JUDGMENT : K. Sankaran, J. First defendant has preferred this appeal against the lower court's order dismissing his objections to the execution petition No. 56, dated 18th Vrischigam 1121 filed by the decree-holders. In the lower court's order it is stated that when the 1st defendant's objection came on for hearing two points alone were pressed on his behalf and accordingly the lower court has considered those two objections only. We do not see any reason to doubt the correctness of the fact as stated by the lower court and hence we propose to deal only with the two points which were pressed by the first defendant in the lower court. 2. The first and the most important objection raised by the first defendants-appellant is that the decree in the case is a nullity and that as such it should not be allowed to be executed. Plaintiff's suit was for recovery of money due to them under a chitty hypothecation bond which had been executed by the first defendant in respect of the plaint items. The decree in the case was passed in accordance with the terms of the compromise petition filed by the parties. Plaintiffs have taken out execution for recovery of the lump amount as stipulated in the decree on the ground that the first defendant has committed default in the due payment of the instalment. The first defendant now contends that item No. 2 in the decree is Kandukrishi land and that the suit could not be entertained without the required Government sanction. S. 8 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1100) insists on the production of such sanction in respect of suits relating to Kandukrishi lands. The section lays down that no civil court shall take cognisance of any suit relating to Kandukrishi lands unless the plaint is accompanied by an order of Government permitting the plaintiff to seek redress in a civil court. The plaintiffs had no case that such sanction had been produced in the present case. The question therefore is whether for reason of the non-production of the required Goverment sanction the compromise decree passed in the case can be said to be a nullity. The non-production of the Government sanction can at the worst affect the decree as against item No. 2 only. The question therefore is whether for reason of the non-production of the required Goverment sanction the compromise decree passed in the case can be said to be a nullity. The non-production of the Government sanction can at the worst affect the decree as against item No. 2 only. The decree as against the other items and the first defendant, would even then remain valid and it could be enforced. Regarding that portion of the decree the first defendant's objection is clearly unsustainable. 3. Normally the executing court cannot go into the validity of the decree, but has to take the decree as it is and enforce it. This is particularly so when the decree is one which was passed on the consent of the parties. But this rule is subject to one exception. Where it is shown that the decree is a mere nullity in so far as it was passed by a court having no jurisdiction to pass such a decree, the executing court can refuse to enforce it. In the present case the sanction required by S. 8, Civil Procedure Code was not before court when it passed the decree against the plaint items including Kandukrishi lands. Can it be said that there was a total absence of jurisdiction to the court to pass such a decree? S. 8, Civil Procedure Code, prima facie indicates that the court would get jurisdiction to entertain a suit in respect of Kandukrishi lands only when the required sanction is produced. But in construing the scope of this section it has been ruled in a series of cases that the sanction insisted on in S. 8, Civil Procedure Code, is only intended to protect the rights and interests of the Crown in respect of Kandukrishi lands and that though a decree passed without such sanction will not bind the Crown it will be valid as between the parties to it. In Mohamed Kunju v. Asan Sahib 18 T.L.R. 157 the validity of a court sale of Kandukrishi lands held in execution of a decree which had been passed without the required Government sanction, came up for consideration and it was held that if the lands sold are really Crown lands, the proceedings taken will not bind the Crown, though as between the parties to the decree such proceedings have to be accepted as valid. In Perumal Joshua v. Krishna Pillai Kauli Pillai 33 T.L.R. 240 it was ruled by a Full Bench that the rights of a tenant of Kandukrishi land to the improvements effected by him on such land are attachable and saleable in execution of a decree against such tenant and S. 7(a) of the Civil Procedure Code (corresponding to present S. 8) is no bar to such attachment and sale and that this section does not apply to execution proceedings. The decision in Rajangam Iyer v. Umbichi Aiysha Veevi 43 T.L.R. 466 is also to the same effect and it was ruled there that a vesting order under S.16 of the Insolvency Act could be passed in respect of Kandukrishi lands in the possession of the insolvent even without obtaining any sanction from the Government. The view consistently taken in all these cases is that the effect of S. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code (S. 7(a) of the prior Code) is not completely to oust the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the interests of the tenant of the Kandukrishi land in respect of such lands. In Madhavan Pillai v. John 1947 T.L.R. 551 it was ruled that the prohibition under S. 8, Civil Procedure Code, cannot be invoked after the decree has been passed. It was further ruled that the decree passed is not without jurisdiction so as to make it a nullity and that as between the parties to the decree it can be enforced. We see no justification for deviating from such a view taken in a long current of decisions, and hence we accept the principle underlying these rulings and uphold the finding of the lower court that the decree in this case cannot be ignored and treated as a nullity even in respect of item No. 2. All the same it cannot be said that the first defendant's objection to the execution of the decree against item No. 2 is unstenable. S. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code as it stands amended by Act XXV of 1121, governs this proceedings also. In thus amending the section the point raised in the earlier rulings already referred to that the section as it stood was no bar to execution proceedings being taken against Kandukrishi lands, has been met by the legislature. S. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code as it stands amended by Act XXV of 1121, governs this proceedings also. In thus amending the section the point raised in the earlier rulings already referred to that the section as it stood was no bar to execution proceedings being taken against Kandukrishi lands, has been met by the legislature. The amended section reads as follows:- "No civil court shall take cognizance of any suit or execution proceedings relating to .............. Kandukrishi lands ............... or to any benefit arising out of such lands, unless the plaint or execution application is accompanied by an order of Our Government permitting the plaintiff or the decree-holder to seek redress in Civil Courts". In view of this mandatory provision it is clear that in spite of the decree in this case the decree-holder has to produce the required Government sanction before he can be allowed to take out execution against the Kandukrishi land included in the decree and we hold accordingly. To this extent the first defendant's objection is allowed. 