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Calcutta High Court · body

1949 DIGILAW 287 (CAL)

Panchanan Mallik and 3 Ors. v. R. Chatterjee

1949-07-04

body1949
JUDGMENT Sen, J. - This application is by the second party and it arises out of an order passed under sec. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts put shortly are these: The first party prayed before the Magistrate for pro ceedings under sec. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stating that the second party were working a factory in such a way as to constitute a nuisance, the nuisance alleged was that there was continual noise day and night and that lead dust was discharged from the outlet pipes and chimneys and other openings in the factory. This lead dust contaminated the air and injuriously affected the health of the people of the locality. The Magistrate passed the usual conditional order which is in these terms: I do hereby direct you to check the discharge of lead dust through openings, outlet pipes and ohimneya or to show cause against this order by 15th June. 1949 2. The learned Magistrate evidently did not take into account the other nuisance alleged, namely, that relating to the production of continuous noise throughout the day and night. 3. When passing this conditional order under sec. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Magistrate also passed a prohibitory order under sec. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in these terms : I further direct you under sea, 142, Criminal Procedure Code to stop work in the factory from 8 p.m. to 5-30 a.m. 4. It is against this last order that this Rule has been obtained. Mr. Basu appearing on behalf of the. second party contends that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction at this stage to pass such an order. His contention is that the order which may be passed under sec. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was merely an ancillary order to be made for an interim prevention of the nuisance complained of. The Magistrate according to him had no authority to pass an order in this comprehensive form. He should have restricted himself to the nuisance which was to be prevented and should not have gone beyond the scope of that nuisance and ordered the second part)' to close their factory. The Petitioners complain that the closing of the factory at night will cause them immense loss. Mr. Sarkar appearing on behalf of the first party referred to the provisions of sec. The Petitioners complain that the closing of the factory at night will cause them immense loss. Mr. Sarkar appearing on behalf of the first party referred to the provisions of sec. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and stated that as the Magistrate had passed the conditional order directing the second party to check the discharge of lead dust, the Magistrate had the right to issue an injunction under sec. 142 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the form in which he has done because by issuing that injunction he was merely directing the Petitioners to refrain from continuing with the alleged nuisance pending the decision of the case. He contended that unless the factory was stopped, there could be no other means of checking the discharge of lead dust. 5. In my opinion the learned Magistrate in passing the order under sec. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has travelled beyond the scope of his jurisdiction. The conditional order related to the checking of discharge of lead dust and to nothing more, and the injunction under sec. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be restricted to the checking of the particular nuisance which was prohibited by the order under sec 133 of the Code. There may be means of checking the discharge of lead dust without stopping the factory for any period. Again, it may be that no lead dust is being discharged from the factory. This latter question will have to be decided when cause is shown. The Magistrate has passed the order under sec. 133 ex parte. He cannot have come to any definite conclusion at this stage that lead dust is actually being discharged from the factory. In these circumstances, it would be quite unfair to direct the second party to close down their factory for any period. I, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate passed under sec. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in its stead I pass the following order: I direct the second party under sec. 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to stop the discharge of lead dust through the outlet pipes, chimneys or other openings in the factory until the determination of these proceedings. The Rule is disposed of in these terms.