Judgement Appeal (No. 3 of 1948) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (June 29, 1944) affirming with certain variations the order and decree (August 25, 1941, and May 10, 1943, respectively)—in Misc. Case No. 18/40—passed by the Subordinate Judge at Alipore. Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 179 ( 1948- 1949) Jadunath Roy V. Kshitish Chandra Acharjya Choudhury 96 The following facts and statutory provisions are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. This appeal arose from a petition made by the respondents for re-opening certain mortgage decrees obtained by the appellants respectively on April 4, 1929, September 13, 1929, and December 13, 1937 (in Title Suit No. 121 of 1927). The right to re-open the decrees was claimed under s. 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act (Beng. Act X. of 1940) herein referred to as " the Act.” The material provisions of s. 36 of the Act were— " 36.—(1.) Notwithstanding anything contained in any “law for the time being in force, if in any suit to which " this Act applies .... the court has reason to believe "that the exercise of one or more of the powers under " this section will give relief to the borrower, it shall exercise " all or any of the following powers as it may consider " appropriate, namely, shall— " (a) re-open any transaction and take an account " between the parties ; “ * * * * " (c) release the borrower of all liability in excess of " the limits specified in clauses (1.) and (2.) of section 30 ; “* * * * " Provided that in the exercise of these powers the " Court shall not— " (i) * * * * " (ii) do anything which affects any decree of a Court, " other than a decree in a suit to which this Act applies " which was not fully satisfied by the 1st day of "January, 1939..... ." Explanation.—A decree shall not, for the purposes " of this section, be deemed to have been fully satisfied " so long as there remains undisposed of an application " by the decree-holder for possession of property purchased " by him in execution of the decree. ." Explanation.—A decree shall not, for the purposes " of this section, be deemed to have been fully satisfied " so long as there remains undisposed of an application " by the decree-holder for possession of property purchased " by him in execution of the decree. " (2.) If in exercise of the powers conferred by sub- section (1.) the Court re-opens a decree, the Court— " (a) shall, after affording the parties an opportunity " of being heard, pass a new decree in accordance with " the provisions of this Act . , . . “ * * * * " (4.) This section shall apply to any suit, whatever " its form may be, if such suit is substantially one for the " recovery of a loan or for the enforcement of any agreement or security in respect of a loan or for the redemption of " any such security." * * * * The question for decision in this appeal was whether in the circumstances of the case the respondents were entitled to have the aforesaid decrees re-opened under s. 36 of the Act. The father and predecessor-in-interest of the respondents obtained two loans, one for Rs. 1,60,000, and another for Rs. 73,000, from the opposite party No. 1, and predecessor-in-interest of opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 179 ( 1948- 1949) Jadunath Roy V. Kshitish Chandra Acharjya Choudhury 97 (appellants) by executing two mortgages dated August 16, 1918, at 8 per cent, interest per annum with yearly rests. On March 10, 1926, the mortgagees instituted in the court of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Alipore a suit, which became Title Suit 121/ 1927, to enforce both the mortgages, and obtained a preliminary mortgage decree for sale under Ord. 34, r. 4, Code of Civil Procedure, for a total sum of Rs. 4,21,851-6-6 on April 4, 192Q. The decree declared (1.) that two sums which amounted to the above-mentioned sum were due to the mortgagees. After that declaration, (2.) the usual decree for sale was made of the properties specified in the schedules in default of payment by July 3, 1929. 4,21,851-6-6 on April 4, 192Q. The decree declared (1.) that two sums which amounted to the above-mentioned sum were due to the mortgagees. After that declaration, (2.) the usual decree for sale was made of the properties specified in the schedules in default of payment by July 3, 1929. (3.) The decree further provided that if the net proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the amount, subsequent interest and costs in full " the plaintiff shall be at liberty to apply for a " personal decree for the amount of the balance." On September 13, 1929, a final decree for sale was passed under Ord. 34, r. 5, Code of Civil Procedure. That decree provided that, as the amount mentioned in the preliminary decree had not been paid, the properties specified or a part thereof be sold .... and that if the net proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the decretal amounts and subsequent interest and costs in full " the plaintiff shall be at liberty to " apply for a personal decree for the amount of the balance." The respondents paid Rs. 15,500 to the decree-holders. Subsequent thereto, execution proceedings were started. On March 