administration of justice till two years from the commencement of the Act (XXXI [31] of 1947)? That could be only in the land of absurdities. Another reading of the second part of the sub-section might be "the section itself as a whole so as to define the suits as are instituted before but pending at the Commencement of the Act". This amounts to not reading or for and by way of complete replacement but reading both as or a disjunctive conjunction and also as a conjunctive one. In grammar, when this is intended, the language used is and/or-a formula allowing readers to take either or both of two expressions (e. g. contributions in money and/or garments). 6. Besides, there are certain other considerations which also compel us to the view. In S. 64 (2), the time limit for instituting a suit challenging the correctness of the Endowments Comr.s order is one year. The Amendment Act does not raise it to two years or more. If the bar of limitation is to be avoided, the party must file a suit, this amending Act notwithstanding, within one year of the Comrs order, under challenge. He should file the suit, pay c. f. and then be prevented from proceeding further. This could never have been the intention of the Legislature. If it were so, they could have, in very simple language, expressed the section and could have kept operation of sub-S. (2) of S. 64 in abeyance pending further legislation. Unnecessary and unuseful harassment to the members of the public can never be imagined to have been within the contemplation of the Legislature. One construction would have led to consequential amendment of S. 64 or its abeyance for two years and the other would require neither this nor that. Under the circumstances, it is futile to argue that the intention of the Legislature was to harass the people and to compel them to file suits spending money over them but for no purpose. One construction would have led to consequential amendment of S. 64 or its abeyance for two years and the other would require neither this nor that. Under the circumstances, it is futile to argue that the intention of the Legislature was to harass the people and to compel them to file suits spending money over them but for no purpose. Besides, we are not concerned with nor it is our function to speculate on what the intention of the Legislature could more probably be. It is only when the language employed admits of several constructions, we may accept one in preference to the other in order to give effect to the Legislatures intention when that appears clearly within the four corners of the piece of the legislation, under consideration. Here, neither the intention is clear nor the language admits of more than one construction, namely, the one which we have been forced to put on the section. In our view, therefore the present suit is not one which shall be considered to have been stayed by the Amendment Act (XXXI [31] of 1947). 7. The next paint, for consideration, is that conceding that the suit is within the class of suits which have been stayed, if the Ct. is deprived of his power of giving protection to an aggrieved party by such interlocutory orders as an injunction. This leads us to think that if the Legislature has not prevented the suits from being instituted, they cannot be said to have deprived the Ct. of the powers of protection by maintaining the status quo ante. What has been intended to be stayed must be the trial of the suit challenging the validity of the Comrs order. The matter is not without an authority. In the case of Senaji Kapurchand v. Pannaji Devichand, 46 Bom. 431 : (a. i. R. (9) 1922 Bom. 276), it has been held: "It is competent to the Ct. to pass interlocutory orders, e. g., orders for a receiver or an injunction or an attachment before judgment, where a suit has been stayed under S. 10 of the Procedure Code, 1908". I find no distinction between the stay, as enacted in S. 10, and the provision for stay in this Act. Both the stays are as against adjudication of the subject matter of dispute. I find no distinction between the stay, as enacted in S. 10, and the provision for stay in this Act. Both the stays are as against adjudication of the subject matter of dispute. If the Legislature intended that not only the trial of the suit should be stayed but also that in matter of all interim protections against continuance of injury, violence and ravages to ones property he should be made completely defenceless, they must express themselves clearly. To hold that it did so intend, it would be assigning to it attribute of reacting Czars regime in this land. They could have kept in abeyance or suspense the operation of S. 64 (2), though that should not have been enough, because as against civil wrong, a citizen has got a right to sue under his fundamental right and under Civil P. C. If they did do so it must be with a purpose, namely, at any rate they did not contemplate that they would make the aggrieved defenceless as against a containing wrong by paralysing the interim machinery of temporary protection. If I assume that the Legislature has paralysed and freezed the said machinery, I shall have to assume that the Hindu Religious Endowments Comr. has been let loose upon the public as a licensed despotic autocrat, like Autocrat of all the Russians (title of the Czar)." I cannot conceive for a moment that the Legislature intended such irresistible harassment to the public in relation to their fundamental rights. Under the circumstances we are unhesitatingly of opinion that, even in all suits, which come within the class specified in S. 3 as interpreted by us in the earlier part of this judgment, the Cts. have got the power of passing interlocutory orders by way of protection to the aggrieved by way of maintaining the status quo till the disposal of the suit. 8. Coming to the merits of this appln. it is contended by the learned Advocate-General that the levy of contribution is not going to be a very serious affair nor to inflict any irreparable loss and injury to the pltfs. and further urges that it being a stone temple situate beyond the homestead of the pltfs.