JUDGMENT K.C. Chunder, J. - This is a group of 18 second appeals against the appellate decrees of the Subordinate Judge of the Second Additional Court, Alipore. Twenty-five rent suits were filed by the plaintiff-respondent against the occupancy tenants on the land in the Court of the Munsif at Diamond Harbour, which were decreed in favour of the plaintiff. Twenty-five appeals were filed against the said decrees by the pro forma defendants who are under-tenure holders under the plaintiff and the landlord of the occupancy tenants. Four of these appeals were dismissed for default while the remaining 21 were dismissed on merits by one judgment by the Second Additional Subordinate Judge. Eighteen second appeals have been filed in this Court and they were heard together, as they raise the same question of law. In all the appeals the pro forma defendants are the appellants and the plaintiff is the contesting respondent. 2. It appears that the Government made a temporary settlement of a tenure for a period of 40 years on 1st April 1901, in favour of one Madan Mohan Janah in the benami of two persons Kamdeb and Jnanada. The interest of Madan Mohan devolved upon the Benares Bank and then upon one Bonbehari Janah. On the expiry of the period of original lease, it was renewed for a further period of 30 years in accordance with the renewal clause of the lease, on 31st March 1941, in favour of Bonbehari Janah. Bonbehari defaulted in payment of the December kist of 1942 and a revenue sale was held on 26th March 1943. The lands are in the 3rd portion of the Manasa dwip, one of the Sagar islands, and constitute touzi No. 3026 of the Alipore Collectorate. The touzi was purchased by the plaintiff. He is said to have then annulled all the incumbrances and claims to have annulled the under-tenure of the pro forma defendants appellants. He brought the rent suits against the tenants actually on the lands. 3. It is not contested before us that the tenancy created was a tenure. The original lease as also cl. (13) of the renewal lease makes it absolutely clear. The clause runs thus: That the Governor reserves to himself the right to all minerals, on the lands together with such rights of way and right to resume surface land as he requires for working, getting and carrying away such minerals. The original lease as also cl. (13) of the renewal lease makes it absolutely clear. The clause runs thus: That the Governor reserves to himself the right to all minerals, on the lands together with such rights of way and right to resume surface land as he requires for working, getting and carrying away such minerals. He also retains his proprietary right in the land. The lands are, therefore, held under the Government as proprietor landlord and not as the sovereign. Both the Courts below have found that the touzi No. 3026 constituted an estate. They appear to have paid some attention to the fact that the procedure followed as regards the sale was that of Act XI [11] of 1859. Obviously, their attention was not drawn to the fact that under S. 30 of Act VII [7] of 1868 it was enacted that Act VII [7] was to be read with and taken as part of Act XI [11] of 1859 as modified by Act III [3] of 1862, and, therefore, as pointed out by the Judicial Committee in the case of Haji Buksh Elahi v. Durlav Chandra Kar reported in 39 I.A. 177 : (39 Cal. 981 P.C.), no distinction could be drawn between the provisions of Act XI [11] of 1859 and those of Act VII [7] of 1868 with reference to the procedure for sale and with reference to what constitutes arrears. 4. The argument advanced by Mr. Radhabinode Pal appearing on behalf of the respondents before us is that though the tenancy created by the Government was a tenure held directly under the Government, for the purposes of revenue sale it is to be taken as an "estate" in view of the definitions contained in S. 1 of Act VII [7] of 1868. This is the first point in the appeal. There were various other defences taken before the Courts below with which we are not concerned as these have not been urged. The second contention was that even if it was a "tenure," which was sold under S. 11 of Act VII [7] of 1868, the under-tenure of the pro forma defendants can be annulled as an incumbrance as the third exception to S. 12 of the same Act does not apply. The second contention was that even if it was a "tenure," which was sold under S. 11 of Act VII [7] of 1868, the under-tenure of the pro forma defendants can be annulled as an incumbrance as the third exception to S. 12 of the same Act