Peerukannu Mytheenkhan v. State — 1949 DIGILAW 23 (KER)

ORDER : K.T. Koshi, J. The petitioner is the brother of Peerukannu Pakirkhan who is the accused in C.C. No. 134 of 1122 and C.C. No. 78 of 1124 on the file of the First Class Magistrate's Court at Neyyattinkara. By the order dated 3rd Chingam 1125 passed by this Court on Crl. M.Ps. Nos. 17 and 18 of 1125 he was ordered to be released on bail. The bail bonds were duly executed and the Magistrate accepted those bonds and directed the release of the accused. The petitioner alleged that the said direction has not been complied with by the police and that the accused is being illegally and improperly detained in custody in the Neyyattinkara Police Station. Accordingly the present petition has been filed under S. 402 of the Travancore Criminal Procedure Code (corresponding to S. 491 of the Indian Code) praying that directions in the nature of a habeas corpus may be issued for releasing Pakirkhan from such illegal and improper custody. The petition is opposed by the Sirkar. The Police Inspector in charge of the Nemom Police Station has field an affidavit denying the allegation that Pakirkhan is being detained in illegal and improper custody and also explaining the circumstances under which he is being detained in custody at present. It is stated that in pursuance of the bail order passed by the High Court Pakirkhan was released on 11th Chingom 1125 and that at about 10 p.m. on the same day he was again arrested under Cl. (1) of S. 29 of the Travancore Emergency Powers Act (I of 1122). The fact of such arrest was reported to Government on 12th Chingam 1125, as required by Cl. (2) of S. 29, and by the order No. H5 723/49/ C.S., dated 9th September 1949/24th Chingam 1125, Government have authorised the detention of Pakirkhan in custody in the Bhoothapandy Police Station lock-up for a period of two months commencing from 11th Chingam 1125, the date of his arrest. A copy of this order and a copy of the report of arrest submitted by the Inspector of Police have also been filed by the Sirkar. In answer to these records the petitioner has filed Crl. M.P. No. 49 of 1125 urging certain additional grounds in support of his prayer in Crl. M.P. No. 24 of 1125. A copy of this order and a copy of the report of arrest submitted by the Inspector of Police have also been filed by the Sirkar. In answer to these records the petitioner has filed Crl. M.P. No. 49 of 1125 urging certain additional grounds in support of his prayer in Crl. M.P. No. 24 of 1125. These grounds are that the petitioner is not aware that there is any Government order sanctioning the detention of his brother Pakirkhan and that, even if there is any such order passed under any statute, it is only an illegal and improper order and it could only be a fraud on the statute and an abuse of the power given by the statute. By the order passed on Crl. M.P. No. 49 of 1125 these additional grounds have been allowed to be urged in support of Crl. M.P. 24 of 1125. 2. By S. 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act VIII of 1117 of Travancore, as amended by Acts XI of 1117 V of 1119 and XX of 1119) the High Court of Judicature in Travancore was given the power to issue directions in the nature of habeas corpus in respect of persons illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody in any part of Travancore. That power is retained by this Court by virtue of S. 18 of Ordinance No. II of 1124 by which this High Court was constituted and also by virtue of S. 3 of Ordinance No. I of 1124 which is to the effect that the existing laws of Travancore shall continue to be in force until altered, amended or repealed by competent authority. Thus it cannot be doubted that this Court has the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus as contemplated by S. 402 of the Travancore Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to S. 491 of the Indian Code.) In order that such a writ may be issued in the present instance, the petitioner has to make out that his brother Pakirkhan is being illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody. The allegation that the police is detaining Pakirkhan in custody without lawful authority cannot stand in the face of the Government order authorising his detention, a copy of which has been produced in this enquiry. The allegation that the police is detaining Pakirkhan in custody without lawful authority cannot stand in the face of the Government order authorising his detention, a copy of which has been produced in this enquiry. The Government order No. H5-723/49/C.S., dated 9th September 1949/24th Chingam 1125 directs Pakirkhan to be detained in the Bhoothapandy Police Station lock-up for a period of two months commencing from 11th Chingam. 