JUDGMENT Kaul, J. - This is a Plaintiffs' appeal in a suit for possession of a plot of land by demolition of a building erected thereon by some of the Respondents. 2. The material facts are as follows: The land in dispute lies in village Belhara district Bara Banki. This land originally formed part of a market which existed in the village. The Plaintiffs had been allowed by the proprietor of the village to construct a shop in the market for the purpose of carrying on their business as dealers in cloth and iron. About 1911, the Raja of Belhara who was the proprietor of the village, as also of the market, decided to establish a market at another place. He insisted that all the shop-keepers should shift to the new market. They were granted plots of land whereon to built their shops in the new market. The Plaintiffs, like other shop-keepers, shifted to the new market, where they built two shops. The shop in the old market was allowed to fall down. In 1939 the successor of the Raja of Belahra Rani Kaniz Abid, granted permission to Kundan Lal, Gulab Chand and Babu Chand to built their house on the site of the old shops of the Plaintiffs. Shortly after the construction of the house was started, the Plaintiffs instituted a suit for an injunction restraining Kundan Lal, Gulab Chand and Babu Chand, from constructing the house. That suit was, however, withdrawn. The suit which has given rise to the present appeal was instituted on the 13th of October, 1942, for possession of the plot of land by demolition of the house constructed by Kundan Lal, Gulab Chand and Babu Chand. These three persons and Rani Kaniz Abid were impleaded as Defendants in the suit. 3. Briefly stated the defence put forward on behalf of the Defendants was that with the establishment of the new market the old shop was abandoned by the Plaintiffs who transferred their business to the two shops which they had elected(sic) in the new market The old shop fell down and the land became parti. The licence terminated and the land esheated(sic) to the taluqdaria. It was further contended that in case the claim was decreed the Plaintiffs must pay Rs. 1,600/- which the Defendants had spent in constructing the house. 4. The licence terminated and the land esheated(sic) to the taluqdaria. It was further contended that in case the claim was decreed the Plaintiffs must pay Rs. 1,600/- which the Defendants had spent in constructing the house. 4. The learned Munsif of Bara Banki, before whom the matter came up for consideration held that the Plaintiff continued in possession of the land till the date of the suit and that it never became parti. That there was no abandonment of the site of the old shop by the Plaintiffs and accordingly no question of escheat could arise. That the Defendants had built their house with the knowledge of the Plaintiffs' claim and were not entitled to any reimbursement for the demolition of the building and that the shop was a riya's house governed by the village custom relating to house. In view of the conclusions arrived at by him he decreed the claim. 5. It appears that Kundan Lal died during the pendency of the suit and an appeal was preferred against the Munsif's decision by Gulab Chand, Babu Chand and Rani Kaniz Abid. This was disposed of by the District Judge of Bara Banki. Agreeing with the trial Court the District Judge held that the shop was not abandoned in 1911. On an examination of the evidence in 1911. On an examination of the evidence adduced by the parties, however, he came to the conclusion that several years before permission to build the house was granted by Rani Kaniz Abid to Gulab Chand, Babu Chand and Kundan Lal, the shop had fallen down completely and the land had become parti. He was of opinion that the licence under which the shop had been constructed came to an end. He accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Dissatisfied with this decision the Plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal. 6. An attempt was made by the Appellants' Counsel, Mr. Dhaon, to persuade me to hold that the land had not become parti as found by the learned District Judge. This is a pure question of fact, and the finding of the learned Judge is based on evidence on the record. It cannot, therefore, be disturbed. We must approach the present case on the presumption that the old shop was allowed to fall down and that the land became parti about the year 1928. This is a pure question of fact, and the finding of the learned Judge is based on evidence on the record. It cannot, therefore, be disturbed. We must approach the present case on the presumption that the old shop was allowed to fall down and that the land became parti about the year 1928. That it was not used by the Plaintiffs for any purpose nor did they exercise any act of possession over this plot of land for 10 or 12 years when Rani Kaniz Abid granted permission to Gulab Chand, Babu Chand Kundan Lal, to build a house upon it. The findings of the learned Judge in the Court below that the site of the shop had been abandoned by the Plaintiffs was also sought to be challenged Though the question whether a plot of land was or was not(sic) abandoned by a party may not necessarily be always a question of fact, in the present case there can be no doubt that the answer to this question must depend upon facts and inferences of fact that may be drawn from the evidence. Accordingly it is a question of fact. Mr. Dhaon, however, contended that the learned Judge had omitted to consider a very important piece of evidence bearing on this question. This error in procedure, it was argued, vitiated his finding and it was sought to be challenged in second appeal. Mr. Dhaon relied on a large number of receipts, Exhibits 3 to 18, which were produced by his clients in the trial Court. These receipts shows that Re. 1/- per year had been paid by the Plaintiffs in