does not apply. Both the Courts below found that the under-tenure was not saved from annulment under Act XI [11] of 1859, as they held that the tenure itself was an estate. They further held that if they were wrong in their interpretation and it was a tenure which was sold, and not an estate, even then there was no protection against annulment of the under-tenure under exception 3 of S. 12. The contention of Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta, appearing on behalf of the appellants, is that the under-tenure is protected from annulment and the Courts below are wrong on this point. On the other hand, Dr. Pal, on behalf of the respondents, bas supported the judgment of the Courts below and specially the judgment of the single Judge in the case of Rohini Ranjan Das Vs. Umesh Chandra Datta, AIR 1943 Cal 211 which formed the basis of the decision of the Courts below. 5. We have already pointed out that the document admits of no doubt that what was created was a tenure under the Government as proprietor. The contention of Dr. Pal is that under the interpretation S. 1 of Act VII [7] of 1868 the word "proprietor" includes any tenant by whom any estate or tenure is held directly under the Government. There is no question in the present case that this tenure is held directly under the Government. Therefore there is no question that technically the owner of the tenure is to be called a proprietor for the purposes of revenue sale. The definition of "proprietor" does not mean that the proprietor of a tenure is the same as the proprietor of an estate. Ordinarily, and previous to this enactment of Act VII (7) of 1863, "the proprietor" meant only the proprietor of the estate. The meaning of the word was enlarged to include the proprietor of a tenure as well. Therefore after this enactment there were to be two classes of proprietors-proprietor of an estate and proprietor of a tenure and the context is to show which class of proprietor is meant in any particular section. The meaning of the word was enlarged to include the proprietor of a tenure as well. Therefore after this enactment there were to be two classes of proprietors-proprietor of an estate and proprietor of a tenure and the context is to show which class of proprietor is meant in any particular section. This would be apparent from the definition of the word "revenue" which includes not only sums annually payable to Government by the proprietor of an estate but also such sums as were annually payable to Government by the proprietor of a tenure. The mere fact that a person is recorded as a proprietor or the dues are spoken of as revenue, would not go to show that the tenure has to be taken, for the purpose of land revenue sale, to be an estate. If the tenure-holder does not become the proprietor of an estate under the Revenue Sale Law he acquires no new rights under the Land Registration Act in view of his name being recorded in a particular manner under that Act. 6. Dr. Pal contends that the definition of the word ''estate" shows that a tenure may be an estate if it is entered in the General Register of the revenue paying estate or if, in respect of it, a separate account has been opened under S. 10 or S. 11 of Act XI [11] of 1859. Because the word "proprietor" is used in the definition of an "estate" there is no justification for the contention that a proprietor of a tenure is to be included. The contest is with reference to an estate. The definition is not an enlarging one but, for the purposes of revenue sale, the meaning of "an estate" is restricted to a "mehal" or the whole estate, and to such portion of a mehal with regard to which a separate account has been opened but not to an undivided portion of a mehal as to which separate accounts are not kept, This was decided by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Narain Koer v. Mahabir Pershad Singh and the Secretary of State for India in Council, reported in 13 Cal. 208, The distinction between an estate and a tenure has not been obliterated or confused in any way by Act VII [7] of 1868. 208, The distinction between an estate and a tenure has not been obliterated or confused in any way by Act VII [7] of 1868. All that was done was to make a tenure held directly under the Government also liable to be sold for arrears under the procedure of a revenue sale and also under certificate proceedings. Which of the two procedures should be followed was left to the discretion of the Collector. We are unable to accept Dr. Pal's contention that for the purposes of revenue sale, the tenure in question in these appeals is to be taken as an estate. We hold that the tenure in question was sold as a tenure under S. 11 of Act VII [7] of 1868. 