JUDGMENT Harries, C.J. - These are five applications under sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The points involved in all the cases are the same and it will, therefore, be convenient to deal with all the cases in this judgment. Miscellaneous Case No. 84 of 1949 has been preferred on behalf of three detenus-- Badal Bose, Kashinath Srimani and Sarada Prosad Roy. Badal Bose was arrested on May 26, 1949, under sec. 30 (1) of the West Bengal Security Act, and Kashinath Srimani and Saroda Prosad Roy were arrested on May 26, 1949. Orders under sec. 16 (1) of the West Bengal Security Act were made with respect to these three persons on June 10, 1949, whereby they were ordered to be detained for a period of nine months. 2. Miscellaneous Case No. 88 of 1949 concerns a detained person Bimalendu Bagchi who was arrested under sec. 30 (1) of the West Bengal Security Act on June 8, 1949. An order of detention under sec. 16 (1) of the West Bengal Security Act was made on June 18, 1949, the period of detention being nine months. 3. Miscellaneous Case No. 89 of 1949 concerns two detenus Amalendu Bagchi and his wife Anupama Bagchi. These two persons were arrested under sec. 30 (1) of the West Bengal Security Act on June 8, 1949 and an order for their detention for a period of nine months was made by Government on June 18, 1949. 4. Miscellaneous Case No. 91 of 1949 concerns a detained person named Bhairab Nath Ganguly who was arrested on April 19, 1949, and was ordered under sec. 16 (1) of the West Bengal Security Act on May 13, 1949 to be detained for a period of nine months. 5. Miscellaneous Case No. 93 of 1949 concerns a detained person--Sitanath Das -- who was arrested on June 9, 1949 and was ordered on June 24, 1949 to be detained for a period of nine months under sec. 16 (1) of the West Bengal Security Act. 6. This Court issued Rules in all these cases on the Chief Secretary and the Superintendents of the Jails concerned to show cause why these detained persons should not be set at liberty. The Government have appeared through the Advocate-General and he has contended that each of these detained persons is detained under a valid order issued by Government under sec. This Court issued Rules in all these cases on the Chief Secretary and the Superintendents of the Jails concerned to show cause why these detained persons should not be set at liberty. The Government have appeared through the Advocate-General and he has contended that each of these detained persons is detained under a valid order issued by Government under sec. 16 (1) of the West Bengal Security Act, 1948. 7. Sec. 16 (1) of the Act is in these terms: The Provincial Government, if satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from doing any subversive act it is necessary so to do, may make an order-- (a) directing that he be detained,.......... 8. It is clear that these orders for detention may be made for nine months under the Act. 9. It will be seen that by the terms of sec. 16 (1) of the Security Act all that is required, before an order can be made, is the satisfaction of the Provincial Government. If the Government is satisfied that it is necessary to make an order to prevent a person from doing any subversive act then a lawful order can be made. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the Court cannot go into the question whether the satisfaction of the Provincial Government is based on reasonable grounds. In the Act as originally passed the words "the Provincial Government, if satisfied on reasonable grounds" appeared; but as a result of certain cases the words "on reasonable grounds" were struck out by subsequent legislation. It was therefore quite impossible to assail any of these orders merely by contending that the Provincial Government was acting unreasonably. This Court had held that the only grounds for setting aside an order made under this section are that the order was mala fide or that it was an order not made under the Act at all. In these cases before us it has not been contended that the orders are mala fide but what has been contended is that the Act under which the orders were made is no longer in force, and it appears to me that there is force in this contention. 10. The West Bengal Security Act, 1948, was passed on March 13, 1948 and was later modified on November 1, 1948. Sec. 1 (4) provided for its duration. 10. The West Bengal Security Act, 1948, was passed on March 13, 1948 and was later modified on November 1, 1948. Sec. 1 (4) provided for its duration. The subsection was in these terms: It shall, in the first instance, remain in force for a period of one year; provided that if a resolution in that behalf is, before the date on which under this sub-section it would otherwise have eeased to operate, passed by the Provincial Legislature, it shall continue in force for a further period of one year from such date. 11. On March 5, 1949 before the first year of the Act expired a resolution was passed in the West Bengal Legislative Assembly in these terms: This Assembly is of opinion that the West Bengal Security Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act :11 of 1948) do continue in force for a further period of one year from the date on which the said Act would, under sub-sec. (4) of sec. I thereof, otherwise cease to operate. 