1125/27th August 1949, the date on which he was arrested. The arrest appears to have been made by the Inspector of Police, Nemom, under Cl. (1) of S. 29 of the Emergency Powers Act (I of 1123 of Travancore). About such arrest the Inspector submitted a report to Government and it was on the strength of that report that the detention order was passed by Government. The validity of Act I of 1122 is not challenged by the petitioner. Before the expiry of the period of duration of the Act such period was extended by a further period of one year from 1st October 1948 by the Notification D. Dis. No. 378/48/C.S., dated 25th September 1948, published at page 124, Part I, of the Travancore Government Gazette dated 28th September 1948. By S. 3 of Ordinance No. I of 1124 this Act also is kept alive. Hence the action taken against Pakirkhan under S. 29 of Act I of 1122 cannot be said to be illegal unless it is shown that the provisions of the section have not been strictly complied with. 3. Pakirkhan's arrest and subsequent detention under S. 29 of the Emergency Powers Act are impeached by the petitioner as being illegal and improper and as an abuse of the power conferred by the statute on the authorities concerned. On behalf of Government it is contended that this court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or propriety of the orders passed in exercise of the powers conferred by the Emergency Powers Act. Cl. (1) of S. 34 is relied on in support of this position. That clause runs as follows. On behalf of Government it is contended that this court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or propriety of the orders passed in exercise of the powers conferred by the Emergency Powers Act. Cl. (1) of S. 34 is relied on in support of this position. That clause runs as follows. "No order made or deemed to be made in exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any court." It is clear from this clause that the court is debarred from examining the validity of an order made or deemed to be made in exercise of the powers conferred by the Emergency Powers Act. But there is nothing in the clause to suggest that the court has no jurisdiction even to consider the question whether an order purporting to have been passed under the Act has really been passed in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act. This aspect of the order in question has necessarily to be examined by the court in order to come to a conclusion whether or not the order is protected by Cl. (1) of S. 34. A reading of Cl. (2) of the same section also indicates that no complete ouster of the court's jurisdiction is contemplated by Cl. (1). Cl. (2) lays down that "no court shall have power to make any order under S. 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1117, in respect of any order made under S. 21 of this Act or in respect of any person the subject of such an order". S. 21 of the Act deals with the externment of persons found to be engaged in prejudicial acts as defined in the Act. Cl. (2) of S. 34 completely ousts the jurisdiction of this Court to pass an order under S. 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of a person externed under S. 21 of the Emergency Powers Act. No such express ouster of the jurisdiction conferred by S. 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is made in respect of persons detained under S. 29 of the Act. It follows, therefore, that Cl. No such express ouster of the jurisdiction conferred by S. 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is made in respect of persons detained under S. 29 of the Act. It follows, therefore, that Cl. (1) of S. 34 does not operate as a complete ouster of this Court's jurisdiction to entertain an application under S. 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of a person purporting to have been detained under S. 29 of the Act. At the same time it is clear that the court's jurisdiction to examine the propriety of an order passed under S. 29 of the Emergency Powers Act has been very much restricted and limited in its scope by Cl. (I) of S. 34 of the Act. 4. The question how far the High Court's statutory power to issue a writ of habeas corpus can be exercised in the case of persons detained as per orders passed by executive authorities in exercise of powers conferred on them by emergency legislative enactments similar to the Travancore Emergency Powers Act (I of 1122), has come up for the consideration of the several High Courts in Indian in a series of cases. A few of those cases may be referred to with advantage. In Kamala Kant v. Emperor A.I.R. 1944 Pat. 354 at 367 the Patna High Court, while dealing with applications under S. 494, Criminal Procedure Code, filed on behalf of persons detained under R. 26 of the Defence of India Rules, observed as follows: "The powers of this Court are not the powers of a Court of appeal. We do not know the materials on which the orders were made. We cannot compel the Crown to disclose them and, therefore, we cannot pronounce on their validity or otherwise. But the power to order the detention of a man under R. 26 Defence of India Rules, is not an arbitrary power. There are limitations on it and this Court may and is bound to satisfy itself that these limitations have not been exceeded. If the executive have gone beyond them and have used the rule in a way not intended, the order is not a bona fide order but a 'sham' order, and this Court may interfere." In dealing with a similar application it was ruled by the Allahabad High Court in Harish Chander v. Emperor A.I.R. 1943 All. If the executive have gone beyond them and have used the rule in a way not intended, the order is not a bona fide order but a 'sham' order, and