7. The next question therefore is whether Excep. 3 to S. 12 of Act VII [7] of 1868 affords protection to the under-tenure in these appeals. Section 12 enables the purchaser of a tenure sold under the provisions of S. 11 of this Act, to avoid and annul all under-tenures and to eject all under-tenures except in four cases. It is with the third of these exceptions that we are concerned. The third exception relates to tenures created or recognised by the settlement proceedings of any current temporary settlement as tenures bearing a rent which is fixed for the period of such settlement. In the case of Lakhindra Barua v. Saroda Charan Dey reported in 20 C.L.J. 40 : (A.I.R. 1914 Cal. 852), it was held that the expression "tenures created or recognised by the settlement proceedings of any current temporary settlement" has reference to S. 9, cl. (2) and S. 14, cl. (1) of Regulation VII [7] of 1822 It is also clear that this Exception applies when proceedings have been instituted under chap. X, Bengal Tenancy Act. "Recognition" implies something more than a mere record of a fact found to exist; it involves the notion of either acquiescence in or sanction for a fact found to exist. In that case it was recorded that "this etmam is not binding upon the Government." Ashutosh Mookerjee J. distinguished the case of Buroda Kanth Laha v. Govind Chunder Gooha reported in 7 W.R. 50 and pointed out that the entry showed that there was no intention on the part of the Government to recognise the under-tenure either in fact or in law. This decision was followed by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nagendra Chandra De and Others Vs. Har Kumar De, AIR 1932 Cal 514 , where it was held that the word "recognised" in S. 12, Excep. 8 has reference to the question of recognition as against the Government as the sale is held for the realization of the dues of the Government. A single Judge of this Court in the case of Rashik Chandra Dhupi v. Peary Mohan Chowdhury reported in 58 I.C. 287 : (A.I.R. 1920 Cal. 957) pointed out that the defendants' interest in that suit was recognised in the settlement proceedings at the last temporary settlement and the rent had been fixed under the rent law for the period of such settlement. It was held that gave them the right of protection under Excep. 3 to S. 12. It is clear that recognition must be found from the records of the last temporary settlement then current and that rent must be fixed under Chap. X, Bengal Tenancy Act. Whether it had been recognised or not must be seen from the records of the settlement proceeding itself. The last settlement proceeding in the present case was one in accordance with the instructions given to the settlement authorities by the Government in the Bengal Survey and Settlement Manual of 1935. 8. When the settlement in the case reported in Lakhindra Bania v. Saroda Charan, 20 C.L.J. 40 : (A.I.R. 1914 Cal. 852) referred to above, was made, it was done in accordance with the instructions contained in the Manual of 1896 which did not contain the elaborate provisions now contained in Para. 437 of the Manual of 1935. The entry made in the settlement records as regards recognition has got to be interpreted in the light of such instructions as showing what was actually done in the settlement proceeding. In the present case, as also in the case reported in Rohini Ranjan Das Vs. Umesh Chandra Datta, AIR 1943 Cal 211 , referred to above, the entry was "not binding against the Government for the purpose of assessment; the profit of the tenure has come out of the profit of the superior landlord," In the decision reported in Rohini Ranjan Das Vs. Umesh Chandra Datta, AIR 1943 Cal 211 , referred to above, the entry was "not binding against the Government for the purpose of assessment; the profit of the tenure has come out of the profit of the superior landlord," In the decision reported in Rohini Ranjan Das Vs. Umesh Chandra Datta, AIR 1943 Cal 211 , referred to above, this was interpreted as meaning an absence of recognition by the Government. With great respect to the learned Judge who decided we are unable to accept that interpretation. We have already pointed out the absence of elaborate instructions in the previous Survey and Settlement Manual at the time when the settlement referred to in Lakhindra Barua v. Saroda Charan, 20 C.L.J. 40 : (A.I.R. (1) 