Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1949 DIGILAW 271 (ALL)

Bhagawati Prasad v. Ram Avadh

1949-11-04

KIDWAI

body1949
JUDGMENT Kidwai, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit u/s 33 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. 2. On the 4th of September, 1933, Ram Avadh, Bisheshwar Prasad and Baleshwar Dutt, father of Bijleshwari Prasad, Ram Chandra and Paras Nath, executed a deed which is called a zarpeshgi lease in favour of Bhagwati Prasad and Mahadeo, the deceased husband of Phul Kuar. It was stipulated that a sum of Rs. 72-14.5/-(sic) would be payable as rent of the property leased. It was, however, stated that a sum of Rs. 460/- had been paid to the lesser who stood in urgent need of it and that at the end of the stipulated period of the lease, namely 10 years, the lessor would be entitled to get the lease cancelled on payment of this Rs. 460/-. 3. On the 17th September, 1943, the suit out of which this appeal arises, was led by Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 for accounting. The Defendants pleaded that the deed was a lease and not a mortgage: that the Plaintiff were not agriculturists within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. They also raised other pleas with which we are no longer concerned. 4. The learned Munsif held that the deed in suit was a mortgage: that the Civil Court had jurisdiction: that the Plaintiff were agriculturists within the meaning of Act XIII of 1940 and that, on an account being taken, the entire sum due under the mortgage had been paid off. He accordingly declared that nothing remained due from the Plaintiff s to the Defendants. 5. Bhagwati Prasad appealed and impleaded Phul Kuar also as a Respondent. The learned Civil Judge of Gonda, accepted all the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 6. Bhagwati Prasad has now come up in second appeal and his learned Advocate has contended that the deed is not a mortgage and that consequent Section 33 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act is not applicable and that the Plaintiff's are not proved to be agriculturists within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. 7. 6. Bhagwati Prasad has now come up in second appeal and his learned Advocate has contended that the deed is not a mortgage and that consequent Section 33 of the U.P. Agriculturists' Relief Act is not applicable and that the Plaintiff's are not proved to be agriculturists within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. 7. With regard to the first point it may be stated that Section 33 does not contemplate the taking of an account only between a mortgagor and a mortgagee but it authorises the taking of an account with regard to any advance made to an agriculturist debtor. If, therefore, the Plaintiff s are agriculturists and this transaction was an advance whether it was a mortgage or not, the Plaintiff s would be entitled to ask for an account to be taken. A consideration of the conditions of the deed, Ex. 1, shows that the lessors were not entitled to get the lease cancelled, except on payment of the Rs. 460/- which they originally took from the lessees. The distinction that exists between a zarpeshgi lease in the real sense of the word and a zarpeshgi lease disguised as a mortgage is that in the former case the lessor is entitled to recover possession after the expiry of the fixed period without payment of anything while in the latter case the sum originally borrowed, or whatever may be found to be due on accounting must be paid back before the lessee is asked to quit - vide Tulshi Ram v. Mst. Muna Kuar ILR 12 Luck. 161 at 165. In the present case the deed clearly stipulates that the lease could not be cancelled without payment of the entire sum originally taken by the lessor. Thus this particular transaction was a mortgago and, an account would clearly be taken u/s 33 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act. 8. Even if it was not a mortgage the sum of Rs. 460/- was an advance and in view of the language of Section 33 the person to whom the advance was made was entitled to call for accounts with regard to that advance. Thus in either case, Section 33 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act justifies the taking of an accounts. 9. 460/- was an advance and in view of the language of Section 33 the person to whom the advance was made was entitled to call for accounts with regard to that advance. Thus in either case, Section 33 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act justifies the taking of an accounts. 9. With regard to the question as to whether the Plaintiff s are agriculturists within the meaning of Act Xlll of 1940 my attention was drawn to Section 2, Sub-section (18) of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. That Act defines a tenant to include a person entered in a register maintained under the provisions of Clause (b) or Clause (c) of Section 32 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. It was contended that no copy of such register had been produced and that, therefore, there was no material on the record upon which it could be found that the Plaintiff s were agriculturists' within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. It is true that the Plaintiff s had not produced any copy of the register maintained u/s 32, Clause (b) or Clause (c) but they have produced an order of the Assistant Record Officer of Gonda in a suit between them and Balrampur Estate which held that the Plaintiff s were permanent lessees holding under special agreement and were entitled to be entered in the register maintained u/s 32 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The learned Assistant Record Officer, in the exercise of the powers which he possessed, during the course of settlement proceedings, therefore, directed the entry of the names of the Plaintiff s in the register kept u/s 32 as permanent lease (i.e. as persons covered by Clause (b) of Section 32). In the absence of any evidence to show that this order was set aside on appeal, it will be presumed that it had effect given to it and that the entries directed by it to be made were, in fact, made. Thus the evidence on the record does establish that the Plaintiff s are agriculturists within the meaning of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act. 10. The result, therefore, is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.