respect of what is called parjot, and in most of the receipts it has been described as haq razai. It was strongly argued by the Appellants' learned Counsel that this payment was in respect of the Plaintiffs' right to the land on which the old shop stood and as they continued to pay it; even though the shop was allowed to fall down and the land had become parti, it cannot be said that they had abandoned it. Abandonment is always a question of intention, and if a person continues to pay parjot or haq razai in respect of any land it is clear that he cannot be deemed to have abandoned it. Abandonment is always a question of intention, and if a person continues to pay parjot or haq razai in respect of any land it is clear that he cannot be deemed to have abandoned it. At one stage of the hearing of the appeal I was much impressed by this argument, but on an examination it was found to be without substance. There is nothing on the record to show that the payments referred to in the receipt were made in respect of the shop in question. According to the Respondents contention this parjot was paid by the Plaintiffs to the taluqdaria not for the shop but for the privilege of being allowed to carry on their trade or business formerly in the old market and later in the new market. It is unnecessary to determine whether the payment was in respect of the right to use the land for the shop or for the privilege of carrying on trade or business in the market. I am satisfied on the evidence on record that, even if the payment was made in respect of the shop after the new market was established, this payment must be taken to relate to the two shops which had been erected by the Appellants in the new market. Ex. B-5 is a report made by an official of Rani Kaniz Abid's office in relation to an application made by Kundan Lal in respect of the parjot or haq razai paid by him. It ran as follows: The applicant appeared. It appears from his statement and inquiry that the old shop in respect of which he paid Rs. 3/- annually was demolished. Accordingly when no shop is in existence, in respect of what is he to pay the annual dues. He will of course pay annual dues which may be assessed on his shop in the new market just like other shopkeepers. 7. This report, though it does not relate to any application made by the present Appellants, warrants a clear inference that nothing was charged in respect of shops which existed in the old market but had ceased to exist on the establishment of the new market. The argument based on the payment evidenced by Exs. 7. This report, though it does not relate to any application made by the present Appellants, warrants a clear inference that nothing was charged in respect of shops which existed in the old market but had ceased to exist on the establishment of the new market. The argument based on the payment evidenced by Exs. 3 to 16, therefore, cannot be helpful to the Appellants because on the view taken by me those payments did not relate either to the old shop or its site. 8. It may be pointed out that this argument was not raised either in the Court below or in the trial Court. These documents make no reference either to the shop or to the site thereof and were never intended to be used as evidence of payment of any annual dues in respect of the land in question. Were it otherwise I have no doubt that some reference to this point must have been made in the judgment of the two Courts below. 9. In view of what has been stated already I am satisfied that the finding of the learned District Judge that the site had been abandoned by the Plaintiff must be upheld. 10. Another argument advanced by Mr. Dhaon was that his clients held the land under the terms of a grant contained in the wajib-ul-arz, and even if the shop fell down and the land became parti, his clients should not be deemed to have abandoned it. I am clear that the argument is without force. Abandonment is the relinquishment of a right, the giving up of something to which one is entitled. It is a question of intention and in the present case the Appellants' intention to abandon the land is clear. Moreover as held by me, it is a finding of fact which cannot be disturbed is second appeal. 11. Reference was, in the course of argument, made by Mr. Dhaon to Section 60(b) of the Easement Act. He argued that as he had executed a work of a permanent character by building a shop the licence was not revokable. In view of the finding on the question of abandonment, this question does not arise. Assuming, however, that such a question does arise, I am clear that the provisions of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act cannot be of any avail to the Appellants. In view of the finding on the question of abandonment, this question does not arise. Assuming, however, that such a question does arise, I am clear that the provisions of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act cannot be of any avail to the Appellants. Section 60(b) reads thus: A licence may be revoked by the grantor unless the licencee acting upon the licence has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. 12. This would not apply to a case where the work of a permanent character was allowed to fall down and the land permitted to remain parti for more than ten years. A licence, as is well established, is revokable. The exception referred to in the above quoted provision of law cannot apply to a case like the present. Two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of that provision of law: (1) the licencee acting on the licence must execute a work of a permanent character and (2) incur expenses in the execution. 13. This can hardly apply to a case where the work of a permanent character no longer exists and no other work has been executed in its place for ten or eleven years. 14. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.