JUDGMENT Radcliffe, J. - These are two appeals from the High Court of Judicature Patna. They have been consolidated and the central point upon which appeals turns is the same: which of the parties is to be treated as the lawful owner of the piece of property in dispute? That piece of property is a four annas undivided share out of a fourteen annas partitioned share of an estate Called Touzi No. 7893 in mauza Awari, pargana Lautan, district Darbhanga, and it is hereinafter referred to as ''the disputed property." 2. The two suits out of which the appeals arise were respectively a partition Suit (No. 89 of 1932) filed by the Appellant on 16th September, 1932, and a Title Suit (No. 72 of 1933)filed by the Respondents in the second appeal on 7th November, 1933. The Appellant, who is the Mahanth of a Math or A thal called the Birpur Asthal. sought by the partition suit to obtain a declaration of his title to the disputed property and an order for partition of the lands of which that property was an undivided share. He was met by a defence on the part of those Respondents who formed the Defendants first party to his suit to the effect that on various grounds, some of which will be noticed later, he had no title to the disputed property. These Respondents were the Mahanth and the Deicies acting through the Mahanth) of another Math or Asthal known as the Pokrauni Asthal and it was they who instituted the title suit in which they asked for a declaration against the Appellant that the disputed property is devotear(sic) property of the Pokrauni shall and that the Appellant had no riqht to any interest in it. As it is plain that the real question at issue is, to which of these two religious institutions does the disputed property belong it will be convenent to use the term Respondents to refer to the Respondent Mahanth Ram Kirpal Das and the Idols Sri Thakurji, Ramji, Lachmanji and anlcji.(sic) 3. In their Lordships view, as will appear later, the Appellant has a good defence to the title suit under the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) as subsequently amended, and, although other grounds of appeal were argued before them it is upon this ground that they think that the appeals should be allowed. In their Lordships view, as will appear later, the Appellant has a good defence to the title suit under the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) as subsequently amended, and, although other grounds of appeal were argued before them it is upon this ground that they think that the appeals should be allowed. So much of the narrative of the complicated history of this case as follows is recorded therefore in order to explain how the question of limitation arises lather than to give any comprehensive account of the various issues in the suits. 4. The Appellant's claim to the disputed property comes through his predecessor as Mahanth of the Birpur Asthal, one Priya Das. In the year 1910, Priya Das had lent 500 in maunds of grain to the then Mahanth of the Pokrauni Asthal, Damodar Das. The loan was not repaid and on l6th May, 1913, Priya Das obtained a decree against Damodar Das in the Court of the Munsiff at Muzaffarpur ordering Damodar Das to pay him the sum of Rs. l,562-8-0/-, the monetary equivalent of the loan, together with costs and interest. This was followed by a sale of the disputed property at public auction in execution of the decree. Priya Das was himself the purchaser, and on 6th April,1915 he received the usual Court certificate confirming his purchase. One of the question that was in issue in the present suits was the question whether this loan of 500 maunds was for any "justifying necessity" of the Pokrauni Asthal itself. The reevance of the enquiry was that, had the loan been made for any such necessity, the disputed property, even if it did belong to the Asthal, instead of being the private property of the Mahanth, would have been validly disposed of by an execution sale pursuant to the decree for payment of the value of the loan. The Subordinate Judge, after reviewing the evidence, decided that Damodar Das did not "run into the debt in question for any justifying necessity of the Asthal." On appeal the High Court expressed their agreement with the trial Court on this finding. The Subordinate Judge, after reviewing the evidence, decided that Damodar Das did not "run into the debt in question for any justifying necessity of the Asthal." On appeal the High Court expressed their agreement with the trial Court on this finding. The Appellant sought to challenge the High Court's decision on this point: but in their Lordships' view there are concurrent findings of fact in the two Courts without any apparent misapplication of the relevant law to those facts, and, that being so, an appeal cannot be entertained on that ground. 5. In the year l9l8 a Suit (No. 1 of 1918) was instituted against Damodar Das in the Court of the District judge at Darbhanga. It was a suit under the provisions of Section 92 of the Code of CPC and in it Rajkumar Das, a farmer claimant to the office of Mahant then held by Damodar Das, and certain other person interested in the proper administration of the Pokrauni Asthal claimed that at Damodar Das ought to be removed from the Mahantship, a new Mahant appointed in his place, and a scheme of administration settled by the Court for the Asthal. It is not necessary to go into the details of these proceedings. In the end, on 16th March 1922, judgment was delivered in the District Court holding that the properties of the Asthal were not devottar and that, accordingly, the Court was not entitled to entertain the suit u/s 92. An appeal from this decision was taken to the High Court, but while the appeal was still pending Damodar Das died, being succeeded in the Mahantship by the present Respondent Ramkirpal Das, and Rajkumar Das abandoned the appeal. 6. The dates of three events incident to this suit should be mentioned. On 10th September, 1918(sic), the Court appointed a receiver of the Asthal properties. On 28th August, 1919, an ex parte decree was made declaring that the Pokrauni Asthal had trust properties and removing Damodar Das from the Mahantship. 7. On 12th September, 1919, Rajkumar Das was appointed, Mahant in his place. These steps in the proceedings were however set aside on appeal to the High 8. Court end the judgment given on the rehearing in the District Court on 16th March, 1922, was inconsistent with the basis on which they were made. It follows that after that judgment Damodar Das must have resumed his Mahantship. 9. These steps in the proceedings were however set aside on appeal to the High 8. Court end the judgment given on the rehearing in the District Court on 16th March, 1922, was inconsistent with the basis on which they were made. It follows that after that judgment Damodar Das must have resumed his Mahantship. 