10, the mortgaged properties were sold in execution Case No. 38 of 1930, and bought by the decree-holders (appellants) for the total sum of Rs. 2,35,200. Those sales were confirmed in 1932 and 1935, and the purchasers took delivery of possession of different items of properties on different dates ranging from June 25, 1933, to March 9, 1936. On December 13, 1937, the decree-holders obtained a personal decree under Ord. 34, r. 6, for Rs. 3,30,903, the balance due under the final decree. The court declared that “the balance now due to him " under the aforesaid (i.e., the final) decree is Rs. 3,30,903." (The italics are by their Lordships of the Board.) The above decree was transferred for execution to the court of the Subordinate Judge at Mymersingh, and was registered as execution Case No. 18 of 1938 on May 10, 1938. It was put into execution and some personal properties of the mortgagors were sold to the decree-holders on August 8, 1939, for Rs, 3,899, and delivery of possession was made to them on July 6, 1940. It was undisputed that the personal decree had not been satisfied. The Act came into force on September 1, 1940. It was put into execution and some personal properties of the mortgagors were sold to the decree-holders on August 8, 1939, for Rs, 3,899, and delivery of possession was made to them on July 6, 1940. It was undisputed that the personal decree had not been satisfied. The Act came into force on September 1, 1940. It was passed " to make further and better provision for the control " of moneylenders and for the regulation and control of " money lending." During the pendency of the execution proceedings, on December 9, 1940, the respondents applied under s. 36 of the Act to re-open the transaction and decree passed in T.S. No. 121 of 1927, on the ground (1.) that compound interest at 8 per cent, per annum with yearly rests was allowed instead of 8 per cent, simple ; (2.) that interest after the decree was allowed ; and (3.) that the total amount decreed, excluding cost of the suit, was more than double the amount of the original loan taking into account the amounts paid from time to time towards principal and interest—(see s. 30 of the Act). By s. 2 of the Act — “Section 2.—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant " in the subject or context— " * * * * “* * * * " (22.) suit to which this Act applies means any " suit or proceeding instituted or filed on or after the 1st day " of January, 1939, or pending on that date and includes " a proceeding in execution— Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 179 ( 1948- 1949) Jadunath Roy V. Kshitish Chandra Acharjya Choudhury 98 " (a) for the recovry of a loan advanced before or " after the commencement of this Act; " Section 30 of the Act related to " Limitations as to amount " and rate of interest recoverable." The Subordinate Judge gave judgment ordering, inter alia, the re-opening of all the decrees, and the High Court (Mitter and Sharpe JJ.), following the decision of the Full Bench in Mrityunjay Mitra v. Satish Chandra Banerji (I. L. R. [ 1944] 2 C. 376.), affirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge. 1949. Feb. 16,17. Sir Herbert Cunliffe K.C. and G. Simonds for the appellants. 1949. Feb. 16,17. Sir Herbert Cunliffe K.C. and G. Simonds for the appellants. Proviso (ii) to sub-s. 1 of s. 36 of the Bengal Money Lenders Act provides in effect that the court must not re-open a decree if it is one which has been completely satisfied. It is submitted that in this case a decree having been made years ago for the sale of the mortgaged property, that decree has been fully satisfied because the property was sold, the sale confirmed by the court and possession given to the purchasers, who were the original mortgagees. The suggested answer by the respondents to that is that later on there was a personal decree which was not fully satisfied by the statutory date, January 1, 1939.In working out a claim by a mortgagee there are three decrees, preliminary decree, final decree for sale, and a personal decree for any balance. It is submitted that according to the Civil Procedure Code there are three quite distinct decrees. The Subordinate Judge said, in effect, that there are not three decrees, but one. It is submitted that they are separate decrees, and that the final mortgage decree was fully satisfied before January 1, 1939, and that consequently the application by the respondents was barred by proviso (ii.) of s. 36. There cannot be a reopening if the effect of it is to affect a decree which has been fully satisfied. It is not disputed and, indeed, is conceded, that so far as the personal decree is concerned, it was not completely satisfied on January 1, 1939, and can be re-opened. The whole question is, is the decree for sale completely satisfied by the sale of the mortgaged property, or must all the three decrees be read as a sort of trinity in unity. It is submitted that a final decree for sale exactly answers the definition of “decree “in s. 2, sub-s. 2, of the Civil Procedure Code; it finally determines “the matters in controversy in the suit." The mortgage property was one of those matters. The order for sale is a self-contained order. It may not