JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule must be made absolute. The Petitioner was tried for having committed the offence of simple hurt, an offence punishable u/s 323 of the Indian Penal Code. He was tried according to the summary procedure. Against the order of conviction and sentence he has obtained this Rule. 2. Learned advocate appearing for the Petitioner argues that the procedure laid down in Section 262 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the trial of warrant cases in a summary manner has not been followed and that, consequently, the conviction cannot stand. He refers me to Sections 255 and 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and points out that in warrant cases the plea of the accused must be taken. This is laid down in Section 255 of the aforesaid Code. As regards Section 256 of the said Code, his grievance is that not only was the accused's plea not taken, but he was not given an opportunity of stating which witnesses he wished to cross-examine. The case was taken up and disposed of on the same day. His contention is that this was in contravention of the terms of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Next, he refers me to Section 262 of the said Code, which lays down that, in warrant cases tried summarily, the procedure prescribed for warrant cases shall be followed except as varied by the subsequent sections. His contention is that there is nothing in the chapter on summary trials which would justify the Court in not taking the accused's plea and in not following the provisions of Section 256 of the said Code. Learned advocate appearing for the complainant contends that, as the case was tried summarily, all these errors, even if they have been committed, should be condoned. His argument seems to be that a summary trial is a trial in which no definite procedure need be followed. He has failed entirely to appreciate that there is a definite procedure laid down in the Code of summary trials and that a summary trial does not mean any kind of trial. I was somewhat surprised at the argument urged on behalf of the complainant. He has failed entirely to appreciate that there is a definite procedure laid down in the Code of summary trials and that a summary trial does not mean any kind of trial. I was somewhat surprised at the argument urged on behalf of the complainant. Learned advocate has not acquainted himself with the principles laid down in the Code regarding the trial of warrant cases and regarding summary trials and his arguments have been of no assistance whatsoever to the Court. 3. It is quite clear from the provisions of Section 262 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that warrant cases tried summarily must be tried in accordance with the procedure laid down for warrant cases in the chapter dealing with the warrant cases and that the only variations which are permitted from that procedure are the variations prescribed in the sections subsequent to Section 263 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For instance, in warrant cases, where the sentence is non-appealable, no formal charge need be framed if the case is tried summarily. This is a variation of the rule laid down regarding the procedure of trying warrant cases in the ordinary way. The Court trying a warrant case summarily, however, is bound to follow the provisions of Sections 255 and 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as those sections have not been excluded from the procedure laid down for summary trials. Now, in this case, the order-sheet shows that the accused was examined in accordance with the provisions of Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but there is nothing to show that his plea was taken in accordance with the provisions of Section 255 of the Code. The examination of the accused u/s 342 of the Code is quite a different thing from taking the plea of the accused. The plea of the accused is taken at an earlier part of the proceedings. The examination u/s 342 of the Code takes place after all the prosecution witnesses have been cross-examined and before the accused is called upon to enter upon his defence. The object of the two sections is entirely different. The learned Magistrate seems to think that the taking of the plea of the accused and his examination u/s 342 of the Code is the same thing; this is entirely wrong. 4. The object of the two sections is entirely different. The learned Magistrate seems to think that the taking of the plea of the accused and his examination u/s 342 of the Code is the same thing; this is entirely wrong. 4. Next, the learned Magistrate has not followed the provisions of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which directs him to ask the accused on the next day after his plea had been taken to state which witnesses for the prosecution he would like to cross-examine. This the learned Magistrate has not done. It is impossible to understand from the state of the record and from his order-sheet what procedure the Magistrate has followed. It seems, however, that he must have insisted on the accused cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution immediately after his plea was taken. He has given no reasons for following this course, a course which is not to be followed ordinarily. The learned Magistrate has not sent any explanation to the grounds taken in this motion. The trial has been perfunctory and hurried. I would impress upon the learned Magistrate that a summary trial does not mean a hurried trial. 5. The order of conviction and sentence in this case must be set aside. Having regard to the nature of the case I am of opinion that no order for retrial is necessary. The accused is acquitted. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded. The Rule is made absolute.