This is a revision petition under S. H5, Civil P/C., directed against an order pass­ed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Cachar, on 21st August 1948, by which he set aside the order of the Sadar Munsiff of Silohar and remanded the suit for disposal according to law. [2] The facts material to the petition are these. The plaintiffs Kashbehari Roy, Narendralal Roy and others, brought a suit against the defendant, Prahlad Chandra Roy, for recovery of possession of certain lands and for compensation for their use and occupation. According to the plaintiffs, they had purchased the property in dispute from one Devendranath Roy by a sale-deed, dated 32nd November 1944, at a time when the defendant was a tenant of Devendranath Roy, in pursuance of a compromise decree which Devendranath Roy had obtained in a suit insfcituted by him against the defendant. Under the terms of the compromise decree, the defendant was recognised by D. N, Roy as his tenant for a further period of one year, and the defendant was to vacate the property by the end of 1352 B. 8. The defendant, however, did not vacate the property, as agreed, and continued to remain in occupation. The plaintiffs, who had purchased the property some time before the defendant was to hand over possession to D. N. Roy, served a notice upon the defendant to vacate property. The defendant failed to comply with the notice, whereupon the plaintiffs brought the present suit in the Court of the Sadar Munsiff of Silchar. [3] The plaintiffs valued the suit for the pur­poses of jurisdiction and court fees under 8. 7 (xi) (cc), Court-fees Act. The defendant contend­ed that the suit should have been valued not under S. 7 (xi) (cc) but under S. 7 (v), Court-fees Act. The Sadar Munsiff came to the conclusion that S. 7 (v), Court-fees Act applied for the pur­poses of valuation, and that as the market value of the property was Rs. 8000 to Rs. 10,000 a sum •which exceeded his pecuniary jurisdiction, he returned the plaint for presentation to the pro­per Court. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal against this order. The lower appellate Court agreed with the view of the Sadar Munsiff that s. 7 (v), Court-fees Act applied for the purposes of valuation, but relying upon the authority of a decision reported in Mi. Barkatunnisa Begum v. Mt. The plaintiffs preferred an appeal against this order. The lower appellate Court agreed with the view of the Sadar Munsiff that s. 7 (v), Court-fees Act applied for the purposes of valuation, but relying upon the authority of a decision reported in Mi. Barkatunnisa Begum v. Mt. Kaniza Fatma, A. I. B. (14) 1927 Pat. 140 : (5 Pat 631) it took the view that the valua­tion of the property was to be made on the basis of the right of the defendant to enjoy the property, namely as a tenant, and upon this basis, it held that the plaintiffs had properly valued the subject-matter of the suit, and set aside the order of the Sadar Munsiff and remanded the case to him for disposal according to law. [4] Mr. Dam for the defendant petitioner has contended that the learned Sub-Judge acted •without jurisdiction in remanding the suit to the Sadar Munsiff for trial, that, in any case, he acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction in adopting a basis of valuation not permitted by law, that in view of the provisions of S. 12, Court-fees Act the appeal preferred to the Subordinate Judge was incompetent, and that the learned Subordinate Judge had acted without jurisdiction in enter­taining the appeal. [5] For a proper appreciation of the conten­tions raised by Mr. Dam, it is necessary to set out the terms of the compromise decree passed in the suit instituted by Narendranatb Roy against the defendant shortly before the plain­tiffs' purchase of the property in dispute. The compromise decree is in these terms : "1. That the defendant would pay to the plaintiff rent up to Aawin 1351 B S. at Bs. 400 per year and from Kartik 1351 B.S. up to the end of 1352 B. S. at the rate of Ba. 482. 2. That the plaintiff will get the rent of the room occupied by Mitra Singh and the defendant would get the rent of the room occupied by Adhar Pal. 3. That the plaintiff would pay the Municipal tax. 4. That the defendant has spent Rs. 34-14-0 for repair of the house which will be deducted from the rent due to the plaintiff up to Aswin 1351 B.S. and the defendant would pay the rent due to the plaintiff up to Aswin 1351 B.S. by the month of Kartik. 5. 3. That the plaintiff would pay the Municipal tax. 4. That the defendant has spent Rs. 34-14-0 for repair of the house which will be deducted from the rent due to the plaintiff up to Aswin 1351 B.S. and the defendant would pay the rent due to the plaintiff up to Aswin 1351 B.S. by the month of Kartik. 