this Court may interfere." In dealing with a similar application it was ruled by the Allahabad High Court in Harish Chander v. Emperor A.I.R. 1943 All. 277 F.B. that, "In cases in which, even though the forms of law have been observed, the detention constitutes a clear fraud on an enactment or amounts to an abuse of the powers given to the executive by the Legislature, it is the duty of this Court to step in and to order that the person detained be set at liberty". The propriety of detention made under S. 2 (1) (a) of the C.P. and Berar Public Safety Act (Act XXXVIII of 1947) was considered by the Nagpur High Court in Wasudeo Anant v. Emperor A.I.R. 1949 Nag. 59 and it was held that the order of detention must be presumed to have been properly made and that the requisite as to a particular belief was complied with. On the strength of the Privy Council ruling in Bhagat Singh v. Emperor A.I.R. 1931 P.C. it was also held that the presumption regarding the validity of the detention order has to be rebutted by alleging and proving that there is a mistake as to the identity of the detenu, or that there has been a manifest fraud upon the statute, or that the power conferred by the statute is being utilised for some indirect purpose not connected with the objects of the Act or the mischief it seeks to remedy. The principles enunciated in the leading English cases, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson 1942 A.C. 206 and Greene v. Secretary of State of Home Affairs 1942 A.C. 284 were followed in all the decisions referred to above. 5. Ss. 2 and 16 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1947, contain provisions somewhat akin to the provisions contained in Ss. 29 and 34 of the Emergency Powers Act (I of 1122) of Travancore. 5. Ss. 2 and 16 of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1947, contain provisions somewhat akin to the provisions contained in Ss. 29 and 34 of the Emergency Powers Act (I of 1122) of Travancore. S. 2 (1) (a) of the Madras Act lays down that "The provincial Government, if satisfied with respect to any particular person that he is acting or about to act in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order and with a view to preventing him, it is necessary to do so may make an order directing that he be detained." Under S. 15 of the Act this power could be delegated by Government to such officers or authorities as may be specified in the order. S. 16(1) lays down that no order made in exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act shall be called in question in any court. The question as to how far S. 16 restricts and limits the High Court's power under S. 491, Criminal Procedure Code, has been recently considered by a Special Bench of the Madras High Court in Narayanaswami v. Inspector of Police A.I.R. 1940 Madras 307. After an exhaustive review of the case law pertaining to the question, the learned Chief Justice who wrote the leading judgment in that case has come to the conclusion that S. 16 of the Act does not affect the High Court's power to interfere and set at liberty a person who is being detained by an order which, though purporting to be made under S. 2 of the Act, is not in fact such an order. His Lordship has also explained the circumstances which would make the detention order not one passed in accordance with S. 2 of the Act. These circumstances are: (1) when the order is passed by an officer or authority not empowered to pass such an order; (2) when there is a mistake regarding the identity of the person ordered to be detained; (3) when the order has been passed without any bona fides and as a result of the abuse of the power conferred by the Act on the authority concerned; and (4) when it is established that the order was passed without the proper authority being satisfied of the existence of the necessity as contemplated by S. (2). It has been laid down that the Court has jurisdiction to consider the question whether the detention order is bad on account of any of these vitiating circumstances and to exercise its power under S. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code in case it is found that such grounds do really exist. If the order is not bad for any of these reasons it has to be accepted as an order passed in exercise of the power conferred by the Act, the necessary consequences being that the High Court cannot go against it and order the release of the detenu by exercising its power under S. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court cannot investigate into the sufficiency of the material or the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the Government or the officer or authority empowered to act under S. 2 had been satisfied as to the necessity of passing the detention order. It is not competent for the Court to call upon the Government or the officer concerned to disclose the information and material on which it or he was satisfied as to the necessity for passing the detention order. The satisfaction required by the section is the satisfaction of the Government or the empowered authority and not the satisfaction of the Court. All the High Courts in India are of the same view as to the soundness of these principles as applicable to cases of detention orders passed as preventive measures to safeguard peace and tranquility within the State. The detention order challenged in the present case has also to be tested in the light of these principles. 