1914 Cal. 852), was made, Allen's Survey of Noabad Taluqs of Chittagong was under way and in order to see which taluqs were or were not recognised by the Government, Allen's reports and Government's Instructions were considered and in case of taluqs then not recognised the entries as regards Noabad Taluqs referred to in the two decisions in Lakhindra Barua v. Saroda Charan 20 C.L.J. 40 : (A.I.R. (1) 1914 Cal. 852) and Nagendra Chandra v. Harkumar De, 56 C.L.J. 4 : (A.I.R. (19) 1932 Cal. 514) were made in the way mentioned in those two decisions. Entries are now made in accordance with para. 437 of the present Bengal Survey Manual of 1935, Under that paragraph, certain under-tenures are recognised as valid in all other respects except in respect of reduction of revenue demands of the Government under S. 193, Bengal Tenancy Act. These under-tenures are, therefore, valid as far as Excep. 3 to S. 12 of Act VII [7] of 1868 is concerned and they are only not binding upon the Government for the purpose of reduction of revenue demand at the time of assessment as mentioned in S. 193, Bengal Tenancy Act, The entries as regarding under-tenures referred to in the case reported in Rohini Ranjan Das v. Umesh Chandra Dutta, 47 C.W.N. 241 : (A.I.R. (30) 1943 Cal. 211), as also in the present appeals, are all of this class. In case of these under-tenures, the second element necessary under Excep. 3 is also to be found. 211), as also in the present appeals, are all of this class. In case of these under-tenures, the second element necessary under Excep. 3 is also to be found. In case of under-tenures of this class which are recognised, the Settlement Officer has not only to record the under-tenure in the settlement rent roll but also to fix a rent for it under Chap. X, Bengal Tenancy Act as a reassessment of revenue is being made. The paragraph referred to before, namely, para. 437 mentions a second class of under-tenures in which no fresh rent is to be fixed and a note is to be made that it is "not binding against the Government in any respect." If there is such a note in the settlement record and in such a case, as no fresh rent is fixed for the term of such settlement, it is clear that Excep. 3 to S. 12 cannot apply. It is this class of under tenures that corresponds to the under-tenants not recognised by the Government in the decisions reported in Lakhindra Barua v. Saroda Charan, 20 C.L.J. 40 : (A.I.R. (1) 1914 Cal. 852) and Nagendra Chandra De v. Harkumar De, 56 C.L.J 4 : (A.I.R. (19) 1932 Cal. 514) referred to above. There is also a third class of under-tenures which according to Para. 437 is not recorded in the settlement proceeding at all. With this class we are not concerned, and Excep. 3 to S. 12 does not apply to them. In these circumstances it must be held that the notes made in the settlement proceedings of the current settlement as regards the under-tenure in the present appeals clearly show that, except for the purposes of S. 193, Bengal Tenancy Act, the Government recognised the under tenure as valid for all other purposes which would include the protection of the same on a revenue sale and further that the Revenue Officer fixed rent for the currency of the said settlement so as to fulfil both the requirements of Excep. 3 to S. 12. We are of opinion that the single Judge decision reported in Rohini Ranjan Das v. Umesh Chandra, 47 C.W.N. 241 : (A.I.R. (30) 1943 Cal. 211) referred to above, was not correctly decided and the under-tenure of the appellants is protected under Excep. 3 to S. 12. We are of opinion that the single Judge decision reported in Rohini Ranjan Das v. Umesh Chandra, 47 C.W.N. 241 : (A.I.R. (30) 1943 Cal. 211) referred to above, was not correctly decided and the under-tenure of the appellants is protected under Excep. 3 to S. 12 of Act VII [7] of 1868 and cannot, therefore, be avoided and annulled. 9. All the appeals must, therefore, succeed and the decrees of the Courts below must be set aside and as the under-tenure of the pro forma defendants appellants is still in existence, all the 18 suits, out of which these 18 second appeals arose, must be dismissed with costs in both the Courts below on the ground that the tenants sued for rent are the tenants under the pro forma defendants and not directly under the plaintiff and so the plaintiff was not entitled to any rent from them. 10. The appellants will have their costs in these appeals from the contesting plaintiff respondent within one set of hearing fee for all the appeals. R.P. Mookerjee, J. 11. I agree.