JUDGMENT Seth, J. - This is an appeal by a Plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption. The suit was defended by the vendee inter alia on the ground that before the institution of the suit he had obtained indefeasible title to some property by means of a deed of exchange, according to which he had an equal right of preemption with the Plaintiff. The document by which the Defendant vendee claims to have acquired such title is dated January 11, 1945. The suit for pre-emption was instituted on January 25, 1945. So that this document is of a date prior to the date of the institution of the suit. The lower appellate Court has held that the Defendant vendee should be deemed to have acquired the title to the property by reason of which he claims an equal right of pre-emption on the date when this deed of exchange was executed. In this view of the matter the lower appellate Court has dismissed the suit for pre-emption. 2. It is contended before me in this second appeal, that by reason of the provisions of the U.P. Regulation of Agricultural Credit Act (Act XIV of 1940) the Defendant vendee did not acquire any permanent title to this property by means of the deed of exchange dated January 11, 1945, in order to adjudge the merits of this contention, it is necessary to take note of the following dates: The deed of exchange, as already stated, was executed on January 11, 1945, but was not registered on that date nor was it executed with the permission of the Assistant Collector, as required by Section 24 of the aforesaid Act XIV of 1940. The application for permission was granted on March 27, 1945. The deed of exchange was registered on April 11, 1945. The effect of registration on April 11, 1945, was that the deed related, back to the date of its execution, namely, January 11, 1945. 3. The position, therefore, is that this document relates back to a date prior to the date on which permission for a permanent alienation was granted. 4. The effect of registration on April 11, 1945, was that the deed related, back to the date of its execution, namely, January 11, 1945. 3. The position, therefore, is that this document relates back to a date prior to the date on which permission for a permanent alienation was granted. 4. On these facts it is contended, by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff preemptor, that the alienation brought about by the deed of exchange, which is to be deemed to be effective from the date of the execution of the deed, does not operate as a permanent alienation, because it cannot be said that it was made, with the permission of the Assistant Collector. 5. I have been taken through Section 24 of the Act and, in my opinion, the contention of the learned Counsel, that previous permission is needed, is well-founded. There is only one case, provided for in the Act, where an alienation made without the requisite permission may be validated by permission subsequently granted with retrospective effect from the date of the alienation, and that is the case provided by Section 26 of the Act. For the application of Section 26 of the Act, it is necessary that there should be a report by a Tehsildar, before whom proceedings Under Sections 34 and 35 of the U. P. Land Revenue Act are taken, to the Assistant Collector, to the effect that the Tahsildar, after making a summary enquiry, has reason to believe that a permanent alienation of protected land has been made otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act. When the record is submitted to the Assistant Collector along with this report and an application is made for permission contemplated by Section 24, it is open to the Assistant Collector to grant such permission, and when such permission is granted the alienation is validated as a permanent alienation from the date when it was made. 6. There being this one express provision in the Act for validating a permanent alienation without the permission of the Assistant Collector, by a subsequent permission, it is to be presumed that the legislature did not intend that subsequent permission in any other case would have the effect of validating a permanent alienation made without the requisite permission. 7. 6. There being this one express provision in the Act for validating a permanent alienation without the permission of the Assistant Collector, by a subsequent permission, it is to be presumed that the legislature did not intend that subsequent permission in any other case would have the effect of validating a permanent alienation made without the requisite permission. 7. In my opinion, therefore, the deed of exchange did not pass such title to the Defendant vendee as would entitle him to defeat the Plaintiff's claim for preemption. 8. This appeal is, therefore, allowed, the decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the case is remanded to that Court, with the direction that after the decision of such points as may have remained undecided, and if all other points have been already decided, then in accordance with the decision of such points, the suit may be finally disposed of by that Court. The Appellant shall get his costs of this appeal. Other costs shall be in the discretion of the lower appellate Court. 9. Permission to file a Letters Patent appeal is asked for and is granted.