be the final decree in the suit, but it is the final decree on the question of sale. The properties sold under the personal decree have nothing to do with the mortgage properties. The order for sale is a self-contained order. It may not be the final decree in the suit, but it is the final decree on the question of sale. The properties sold under the personal decree have nothing to do with the mortgage properties. Reference must be made to four cases, in two of which the reasons are in the appellants favour, the third has no reasons, and the fourth, a Full Bench decision, overruled the first two cases and so is against the appellants. Naresh Chandra Gupta v. Lal Mahmud Bhuiya (I. L. R. [ 1942] 2 C. 243.) is exactly this case, and we need not bother about the preliminary decree. By re-opening the personal decree the preliminary decree may in that way be affected, but the final decree for sale, which has been completely carried out, cannot be affected. The next case, Abdul Wahed Howladar v. Sukumari Debt (( 1942) 75 Cal. L. J. 299.) will not help much, because there is an absence of reasoning. Bhabani v Prosad Maitra v. Satyendra Nath Mukherji (I. L. R. [ 1943] 2 C. 417.) followed the first case and is in the appellants favour. My submission is consistent with the sanctity which the Act indicates is to be given to decrees of the court, and the only limitation is that there may be a decree which has not been completely satisfied. This Act is interfering with contractual rights and has not to be taken one degree beyond what the provisions of the Act require for the interference with those contractual rights. So when the Act says that you must not interfere with the decree unless it is something which has not been completely satisfied, that has to be given its strictest interpretation. In the Full Bench case, Mrityunjay Mitra v. Satish Chandra Banerji (I. L. R. [ 1944] 2 C. 376.), it was held in effect that so long as the personal decree remained unsatisfied the court could re-open the preliminary and final decrees as well as the personal decree so as to affect all three. It is submitted that the reasoning in that case compares unfavourably with that in the two Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 179 ( 1948- 1949) Jadunath Roy V. Kshitish Chandra Acharjya Choudhury above-cited cases in the appellants favour. Lastly, the Act does not empower the court to take account of mesne profits. It is submitted that the reasoning in that case compares unfavourably with that in the two Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 179 ( 1948- 1949) Jadunath Roy V. Kshitish Chandra Acharjya Choudhury above-cited cases in the appellants favour. Lastly, the Act does not empower the court to take account of mesne profits. S. C. Isaacs for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The decision of the High Court should be affirmed. The policy of the Act is to relieve borrowers, and it is intended to extend to them, including mortgagors, the fullest possible measure of relief, including not only a re-opening of the transactions, but of any execution sale which had taken place in pursuance of execution proceedings. The court is authorized to re-open and virtually to set aside the final decree and revest the property in the mortgagor subject to a condition of defeasance whereby on default in paying any of the instalments which are prescribed by the court in accordance with s. 36, sub-s. 2 (d), the property may vest in the mortgagee. The only limitations are, first, the, court in exercising its powers should not affect any other decree ; secondly, the limitation in respect of time ; and thirdly, the limitation as to " fully satisfied." By " satisfaction " the Act means, or has in view, a conclusion of the transaction between the parties either by adjustment or by some process which has brought the matter to a conclusion. My approach to the question is two-fold I rely on the Full Bench decision, Mrityunjay Mitra v. Satish Chandra Banerji (i), which, it is submitted, is quite accurate; but in the first instance I desire to approach the matter apart from authority, and the proposition is that, at any rate for the purposes of the Act of 1940, a decree in a mortgage suit cannot be said to be fully satisfied until the decretal amount representing the mortgage debt has been fully paid or treated as paid. That raises two points (i) what is a mortgage decree and (ii) what connotation is to be given to the expression " fully satisfied." In substance a decree in a mortgage suit is one decree, and it cannot be divided into three separate decrees. That raises two points (i) what is a mortgage decree and (ii) what connotation is to be given to the expression " fully satisfied." In substance a decree in a mortgage suit is one decree, and it cannot be divided into three separate decrees. [In this connexion the nature of the mortgage transaction in question was examined, and the procedure rules whereby the mortgage decree could be enforced were analysed.] For the definition of " mortgage " see s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The contractual liability which is created results in a debt which has to be paid. The purpose of the procedure