6. In this case it is not contended that there is any mistake as to the identity of the detenu. There is also no case that the order of detention was passed by the authority not authorised to do so. Under Cl. (2) of S. 29 of the Emergency Powers Act (I of 1122) the authority is vested in the Government to pass a detention order. Copy of the order produced in this case shows that it was passed by Government in exercise of the power conferred on it by S. 29, Cl. (2). Then there is the question whether the order was passed after the Government had become satisfied as to the existence of the conditions necessitating the passing of the detention order. Copy of the order produced in this case shows that it was passed by Government in exercise of the power conferred on it by S. 29, Cl. (2). Then there is the question whether the order was passed after the Government had become satisfied as to the existence of the conditions necessitating the passing of the detention order. In the cases referred to above much emphasis has been laid on this aspect of the matter and it has been pointed out that the omission of the authority concerned to form an independent conclusion as to the existence of such a necessity is fatal so far as the order of detention is concerned. But it has to be remembered that the sections which authorise the detention in all those cases contained specific provisions insisting such satisfaction by the detaining authority as an essential condition to justify the order of detention. There is no such provision in S. 29 of Act I of 1122 under which the detention order in this case was passed by Government. xxxxxx It is seen from Cl. (1) of S. 29 that any police officer or other empowered officer of Government may arrest without warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects of having acted, of acting, or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety. It is significant to note that the section does not require such officer to be satisfied that the person sought to be arrested has acted or is acting, or is about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety. It is enough if the officer reasonably suspects the person of having acted, or of acting, or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety. After effecting the arrest the officer has to forthwith report the fact of such arrest to Government. On receipt of such report an order has to be passed by Government authorising the detention of the arrested person in temporary custody for a period not exceeding two months. The power thus conferred on the executive authority by S. 29 is much wider in its scope than the powers conferred under other similar enactments already referred to. On receipt of such report an order has to be passed by Government authorising the detention of the arrested person in temporary custody for a period not exceeding two months. The power thus conferred on the executive authority by S. 29 is much wider in its scope than the powers conferred under other similar enactments already referred to. It is not for the court to pronounce any opinion on the propriety and advisability of such an enactment conferring so much power on the executive to interfere with the liberty of the subjects. Such considerations are within the exclusive competence of the Legislature. So long as the Act passed by a competent legislative authority remains in force, it is the duty of the Court to faithfully interpret it and to give effect to its provisions and to scrupulously refrain from questioning the wisdom of the Legislature in passing such an enactment. If the order of detention was passed in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act, the order cannot be said to be illegal or improper. Cl. (2) of S. 29 does not insist that the detention order should be passed only after the Government have come to a final and independent conclusion that justifiable grounds as stated in the report of the arresting officer do really exist. Hence the non-mention of such satisfaction in the order of detention cannot be said to be a fatal defect. It is clear from Cl. (3) of S. 29 that the two months' detention contemplated by the second proviso to Cl. (2) is only intended to ensure the temporary custody of the person arrested under Cl. (1). Cl. (3) requires that before the expiry of the said period of two months Government should, in the exercise of any power conferred upon it by any law for the time being in force, pass a final order as to the detention, release, residence or any other matter concerning the detenu as may appear to Government in the circumstances of the case to be reasonable or necessary. Obviously such a final order has to be passed by Government after a due consideration of all the relevant matters placed before it and after coming to an independent conclusion as to whether such materials would justify a final order of detention or not. Obviously such a final order has to be passed by Government after a due consideration of all the relevant matters placed before