4. The next point raised on behalf of the appellant is that the decree is invalid in so far as it has included in it matters which were not involved in the suit. This objection is based on Cl. 2 of the compromise decree. Out of the amount that had been mentioned in the plaint hypothecation bond a portion had been attached and sold by another creditor of the first defendant. That creditor subsequently obtained the decree in O.S. 267 of 1112 of the Alleppey Munsiff's Court for recovery of that amount. In the compromise entered into by the plaintiffs and the first defendant in the present case it was agreed that the decree amount in O.S. 267 of 1100 will be paid off by the first defendant within a period of three months and in case of default he would be liable to pay that amount also to the plaintiffs as part of the decree amount in the case. It is this agreement that is embodied in Cl. 2 of the decree. The question is whether the court acted without jurisdiction in passing such a decree. The provision regarding the passing of a decree based on a compromise entered into by the parties is contained in R. 3 of O. 23 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is this agreement that is embodied in Cl. 2 of the decree. The question is whether the court acted without jurisdiction in passing such a decree. The provision regarding the passing of a decree based on a compromise entered into by the parties is contained in R. 3 of O. 23 of the Civil Procedure Code. That rule lays down that "where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise ......., the court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit." Admittedly there has been a compromise and adjustment of the plaint claim in the present case and there is no case that there was anything unlawful or illegal about the compromise. Hence the court was justified in recording the compromise and in passing a decree on the basis of it. O. 23, R. 3 makes a clear distinction between the compromise agreement and the decree to be passed on the basis of that agreement. The agreement may embody in it matters which are extraneous or foreign to the scope of the suit. All the same the agreement as such has to be recorded by the court but the decree to be passed on the basis of that agreement shall be confined to that portion of the agreement which relates to the suit. It is significant to note that the direction is "to pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit." The expression "so far as it relates to the suit" clearly indicates that the decree need not strictly be limited to the claim involved in the suit. Other matters which may have a direct bearing on the claim in the suit can also be taken into account in adjusting and compromising the claim and in such cases the compromise can be said to have dealt with matters relating to the suit. But where a compromise comprises matters unconnected with the suit, the court may recite the compromise as a whole in the decree but has to restrict the operative part of the decree to those terms of the compromise which relate to the suit. The ruling in Hemanta Kumari v. Devi. But where a compromise comprises matters unconnected with the suit, the court may recite the compromise as a whole in the decree but has to restrict the operative part of the decree to those terms of the compromise which relate to the suit. The ruling in Hemanta Kumari v. Devi. Midnapore Zamindari Company A.I.R. 1919 P.C. 79 is to that effect. This ruling was followed in Vishnu. v. Ramachandra 34 Bombay Law Reporter 840 where it was held that the operative part of the decree relating to the subject matter of the suit dealt with in the compromise can be enforced by way of execution while the agreement as to matters extraneous to the suit has to be enforced in a separate suit. The question whether any portion of the compromise relates to the subject matter of the suit has to be decided with due reference to the frame of the suit, the relief claimed in it and the relief allowed as a result of the adjustments made by common agreement. The manner in which the different parts of the relief agreed upon are connected with one another will have a great bearing in determining the question whether any portion of the relief is within the scope of the suit. These general tests were laid down in Govinda Chandra Pal v. Dwaraknath Pal. I.LR. 35 Cal. 837 at 841. That was a suit for recovery of money due on accounts and in the compromise it was provided that in default of payment of the agreed amount in specified instalments the plaintiff will be at liberty to realise the whole amount as a charge on the immovable properties scheduled to the compromise petition. It was held that as hypothecation of the immovable property in the consent decree was the consideration for the time allowed for payment of the decree amount in instalments and as it was an integral and necessary part of the adjustment of the claim in the suit, the hypothecation clause was properly inserted in the consent decree and the court did not act against the provisions of S. 375, Civil Procedure Code (present O. 23, R. 3), in allowing its insertion. In the present case also the adjustment made in Cl. In the present case also the adjustment made in Cl. 2 of the decree in respect of O.S. 267 of 1112 of the Alleppey Munsiff's Court is undoubtedly an integral and necessary part of the scheme of the compromise by which the plaint claim was agreed to be adjusted and satisfied in a particular manner. As already pointed out, the suit itself was based on a chitty hypothecation bond and the amount covered by the decree in O.S. 267 of 1112 represented part of the amount reserved under the bond. The settlement of the claim under the decree in O.S. 267 of 1112 also in the present compromise cannot be said to be a matter extraneous to the subject-matter of the suit. On the other hand, it was also a matter clearly relating to the suit and hence the court was perfectly justified in incorporating Cl. 2 of the compromise petition also in the decree in the case. The first defendant who is a party to the decree is therefore not entitled to object to the enforcement of Cl. 2 of the decree also in the present execution proceedings and we hold accordingly. 5. Lastly it was contended on behalf of the appellant that all the amounts deposited by him in this case have not been given credit to in the execution petition. It is only a matter to be rectified by verification of the relevant records. Mistakes or omissions in the calculation made in the execution petition will be directed to be rectified on the execution court being satisfied with the existence of such mistakes or omissions. 6. In the result this appeal is allowed only to the extent that the Kandukrishi land involved in the decree will be allowed to be proceeded against in execution only on production of the Government sanction as required by S. 8, Civil Procedure Code, as indicated in paragraph 3 of this judgment and to the extent of the rectification of the mistakes, if any, in calculating the decree amount remaining due to plaintiffs. In other respects this appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties will bear their respective costs of the appeal. Appeal partly allowed.