12. It will be seen that all the orders of detention in these cases were made in the second year of this Act. The first year of the Act expired on March 12, 1949 and therefore all the orders of detention in these cases can only be justified if the life of this Act was validly extended for a further period of one year by the resolution to which I have made reference. 13. It is contended on behalf of the detenus that the resolution passed by the West Bengal Legislative Assembly could not extend the life of the Act and therefore the Act which was originally only to be in force for one year had ceased to be effective and that no power existed at the time these orders were made for making such orders. The argument is that the West Bengal Legislature could not delegate their powers to direct that the Act should continue in force for a further period. Extension of an Act, it is said, can only be done by the Legislature in proper form and the Legislature could not delegate their powers to any other body to extend the said Act. 14. It will be seen from the terms of sub-sec. (4) of sec. Extension of an Act, it is said, can only be done by the Legislature in proper form and the Legislature could not delegate their powers to any other body to extend the said Act. 14. It will be seen from the terms of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 1 of the Security Act that the piece of legislation enacted was only to remain in force in the first instance for a period of one year. It could be continued in force for a further period of one year if a resolution in that behalf was passed by the Provincial Legislature before the Act expired. What is said is that providing for the extension of the Act by a resolution of the Provincial Legislature is providing for a different mode of legislation from that contemplated by the Government of India Act. Legislation can only be enacted by the Legislature and in the Province of West Bengal the Legislature consists of His Excellency the Governor and the Legislative Assembly. It is contended on behalf of the detained persons that this Act could not be extended except by an enactment of the Provincial Assembly assented to by the Governor. But sub-sec. (4) of sec. 1 provides for legislation by a different body to which the West Bengal Legislature has delegated its powers. This delegation, it is contended, is not permissible and reliance is placed upon the very recent decision of the Federal Court in the case of Jatindra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar 33 C.W.N. 91 (F.R.) (1949) which is up to now unreported and was decided by their Lordships of the Federal Court on May 28, 1949. 15. On behalf of the Provincial Government it is contended that the cases now before us are clearly distinguishable from the case decided by the Federal Court and that this Court is in no way bound by that decision. 16. The facts of the Federal Court decision in so far as they are material to this case can be very shortly stated as follows. The Bihar Legislature enacted a statute-- the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947--which became law on March 16, 1947. It was provided by sec. 1 (3) of that Act that the Act should remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement. The Bihar Legislature enacted a statute-- the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947--which became law on March 16, 1947. It was provided by sec. 1 (3) of that Act that the Act should remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement. A proviso to the sub-section read as follows: Provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification. 17. After this Act was passed the Governor of Bihar by a notification extended the application of the Act to the excluded districts in Chotanagpur. This the Governor was empowered to do by reason of sec. 92 of the Government of India Act. 18. Before the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, had been in force for a whole year, a resolution was passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council extending the life of the Act for a further period of one year. No fresh notification was made by His Excellency the Governor for a considerable time applying the Act for this extended period to the excluded areas in Chotanagpur. 19. After the first period of one year of the life of the Bihar Act had expired and during the time that its life had, it is said, been extended by this resolution, orders were made detaining certain persons who were resident in these excluded Districts in Chotanagpur. On behalf of the detained persons it was contended before the Federal Court that the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947. had not been validly extended and, therefore, there was no Act in existence justifying the orders of detention which were impugned in that case. It was urged that by sec. 1 (3) of the Act the Bihar Legislature had delegated their legislative function to a body consisting of the two Assemblies and that the resolution passed by those two Assemblies could not have the force of law. It was urged that by sec. 1 (3) of the