it and after coming to an independent conclusion as to whether such materials would justify a final order of detention or not. So far as the preliminary order of temporary detention for two months is concerned, the report of the arresting officer together with the materials supplied by him could alone be relied on as making out a prima facie case for ordering such detention. The order passed by Government shows that Government's attention was directed to the several grounds mentioned in the arresting officer's report and on which he came to the conclusion that the person concerned was acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and that his detention was necessary to prevent his sub-versive activities. It is thus clear that the detention order was passed in strict compliance with the requirements of the Act. 7. The next aspect to be considered is whether the detention order is lacking in bona fides or, in other words, whether the detention constitutes a fraud on the enactment, or whether it amounts to an abuse of the powers given to the executive by the Legislature. When a duly authenticated order of detention is produced, it carries with it a presumption that the order was properly and validly made. No doubt it is a rebuttable presumption and the burden is on the party challenging the order to make out that the order is unwarranted, defective or otherwise invalid. It will undoubtedly be a difficult job to attempt to prove that the detention order is lacking in good faith. The information’s and materials, on the basis of which the detention of the individual concerned was thought necessary, will have an important bearing in determining the question of the bona fides of the action taken. In most instances such information’s and materials may be of a highly confidential nature and the disclosing of the same may be against public interest. The detaining authority cannot also be compelled to disclose such informations and materials. In most instances such information’s and materials may be of a highly confidential nature and the disclosing of the same may be against public interest. The detaining authority cannot also be compelled to disclose such informations and materials. Hence the petitioner will have to rely mainly on the circumstances which he may be in a position to allege and prove by way of discharging this onus to make out that the detention order is lacking in bona fides and is an abuse of the power conferred on the detaining authority. In Vimalabai Deshpande v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1945 Nag. 8) it was established on the facts disclosed at the enquiry under S. 491, Criminal Procedure Code, that the detention ordered under R. 129 of the Defence of India Rules was not in furtherance of the object contemplated by the rule, but was merely with a view to facilitate the investigation by the police into a case of dacoity. Accordingly it was held that the detention was an abuse of the power granted by R. 129 and was a fraud upon the statute. No such grave allegations have been made in the present case. There is only the general allegation that no valid grounds exist to justify the detention of the petitioner's brother Pakrikhan. The answer to this allegation is contained in the report sent to Government by the Police Inspector soon after the arrest of Pakrikhan, wherein it is stated as follows: "Pakrikhan is an active communist worker who was acting in a manner highly prejudicial to the public safety and maintenance of public order. He was working hand-in-glove with the top-ranking communist leaders who have gone underground, his activities being directed towards the overthrow of the existing machinery of Government. He is an accused in Crime No. 31 of 1122 under S. 4, Act I of 1114 (The Travancore Criminal Law Amendment Act) and Crime No. 148 of 1124 of Nemom Station under S. 9(1) of the Emergency Powers Act and in Crime No. 36 of 1122 of Neyyattinkara Station under S. 103, Criminal Procedure Code. He was underground since Thulam 1122 and was arrested on 28th Mithunam 1124 for the above cases. While underground he was organising the weavers and the agricultural labourers of Neyyattinkara Taluk under communist party and was doing secret propaganda among them with a view to achieve the objectives of the communist party through violence. He was underground since Thulam 1122 and was arrested on 28th Mithunam 1124 for the above cases. While underground he was organising the weavers and the agricultural labourers of Neyyattinkara Taluk under communist party and was doing secret propaganda among them with a view to achieve the objectives of the communist party through violence. Following this his adherents committed various acts of lawlessness in Neyyattinkara Taluk ......." It is conceded in the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of his present application that Pakrikhan is an accused in the three cases mentioned in the Inspector's report and that he was arrested on 28th Mithunam 1124 for the above cases. The fact that he could be arrested only after such a long interval after those cases were registered against him is a circumstance lending support to the allegation that Pakrikhan was absconding during that period. The