ORDER : 1. This is an application under S.491, Criminal Procedure Code by the petitioner detained in public custody to be set at liberty on the ground that his detention has been illegal. He resides in the city of Indore and the Subha of Indore who is invested with the powers of a District Magistrate for the district of Indore made on 30th July 1949 an order in respect of the petitioner under S.3(1)(a) read with S.3(2), Maintainence of Public Order Act, No. VII [7]-of 1949, directing that he be detained in the Central Jail at Indore for a period of one month. As required by the Act the Magistrate furnished the petitioner with the grounds on which the order of detention was made. The document does not bear any date which it should have done. The text of the grounds reads as follows: 2. Thereafter, on 13th August the petitioner moved the Court to act under S.491, Criminal Procedure Code. In the petition objection was taken to the order of detention but at the hearing it was abandoned on the order received from the jail being read by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The learned counsel complained that the order bad not been served on him and on application made, copy of it had not been supplied to him. I do not know about the truth of these allegations. Though there is no express provision made in (HINDI WORD OMMITED) these respects in the Act, justice requires twat the detenu should, immediately he is taken in custody, be furnished a copy of the order. The learned Advocate General has promised to see that this is done. 3. The one plea taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the particulars of the grounds on which the order of detention was made are not sufficient to enable him to make a representation to the detaining authority against his detention which he is entitled to make under S.5 of the Act. The learned Advocate-General in the course of his reply put forward two arguments which are in the nature of preliminary objections. 4. The learned Advocate-General submitted that under S.5 of the Act, the detaining authority could withhold communication of grounds of detention to the detenu, if it thought that the disclosure would harm the public interest. The learned Advocate-General in the course of his reply put forward two arguments which are in the nature of preliminary objections. 4. The learned Advocate-General submitted that under S.5 of the Act, the detaining authority could withhold communication of grounds of detention to the detenu, if it thought that the disclosure would harm the public interest. It should, therefore, be assumed that there were undisclosed grounds also on which the order of detention was made without the detaining authority making statement to that effect on affidavit or otherwise. No reason for making the assumption was advanced by the learned Advocate-General. I see no reason why the detaining authority should not tell the detenu that none or some of the grounds on which the order of detention was made cannot in the public interest be communicated to him. Also I do not understand why the detaining authority should not on affidavit say when the case comes to Court that there were grounds of detention which could not be disclosed. The plea in itself is suspicious. The learned Advocate-General would like to secure for the detaining authority the benefit of an assumption when that authority may not make a statement in writing or if it did expose itself to inconvenient criticism. The plea is untenable. 5. The learned Advocate-General urged that the detenu has to be content with the grounds of detention as are furnished to him and these would obviously be general in form and furnishing particulars of the matters constituting the grounds was in the absolute discretion of the authority making the order of detention. The object of communicating the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and other particulars as laid down in S.5 of the Act is that the detenu might, if he so wishes, make a representation against his detention to the detaining authority. He may explain, deny and offer to disprove the facts alleged to exist against him and which have been relied on by the authority to make the order of detention. These facts (except when they cannot be disclosed in the public interest) have to be communicated to the detenu. When giving the communication shape in words it becomes a question of selection of material and expression. There are facts appearing against a person brought up before the authority with a view to his being detained under the Act. These facts (except when they cannot be disclosed in the public interest) have to be communicated to the detenu. When giving the communication shape in words it becomes a question of selection of material and expression. There are facts appearing against a person brought up before the authority with a view to his being detained under the Act. The authority selects these facts from the mass that may be before it and which to its opinion justified his detention. These facts become the grounds of the order of detention. If these, as put into words are not sufficient enough to enable the person detained to make a representation to which he is entitled, the grounds have to be supplemented by further particulars (of time, place and circumstance). The detenu is entitled to know so much as will enable him to identify the facts which have been effected the judgment of the detaining authority against him. The facts against the detenu have split up under two heads 'grounds' and 'particulars'. The grounds (the main facts which tell against the detenu) have all to be furnished but not so with the 'particulars'. The detenu is not on his trial. He is not entitled to know every little detail attaching to the leading facts supposed to exist against him. By way of safeguard an opportunity is afforded by the legislature to the detenu to convince the detaining authority of its error, if he can. Since the proceeding is not meant to be more than a mere representation, the discretion is vested by the law in the detaining authority as to what particulars out of the many shall be communicated to the detenu and he may not ask for all that he thinks he requires. 6. The law expects the detaining authority to act in due course of law. There may be numerous words in the communication. They may be called by the names 'grounds' and 'particulars' and yet may not precisely convey to the mind of the detenu what the facts are which have weighed against him in the mind of the detaining authority. In such a case, the apparent proceeding of furnishing the grounds to the detenu is in fact a sham one. They may be called by the names 'grounds' and 'particulars' and yet may not precisely convey to the mind of the detenu what the facts are which have weighed against him in the mind of the detaining authority. In such a case, the apparent proceeding of furnishing the grounds to the detenu is in fact a sham one. As under S.3 of the Act the 'satisfaction' is that of the detainining authority but the Court will interfere if the alleged satisfaction is proved to be a sham one. So also under S.5 of the Act, the detaining authority shall select the particulars to be communicated to the detenu but under the guise of exercising the discretion vested in it by law it cannot take away the advantage given by the law to the person detained without a trial. There is a line of the reasonable minimum which the detaining authority cannot cross and if it does, this Court is bound by law to intervene and declare that the law has been evaded and the detention is, therefore, illegal. 7. I will now proceed to apply this interpretation of the law to the grounds of detention as communicated to the petitioner. It is stated in the communication of the District Magistrate that the petitioner was a member of the Communist Party and the Majdur Sabha which have been declared illegal bodies in that part of Madhy Bharat which at one time was the Indore State and he had been secretly participating in their activities, Without more this statement is not sufficient to make the detenu to make the representation.Particulars of participation in and of the activities are required. This as a good ground of detention fails. It is next stated that on 17th July 1949 a meeting of the Textile Federation, open to the public, was held in the Subhas Chowk at which the petitioner made a spirited speech promoting feelings of class hatred and exhorting the labourers to go on strike and use violence. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that this was not enough. Some words used in the speech, should have been reproduced. I am unable to accept this contention. The detenu is told the day and place of the meeting and the gist, in its effects, of the speech. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that this was not enough. Some words used in the speech, should have been reproduced. I am unable to accept this contention. The detenu is told the day and place of the meeting and the gist, in its effects, of the speech. These should suffice to enable him to make the representation which under the law he is entitled to make. There being one good ground communicated to the detenu, the petition fails. It is dismissed.