under Ord. 34, rr. 4, 5 and 6, of the Civil Procedure Code is the realization of the debt. The purpose of the final decree is to sell the property for the purpose of realizing the mortgage debt, and therefore it follows that the final decree cannot be said to be satisfied unless it fulfils that purpose of realizing sufficient by the sale to satisfy the amount in respect of which the sale is held. The final decree is passed in relation to the preliminary decree, which sets out the obligation which has to be fulfilled. It may also be pointed out that these three decrees are decrees in one suit; there is only one plaint. For the reasons given in the judgments of the courts in India, and also in Mrityunjay Mitras case (I. L. R. [ 1944] 2 C. 376.) these respondents were entitled to relief under the Act. The respondents should have mesne profits from the date on which they obtained possession of the mortgage properties. Sir Herbert Cunliffe K.C. replied. June 14. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR MADHAVAN NAIR, who stated the facts set out above and continued It is not disputed that the application made on December 9, 1940, was properly made under the Act. What is disputed is whether or not the relief asked for under s. 36 of the Act can be granted. Under the Act, a decree can be re-opened, provided it relates to a suit to which the Act applies, and it has not been fully satisfied before January 1, 1939 (s. 36, sub-s. 1, proviso (ii)). What is disputed is whether or not the relief asked for under s. 36 of the Act can be granted. Under the Act, a decree can be re-opened, provided it relates to a suit to which the Act applies, and it has not been fully satisfied before January 1, 1939 (s. 36, sub-s. 1, proviso (ii)). In view of the expression " a suit to which the Act applies/ which is defined in s. 2, sub-s. 22, as meaning any suit or proceeding instituted or filed on or after January 1, 1939, or pending on that date, including a proceeding in execution for the recovery of a loan advanced before or after the commencement of the Act (in this case it was advanced before the commencement of the Act) the Subordinate Judge held that the Act applies to T.S. 121/ 1927 inasmuch as the proceeding in execution was pending. He also held that the decree in that suit had not been fully satisfied by January 1, 1939. In holding so, he overruled the argument that " as soon as the mortgaged property is " sold and the sale is confirmed, the mortgage decrees have " been fully satisfied.” It was conceded that the personal decree, being a decree for money and not a decree for sale, is liable to be re-opened ; the Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 179 ( 1948- 1949) Jadunath Roy V. Kshitish Chandra Acharjya Choudhury 100 distinction was drawn that the preliminary decree and the final decree were decrees for sale, while the personal decree was a decree for money and was outstanding. As regards this, the Subordinate Judge expressed the view that a preliminary mortgage decree directing sale of the mortgaged properties in the event of the non-payment of decretal dues within the specified date is substantially a decree for money, whether there is a direction to pay personally or not. To anticipate, the argument overruled by the Subordinate Judge is substantially the argument pressed before the Board on behalf of the appellants. In the result, the Subordinate Judge re-opened all the decrees, and passed a new decree on March 10, 1943, for payment to the decree-holders of a sum of Rs. 3,76,324-12-6 in fifteen equal instalments. Some other relief’s which the respondents were entitled to under the Act were also granted to them. In the result, the Subordinate Judge re-opened all the decrees, and passed a new decree on March 10, 1943, for payment to the decree-holders of a sum of Rs. 3,76,324-12-6 in fifteen equal instalments. Some other relief’s which the respondents were entitled to under the Act were also granted to them. These need not be referred to as they do not arise for consideration in the appeal before the Board. From the above decree the appellants appealed to the High Court and the respondents filed cross-objections. The new decree passed by the Subordinate Judge re-opening all the decrees passed in T.S. No. 121/ 1927 was confirmed by m the High Court, but variations, with which their Lordships are not concerned, were made in the connected and subsidiary relief’s granted by theSubordinate Judge. The correctness of the amount found payable was not challenged before the High Court, nor has it been challenged here—assuming that the decision of the Courts in India re-opening the previous decrees is held to be correct. Before the High Court it was argued that the Subordinate Judge was not right in re-opening the preliminary and final mortgage decrees passed in the suits. The learned judges held that the Subordinate Judge decided the point correctly on the ground that it “is now " concluded by the decision of the Full Bench in Mrityunjay " Mitra v. Satish Chandra Banerji (I. L. R. [ 1944] 2 C. 376.) " No discussion of the question beyond this reference to the Full Bench decision appears in the judgment. It was decided by the Full Bench (Nasim