JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This Rule has been obtained by the Petitioner, whose application made in certain execution-proceedings has been dismissed. 2. The facts material for the purposes of this Rule briefly are as follows: One Maulvi Moslem Ali Molla is the landlord of certain premises, which are part of No. 10, Lower Range in Beniapukur, within the district of 24-Parganas. He let the premises to Dr. Ansaruddin Chaudhuri. Dr. Ansaruddin Chaudhuri sub-let the premises to the Petitioner Brojendra Goswami. The landlord instituted a suit for ejectment against Chaudhuri. A decree in ejectment was passed. All this took place before the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1948 was in force. I shall hereafter refer to this Act as the Act of 1948. The Calcutta Rent Control Ordinance of 1946 was then in force and it was held that the tenant was debarred from obtaining protection from ejectment u/s 12 of the Ordinance on the ground that he had sub-let the premises in the absence of any contract allowing sub-letting, without obtaining the written consent of the landlord. In other words, the landlord relied on Section 12(1), prov. (b) of the Ordinance. Thereafter the landlord put the decree into execution against the tenant on August 26, 1948. The Petitioner appeared stating that he was a sub-lessee and asked for three months' time to vacate on the ground of the illness of his son. Time was granted. This was before the Act of 1948 came into force. Delivery, however, could not be given thereafter, as the Petitioner resisted. Thereafter the Act of 1948 came into force and the Petitioner filed an application which purported to be an application under Sections 47 and 151 of the CPC and Section 11(5) of the Act of 1948 in the execution proceedings. Upon this, the execution was stayed pending the disposal of the Petitioner's application. The Munsif at Sealdah, who passed the decree and who was executing it, heard the application and dismissed it on the short ground that Section 11(3) of the Act of 1948 could not be called in aid by the Petitioner as the sub-letting to him was not lawful, as the previous permission of the landlord had not been obtained. The Munsif at Sealdah, who passed the decree and who was executing it, heard the application and dismissed it on the short ground that Section 11(3) of the Act of 1948 could not be called in aid by the Petitioner as the sub-letting to him was not lawful, as the previous permission of the landlord had not been obtained. His view was that Section 11(b) of the Act of 1948 gave the tenant no protection against a decree being passed against him in such a case of sub-letting and that consequently it was an unlawful sub-letting. He next referred to Section 11(3) of the Act of 1948 and held that that sub-section could be availed of by a sub-tenant only if the sub-letting had been lawful. Against this order the present Rule has been obtained. 3. It was argued by the learned advocate for the Petitioner that the sub-letting was not unlawful and that the application had been wrongly dismissed on this ground. Learned advocate for the opposite party contended that the sub-letting was unlawful and that, in any case, the application was misconceived and should be dismissed. His argument briefly put was that such an application did not lie in execution proceedings and that the executing court was bound to execute the decree as it stood and had no jurisdiction to vary or alter the decree. He referred to Section 18 of the Act of 1948 and suggested that until the decree was rescinded or varied on an application u/s 18, the executing court was bound to execute the decree as it stood and the sub-tenant could, therefore, get no relief u/s 11(3). 4. In my opinion, the application of the Petitioner before the Munsif was entirely misconceived and that no relief could be granted to the Petitioner on such an application. I express no opinion as to whether the sub-letting was unlawful or not. I give below my reasons for this view. Section 11(3) of the Act of 1948 cannot be treated as one having retrospective effect. The principles governing the interpretation of statutes and the very words of the section show that Section 11(3) has no retrospective effect. I express no opinion as to whether the sub-letting was unlawful or not. I give below my reasons for this view. Section 11(3) of the Act of 1948 cannot be treated as one having retrospective effect. The principles governing the interpretation of statutes and the very words of the section show that Section 11(3) has no retrospective effect. Except as regards questions of procedure, a statute should not be treated as having retrospective effect unless the words of the statute expressly give it such effect or unless such an intention must necessarily be implied from the words used in the statute. Section 11(3) is as follows: Any person to whom any premises or any part thereof have been or has been lawfully sub-let by a tenant shall, where the interest of the tenant in such premises or part is lawfully determined otherwise than by virtue of a decree or order obtained by the landlord on any of the grounds specified in Clause (f) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), be deemed to be a tenant in respect of such premises or part, as the case may be, holding directly under the landlord on the terms and conditions on which such person would have held under the tenant if the interest of the tenant had not been so determined. 