JUDGMENT . Mishra, J. - This is the Defendants' appeal. In the suit which gives rise to it. Shrimati Shanti Devi, Respondent claimed a decree for possesion by demolition of constructions recently built by the Defendant over 3 biswas 4 baswaisi of plot No. 2734A in village sonart(sic) district Sultanpur. A decree to mat effect was obtained on the 27th August 1942, by the Plaintiff's precedes or, Babu Mohammad Musa Khan, taluqdar of Maniarpur estate. The decree was against the Defendants but before it could be executed an eight annas share in the viilage wherein the property in suit lay, was sold by the taluqdar on 7th September, 1942, to Shanti Devi. The decree itself was not assigned and it could not, therefore, be executed by the transferee in view of the provisions of Order 21 Rule 16 Code of CPC which extends the right of execution to an assignee of a decree. It is not available to the assignee of the property covered by the decree - see Hansraj Pal v. Mukharji Kunwar ILR All. 28. Sahib Charan Das v. Ram Chander AIR 1922 All. 98. and Perumal Naidu Vs. Marukrithammal and Others, AIR 1927 Mad 240 . In her plaint, Shanti Devi made a reference to these facts. She averred that the newly built constructions were likely to endanger her proprietary rights; she stated that she could not obtain possession without a fresh decree in her own favour and she prayed that a decree for possession by demolition of the constructions be passed in her favour. 2. The defence consisted of a repetition of almost all the pleas which were taken by Hamid Ali Khan and Basharat Ali Khan in answer to the taluqdar's suit. It also contained a denial of the Plaintiff's sale-deed and challenged her right to maintain a separate suit for possession. It is unnecessary to encumber this judgment by setting out those pleas in detail or to refer to some other defences which were disposed of by the Courts below and do not form the subject-matter of controversy now. The point is on which the dispute now centres was covered by issue No. 5: Whether a second suit in the same cause of action is maintainable as alleged in a para 5 (a) of the plaint. 3. The point is on which the dispute now centres was covered by issue No. 5: Whether a second suit in the same cause of action is maintainable as alleged in a para 5 (a) of the plaint. 3. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff's remedy lay in executing the decree passed in 1942 in favour of Babu Mohammad Musa Khan. 4. The learned Munsif North, Sultanpur, decided the issue for the Plaintiff and decreed the suit. The learned Civil Judge, Fyzabad, up held the decision and dismissed the Defendant' appeal. 5. The Appellants' learned Counsel did not base his argument in this Court on the ground urged on behalf of his clients in the Courts below. He proceeded upon the assumption that the view of law taken in the cases mentioned above is correct. He strongly maintained, however, that the mere fact that the remedy indicated by the Defendants, namely execution of the previous decree after substitution of the transferee's name was not available to the Plaintiff did not entitle her to get over the bar imposed by Section 11 Code of CPC The suit filed by Shanti Devi, it was said, was obviously on the same title; it was in respect of the same subject matter and the Plaintiff claimed under the Plaintiff of the previous suit. It was urged that an assignment of the property in Plaintiff's favour does not create a fresh cause of action or make the matter res integra. 6. The pleadings upon which the Plaintiff's case rested has been set out above. They indicate that the action was of the nature of a suit on judgment. In such a suit the finality of the judgment is not and cannot be questioned; what is sought to be enforced is not the original title but the legal right of the decree holder or the person who claims under him to enforce the judgment and the corresponding obligation of the judgment debtor or his representative to suffer the consequences which arose there from. Such actions are not uncommon in England or India--see Russell v. Smyth (1842)11 L.J. Ex. 308.,Williams v. Jones (1845) 14 L.J. Exl. 145, Hodsoll v. Baxter (1858) 28 L.J.Q.B. 61, Nouvion v. Freeman L.R. 15 A.C.I. Pembaton v. Hughes 1899 LR.I Ch.781., Pritchett v. English Colonial Syndicate (1899)2 Q.B.D.428. and Articles 117 and 122 of the Indian Limitation Act. Such actions are not uncommon in England or India--see Russell v. Smyth (1842)11 L.J. Ex. 308.,Williams v. Jones (1845) 14 L.J. Exl. 145, Hodsoll v. Baxter (1858) 28 L.J.Q.B. 61, Nouvion v. Freeman L.R. 15 A.C.I. Pembaton v. Hughes 1899 LR.I Ch.781., Pritchett v. English Colonial Syndicate (1899)2 Q.B.D.428. and Articles 117 and 122 of the Indian Limitation Act. Section 47 Code of CPC of course precludes the institution of fresh suits between the same parties for determination of question which can be agitated in the course of execution proceedings but in cases where an executable decree becomes Incapable of enforcement at the instance of the person entitled to its benefit and the rights thereunder are not extinguished by satisfaction or otherwise, neither Section 11 nor the principle of res judicata operates as a bar to the maintainability of a suit on judgment. For in such cases though the parties may be the same or they may be persons who claim under them parties of the earlier litigation, there is no identity of title or cause of action (see in this connection the principles underlying the decisions reported in Ramasami alias Palunna Nathan I.L.R.48 Mad. 482. and Dhanrak Singh v. Lakhrani Kunwar L.L.R. 38 All. 509. It was urged on behalf of the Appellants that a suit on a judgment was incompetent because the earlier decree was still executable by Babu Mohammad Musa Khan. Regard being had, however, to the fact that the transferor divested himself of the right to the property covered by the decree; enforcement by him of the decree for possession would obviously be a miscarriage of the property. It would be against the intention of the parties to the sale transaction and, therefore, obviously a fraud upon the transferees. The Plaintiff is as has been stated above precluded by Order 21, Rule. 16 from enforcing the decree which her predecessor claimed and secured in his capacity as owner of the property. There are cases in which an action may be the only mode of enforcement of a judgment or a decree. The procedural law may operate to exclude a transferee from obtaining a remedy by way of execution which his transferor would have got. It cannot however, bar the right of an owner to remain in exclusive possession of the land of which he obtained the assignment --see Manchharam Kalliandas v. Bakshe Shaib (1869) 6 Bom. The procedural law may operate to exclude a transferee from obtaining a remedy by way of execution which his transferor would have got. It cannot however, bar the right of an owner to remain in exclusive possession of the land of which he obtained the assignment --see Manchharam Kalliandas v. Bakshe Shaib (1869) 6 Bom. H.C.R.A. 231 and Annoda Prasad Bannerjee v. Nobo Kissore Roy ILR 33 Cal. 560. 7. On the findings reached by the Courts below the judgment debtors have no legal excuse for refusing to perform the decretal obligation. The Plaintiff cannot obtain its enforcement by recourse to execution. I am satisfied that she is not precluded either by Section 47 or Section 11 of the Code from maintaining the present suit, 8. No other point was pressed at the Bar. I dismiss the appeal with costs.