9. While the 1918 suit was in progress the Appellant, who held by that time succeeded Priya Das. instituted a Suit (No. 226 of 1919 in the Court of the Subordinate judge at Darbhanga asking for a declaration of his title to the disputed property (of which Priya Das had apparently been dispossessed) and for possesion, Damodar Das was made a Defendant to this suit, but no other person who could possibly he said to represent the interest of the Pokrauni Asthal. Since Damodar Das had been removed from the Mahantship by Court on 28th August, 1919, Rajkumar Das being installed in his place, and Damodar Das could not have returned to the position of Mahant until the order removing him had been upset, it seems clear that during much, if not all, of the progress of the Suit No. 226 of 1919 there was no party to it who could act on behalf of the Pokrauni Asthal. However that may be, judgment was given in the Suit on 26th June, 1920, declaring that the Appellant was entitled to the disputed property and ordering that he should get possession over it with Damodar Das and another Defendant interested in other undivided shares. An appeal against this judgment was dismissed, and on 23rd September, 1920 the Appellant was given formal possession of the property mentioned in the writ of delivery of possesion" by the officer of the Court. It is difficult to tell from the actual form of the officer's report whether he is certifying that he delivered possession of the property comprised in the whole 14 annas share (Which would be a joint possession of all co owners) or of the undivided four annas share of that property. But, whatever form the delivery itself took, there is no reasonable doubt as to the nature of the possession that the Appellant in fact enjoyed thereafter. 10. But, whatever form the delivery itself took, there is no reasonable doubt as to the nature of the possession that the Appellant in fact enjoyed thereafter. 10. The Appellant based part of his defence in the present suits upon the contention that the Respondent claim that the property in dispute was devottar property of the Asthal was barred by res judicata. The res judicata. he(sic) said, arose out of the decision in Suit No. 1 of 1918 or the decision in Suit No. 226 of 1919. This concention was rejected by the trial Court and by the High Court on appeal. It was relied upon in argument during the appeal before the Board but there Lordships do not find it necessary to express any decided view upon it. They will content themselves with observing that there appear to be for midable difficulties to be surmounted before it could succeed. 11. The question of limitation has now to be dealt with Limitation was an issue both in the partition suit and in the title suit. In both cases the trial Judge held that there was no bar by limitation and, so holding, decided the title suit in favour of the Respondents, since he came to the conclusion that the property in dispute was devottar property of the Pokrauni Asthal and that the execution sale of 1914 had been ineffective to deprive the Asthal of its title to the property. This being his decision as to title, he dismissed the Appellant's partition suit as misconceived. The High Court upheld his view that the title suit was not barred by limitation and that the Pokrauni Asthal was entitled to recover the disputed properly as its own. They did not have before them the question whether the partition suit had been correctly decided not to be barred by limitation. Nor have their Lordships. No argument was placed before them on behalf of the Respondents to this effect, and limitation as a bar to the partition suit needs, therefore, no further consideration. 12. The Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act contains several Articles that might be thought to have an application to the Title Suit The first important question is which is the governing Article. 12. The Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act contains several Articles that might be thought to have an application to the Title Suit The first important question is which is the governing Article. The Subordinate Judge rightly, as their Lordships think, took the view that he was faced with a choice between Article 134(B), which was introduced by amendment in 1929, and Article 144. He decided wrongly, as their Lordships think, in favour of applying Article 134(B). That Article runs as follows: By the manager of a Hindu, Mohammedan or Buddhist religious of charitable endowment to recover possession of immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration Twelve years from the death, resignation or removal of the transferor. 13. Article 144 on the other hand runs: For possession of immovable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specifically provided. Twelve years from the time when the possession becomes adverse to the Plaintiff. 14. Treating the execution sale of 1914 as a transfer by a previous manager for valuable consideration, he held that tha relevant date for the commencement of the bar by limitation was the death of Damodar Das, namely, 13th September, 1922. As the Title Suit was brought in Novmber. 1933, it was, on that basis, within time. The learned Judge also held that, even if Article 144 applied, the period of limitation would not begin to run until the death of the 'Vendor", namely, the occupying Mahant, Damodar Das. He regarded the decision of their Lordships' Board in Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti L.R. 62 IndAp 47 as establishing this. He seems to have thought that in any event adverse possession for the purpose of Article 144 did not begin until Ramkirpal Das succeeded Damodar Das. In the result he considered the only relevant date to be 13th September, 1922. 15. The High Court dealt only briefly with this issue in their judgment. They regarded Mahadeo Prasad Singh's case (supra) as authority for the view that limitation would begin to run from the death of the Mahant and not from the date of alienation. 16. Their Lordships cannot accept that the death of Damodar Das is the commencing date for limitation in this case. No doubt it would be if Article 134 B were to be applied. 16. Their Lordships cannot accept that the death of Damodar Das is the commencing date for limitation in this case. No doubt it would be if Article 134 B were to be applied. But to apply it involves a reading of that Article which would construe the words "transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration" as covering an execution sale under Court process, and the word ''transferor" as extending to the judgment debtor whose land is sold. In their plainly an adverse possession for the purposes of Article 144. 17. If this is so, it follows that when the Title Suit was instituted on 7th November. 1933, the Appellant had been for over 12 years in adverse possession. Consequently the suit must be treated as barred by limitation. If the Respondents are thus precluded from disputing the Appellant's title to his share, it follows that the Partition Suit must succeed. 18. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that, this appeal should be allowed and that the two Decrees of the Additional Subordinate judge at Darbhanga dated 30th June, 1935 and the two Decrees of the High Court at Patna dated 20th March, 1942, should be set aside end that the Respondents should pay to the Appellant his costs in those Courts. In place of these Decrees the Title Suit should be dismissed and the Partition Suit remitted to the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge at Darbhanga with instructions to proceed with the case in accordance with this Judgment. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The Respondents must pay the Appellants costs of this appeal.