5. Section 11(3) does not deal with questions of procedure; it purports to confer a substantive right on a sub-tenant which the sub-tenant did not have under the previous law and it takes away a substantive right which the decree-holder had before the Act of 1948 came into force. Under the old law a decree in ejectment gave the decree-holder the right to eject the tenant and those holding under him. The sub-tenant had no right to resist ejectment. u/s 11(3) of the Act of 1948, under certain circumstances mentioned in the section, a decree in ejectment takes away the decree-holder's right to eject the sub-tenant and converts a sub-tenant into a tenant whose interest has not been determined by the decree. It is thus not a provision relating to procedure, but a provision destroying vested rights and creating new rights. Such a section cannot be given retrospective effect unless an intention is expressly stated in the statute or unless such an intention must necessarily be implied from the terms thereof. It is thus not a provision relating to procedure, but a provision destroying vested rights and creating new rights. Such a section cannot be given retrospective effect unless an intention is expressly stated in the statute or unless such an intention must necessarily be implied from the terms thereof. There are admittedly no express words giving retrospective effect to Section 11(3), nor are the terms such as to give rise to a necessary implication that it is retrospective. On the contrary, the section expressly relates to decrees affected by the provision of Section 11(1) of the Act of 1948, as it refers in terms to prov. (f) of Section 11(1). I hold, therefore, that a decree obtained prior to the enactment of the Act of 1948 is not affected by Sub-section 11(3) ex proprio vigore. There is, however, provision made in the Act which would affect the rights of a decree-holder who obtained his decree prior to the Act of 1948. I refer to Section 18 of the Act, which is in the following terms: Where any decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises has been made, before the date of commencement of this Act, but the possession of such premises has not been recovered from the tenant by the execution of such decree or order, the court by which the decree or order was made may, if it is of opinion that the decree or order would not have been made if this Act had been in operation at the date of the making of the decree or order, rescind or vary the decree or order in such manner as the court may think fit for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. 6. This section by its terms expressly makes its provisions retrospective. If the terms of the section are satisfied, a decree passed before the Act of 1948 came into force may be rescinded or varied so as to give effect to the purposes of the Act of 1948. In other words, the section allows the court to make a new decree. When such a decree is made, then it is a decree under the Act of 1948 and the provisions of Section 11(3) would be at once attracted. In other words, the section allows the court to make a new decree. When such a decree is made, then it is a decree under the Act of 1948 and the provisions of Section 11(3) would be at once attracted. But until an application u/s 18 is made and allowed, the old decree would stand and the executing court would be bound to execute it as it stood. 7. In the present case, the court was not moved to rescind or vary the decree passed under the provisions of the Ordinance of 1946. The executing court was, therefore, bound to execute the decree in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance of 1946. What the Petitioner should have done was to apply u/s 18 of the Act of 1948 and get a stay of the execution till that application was decided. If he succeeded in getting the decree rescinded or varied, he could then ask the court to give effect to 11(3) and if he succeeded in satisfying the conditions laid down in Section 11(3) he could have got relief under that sub-section. 8. Learned advocate for the Petitioner now prays that his client may be given an opportunity of making an application u/s 18 of the Act of 1948 and if successful in the application, to apply to the executing court to give effect to the provisions of Section 11(3), when executing the decree and he prays that the execution case may be stayed pending the decision of the application u/s 18. 9. In view of the fact that the Act nowhere clearly lays down the procedure to be adopted in these matters and in view of the difficulties which litigants have to experience by the defective drafting of the Act, I think I should allow this prayer, but it must be on certain terms which I state below. I, accordingly, direct that the order of the learned Munsif be set aside and the execution case be kept pending till the application to be filed by the Petitioner u/s 18 of the Act of 1948 be decided. The application shall be made within two weeks of this record reaching the court below. The record shall be sent down at once. The application shall be made within two weeks of this record reaching the court below. The record shall be sent down at once. In default of the Petitioner making such application within two weeks of the record reaching the court below, the order of the Munsif shall stand and this Rule shall be discharged with costs. The Petitioner shall pay the costs of this Rule as a condition precedent to the making of the application u/s 18. In default, the Rule shall stand discharged with costs. 10. I wish to make it perfectly clear that I express no opinion whatsoever as to whether the application u/s 18 should or should not be granted nor do I express any opinion as to whether the Petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of Section 11(3) on the facts of this case. 11. These matters shall be decided by the court below according to law.