This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Silcbar, dated 29th November 1946, by which he affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court which had dismissed the plain­tiff's suit un contest against defendant 1 with costs, and with no order as to costs against the other defendants. [2] It appears that defendant 1 had taken a settlement of the land in suit from the plaintiff for a period of 5 years from 1317 B. B. to 1361 B. S. by which defendant 1 had agreed to pay Bs. 50 as rent per annum. At the determination of the lease, the plaintiff served a notice upon defendant 1 asking him to quit the land as he required it for his khas possession. At the expiry of the notice to quit, defendant 1 continued to remain in possession of the land, which compelled the plaintiff to bring the present suit. Defendants 2-7 are the sub-lessees of defen­dant 1. [3] The defence to the suit of defendant 1 was that the notice to quit was not a valid notice, that he was not liable to be evicted because the plaintiff had agreed, by the terms of the lease, to give him an option of renewal of the lease at the determination of the original lease; that he sent a notice to the plaintiff on 2nd April 1945, a few days before the expiry of the period of 5 years, stating that he was prepared to take a fresh settlement in accordance with the terms of the agreement as to renewal. The plaintiff however, ignored the notice and brought the present suit. [4] Upon the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues : (1) Is the answering defendant liable to ejectment ? (2) Is the notice valid? (3) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? [5] The provision as to renewal is in these terms : "After expiry of the first lease, I shall take second lease of these lands by paying proper rent. I shall not be entitled to claim possession of the land without taking settlement. (2) Is the notice valid? (3) To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? [5] The provision as to renewal is in these terms : "After expiry of the first lease, I shall take second lease of these lands by paying proper rent. I shall not be entitled to claim possession of the land without taking settlement. After expiry of the due date, I shall give up possession of the lands without notice." The trial Court came to the conclusion that this provision was intended to give defendant 1 an option of refusal of a fresh settlement and that, as the plaintiff brought the present suit without giving defendant 1 an option of refusal, defen­dant 1 was not liable to be ejected. The lower appellate Court accepted this interpretation of the provision in the lease and affirmed the judg­ment of the trial Court. [6] It is contended by Mr. Ghose for the ap­pellant that the provision upon which the Courts below have relied as a provision intended to give defendant 1 an option of refusal, has been wrongly interpreted ; that the true meaning of the provision is that there was to be a fresh agreement of lease between the parties after the question of proper rent to be paid by defendant 1 was settled between them; that in the absence of a fresh agreement arrived at between the parties, the defendant was to quit the lands in suit; that assuming this provision wag intended to give defendant 1 an option of refusal, the option wag to be given to defendant 1 only in case the plaintiff decided to settle the lands upon some person other than defendant 1; that it was not the intention of the plaintiff to settle the land upon any person. In the course of argu­ments, however, Mr. Ghose conceded that the provision in the lease was intended to give de­fendant 1 an option of refusal. We think the concession was properly made. If the provision was not intended to give defendant Ian option of refusal but was merely intended to make pro. vision for a fresh agreement between the parties at the determination of the lease, we think there was no object in making the provision at all. We think the concession was properly made. If the provision was not intended to give defendant Ian option of refusal but was merely intended to make pro. vision for a fresh agreement between the parties at the determination of the lease, we think there was no object in making the provision at all. [7] As to the alternative contention, namely that the option was to come into force only in the event of the plaintiff exercising his right to give a lease to some other person, the contention was developed in course of arguments. That was not the case of the plaintiff in the plaint or in his evidence. The provision having been made in the lease, it is proper that effect should be given to it as far as possible, and for the purpose of giving effect to it, we have endeavoured to ascertain the intention of the parties. As we have said, if the intention of the parties was that at the determination of the lease by efflux of time, a fresh agreement was to be entered into without any option to defendant 1, nothing would have been easier than to have said nothing at all in the lease as regards settlement of the lease after the expiry of its term. Defen­dant 1 undoubtedly understood the material pro­vision as giving him the right to ask for a renewal of the lease for he sent to the plaintiff a notice in writing in this behalf some 10 days before the determination of the lease. The plain-tiff ignored the notice; he did not say that de­fendant 1 had no right to ask for a renewal of the lease. It is true that the material provision was capable of being more appropriately worded. For instance if instead of being worded 'on the expiry of the term I shall .take second settle­ment of the said land at proper rent" it had been worded 'on the expiry of the term, I shall nave the option to take second settlement of the said land at proper rent,' no difficulty would have arisen in ascertaining the intention of the par­ties. Even so, we think the intention of the par­ties was clear enough and we need not dilate on this aspect of the casa in view of the concession made by Mr. Ghose. [8] Mr. Even so, we think the intention of the par­ties was clear enough and we need not dilate on this aspect of the casa in view of the concession made by Mr. Ghose. [8] Mr. Sen for the respondents hag draw's our attention to a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Hemanta, Kumari Debi V. Sefatulla Biswas, 37 O. W. N. 9 : U. I. R. (20) 1933 cal. 477), where it was held : "When the original lease contains a renewal clause with no term fixed, and the lessor continues in posses­sion after the expiry of the original terms, the mere fact that the original term has expired, in the absence of any circumstance suggesting a waiver or refusal, ought not, in our opinion, to be regarded as determining the relationship between the parties." Mr. Ghose for the appellant baa sought to dis­tinguish this case from the facts of the case before us by stating that in the Calcutta casa there was an attempt by the plaintiff to grant a lease to persons other than the original lessees, that in this case there was no intention or at­tempt on the part of the plaintiff to settle the land upon a third party. We do not think the .authority of the Calcutta case is necessarily to be confined to cases where the plaintiff intends to give or has given a lease to a third party. If a lessor agrees to a provision in the lease that the lessee will have the option to ask for a rene­wal at the determination of the lease, for a further period, we think the provision must be given effect to without reference to a collateral enquiry as to whether the lessar had leased or intended to lease the same property to a third person. [9] In a case reported in Secretary of State v. Digambar Nanda, 27 C. L. J. 413 ; (A. I. R. (6) 1919 Gal. [9] In a case reported in Secretary of State v. Digambar Nanda, 27 C. L. J. 413 ; (A. I. R. (6) 1919 Gal. 620), the covenant was in these terms : "If you agree to pay the enhanced rent which will be fixed at the time of re-settlement in future, the Government will have the right to settle with you, and if you decline, with some other person." Mooherjee J., in course of his judgment ob­served : "There can be no room for reasonable doubt that the clause in the lease set out above embodied in essence a covenant for renewal In the absence of such a clause, the grantor would have been at liberty, on the expiry of the term of the lease, to settle the land on any terms with any person he might choose ; hence, if the construction were accepted that the clause was intend­ed merely to reserve liberty to the Government to make a re-settlement with the lessee at enhanced rent, it would be obviously superfluous. It is not necessary for our present purpose to determine whether, notwith­standing this clause in the lease, the Government might not, on the expiry of the term, decide not to settle the lands with anybody. This much is plain that if the Government did decide to re-settle the lands, the first offer would have to be made to the settlement-holder whose term had expired and a settlement would have to be made with him if he should agree to pay the enhanced rent ; in other words, ha had the option of refusal " [10) We think the observations of Mookerjea J., effectively dispose of the contentions raised by Mr. Ghose for the appellant. [11] In this view, we think the decision of the lower appellate Court was right arid we Bee no reason to interfere in the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.