This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 700 on the basis of a deed of mortgage executed by defendant 1 and the father of defendants 1-8, on 5th of May 1932. The mortgage deed was executed in favour of the firm called Chandulal Bam Prosad. The suit was instituted in the name of four persons, viz. Bani Prosad, Durga Prosad, Sew Prosad and Juela Prosad sona of Chandulal, owners of the joint Hindu family firm known as Ghaudulal Bam Prosad. The plaint was verified and signed by Bam Prosad alone as karta of the joint family. The suit was resisted by defendants. They pleaded that the suit was not properly constituted. The plaintiffs were not members of a joint Hindu family and Kamprosad, therefore, could not sue as karta of the joint family which had ceased to exist as such. Plaintiffs constituted a firth which was governed by the Partnership Act. The second plea raised was that the amount due under the mortgage deed had been paid. "The Courts below came to the agreed conclusion that the plea of payment was not proved. They also came to the concurrent finding that the •suit was not maintainable as framed. [2] The trial Judge found that even if the plaintiffs were doing the business of the joint Hindu family firm at one time, the firm had got itself registered under the provisions of the Partnership Act, and therefore, ceased to be a joint Hindu family firm. It was further held that even if the firm is treated as a joint Hindu family firm, the suit is in the name of some members alone, and, it is not properly cons­tituted in the absence of the other members who admittedly existed but were not joined. The learned Subordinate Judge in appeal held that plaintiffs' firm was a joint Hindu family firm. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge did not consider the fact of the registration of the plaintiffs' firm which plaintiff 1 had admitted in a statement made by him on interrogatories issued to him by the defendants. [3] Bam Prosad on his own behalf and on behalf of the joint Hindu family as its karta, has come to this Court on appeal. The only question which arises for determination at this stage is whether the suit as laid is properly constituted. [3] Bam Prosad on his own behalf and on behalf of the joint Hindu family as its karta, has come to this Court on appeal. The only question which arises for determination at this stage is whether the suit as laid is properly constituted. The learned counsel for the appel­lant has contended that the family never changed its character; it was a joint Hindu family firm in 1932 when the deed oi mortgage was executed. There had been no partition after that. He states that the registration of the firm was obtained under the Partnership Act under the erroneous belief that registration was compulsory even for joint family firms. The registration came soon after the passing of the Partnership Act. It was not realised then that the registra-tion of the joint family firm was not necessary. This registration was not preceded by any parti, tion, [4] In point of fact, the statement of the plain, tiff also, on which reliance has been put by the defence, does not concede that there had been any previous partition or agreement by which the members of the divided family agreed to convert the joint family into a Partnership. Even the certificate of the registration of the firm is not before the Court and therefore it is not possible to say the basis on which the firm was described as a partnership under the Act. The fact of registration however remains and the explanation given by the learned counsel, though plausible could not be accepted at this stage of the litigation. Its acceptance involves the possibility of prejudice to the other side. However genuine this explanation may be, it was not given at the time the plaintiff made his statement. The statement was made at an early stage of the litigation. Plaintiffs had ample op­portunity of showing that the registration of the firm was obtained under the erroneous belief that all firms were required to be registered. No such statement was made and no attempt was made to prove that in spite of the registration the firm continued as a joint family. firm. In these cir­cumstances it is difficult wholly to ignore the situation created by the fact that the plaintiffs got themselves registered as a firm to which the Partnership Act applied. They will have to be dealt with therefore as a firm created by contract. firm. In these cir­cumstances it is difficult wholly to ignore the situation created by the fact that the plaintiffs got themselves registered as a firm to which the Partnership Act applied. They will have to be dealt with therefore as a firm created by contract. It is not necessary in these circumstances to consider whether the suit was properly framed on the basis that the plaintiffs constituted a joint family firm. [5] Treated as a firm, governed by the Part­nership Act, the suit by the plaintiffs could have been instituted either in the name of the firm or by its partners. As stated above, the suit is in the name of four plaintiffs who have been described as owners of a joint Hindu family firm. It is in the name of the plaintiffs, and if the joint family of the plaintiffs ceased to exist before the death of Chandulal, the four persona named as plaintiffs would be the .only partners. All necessary plaintiffs are, therefore, there. There is no non-joinder of a necessary party. Bat the plaint was signed and verified by Bam Prosad only, who was described as the Karta. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that Bam Prosad could have instituted the suit on behalf of the plaintiffs. The omission of the three others to sign and verify the plaint is merely technical, and the defect may be permit­ted to be cured by an amendment at this stage. The learned counsel for the respondents urges that the defect is not of form but of substance ; plaintiffs have fought this case from the time of the institution of the suit on the basis that they were members of a joint Hindu family. If it is found that the suit could not have been instituted on that basis, then the suit instituted by a karta in substance on behalf of a joint Hindu family could not be converted into a suit by a firm governed by the Partnership Act. The amendment asked for, if permitted, will alter the nature and character of the suit and in any case it cannot be described as technical. The defect is not of description. It was a definite position taken up and that position has been found to be not maintainable. Besides at no earlier stage of litigation was any suggestion or request made for the amendment of the plaint. The defect is not of description. It was a definite position taken up and that position has been found to be not maintainable. Besides at no earlier stage of litigation was any suggestion or request made for the amendment of the plaint. If the suit is instituted now, it would be time barred. The de­fendants, therefore, have acquired a right and amendment would cause them serious prejudice. [6] I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents on this point. The defect in the plaint is not merely a mistake in 'description. The suit was by plaintiffs as members of a joint Hindu family. The question was, as to whether the family retained its character as a joint Hindu family till the institution of the suit, or there was a division which altered the status of the family. If it is found now that the suit could not be instituted by Earn Prosad as Karta of the joint Hindu family, it would not be fair to allow an amendment of the plaint at this 'stage. Without amendment no relief can be given to the plaintiffs. The result may be un­fortunate, but the plaintiffs have to thank them­selves for their difficulties. In these circumstances I would dismiss the appeal, but I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.