Ali, Mitter, and Akram JJ.) that " where, in a suit " for recovery of money lent upon a mortgage, the final decree " was executed by the sale of the mortgaged property before " January i, 1939, but a personal decree for the unrealized " balance remained unsatisfied on that date, the court can, " in the exercise of its power under s. 36 of the Bengal Money " Lenders Act, 1940, re-open the preliminary decree, and the " final decree, as well as the personal decree, so as to affect " all the three." Reference to the Full Bench was occasioned because the decisions of the High Court were in conflict on this point. In Naresh Chandra Gupta v. Lal Mahmud Bhuiya (I. L. R. [ 1942] 2 C. 243.) it was decided by Sen and Mukherjea JJ. that, "in a case where the preliminary, final and personal decrees " were all passed and possession of the property delivered " to the decree-holder purchaser before January 1, 1939, " but a proceeding in execution of the personal decree was " pending on that date—the final decree having been fully " satisfied before the statutory date cannot be re-opened, " by reason of the bar laid down in proviso (ii.) to s. 36, sub-s. 1, “and since the preliminary decree, though not fully satisfied,” cannot be re-opened without affecting the final decree, it " cannot be re-opened either; the personal decree, however, 14 is liable to be re-opened .. . . " (see the summary given in the F.B. reference). In a subsequent case, Abdul Wahed Howladar v. Sukumari Debt (( 1942) 75 Cal. L. J. 299.), it was held by Derbyshire C.J. and Gentle J. that it was the duty of the court " to re-open " the transaction between the lender and the borrower and " to take account of what had been paid and what ought " to have been paid according to the Bengal Money Lenders " Act and on such re-opening and taking of account to give " the borrowers such relief as they are entitled to under the " Act.” The previous decision was not noticed in this case. In a later decision, Bhabani Prosad Maitra v. Satyendra Nath Mukherji (I. L. R. [ 1943] 2 C. 417.), Mukherjea and Blank JJ. followed the first decision, observing that it does not seem to have been cited before the learned judges who decided the second case and " is certainly not noticed and much less dissented from in " the judgment." The conflict in the views evidenced in the above decisions has now been solved by the Full Bench decision. Generally stated, the question for decision in all the above cases was—the situation being similar in all Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. Generally stated, the question for decision in all the above cases was—the situation being similar in all Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 179 ( 1948- 1949) Jadunath Roy V. Kshitish Chandra Acharjya Choudhury 101 the cases, which were suits for recovery of money lent on mortgages—whether or not the decree in a suit to which the Act applies could be said to be fully satisfied when all the mortgaged property has been sold in execution of the final decree before January i, 1939, within the meaning of proviso (ii.) of s. 36, sub-s. 1, of the Act, the personal decree remaining unsatisfied at the time. Proviso (ii.) of the section, in so far as it relates to this case, states in effect that the decree of a court to which the Act applies cannot be re-opened under s. 36, sub-s. 1 (a), if the decree has been fully satisfied, i.e., it can be re-opened only if the decree has not been fully satisfied. Sir Herbert Cunliffe, the learned counsel for the appellants, stated frankly that " he does not deny that this is a suit to which the Act applies/ Therefore, the only question remaining for decision under proviso (ii.) is Can it be held in the circumstances of the case that the decree in the suit, T.S. 121/ 1927, has been fully satisfied when the mortgaged property had been sold before January 1, 1939, the statutory date ? The learned counsel for the appellants answers the question in the affirmative. He has also stated that no question except this arises for decision in this appeal. After careful consideration their Lordships are unable to accept the appellants argument that the decree is fully satisfied in this case, when the mortgaged properties were all sold in execution, while the personal decree remains unsatisfied. To answer the question propounded above it is necessary to inquire what is the nature of the preliminary decree passed in Suit No. 121/ 1927, and the place of " the decree for sale " in the scheme provided to effectuate that decree. On one side, it is argued it is a decree essentially for money, while on the other side it is said that it is a decree for sale pure and simple, and when once the sale is completely carried out the decree is fully satisfied. On one side, it is argued it is a decree essentially for money, while on the other side it is said that it is a decree for sale pure and simple, and when once the sale is completely carried out the decree is fully satisfied. Shortly stated, a plaint in a suit to enforce a simple mortgage under s. 58, sub-s. 2, of the Transfer of Property Act—in the present case it is to enforce two such mortgages—would commence ordinarily with a statement of the total amount