facts and circumstances mentioned in the Inspector's report were by themselves sufficient to induce him to suspect Pakrikhan of having acted in a manner prejudicial to the public safety. Besides those grounds, certain other grounds which induced him to take action against Pakrikhan under Cl. (1) of S. 29 have been explained by the Inspector in the affidavit filed by him before this Court. The Inspector has stated as follows: "I had sufficiently strong materials based on confidential documents and other information to suspect that Pakrikhan would act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety............................................... He has been habitually and systematically acting in a manner highly prejudicial to public safety and the maintenance of public order. His activities have been directed towards the overthrow of Government established by law. For several months before his arrest he was an underground worker along with some top-ranking communist leaders ......... His conduct in the immediate past would also show that he was prepared to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety." The Inspector cannot be compelled to disclose all the confidential documents and other information referred to by him in his affidavit. But, can it be said that the Inspector, who was in possession of such confidential documents and other information and who was fully aware of the antecedents of Pakrikhan, could not reasonably suspect him of having acted or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety? But, can it be said that the Inspector, who was in possession of such confidential documents and other information and who was fully aware of the antecedents of Pakrikhan, could not reasonably suspect him of having acted or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety? The answer should be that anybody in the position of the Inspector would, under such circumstances, have entertained such reasonable suspicion regarding the conduct of Pakrikhan. 8. Pakrikhan was in custody from 28th Mithunam 1124, the date on which he was first arrested, to 11th Chingam 1125, the date on which he was released on bail. In view of that circumstance, the learned Advocate for the petitioner argues that it could not be said that Pakrikhan was acting or was about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety when he was rearrested at 10 p.m. on 11th Chingam 1125. Certain observations in that direction made by the learned Judges in A.K. Gopalan v. District Magistrate, Malabar (A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 596) are also relied on in support of this position. At the outset it has to be pointed out that the section which was construed in that case required that the detaining authority must be satisfied that the person sought to be detained is acting or is about to act in a prejudicial manner when the detention order is passed. In the Travancore Act, Cl. (1) of S. 29 permits the detaining authority to take into account the past conduct also of the person sought to be detained. When he is reasonably suspected of having acted, of acting or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety, action under Cl. (1) of S. 29 could be taken. The expressions "of having acted" and "of acting" cannot obviously refer to any wrongful act committed by the individual during the period while he was under arrest. They must necessarily refer to his conduct immediately prior to his arrest. Such antecedent conduct of his is an essential factor which would legitimately induce the authority concerned to come to a conclusion as to how the man would act on being set at liberty. They must necessarily refer to his conduct immediately prior to his arrest. Such antecedent conduct of his is an essential factor which would legitimately induce the authority concerned to come to a conclusion as to how the man would act on being set at liberty. It will not be correct to say that the officer should invariably wait for some time after such a person is released from custody and see if he is acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety in order that he may come to a conclusion that the man is acting or is about to act in such a prejudicial manner. The power given under Cl. (1) of S. 29 is to prevent the commission of acts prejudicial to public safety and that object would be defeated if the officer concerned is to wait until the actual commission of any such act. The language of Cl. (1) of S. 29 certainly warrants the entertainment of a reasonable suspicion on the strength of the antecedents of a person just prior to his arrest than on his release he would continue to act as before in a manner prejudicial to public safety. In view of the antecedents of Pakrikhan as described by the Inspector, the latter could reasonably suspect that on release he is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety. It was not necessary that Pakrikhan must have been acting in such a manner just at the time of his arrest or that he was going to commit any such act immediately. The expression "about to act" must necessarily refer to the possible contingency of acting within a reasonably short space of time. xxxxxx 10. It is urged by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the