JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by a tenant, against whom an order has been passed that a suit in ejectment is maintainable. The Rule is opposed by the landlord. 2. The facts necessary to be stated for the purposes of this Rule briefly are these: The landlord instituted a suit against the tenant for ejectment on the ground that he required the premises bona fide for his own use. He obtained the permission of the Rent Controller to institute this suit in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control Order of 1943. The suit was dismissed and a fresh suit was instituted, this time without any permission, on August 6, 1947. This is the suit, out of which this application arises. In this suit, a preliminary issue was raised as to whether the suit was maintainable without the permission of the Rent Controller. That preliminary issue has been decided by the learned Munsif, who has held that, by virtue of certain provisions of the new West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, no permission is necessary from the Rent Controller and that the suit is entertainable by him. Against this order, the present Rule has been obtained by the tenant. 3. In my opinion, the present suit is not maintainable and the following are my reasons for this view. When the present suit was instituted in 1947, the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, was in force. Section 13(i) of that Rent Ordinance is in the following terms: No suit or proceeding by a landlord against a tenant in possession of any premises for eviction of such tenant therefrom in which any of the grounds specified in Clause (c) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 12 has been taken as a ground for such eviction shall be entertained by any court unless the landlord has been permitted by the Controller by an order in writing under Sub-section (3) to institute such suit or proceeding and has produced before such court proof that such permission has been granted. 4. It is quite clear from the provisions of this section that until the permission of the Rent Controller had been obtained a suit of the nature mentioned in the section could not be entertained by the court. There is no controversy regarding this matter. 4. It is quite clear from the provisions of this section that until the permission of the Rent Controller had been obtained a suit of the nature mentioned in the section could not be entertained by the court. There is no controversy regarding this matter. Learned advocate for the opposite party, however, contends that such permission may be obtained after the institution of the suit. He points to the fact that in the sub-section quoted above the words "entertained" and "institute" are used and his argument is that the permission of the Rent Controller can be obtained after the institution of the suit. He says that the section does not lay it down that no suit shall be instituted until the permission is first obtained, but that the words in the section are that no suit shall be entertained by any court until permission has been obtained. I am not impressed by this argument and for this reason. The section postulates that the landlord must obtain an order in writing from the Rent Controller permitting him to institute the suit. I would draw attention to the words "to institute". Permission must be taken before institution. The permission relates to institution. The position would have been different if the section said that permission of the Rent Controller had to be taken to continue or maintain the suit. Under the section, permission is a prerequisite to the institution. Any suit, which has been instituted without such permission, is, in my opinion, no suit at all in the eye of the law and the defect of not obtaining permission cannot be cured by the subsequent obtaining of permission. Any permission given subsequently must relate to the continuation of the suit, it cannot be permission to institute the suit, because the suit has already been instituted. For these reasons I hold that the present suit, which was instituted without any permission having been first obtained, is in the eye of the law no suit at all and is liable to be dismissed. 5. Learned advocate for the opposite party argues that the landlord had done all that he could do in the matter and that it was through no fault of the landlord that the permission was not granted. In support of his contention he refers me to the order of the Rent Controller. 5. Learned advocate for the opposite party argues that the landlord had done all that he could do in the matter and that it was through no fault of the landlord that the permission was not granted. In support of his contention he refers me to the order of the Rent Controller. In that order the Rent Controller says that as permission had already been granted in the first suit which had been dismissed, no further permission was necessary and that the old permission remained valid. After stating this the Rent Controller passes an order in the following terms: No second permission is necessary and I dismiss the present application on that ground. 6. Learned advocate for the opposite party contends that the landlord, having obtained such an order, he could not appeal against it as it was an order in his favour and that the order should be construed as granting of permission to institute the suit. Now, even if the order be construed as the granting of permission it will still be hit by the fact that this permission was granted after the institution of the suit. As I have stated before, permission must be granted prior to the institution of the suit and permission granted after the institution is of no effect. Again the learned Rent Controller was obviously wrong. The wording of Section 13(2) of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, is quite clear. The words are-- Unless the landlord has been permitted by the Controller by an order in writing under Sub-section (3) to institute such suit or proceeding and has produced before such Court proof that such permission has been granted. 7. The permission must relate to "such suit or proceeding". Therefore, in this case, it must relate to the suit of 1947. The permission granted in respect of the suit of 1946 can be of no help to the landlord. Learned advocate for the Petitioner points out that his client had no right of appeal against the order of the Rent Controller, because the Rent Controller dismissed the application and an order of dismissal was really an order in his favour. I agree with this view. In my opinion, the landlord should have appealed against this order and insisted in the court of appeal that the Rent Controller should grant a second permission in respect of the suit which he had instituted in 1947. I agree with this view. In my opinion, the landlord should have appealed against this order and insisted in the court of appeal that the Rent Controller should grant a second permission in respect of the suit which he had instituted in 1947. Therefore, I am unable to hold that the landlord has done all that was possible for him to do to make the suit conform to law. As a matter of fact, having regard to the view I have taken of the law, the landlord should have obtained permission and then instituted this suit. An application for permission after the institution of the suit would, in my opinion, not help the landlord in curing the initial defect in the suit. 8. The next point for consideration is whether the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, have the effect of making the suit maintainable. Under this Act no permission of the Rent Controller is necessary. A landlord may institute a suit for ejectment alleging that the premises are required by him bona fide for his own use without obtaining any permission from any body. Under the present Act, the court which tries the suit will decide this question. Under the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, the position was that the Rent Controller would first have to decide the question and if he refused permission, the court could not try the suit at all. If permission was granted, the court trying the suit would have the power to decide whether the Plaintiff's claim that he required the premises bona fide for his own use was a good claim or not and it was open to the court to dissent from the view of the Rent Controller. Learned advocate for the opposite party contends that, as no permission is now necessary, the suit is maintainable and the court should go on with its trial. His contention is that the obtaining of permission is really a question of procedure and that the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, would have a retrospective effect on questions of procedure. For this contention he relies upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi ILR (1927) Lah. For this contention he relies upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi ILR (1927) Lah. 284 : L.R. 54 IndAp 421, where their Lordships laid down the principle that-- while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. 9. In my opinion the question involved in the present case is not a question of mere procedure, it is a question relating to a substantive right. Learned advocate for the opposite party contends that, under the old law the Rent Controller decided the question whether the premises were bona fide required for the use of the landlord, while under the present law this question is decided by the court trying the suit; therefore, he says the question is clearly one of procedure only. I do not think that this contention is sound. By the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, a tenant was given a substantive right by the provisions of Section 13(1) of the aforesaid Ordinance. He was given the right to insist on the dismissal of any suit in ejectment unless previous permission of the Rent Controller had been obtained. The present suit, having been instituted at the time when the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1948, was in force and before the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, came into operation, it must be held that the tenant had the right to resist ejectment on the ground of want of permission. The suit being a pending suit it must be governed by the provisions of the Calcutta Rent Ordinance, 1946, unless there are words in the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, which make the Act retrospective. There are no such words in the Act so far as this point is concerned, nor are there any provisions from which such a conclusion necessarily follows. The tenant, therefore, had this right to resist the present suit on this ground and this is a substantive right. 10. I must hold, therefore, that the decision of the learned Munsif is erroneous on this issue. The tenant, therefore, had this right to resist the present suit on this ground and this is a substantive right. 10. I must hold, therefore, that the decision of the learned Munsif is erroneous on this issue. He has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the suit must be dismissed. The Rule is made absolute. 11. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, I am of opinion that the parties should bear their own costs throughout. 12. Let the record be sent down as early as possible.