Act the Bihar Legislature had delegated their legislative function to a body consisting of the two Assemblies and that the resolution passed by those two Assemblies could not have the force of law. On the other hand it was argued on behalf of the Bihar Government that this was not a case of delegation of legislative power, but that it was a case of conditional or contingent legislation which was permissible under the well-known rule enunciated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in The Queen v. Burah L.R. 5 I.A. 178 (1878) and subsequent cases. The point which the Federal Court was called upon to consider was whether this resolution passed by the two Houses of the Bihar Legislature validly extended the life of the Act. The Federal Court held, Fazl Ali, J., dissenting, that the provision of sec. 1 (3) of the Bihar Act allowing the Act to be extended by a resolution of both Houses was void as it amounted to a delegation by the Bihar Legislature of their power to legislate. That being so, the Federal Court held that no Act existed at the date when orders were made- detaining the detained persons and accordingly disagreeing with the Patna High Court ordered their immediate release. 20. The learned Advocate-General who has appeared on behalf of the Government has conceded that if the cases before us cannot be distinguished from the case before the Federal Court then we must order the immediate release of these detained persons. He has, however, urged strenuously that the cases now before us can be distinguished from the Federal Court case because the terms of the West Bengal Security Act empowering the legislature to extend the life of that Act differ very materially from the terms of the proviso of the Bihar Act. 21. In both the Acts it is provided that the Act shall remain in force for a period of one year from the date of the commencement, although the wording of this provision in each Act differs somewhat. In the Bihar Act the words were "It shall remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement," whereas in the West Bengal Act the words are "It shall, in the first instance, remain in force for a period of one year." 22. Mr. In the Bihar Act the words were "It shall remain in force for a period of one year from the date of its commencement," whereas in the West Bengal Act the words are "It shall, in the first instance, remain in force for a period of one year." 22. Mr. Khaitan suggested that the words "in the first instance" which appeared in the West Bengal Act made a great difference. But it appears to me that there is very little difference in the meaning of the words in the two Acts. When it is stated in the West Bengal Act that "it shall in the first instance remain in force for a period of one year" it clearly means that the Act shall remain in force for a period of one year only unless something more is done. It means that the legislature is only enacting that it shall remain in force for a year. Its further life is problematical and will depend whether a resolution of the legislature is passed or not. It seems to me that the provisions in both Acts relating to their life in the first instance are practically the same and no distinction can be drawn between the two Acts from the slightly different wording. 23. There is, however, considerable difference in the wording of the proviso as to how the Acts are to be extended. In the Bihar Act it is provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the two Houses, namely, the Bihar Legislative Assembly and the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that the Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year. There it is quite clear that the resolution has to be passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council. 24. In the West Bengal Act it is provided that the life of the Act will be extended if a resolution to that effect is passed, before the date upon which the Act would otherwise expire, by the Provincial Legislature. Mr. 24. In the West Bengal Act it is provided that the life of the Act will be extended if a resolution to that effect is passed, before the date upon which the Act would otherwise expire, by the Provincial Legislature. Mr. Khaitan lays great stress on the use of the words "Provincial Legislature" and has urged that all that the proviso to this sub-section provides is that the legislative authority, namely, the Provincial Legislature as defined by the Government of India Act is to extend the life of this Act by a resolution and not by the ordinary procedure of a bill. He has urged that in the Bengal Act there is no delegation of the power to legislate because the resolution must be passed not by some body other than the West Bengal Legislature but by the West Bengal Legislature itself. 