of money due to the plaintiff under the claim, and end with the prayer that a decree be passed for the amount and that the amount decreed should be ordered to be realized by the sale of the mortgaged property, and if necessary, by passing a personal decree in case the amount realized by the sale proves insufficient to meet the decretal amount. The plaint has not been filed in this case, but the nature of the claim which determines the nature of the decree appears clearly from the preliminary decree where in it is stated " This is a suit for recovery of money due under two mortgage " bonds . . . . " and above it appears " claim for " Rs. 2,45,625-7~6p. and Rs. 76,205-2-." The suit is thus clearly one to recover a specified amount of money, and as such, s. 36 of the Act under which relief is claimed becomes applicable to it. Sub-section 4 of that section states that, " This section shall apply to any suit, whatever its form " may be, if such suit is substantially one for the recovery " of a loan . . . . " Thus, for the purposes of the Act the suit, though for the enforcement of mortgages, is substantially a suit for money, and this aspect of it should be kept in mind in considering the question whether the decree is fully satisfied by the mere sale of the property. That what is contemplated as the satisfaction of the decree under the Act, in cases such as the present, has reference to the amount of money realized in execution of the decree appears to follow inferentially from the wording of s. 35 of the Act. That what is contemplated as the satisfaction of the decree under the Act, in cases such as the present, has reference to the amount of money realized in execution of the decree appears to follow inferentially from the wording of s. 35 of the Act. This section relates to the " sale of property in execution of decrees in respect of " loans," and is as follows " Notwithstanding anything " contained in any other law for the time being in force, the u proclamation of the intended sale of property in execution " of a decree passed in respect of a loan shall specify only "so much of the property of the judgment-debtor as the court " considers to be saleable at a price sufficient to satisfy the " decree, and, the property so specified shall not be sold at " a price which is less than the price specified. “* * * * “* * * * Law Rep. 76 Ind. App. 179 ( 1948- 1949) Jadunath Roy V. Kshitish Chandra Acharjya Choudhury 102 The words in the section " price sufficient to satisfy the decree " used with reference to the sale would in their Lordships view support the inference indicated above. Just as the suit is one for money, so the decree passed in the suit is substantially a decree for money, though the preliminary decree for sale directs the sale of the mortgaged properties in the event of non-payment of the decretal amount. The decree declares (see the decree already quoted) that the amount decreed is due from the defendants and should be paid within a specified time, and if not so paid the property or sufficient part thereof should be sold. It is to be noticed that the decree ends with the provision that " if the net proceeds " of the sale are insufficient to pay such amount .... in " full, the plaintiff should be at liberty to apply for a personal " decree for the balance." The last provision appears in the final decree also. The preliminary decree, after declaring the decretal amount, lays down the manner in which the decree is to be worked out. It is to be worked out in three stages indicated in the decree which cannot be severed from one another. They are not independent, but constitute different stages in a single degree. The preliminary decree, after declaring the decretal amount, lays down the manner in which the decree is to be worked out. It is to be worked out in three stages indicated in the decree which cannot be severed from one another. They are not independent, but constitute different stages in a single degree. All the decrees show on their face that they are connected, For the purposes of the Act the decrees passed in the suit to which the Act applies should be treated as a single money decree. As already stated, the three decrees should not be treated as severable and independent decrees, each standing out by itself unrelated with the other. The personal decree drawn up in the terms of Form No. 8, Appendix D., Code of Civil Procedure, shows that money is still due under the decree. Where there is a preliminary decree, a final decree and a personal decree which is being executed, the decree is not fully satisfied since all the decrees must be taken together. Their Lordships approve the reasoning of the Full Bench decision in Mrityunjay Mitra v. Satish Chandra Banerji (I. L. R. [ 1944] 2 C 376,). In the course of the arguments reference was made to “mesne profits." Besides the recovery of possession of the properties, the respondents were granted the further relief of mesne profits. Their Lordships think they are entitled to this further relief. They do not propose to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. For the above reasons, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal fails, and should be dismissed with costs.