JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This is an appeal on behalf of three Appellants, of whom Appellant No. 1, Nityananda Shaha, was convicted under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth and Yarn Movements Control Order read with Section 7(1) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (XXIV of 1946) and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 300, in default to rigorous imprisonment for six months. The quantity of yarn seized was also forfeited. Lakshmikanta and Baidyanath Das being Appellants Nos. 2 and 3 were discharged by the Magistrate u/s 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but have appealed, as they are affected by the order of forfeiture passed by the Magistrate. 2. All the three Appellants had been placed on trial, but Nos. 2 and 3 were discharged u/s 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. The three accused persons were charged with removing a quantity of mill-made cotton yarn out of Calcutta without any permit. The yarn seized was being carried on two hand-carts along the Howrah Bridge from east to west. The carts were being pulled by four hand-cart pullers and accused No. 1 was going along with the carts. The quantity of yarn had been purchased from the Barhabazar area in Calcutta for a number of persons, including Lakshmikanta and Baidyanath Das, Appellants Nos. 2 and 3. Prosecution witnesses Nos. 3 and 4 were two of the cart-pullers. The charge is that accused No. 1 Nityananda was moving or causing to be moved yarn from Calcutta to Howrah without the necessary permit required under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Bengal Cotton Cloth and Tarn Movements Control Order, 1947. The original order had been issued on December 19, 1947 and was duly published in the "Calcutta Gazette." Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 provided-- (2) No person shall move or cause to be moved by air, rail, road or water any cloth or yarn from any place within any of the areas specified in column 1 of the schedule of this Order to any place outside that area, without having the Forward. Note or any other document for the transport of such cloth or yarn containing the particulars which are ordinarily contained in a Forwarding Note, countersigned by any of the officers specified in the corresponding entry in column 2 of the said schedule. 4. Note or any other document for the transport of such cloth or yarn containing the particulars which are ordinarily contained in a Forwarding Note, countersigned by any of the officers specified in the corresponding entry in column 2 of the said schedule. 4. Column 1 of the schedule referred to in the sub-rule was as follows: Column 1, 1(a). Calcutta, and (b). Sadar subdivision of the district of Howrah. 2. Any subdivision of West Bengal (excluding the Sadar subdivision of the district of Howrah and any area included in Calcutta). 5. The schedule was amended under a notification, dated June 22, 1948 and published in the "Calcutta Gazette" on June 24, 1948, 6. Column 1 as amended stood as follows: 1. Calcutta, 2. Sadar subdivision of the district of Howrah, 3. Any subdivision of West Bengal (excluding Sadar subdivision of the district of Howrah and any area included in Calcutta). 7. It is alleged that Nityananda, accused No. 1, had no Forwarding Note or Permit as required under the Order aforesaid. The accused were arrested for an offence alleged to have been committed on August 25, 1948. The schedule as amended on June 22, 1948, was then in force. The accused were charged for contravention of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Control Order and thereby having committed an offence punishable u/s 7(1) of the Essential Supplies Act, 1946. 8. It is argued on behalf of the Appellants that the accused had been arrested within the jurisdiction of Calcutta near the junction of the Howrah Bridge and Strand Road "near the big "pillars on the Calcutta side". At one stage of the hearing it was attempted to be argued on behalf of the prosecution that the place where the arrest had been made was outside Calcutta and that the accused had already contravened the provisions of the Control Order by moving out of Calcutta, but on reference to the relevant statutory provisions, it has now been conceded on behalf of the Crown that the place where the accused had been arrested was within Calcutta. We might note in passing that the description of Calcutta as applicable to this particular Control Order has to be gathered with reference to Section 3 of the West Bengal Cotton Cloth and Tarn Movements Control Order, 1947, which again makes a reference to Section 3 of the Calcutta Police Act of 1866 together with the suburbs of Calcutta denned by the notification u/s 1 of the Calcutta Suburban Police Act, 1866. The descriptions as given in the Calcutta Police Act of 1866 are at certain points very difficult to identify after the various physical and local changes which have taken place at various points since 1866. It is desirable that when an offence is created dependent on the boundaries of Calcutta such boundaries should be readily and easily ascertainable by all persons concerned. No doubt ignorance of law is not a plea sustainable in a court, but it is only fair and proper that the legislature should use such descriptions as are easily and readily available to and are understood by an ordinary person. In this particular case, tie position is so unsatisfactory that it was after some trouble that the counsel for the Appellants and Respondents could finally determine whether the accused had been arrested within Calcutta or outside it. 9. Although the offence was committed on August 25, 1948, the trial commenced in October, 1948 and the orders convicting Appellant No. 1 were passed on November 23, 1948. Shortly before the trial had commenced, the schedule to the Control Order, already referred to, was again amended on September 11, 1948. After this amendment, column 1 of the schedule consisted of two items only and the Sadar Subdivision of Howrah along with Calcutta was treated as one entity. The other item continued as before. It has been argued on behalf