25. The language used in the West Bengal Act is different from that of the Bihar Act. But it would appear that the words "Provincial Legislature" in sec. 1 (4) of the West Bengal Act were understood to mean the West Bengal Assembly, because the resolution extending the life of the West Bengal Security Act was passed by the Assembly only and was never agreed to or assented to by His Excellency the Governor. It follows, therefore, that even if the learned Advocate-General was right that the West Bengal Legislature had not delegated its powers but had reserved the right to itself to extend the Act by a resolution, nevertheless the resolution purporting to extend the life of the Act was not the resolution of the Legislature but merely the resolution of the Assembly and it cannot be contended that a mere resolution passed by one component part of the legislature is an act of the Legislature itself. It appears to me, however, that the words "Provincial Legislature" in sec. 1 (4) of the West Bengal Security Act do not mean the "Provincial Legislature" as defined by sec. 60 of the Government of India Act. The words are used loosely and really mean the Legislative Assembly. A resolution, obviously is passed by some body and I do not think that the legislature intended that the resolution referred to in sec. 1 (4) was to be passed by any body other than the Assembly. 60 of the Government of India Act. The words are used loosely and really mean the Legislative Assembly. A resolution, obviously is passed by some body and I do not think that the legislature intended that the resolution referred to in sec. 1 (4) was to be passed by any body other than the Assembly. Part VI of the West Bengal Legislative Rules, 1947, deals with resolution and a perusal of this part of the Legislative Rules makes it clear that resolutions are to be passed not by the legislature, i.e., the Governor and the Legislative Assembly but only by the Assembly. It is a form of procedure prescribed only for the Legislative Assembly and is not a procedure which can be followed by the Provincial Legislature, i.e., the Governor and the Provincial Assembly to enact a piece of legislation. 26. If, on the other hand, the words "Provincial Legislature" mean "Legislature" as defined by sec. 60 of the Government of India Act, then, as I have said, there was no resolution of the Legislature extending the Act, but only a resolution of the Assembly. 27. Mr. Khaitan contended that legislation could be validly enacted in West Bengal by a resolution passed in the Assembly. He contended that secs. 73, 74, etc., of the Government of India Act were not exhaustive and that legislation could be enacted by other means. He referred to sec. 84 of the Government of India Act which empowers a Chamber of a Provincial Legislature to make rules for the conduct of business and he referred us to the West Bengal Legislative Rules already referred to. Part VI of these Rules deals with resolutions and the learned Advocate-General contended that by these Rules laws could be enacted by resolution. It is quite clear to my mind from a perusal of these Rules that enactment of legislation was never contemplated by mere resolution. These resolutions are to be in the form of a declaration of the opinion of the Assembly and a resolution when passed merely expresses the opinion of the Assembly and that can never amount to the enactment of a piece of legislation. These resolutions are to be in the form of a declaration of the opinion of the Assembly and a resolution when passed merely expresses the opinion of the Assembly and that can never amount to the enactment of a piece of legislation. At most, a resolution could only express the opinion of the Assembly that the West Bengal Security Act should be extended for one year, but the expression of such an opinion would not, by itself, extend the life of the Act for one year. In my view these Rules of procedure do not contemplate the enactment of legislation in a manner other than in conformity with the provisions of the Government of India Act. 28. In any event, the learned Advocate-General contended that the decision of the Federal Court in no way compelled this Court to hold that delegating power to extend the life of an Art was the delegation of legislative power. The learned Advocate-General had to concede that there were observations in the judgment of Kania, C.J., and Mahajan and Mukherjea, JJ., to the effect that extending the life of a statute was a legislative Act and the power to do so could not be delegated. The learned Advocate General, however, contended that these observations were unnecessary for the decision of the case and therefore should be regarded by this Court as purely obiter and not followed. It appears to me that since the Federal Court has become the Supreme Court of this land even dicta must be followed unless there is very good reason for not doing so. It is the duty of the Supreme Court of the land to lay down the law and to state the principles of law applicable and such must be followed by inferior Courts. 