Police Inspector who arrested Pakrikhan was not empowered to do so by any general or special order by Government. There is no force in this contention. The order of detention produced in this case itself states that the Inspector of Police, Nemom has been empowered to make arrest under S. 29(1) of the Emergency Powers Act. Another objection raised is about the committing of the arrested person to custody as contemplated by Cl. (2) of S. 29. Pakrikhan was arrested near the bus stand at Neyyattinkara and he was detained in the Neyyattinkara Police lock-up pending orders from Government regarding his detention. Another objection raised is about the committing of the arrested person to custody as contemplated by Cl. (2) of S. 29. Pakrikhan was arrested near the bus stand at Neyyattinkara and he was detained in the Neyyattinkara Police lock-up pending orders from Government regarding his detention. The committing of Pakrikhan to the custody of the Neyyattinkara Police has to be by an order in writing as required by Cl. (2). The Petitioner's advocate would contend that there has been no such written order by the arresting officer to the Neyyattinkara Police. The learned Government Pleader has stated that the entrustment of Pakrikhan to the Neyyattinkara Police was made in writing. We accept this statement as true. The delay in reporting the fact of arrest to Government is also urged as a ground fatal to the order of detention in this case. As already stated, the arrest was at 10 p.m. on 11th Chingam 1125/27th August 1949. The report of such arrest was sent to Government on the next day i.e., 12th Chingam 1125/28th August 1949, i.e., within twenty-four hours from the time of the arrest. Ordinarily the word 'forthwith' means immediately. But the time limit denoted by the word has to be determined with reference to the context in which it has been used. In the particular instance it is clear that the reporting could not be immediately follow the arrest. The officer who effected the arrest, has first to see that proper arrangements are made for the custody of the person arrested because he has necessarily to report about such custody also. The arrest itself was made at 10 o'clock in the night. After arranging for the proper custody of the detenu the officer is seen to have submitted the report to Government on the very next day. In the nature and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that there has been any avoidable delay in sending the report. The direction in Cl. (2) that the fact of arrest should be forthwith reported to Government has to be taken to have been complied with. Still another objection is that there is nothing to show that the custody in the Neyyattinkara Police lock-up has been authorised by Government by any general or special order. It is not thought necessary that a regular enquiry should be made into this matter.. Still another objection is that there is nothing to show that the custody in the Neyyattinkara Police lock-up has been authorised by Government by any general or special order. It is not thought necessary that a regular enquiry should be made into this matter.. There is the general authority empowering the officer in charge of the Police Station to receive into his custody a person who has been arrested in accordance with the provisions of law. In the present instance the Police Inspector in charge of the Police Station at Nemom made the arrest at a place near the Neyyattinkara Police Station and he has stated that the arrested person was duly entrusted to the Neyyattinkara Police. By the first proviso to Cl. (2) of S. 29, the arrested person could be detained for a period not exceeding fifteen days. Before the expiry of that period the detention order was also passed by Government. Even if there have been any minor defects or irregularities in the procedure adopted at the earlier stage, such defects cannot affect the validity or the legality of the order of detention passed by Government. The ruling of the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. Emperor A.I.R. 1945 F.C. 18 is in support of this position. It was ruled in that case that even if the earlier orders of detention was found defective merely on formal grounds there was nothing to preclude a proper order of detention being passed on the pre-existing grounds themselves and that such an order could be passed against a person already under detention. The Government order in this case is seen to satisfy all the essential conditions as required by the provisions of the Emergency Powers Act. At the time of the present petition Pakrikhan was being detained on the strength of such a valid detention order passed by Government. 11. On a consideration of all the aspects relevant to the enquiry at hand, we are satisfied that the petitioner's brother Peerukannu Pakrikhan is being legally and property detained in custody as per the detention order No. H5-723/49/CS, dated 9th September 1949 passed by Government and that there is no reason for this Court to interfere with such detention in exercise of the powers of this Court under S. 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly this petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.