of the Appellants that, although on the date of the alleged offence, Calcutta and Sadar Subdivision of Howrah were treated as two different entities as movement from one to the other was an offence, the amendment introduced in September before conviction does not make the movement from Calcutta to Howrah an offence at all. It is urged that the law as applicable is to be one which was in force at the time of the conviction and not when the offence was committed. No doubt the law in England supports the contention of the Appellants. It is urged that the law as applicable is to be one which was in force at the time of the conviction and not when the offence was committed. No doubt the law in England supports the contention of the Appellants. Where a penal law is broken, the offender cannot be punished under it, if that penal law expired before he was convicted, although the prosecution had begun while the Act was still in force. As observed by Lord Avinger C.D. in Henderson v. Herborne (1837) 2 M. and W. 235 : 150 E.R. 743-- If a crime to be created by statute, with a given penalty and be afterward repeated in another statute, with a lesser penalty attached to it, I cannot say that the party ought to be held liable to both.... The new Act, then, would be in effect a repeal of the former penalty. 10. See also The Queen v. Justices of West Riding of Yorkshire (1841) 1 Q.B. 325 : 113 E.R. 1156. The principle enunciated by the English Courts, however, will not be applicable in India because of the specific provisions contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897). Similar provisions also appear in Section 8 of Bengal Act I of 1899. Under the General Clauses Act, a repeal shall not affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed or-- affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, or obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 11. So, in this particular case the law as applicable is as was in force on the date of the offence. 12. Even, though the law is as on the date of offence, we must hold that the offence has not been brought home. As stated already, the owners of the yarn were acquitted. The learned Magistrate held as regards accused Nos. 2 and 3 that "to make" purchase of such articles or to put forth a demand or claim, is "by itself no offence under this section". As stated already, the owners of the yarn were acquitted. The learned Magistrate held as regards accused Nos. 2 and 3 that "to make" purchase of such articles or to put forth a demand or claim, is "by itself no offence under this section". They were accordingly discharged u/s 253 of tie Code of Criminal Procedure., Nityananda, accused No. 1, was accompanying the hand-cart containing the yarn. Before the conviction can be sustained it Ss incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea. Although it is sometimes difficult to reconcile the conflicting decisions of the English Courts on this point, it is now generally accepted that-- there is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals and both must be considered, Sherras v. De Rutzen (1895) 1 Q.B. 918, 921. 13. The provisions as contained in the Control Order do not indicate the intention to create an offence irrespective of the presence of mens rea. We have next to consider whether the subject-matter of the Act is such as would justify such a presumption to be rebutted. The Judicial Committee in Srinivas Mall Bairoliya v. King-Emperor (1947) 51 C.W.N. 900 applied the principles enunciated in Sherras v. Rutzen (supra) as also in Brend v. Wood (1946) 110 J.P. 549 and came to the conclusion that the offences which can be held to be committed without a guilty mind are usually comparatively of a minor character. An offence under the Essential Supplies Act is not of such a minor character as to make it unnecessary for the prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea:, Bholaprasad Lola v. King (1949) 53 C.W.N. 300. 14. We are, therefore, required to see whether mens rea, can be found to exist in this case. The learned Magistrate did not proceed to consider the evidence from this aspect and it will be necessary for us to examine the evidence from that standpoint. 15. 14. We are, therefore, required to see whether mens rea, can be found to exist in this case. The learned Magistrate did not proceed to consider the evidence from this aspect and it will be necessary for us to examine the evidence from that standpoint. 15. The learned Magistrate has proceeded on the assumption that if it be proved that the prohibited articles were being either moved or caused to be moved outside the limits of Calcutta, that would be sufficient to prove an offence under Rule 2. The evidence merely disclosed that Nityananda, accused No. 1, was accompanying the hand-carts and had directed them to be taken to Telkal Ghat outside Calcutta and in Howrah. There is no evidence that he was causing the yarn to be moved with the knowledge that such movements were without permit and would, therefore, come within the mischief of Rule 2 of the Control Order. He was not one of the owners, but an attendant only. There is no evidence on the record indicating the fact that he had any knowledge as to whether the owners had or had not obtained the requisite permit. Two of the owners, namely, accused Nos. 2 and 3 had also been put on trial with accused No. 1, but the former two had been acquitted. The accused had pleaded not guilty and in the absence of any evidence establishing mens rea, it is not possible to sustain the conviction for the alleged offence. 16. While convicting the accused Nityananda, the learned Magistrate sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 300 and also directed the quantity of yarn seized to be forfeited. As we have come to the conclusion that the conviction cannot stand, the second part of the order must also be vacated, the more so as the owners of the yarn in question were discharged. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed. We set aside the conviction and sentence and further direct that the fine, if already paid, be refunded and the quantity of yarn seized be released. Das Gupta J. 17. I agree.