29. However, in the present cases it is quite clear that the observations of these learned Judges are not obiter but on the contrary they clearly intended to hold that the delegation of a power to extend an Act was delegation of legislative power which was not permissible. The learned Advocate-General has stressed that in the Bihar Act the power to extend the Act was coupled with a power to modify the Act and there is no doubt that the learned Judges of the Federal Court laid stress on this power to modify. The learned Advocate-General has stressed that in the Bihar Act the power to extend the Act was coupled with a power to modify the Act and there is no doubt that the learned Judges of the Federal Court laid stress on this power to modify. They stated that modification of an Act clearly involves the power to legislate. This, the learned Advocate for the Bihar Government appeared to concede. But he contended that the power to extend the Act and the power to modify the Act could be severed and though the power to modify the Act by a resolution might be held to be bad, nevertheless the power to extend could be held to be good and the Bihar Assembly and Council had only extended the Act and had not modified it in any way. The three learned Judges to whom I have already made reference rejected this contention and held that the power to extend and the power to modify could not be severed. However, they went on to say that even if the powers could be severed nevertheless the sub-section would have to be held invalid because delegation of a power to extend the Act was delegation of a power to legislate which was not permissible. 30. Kania, C.J., summarised the argument before the Court in these terms:-- It was contended that the power to extend the life of an Act, beyond the prescribed period, was clearly legislative power, and the Provincial Legislature had no power by the proviso to delegate this power to the two Houses of the Legislature of the Province of Bihar so as to extend the life of the Act by their resolutions only. 31. Answering this contention the learned Chief Justice observed:-- The power to extend the operation of the Act beyond the period mentioned in the Act is prima facie a legislative power. It is for the legislature to state how long a particular legislation will be in operation. That cannot be left to the discretion of some other body. 32. The learned Chief Justice then went on to discuss the effect of the provision that the resolution could even modify the Act. He then stated:-- Even keeping apart the power to modify the Act I am unable to construe the proviso, warded as it is, as conditional legislation by the Provincial Government. 32. The learned Chief Justice then went on to discuss the effect of the provision that the resolution could even modify the Act. He then stated:-- Even keeping apart the power to modify the Act I am unable to construe the proviso, warded as it is, as conditional legislation by the Provincial Government. Sec. 1 (3) and the Proviso read together cannot be properly intepreted to mean that the Government of Bihar in the performance of its legislative functions had prescribed the life of the Act beyond one year. For its continued existence beyond the period of one year it bad not exercised its volition or judgment but left the same to another authority which was not the legislative authority of the Province. The proviso is framed in the affirmative form stating that it shall be extended for a period of one year by the Provincial Government on a resolution passed by the two Chambers. I also think that on a true construction of the proviso this power of legislation to extend the life of the Act beyond the first year is not left in the egis-lative body established by the Government of India Act for the Province, but in a different body. For the extension of the Act beyond the first year, the consent of the Governor of the Province is not required under the proviso, while sec. 60 of the Constitution Act makes the Governor an essential part of the Government of the Province in performing its legislative functions. The procedure laid down for the extension of the Act beyond the first year is also different from the procedure prescribed under sec. 73 etc., of the Constitution Act. Applying the principles laid down by the Judicial Committee of th the Pri(sic) Council in The Queen v. Burah L.R. 5 IndAp 178 (1878) and Bussell v. The Queen 7 A.C. 820 (1881) I do not think the extensions of the Act beyond the first year by the Notifications can escape being classed as delegated legislation It is not and cannot be disputed that delegated legislation will be ultra vires. 33. Mahajan, J., expressed the same view. He observed:-- The proviso which has been assailed in this case, judged on the above teat, comes within the ambit of delegated legislation and is thus an improper piece of legislation and void. 33. Mahajan, J., expressed the same view. He observed:-- The proviso which has been assailed in this case, judged on the above teat, comes within the ambit of delegated legislation and is thus an improper piece of legislation and void. To my mind it not only amounts to abdication of legislative authority by Provincial Legislature, it goes further and amounts to setting up a paralled legislature for enacting a modified Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act and for enacting a provision in it that that Act has to be enacted for a further period of one year. A careful analysis of the proviso bears out the above conclusion. 34. Later the learned Judge observed:-- I am further of the opinion that the power given to extend the life of the Act for another year in the context of the language of sec. 1 (3) also amounts to an Act of legislation and does not fall under the rule laid down in The Queen v. Burah L.R. 5 IndAp 178 (1878). The Act in a mandatory form stated that it shall be in force for one year only. That being so the power given in the proviso to reenact it for another year is legislative power and does not amount to conditional legislation. 