JUDGMENT Blank, J. - This is an appeal by the decree-holder from concurrent decisions of a Munsif of Sealdah and Subordinate Judge of Alipur. The facts in brief are that the Courts below were dealing with an application under S. 47, Civil P.C. The opposite party decree-holder filed a suit against the petitioners for specific performance of contract and the suit was decreed on compromise on 12th March 1947. It was part of the terms of compromise that the opposite party was to pay Rs. 250 to the petitioners on the same day, namely, 12th March 1947, and was to pay the remainder, namely, Rs. 75, within a week, that is, within 19th March 1947. It was agreed by the compromise that the petitioners would execute a deed of reconveyance if Rs. 75 was paid within 19th March 1947. The sum of Rs. 250 was paid on 12th March 1947 but the remainder, namely Rs. 75, was not paid until 21st March 1947. It is said 20th March 1947 was a holiday. The opposite party decree-holder put the decree into execution as the petitioners refused to execute a deed of reconveyance. The petitioners filed their petition under S. 47, Civil P.C., on the basis that the decree was not executable, the sum of Rs. 75 not having been paid within 19th March 1947. The opposite party opposed the application submitting that the delay of one day could be condoned. The question before the learned Munsif was. "Is the decree executable?" The learned Munsif held that time was of the essence of the contract and that the delay could not be condoned. The argument was raised before him that the Court had accepted the deposit and that, therefore, the decree was executable. The learned Munsif rejected the argument holding that "by the mere acceptance of deposit by the Court the petitioner cannot be divested of his right." 2. On appeal before the learned Subordinate Judge the matter was dealt with at somewhat greater length but with the same results. The learned Subordinate Judge refers to para. 4 of the compromise petition and observes that it clearly provides that if the balance of Rs. 75 was not paid within 19th March the plaintiff could not execute the decree for specific performance. He held that time was of the essence of the agreement between the parties. The learned Subordinate Judge refers to para. 4 of the compromise petition and observes that it clearly provides that if the balance of Rs. 75 was not paid within 19th March the plaintiff could not execute the decree for specific performance. He held that time was of the essence of the agreement between the parties. The argument was also raised before the learned Subordinate Judge that the Court could extend the time for deposit under S. 148, Civil P.C. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the Court was not entitled to extend the time fixed by the parties under the compromise decree. A decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Akkach Mondal v. Aminuddin Mullik, 23 C.W.N. 439 : (A.I.R. 1919 Cal. 68), was also placed before the learned Subordinate Judge but he held that the facts of that case were quite different from the facts of the present case and declined to follow what was done by the learned Judges in the case referred to. 3. In second appeal the matter has been argued at somewhat greater length. Mr. M.N. Ghosh for the appellant decree-holder submitted that two questions properly arose, firstly, whether the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time and secondly, if so, whether extension was permissible. The second point was taken up first. The learned Advocate drew my attention to the facts as stated above. He referred to S. 55, Contract Act, but all that concerns this Court in second appeal is that the question whether time is of the essence depends on the intention of the parties. The intention of the parties is a question of fact and this Court will be bound by the proceedings of the Courts below on the matter of fact, The learned Advocate placed before me the decision in the case of Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, 43 I.A. 26 : (A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 83). In that case their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that S. 55, Contract Act, did not lay down any principle which differred from the law of England as to contracts for the sale of land. In that case their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that S. 55, Contract Act, did not lay down any principle which differred from the law of England as to contracts for the sale of land. Their Lordships held that specific performance of such a contract will be granted in spite of the failure to keep the dates assigned by it, if justice can be done between the parties and if nothing in the express stipulations of the parties, the nature of the property, or the surrounding circumstances made it inequitable to grant relief: An intention to make time of the essence of the contract.........may be inferred from what passed between the parties before, but not after, the contract is made. The facts of that case were that there was an agreement in writing with certain provisions and that the respondent subsequently purported to rescind the contract and forfeit the deposit. Their Lordships held that the contract did not make time of the essence of the contract and that the appellant was entitled to specific performance. The learned advocate for the appellant argues that the facts in the present case are even more strongly in favour of his client than were the facts in the case before the Judicial Committee. In that case there was an agreement regarding earnest money followed by considerable delay whereas in the present case the decree-holder had paid most of the money and a small amount remained outstanding, in effect for one day, one of the two days during which it was outstanding being a day on which the Court was closed. He refers to a petition dated 13th August 1947, which states that the appellant thought that the term of the compromise was that he did not have