JUDGMENT Das, J. - This appeal is at the instance of Saradindu Sekhar Banerji, who is a co-sharer landlord and raises a question u/s 168A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 2. The material facts are not in controversy. 3. The Appellant and the Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 are co-sharer landlords in respect of a tenure held by the Respondent No. 4. 4. Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 instituted a suit for rent, being Rent Suit No. 15 of 1932, against the Respondent No. 4 and impleaded the Appellant as the remaining co-sharer landlord under the provisions of Section 148A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. As the Appellant had no claim for the arrears prior to the suit, he could not and did not join as a co-Plaintiff. 5. The suit was decreed on December 8, 1933, against the Respondent No. 4. 6. After certain intermediate executions, the Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 filed, on August 5, 1938, an application for execution of the unsatisfied portion of the decree, viz., a sum of Rs. 7,057-6-7 pies. This gave rise to Execution Case No. 16 of 1939. The Appellant was impleaded in the Execution Case as a co-sharer landlord. The Respondent No. 5 was impleaded as an assignee of the tenure from the judgment-debtor Respondent No. 4. 7. The tenure was sold on December 6, 1945 and was purchased by the Respondents Nos. 1 to 3, the executing decree-holders, for a sum of Rs. 5,000 only which has since been set-oft against their claim in the execution case. 8. On May 23, 1946, the Appellant as a co-sharer landlord filed a statement of his dues for rent and cesses from 1339 B.S. (the date of institution of the rent suit) till the end of Chaitra, 1352 B.S. amounting to Rs. 10,841-7 as. and reserved his right to submit a further claim for rent and cess till the date of confirmation of sale. The statement purported to be filed u/s 168A(2)(b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act. 9. The Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 filed a petition of objection on the ground that, as the Appellant was not a decree-holder, the claim was inadmissible in law. 10. The learned Subordinate Judge, by his Order No. 95, dated March 29, 1947, gave effect to the objection. 11. Against the said order, this appeal has been taken. 12. Mr. 9. The Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 filed a petition of objection on the ground that, as the Appellant was not a decree-holder, the claim was inadmissible in law. 10. The learned Subordinate Judge, by his Order No. 95, dated March 29, 1947, gave effect to the objection. 11. Against the said order, this appeal has been taken. 12. Mr. Sen, appearing in support of the appeal, has submitted that though the plain words of Sub-clause (6) of Section 168A(2) of the Act are against his contention, a liberal construction should be put on the word "decree-holder" in the latter part of the sub-clause and the word should be read in a wider sense as including a co-sharer landlord. Mr. Sen has referred us to the provisions of Section 148A(6), (7), (8) of the Act and has submitted that the spirit of the Act supports his contention. 13. Mr. Roy Choudhury for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 has submitted that the word "decree-holder" has a definite connotation and that, if effect is given to the Appellant's contention, this would have the effect of putting a two-fold meaning on the word "decree-holder" in the same sub-clause viz., (b). 14. Mr. Roy Choudhury did not contend that the appeal was incompetent; as such we express no opinion on the point. 15. It may be observed in passing that the sale has since been confirmed on April 1, 1947 and the execution case has been dismissed on part satisfaction. 16. The question raised in the appeal depends on the meaning to be put upon the word "decree-holder" in the latter part of Section 168A(1)(b) of the Act. 17. The sub-clause runs as follows: (b) the purchaser at a sale referred to in Clause (a) shall be liable to pay to the decree-holder or certificate-holder the deficiency, if any, between the purchase price and the amount due under the decree or certificate together with the costs incurred in bringing the tenure or holding to sale and any rent which may have become payable to the decree-holder between the date of the institution of the suit and the date of confirmation of the sale. 18. Section 168A(3) imposes a condition that the sale is not to be confirmed until the purchaser has deposited the sum referred to in Clause (6). 19. 18. Section 168A(3) imposes a condition that the sale is not to be confirmed until the purchaser has deposited the sum referred to in Clause (6). 19. The word "decree-holder" has not been defined in the Act, nor is it defined in the Bengal General Clauses Act (Ben. I of 1899). 20. Sections 2 and 3 of the CPC defines the word "decree-holder" to mean-- any person in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made. 21. This is also the ordinary meaning of the word. It seems to us that the word has been used in this sense in the sub-clause. Taking the word "decree-holder" in its plain and literal sense, the word in the sub-clause means the person in whose favour the decree was obtained. The provisions of Section 148A(6) of the Act might have extended the word to include a co-sharer landlord initially impleaded as a Defendant u/s 148A(1) and transposed as a co-Plaintiff u/s 148A(3) and whose claim has been specified in the decree. It would, however, appear from the first part of Sub-clause (b) of Section 168A(1) that the word "decree-"holder" is limited to the decree-holder who puts the decree into execution and brings the tenancy to sale. This view is also supported by Section 148A(8)(i)(c) to which we shall refer hereafter. 22. The Appellant who did not get any decree in the suit for rent, as no arrears of rent were due to him prior to the suit, cannot, therefore, be regarded as a decree-holder, if the latter word is construed in its literal sense. 