35. Mukherjea, J., dealing with the same question observed:-- If the intention of the Parliament is that the Governor and the Governor alone could exorcise legislative authority in respect to an excluded or partially excluded area could the Governor delegate his powers to any other external authority and empower the latter to extend the duration of the Act with or without modifications as it considers proper The learned Advocate for the Appellants has contended that the proviso to sec. 1 (3) of the Act amounts to a delegation of the legislative power, to an outside authority and it is ultra vires of the Bihar Provmcial Legislature also. The matter I think may be considered generally for if there is actually any delegation of the legislative powers the clause would be invalid whatever the legislative authority might be. 36. Later, the learned Judge observed:-- In my opinion the validity of the proviso to sec. 1 (3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Pablie Order Act cannot be upheld on the ground of its being a piece of contingent legislation. 36. Later, the learned Judge observed:-- In my opinion the validity of the proviso to sec. 1 (3) of the Bihar Maintenance of Pablie Order Act cannot be upheld on the ground of its being a piece of contingent legislation. It cannot also be supported on the ground that what it delegates is a mere non-legislative function. The duration of a statute is a matter for determination by the legislature itself. From the language of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 1 and that of the proviso, it is difficult to say that the Legislature fixed the duration of the Act at two years from the date of the commencement and left it to the Provincial Government to determine at the and of one year in consultation with the two Houses of the Bihar Legislature whether the Act should be in operation for one year more. If that was the real intention of the Legislature it might have been argued that it was a piece of conditional legislation only. That this was not the intention of the Legislature is, however, clear from the fact that the Provincial Government is authorised to decide at the end of the year not merely whether the Act should be continued for another year but whether the Act itself should be modified in any way or not. 37. These observations of the learned Judges of the Federal Court cannot in my view be regarded as obiter. They were dealing with the question whether a power to extend an Act of Parliament could be delegated. The argument of the learned Advocate-General that they need not have considered this matter cannot I think, be accepted because it had been argued that the powers given in sec. 1 (3) of the Bihar Act were severable. The learned Judges proceeded on the basis that even if they were severable, nevertheless the power to extend the life of an Act could not be delegated because such was legislative power. Further, as I have said, even if these observations were not strictly necessary for the decision of the case, nevertheless I would be bound to follow them as being the observations of the Supreme Court of the land binding on this Court. 38. It follows from this decision of their Lordships of the Federal Court that if sec. Further, as I have said, even if these observations were not strictly necessary for the decision of the case, nevertheless I would be bound to follow them as being the observations of the Supreme Court of the land binding on this Court. 38. It follows from this decision of their Lordships of the Federal Court that if sec. 1 (4) of the West Bengal Security Act means that the Act should be extended by a resolution of the Assembly, then the delegation is one that could not be made and the extension of the Act would be void. On the other hand, if the intention of the Legislature was that the Legislature should extend the life of this Act then quite clearly that has not been done even if legislation can be by resolution because the resolution relied upon for extending this Act for a further period of a year is not the resolution of the Legislature meaning the Governor and the Provincial Assembly, but on the contrary, the resolution of the Provincial Assembly only. 39. It follows, therefore, that no matter what construction is placed upon sec. 1 (4) of the West Bengal Security Act, the Act was not validly extended after it expired on March 12, 1949. As all the detained persons who have applied to this Court were ordered to be detained by orders made after the West Bengal Security Act had ceased to be effective, those orders are null and void and the detained persons must be held to be unlawfully detained. 40. That being so, I would allow the applications in all these cases and direct that the persons detained should be set at liberty forthwith. 41. Let this order be sent down to the Superintendents of the jails forthwith. A certificate under sec. 206 (1) of the Government of India Act is granted. Mitter, J. I agree.