to pay until the 19th had elapsed, that he tendered payment to the opposite party on 20th who refused it, so he went to Court on that day but found it closed and paid the amount into Court the next day. The learned Advocate also submitted that the amount having been received by the Court after hearing both parties, there had, in fact, been an extension of time, but this branch of the argument will be referred to later on. 4. With regard to the case reported in Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, 43 I.A. 26 : (A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 83), Mr. 4. With regard to the case reported in Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, 43 I.A. 26 : (A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 83), Mr. Bholanath Roy for the respondents points out that the contract there was an ordinary contract whereas here the contract has been made part of the decree and that by the act of the parties. While he has no criticism of the observations of their Lordships regarding the nature of equitable jurisdiction and so on, he argues that the decision on the facts is of no help to the appellant in the present case. In my view, his argument is sound. The general principles governing the exercise of equitable jurisdiction in cases of contracts for the sale of land where there has been default in dates are not in substance in issue in the present case. What is in issue in the present case is whether the date fixed for the payment of the sum of Rs. 75 was or was not of the essence of the contract between the parties and as I have said, that is and must be a question of fact and the exposition of the general principles of equitable jurisdiction cannot be of assistance in deciding the question of fact. 5. The question of fact has been dealt with by the Courts below. As it appears from the order-sheet of the learned Munsif no evidence was adduced by either side. It follows that the compromise as recorded by the Court was the only evidence and the Courts of fact have held that time was of the essence. They held so in a some what summary manner but nothing has been placed before me to show that they were wrong. Clearly they have followed the ordinary principle that the recording of the compromise in the decree made it part of the order of the Court and that where the Court has fixed a final date for final settlement by the act of one of the parties and the party concerned has not complied with the order of the Court by that date, there is an end of the matter. 6. On the foregoing view, the other arguments advanced can be dealt with briefly. 6. On the foregoing view, the other arguments advanced can be dealt with briefly. The argument that there has, in fact, been an extension of time as the Court accepted the deposit on 21st after hearing the parties was dealt with on the proper lines by the Court of first instance. The learned Munsif rightly observes that mere acceptance of the deposit by the Court could not divest the petitioner of his right. Clearly, there was no decision as to the right to deposit or not to deposit. The money was merely held in the safe custody of the Court for the convenience of all concerned, pending and subject to decision as to the question of right. 7. Whether the Court was competent to extend the time of deposit was argued on the basis of the decisions in the cases of Akkach Mondal v. Aminuddi Mullik, 23 C.W.N. 439 : (A.I.R. 1919 Cal. 68) and Kshetra Mohan Ghose and Another Vs. Gour Mohan Kapali, AIR 1934 Cal 21 . Mr. Ghose submits that there were conflicting decisions of Divisional Benches of this Court. This is, however, not the case. In the former decision the defendant paid a part of a sum of money into Court and applied for enlargement of time to pay up the balance. The application was refused but the defendant paid the balance into Court after the expiry of the time limited. The learned Judge held that the objection taken by the plaintiff was not seriously pressed before him and observed: We think that on the whole it would not be unjust to both parties that we should now extend the time for the payment of the balance.......... It is true that the question whether the Court had jurisdiction to extend the time without the consent of the decree-holder was argued before the learned Judges as appears from the notes of the arguments at page 440 of the Report, but the observation by the learned Judges that the objection taken by the plaintiff was not seriously pressed is final. In the latter case, a Division Bench held explicitly that where a certain time is fixed by a decree of Court for taking some steps and it directs that on failure of doing so within the time limited the case should stand dismissed, the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time limited by the decree. In the latter case, a Division Bench held explicitly that where a certain time is fixed by a decree of Court for taking some steps and it directs that on failure of doing so within the time limited the case should stand dismissed, the Court has no jurisdiction to extend the time limited by the decree. Here, their Lordships considered certain decisions, including one of the Patna High Court taking a contrary view, and based their decision on the preponderance of the judicial authority in favour of the contention of the appellant. Thus, there is no conflict between the decisions of the two Divisional Benches of this Court. 8. Mr. Roy for the respondents was at some pains to traverse in detail the arguments advanced by Mr. Ghose, but on the view taken above there is no need to go into detail. The fact remains that the Courts below have come to a decision on the question of fact which is binding on this Court, namely, that the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence. There is no scope for further consideration of this question at the present stage. 9. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with cost. 10. Leave under Cl. 15, Letters Patent, was asked for and is rejected.