23. We have now to examine the contention of Mr. Sen that a wider meaning should be given to the word "decree-holder", as this appears to be the plain intention of the legislature. 24. The cardinal rule for the construction of statutes is that they should be construed according to the intention of the legislature which passed them. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can he necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves in such a case best declare the intention of of the law-giver. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can he necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves in such a case best declare the intention of of the law-giver. To this rule there may be a qualification, as laid down in the case of Ram Chandra Marwari v. Keshobati Kumari (1905) 1 C.L.J. 182, where Pargiter J., at p. 192, quoted with approval the following passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes: Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction, of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. Ch. IX, Section 1. 25. Section 148A(8)(i)(c) provides for the disposal of the proceeds of a sale in execution of a decree u/s 148A(6). Clauses (a), (b) and (c) clearly discriminate between: (i) the executing decree-holder, (ii) the other decree-holders who did not join in the execution of The decree and (in) Defendants landlords who did not join as Plaintiffs but who had applied within one month from the date of confirmation of sale. Those coming within category (i) have the first priority; those within category (ii) come next, but only in respect of the sum due to them under the decree drawn up in terms of Section 148A(6). Those coming within categories (ii) and (iii) participate in proportion to their shares in the landlords' interest in the surplus sale-proceeds, if any, as regards the rent due to them from the date of the suit to the confirmation of sale. Such payment can be made, at least a month after the confirmation of sale, this being the time-limit for putting forward the claim. Section 148A(8)(i)(c), therefore, contemplates that the claims of persons coming within categories (ii) and (iii) may remain unsatisfied even after the confirmation of sale. 26. Section 148A(5)(i)(c) thus supports the literal meaning of the word "decree-holder" in Section 168A(i)(6), which limits the word "decree-holder" to one in whose execution the tenancy was sold. 27. The literal construction does not, therefore, lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment. 26. Section 148A(5)(i)(c) thus supports the literal meaning of the word "decree-holder" in Section 168A(i)(6), which limits the word "decree-holder" to one in whose execution the tenancy was sold. 27. The literal construction does not, therefore, lead to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment. Nor does such a construction lead to inconvenience, absurdity, hardship or injustice presumably not intended. The Defendant co-sharer landlords who had no claim to arrears of rent and did not join as co-Plaintiffs could have sued for the subsequent rent and could have got decrees for such rent. There is no provision extending the period of limitation for filing such suits for rent. The sale may be confirmed at a date beyond the statutory period for filing such suits for rent. The other decree-holders who come within Section 148A(6) might have also safeguarded their rights by joining as co-decree-holders when they got a notice u/s 148A(7), or they might have sued for rent. No such inconvenience, absurdity, hardship or injustice, as is referred to by Mr. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes, arises if we put a literal interpretation on the word "decree-holder." 28. There is, therefore, no reason for giving an extended meaning to the word "decree-holder" in Section 168A(1)(b). 29. Moreover, if such an extended meaning is put upon the word "decree-holder" in the latter part of the section, we would have to put two different meanings on the same word in one and the same sub-clause. Such a rule of construction is not permissible. This reason appealed to Henderson J. in the case of Sarat Kumar Ray v. Kiran Chandra Ray ILR (1943) 1 Cal. 408. The proposition is well settled. In Courtauld v. Legh (1869) L.R. 4 Ex. 126, 130, at p. 130 Cleasby B. observed: It is a sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to the same words occurring in different parts of Ali Act of Parliament. 30. It is true that the rule is subject to a qualification suggested by Turner L.J. in In re National Savings Bank Association (1866) 1 Ch. App. 547, 550, that it is quite possible to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense, from that which is borne in another part of the Act if sufficient reason can be assigned. No such reason can be assigned in the present case. 31. App. 547, 550, that it is quite possible to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different sense, from that which is borne in another part of the Act if sufficient reason can be assigned. No such reason can be assigned in the present case. 31. We, accordingly, hold that the word "decree-holder" in Section 168A(1)(b) means the person who obtained a decree for arrears of rent in his favour and does not include a Defendant landlord who did not join as a co-Plaintiff u/s 148A(3). The said word also excludes a decree-holder who did not figure as an executing decree-holder in the execution case in which the tenancy was sold. 32. In the above view, the Appellant cannot come within Section 168A(1)(b) and accordingly, there was no bar to the confirmation of the sale on the ground that the Appellant's dues since the suit for rent was unsatisfied. Nor does the Appellant come within Section 148A(5)(i)(c), as there was no surplus sale-proceeds. 33. The only contention pressed on behalf of the Appellant fails. 34. This appeal must, therefore, be dismissed with costs, hearing-fee being assessed at two gold mohurs. Guha, J. 35. I agree.