5. That the plaintiff will repair the house within the month of November and if he fails to do that within that period, then the defendant will bring it to the notice of one of the arbitrators, Bai Bahadur Bukmini Kumar Das, and according to his advice, coat of the repairs would be deducted from the rent. (6) That the plaintiff will bear the cost of Bs, 67-2-10 pies incurred by the defendant in erecting the fencing in the rear and that would be deducted from the rent of 1352 B. S., but the defendant would repair the same up to Chaitra 1352 B. S. He will not raise any new fencing ; if he does so, the defendant will do so at his own cost and responsibility. (7) That the defendant would give up possession o£ the hired house within Chaitra 1352 B. S." [6] From para. 1 of the decree, it is clear that there was a fresh lease given by Me. Roy to the defendant from Kartik 1351 B. S. to the-end of 1352 B. s. at BS. 482 per annum, and ac­cording to para. 7 of the compromise decree, the defendant was to give up possession of the pro­perty at the end of 1352 B. S. Mr. Dam for the petitioner has contended that para, 7 of the com­promise decree must be construed as giving Roy a decree for ejectment capable of execution on the expiry of the last day of 1352 B. S , and that when so construed, the relationship of landlord and tenant between Devendranath Roy and the defendant had ceased to exist on the date of the plaintiffs' purchase of the property. [7] In my opinion, paras. [7] In my opinion, paras. 1 and 7 of the com­promise decree must be read together and, when so read, the compromise decree merely created a fresh lease between Roy and the defendant, a lease which was to be determined by efflux of time at the end o£ 1352 B. S. In other words, the relationship of landlord and tenant as between Roy and the defendant continued up to the end of 1352 B. S. It is an admitted position that be­fore the determination of this lease by efflux of time, the plaintiffs purchased the property from Devendranath Roy, and upon their purchase, they came to possess the same rights as Deven­dranath Roy had against the defendant by reason of S. 109, T. P. Act. [8] Mr. Dam has attempted to meet this posi­tion by contending that, the lease purported to be created by the compromise decree being for a term exceeding a year, it required registration, and that in the absence of registration, it cannot be given effect to. That may be conceded. But it is one thing to say that a lease is incapable of being enforced for want of registration and quite another to say that the relationship of landlord and tenant has not been created. The question as to the nature of the defendant's possession, is, in my opinion, very material in determining the applicability of the relevant clause of the Court-fees Act for the purposes of valuation of suits for possession. Conceding that the lease pur­ported to be created by the compromise decree cannot be used in evidence for want of registra­tion, nevertheless the compromise decree can be referred to for the purpose of determining the nature of the defendant's possession. In Sunchibala v. Suruj Mia, 46 0. w. N. 419, Pal Ji referred to the case of Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, 46 LA. 285: (A.I.B. (6) 1919 p. 0. 44) and applying the principle underlying that decision, observed that the solehnama be­fore him could be used for the purpose of show­ing that a party was in possession as a lessee although it could not be used for the purpose of showing that it was a permanent lease. [9] The legal character of an assignee vis-a­vis the tenant of the assignor came up for con­sideration before the learned Judges of the Madras High Court. [9] The legal character of an assignee vis-a­vis the tenant of the assignor came up for con­sideration before the learned Judges of the Madras High Court. In G. A. S; Shanmuga Nadar v. P. S. P. Kandasami Nadar, A. I. E. (24) 1937 Mad. 91: (168 I. C. 462), whore A had brought a suit for ejectment of a tenant and for possession stating that he was the assignee of the landlord, that the lease was terminated by the assignor and that he had given notice to the defendant to quit, it was held "that the plaintiff was invested with all the rights of the assignor in respect of the tenancy under S. 109, T. P. Act. The claim in the plaint was a landlord to recover possession of land from the tenant holding over and, as such, the suit fell within S. 7, Cl. (xi) (cc), •Court-fees Act." [10] Mr. Dam for the defendant has sought to distinguish this case by pointing out that in the case before me the plaintiffs had alleged in the plaint that the defendant was a trespasser. That no doubt is true, but having regard to the •proved facts, the plaintiffs' description of the defendant as a trespasser must be regarded as clearly erroneous in the sense that it was mis­conceived. It is common ground that the plain­tiffs are the vendees of Devendranath Boy and acquired title to the property during the continuance in possession of the defendant. Whether the defendant's possession was that of a trespas­ser or of a lessee might be a mixed question of law and fact. In my opinion, however, it is established that the defendant's possession was that of a lessee. The plaintiffs' suit, therefore, in substance, was a suit by a landlord against a tenant holding over. To such a suit; the provi­sions of S. 7, Cl. (xi) (cc), Court-fees Act are applicable. [11] Me. Dam next relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Gobinda Ham Agarwala v. Dulupada Datta, 32 C. w. N. 1113 : (A. I. B. (15) 1928 cal. 753), but that decision was disapproved in Gobinda Kumar v. Mohinimohan, 57 cal. 349 : (A. I. B. (17) 1930 Cal. (xi) (cc), Court-fees Act are applicable. [11] Me. Dam next relied upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Gobinda Ham Agarwala v. Dulupada Datta, 32 C. w. N. 1113 : (A. I. B. (15) 1928 cal. 753), but that decision was disapproved in Gobinda Kumar v. Mohinimohan, 57 cal. 349 : (A. I. B. (17) 1930 Cal. 42), where it was observed that it would be disastrous if the law was that a landlord would have to bring a suit for declaration of title and possession whenever the tenant ref used to vacate. It may be that a suit for a declaration of title as landlord and recovery of possession is govern, ed by 8. 