-sebaits, presumably it is a public temple, or in other words, that, prima facie, the order of the Comr. is correct. and further urges that it being a stone temple situate beyond the homestead of the pltfs.-sebaits, presumably it is a public temple, or in other words, that, prima facie, the order of the Comr. is correct. It is difficult to pre-judge the issue nor is it possible to say that it is easy for the pltfs. to get back the contribution realised from them in case they succeed in the suit. Besides, as Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the petnrs. has put in, the payments of these contributions should naturally reduce correspondingly the funds available for the upkeep of the worship. Under the circumstances, I consider that the balanbe of convenience is in favour of the petnrs. I should, therefore, allow this petn and direct that deft. 1 be restrained from levying any contribution payable under the provisions of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act from the pltfs. including the deity and his properties. 9. The civil revn. is allowed with costs as against deft. 1. Hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs. 10. Panigrahi, J. :- I agree, but I would like to add a few observations in view of the importance of the master involved. If the intention of the Legislature was to direct stay of suits to be instituted after the commencement of the Orissa Act No. 31 of 1947, nothing could have been simpler than to say that no suit shall be instituted to challenge the decision of the Endowments Comr. under S. 64 (2) for a period of two years. It would not be legitimate to attribute vagueness to the Legislature when by adopting this simple language it could have brought in all suits instituted before or after the commencement of the Act within its scope. It says that : "all suits instituted .................... and pending on the date of the commencement of this Act shall be stayed for a period of two years from the said date." All suits instituted could only have reference to those that had already been instituted. The words and pending have also to be read conjunctively with the previous clause beginning with all suits instituted. The proper construction should there, fore, be that a suit should have been instituted and been also pending on the date of the commencement of the Act if the Act is to apply. The words and pending have also to be read conjunctively with the previous clause beginning with all suits instituted. The proper construction should there, fore, be that a suit should have been instituted and been also pending on the date of the commencement of the Act if the Act is to apply. Furthermore, the section says that a suit shall be stayed for two years from the said date. How can it be said that a suit shall be stayed for a period of two years from the date of the Act unless it was pending on that date ? To give effect to the words for a period of two years from the said date, I am compelled to restrict the operation of S. 3 (1) to suits which were capable of being stayed for two years from the commencement of the Act. This could only apply to a suit which had already been instituted and been pending on the date of the commencement of the Act. Reference to the language of S. 3 (a) also leads to the same result. The Govt. is given the power to direct that a suit shall be proceeded with from the stage which had beers reached when the suit was stayed. The suit is stayed under that Act. Therefore, the stage referred to in sub-s. (2) can only be the stage which had already been reached before the commencement of the Act. My third reason for arriving at this conclusion is that the section contemplates stay of suits. Does it mean as was contended by the learned Advocate-General, that the trial of the suit alone is stayed ? That appears to be the meaning of the language used by the Legislature though it could easily have said that all proceedings except the trial of suits shall be proceeded with. Otherwise, we are driven to the position that a suit must be filed under S. 64(2) within one year of the order of the Comr. and must be stayed under the Act xxxi [31] of 1947 as soon as filed. The result would be preposterous because the Ct. cannot check the plaint nor can even order for supply of deficit c.-f. nor can do any thing in the way of progress of the suit. and must be stayed under the Act xxxi [31] of 1947 as soon as filed. The result would be preposterous because the Ct. cannot check the plaint nor can even order for supply of deficit c.-f. nor can do any thing in the way of progress of the suit. If this were the intention of the Legislature, as strict construction of the language would lead us to hold, we arrive at the same conclusion namely, that the Act would not apply to a suit filed subsequent to the commencement of the Act. 11. I am also inclined to accept the contention of the learned advocate-General and, in agreement with my Lord, will hold that no proceeding other than adjudication of the rights involved in the suit was intended to be stayed and that the Ct. is at liberty to pass interim or interlocutory orders as may be necessary from time to time, in the interest of justice. In the present case, I do not see how the balance of convenience can be on the side of the Comr. It is urged for him that the money now paid can, at any time, be recovered from the. Comr. and, therefore, no injunction should issue. It is equally that the Comr. can go on with his administration of endowment even without payment of any sum by the petnrs. and administration of religious endowments is not likely to suffer because of the non-payment of the contribution levied on the petnrs. I have therefore, no hesitation in arriving at the same conclusion, namely, that this is a fit case in which the injunction should issue restraining the Comr. from realising contribution from the petnrs. The petn. should be allowed with costs, as proposed by my Lord the learned Chief Justice. Revision allowed.