7, cl. (v), Court-fees Act. The suit before me is not a suit for declaration of title as landlord and for recovery of possession, but a suit for recovery of possession and compensation for use and occupation. Mr. Dam has referred me to the case of Batilal Manilal v. Chandulal Chhotalal, A. I. B. (84) 1947 Bom. 482 : (49 Bom. L. B. 552). But that was a case in which the plaintiff had brought a suit against a licensee, and it was held that the court-fee payable in respect of such a suit was under S. 7 (v) (e), according to the market value of the house. In the case before me, the suit is not against a licensee but against a tenant holding over. [12] It may be conceded that the view of the lower appellate Court, namely, that the subject-matter of the suit in this case was the plaintiffs' right to eject the defendant was erroneous, but in effect its decision amounts to this that the suit was properly valued for the purposes of jurisdiction and court-fees, in accordance with S. 7 (xi) (cc), Court-fees Act. I do not think the decision in the case of Sellammal v, Jothimani Nadar and others, A. I. B. (23) 1936 Mad. 411 : (161 I. C, 679), is an impediment to the view I have taken of the facts of this case. In the Madras case, the suit was not a suit by an assignee of the landlord against the assignor's tenant. Mr. 411 : (161 I. C, 679), is an impediment to the view I have taken of the facts of this case. In the Madras case, the suit was not a suit by an assignee of the landlord against the assignor's tenant. Mr. Ghose for the plaintiffs has drawn my attention to the following observations of Varadaohariar J. in that case : "The point having been decided by the lower Court in plaintiff's favour I should ordinarily have declined to interfere in revision but for the fact that it hag been held by a Bench of this Court in Kalliya Pillai v. Bamaswami Filial, 119 I. C. 35 : (A. I. K. (16) 1929 Mad. 396), that where the decision on the court-fee question also bears upon the valuation of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction and the suit may have to be filed in a higher Court if the court-fee question should be decided in a different way, this Court is justified in interfering in revision." With respect, I am inclined to take the view that where the question of court-fees has been decided by the lower Court in favour of the plaintiff, the High Court in revision should ordinarily decline to interfere. The view of the lower appellate Court as to the meaning of the expression 'subject-matter' with reference to the facts of this case might be erroneous, but it has, in my opinion, correctly come to the conclusion that, on the facts of this case, the suit, for all practical purposes, must be regarded as one within the purview of S. 7, Cl. (xi) (cc), notwith­standing the allegation made in the plaint that the defendant was a trespasser, an allegation made by the plaintiffs, in all probability, in ignorance of their legal rights. [13] Mr. Dam next relied upon S. 12, Court-fees Act contending that the decision of the Sadar Munsiff was final as between the parties to the suit and that the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The right of appeal against an order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court is given by the Civil Procedure Code. It was in pursuance of that right that the plaintiffs preferred an appeal against the order of "the Sadar Munsiff. The right of appeal against an order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court is given by the Civil Procedure Code. It was in pursuance of that right that the plaintiffs preferred an appeal against the order of "the Sadar Munsiff. The Sadar Munsiff returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court because, in his opinion, the court-fee was payable not in accordance with S. 7 (xi) (cc) but in accordance with S. 7 (v), Court-fees Act. In other words, the learned Sadar Munsiff gave a decision as to the category in which the plaintiffs' suit fell and, as a result of that decision, the learned I Sadar Munsiff took the view that the suit was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction and according­ly returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court, Such a decision is not a decision j to which the provisions of S. 12, Court-fees Act apply. [14] In the view I take of the plaintiffs' case, there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge reman­ding the case for trial by the Sadar Munsiff according to law, holding that the suit was pro­perly valued. The basis which he adopted for the purpose of valuation, namely, that the sub­ject-matter of the suit was the plaintiffs' right to eject, was no doubt erroneous, .but having regard to the fact that the suit was properly valued as one falling within the purview of S. 7 (xi) (cc), the result is the same, namely, that the suit, as brought, was properly valued, and was within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Sadar Munsiff. [15] The result is that the revision application is dismissed with costs. Revision dismissed.