JUDGMENT Sen, J. - These three Rules have arisen out of three applications for pre-emption u/s 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act. They have been heard one after the other and this judgment shall govern the three Rules. 2. The facts briefly are these. Five persons, namely, Rasana, Kiranbala, Purna, Muktipada and Chandra were the co-owners in equal shares of a raiyati occupancy holding recorded in khatiyan No. 248 of mouza Ganpur in the district of Birbhum. 3. On October 23, 1946, Kiranbala sold her one-fifth share to the opposite party Mahadeb. The kabala was registered on February 18, 1947. 4. On October 31, 1946, Muktipada sold his one-fifth share to Dwarka, the Petitioner and the kabala was registered on February 5, 1947. 5. On January 3, 1947, Chandra sold his one-fifth share to Mahadeb and the Kabala was registered on January 6, 1947. 6. On May 17, 1947, Mahadeb applied for pre-emption of the share purchased by Dwarka from Muktipada and this was marked Misc. Case No. 78 of 1947. 7. On June 11, 1947, Dwarka made two applications for preempting the share purchased by Mahadeb from Kiranbala and Chandra and these were marked Misc. Case Nos. 92 and 93 respectively of 1947. 8. The three applications were heard together and the learned Munsif rejected Mahadeb's application and allowed both the applications of Dwarka. Mahadeb filed three appeals against those orders, being Misc. Appeals Nos. 129, 130 and 131 of 1947 respectively. The learned District Judge, by one judgment, allowed the three appeals. Thus Mahadeb's application for pre-emption has been allowed and the two applications for pre-emption filed by Dwarka have been rejected. 9. Dwarka has moved this Court and has obtained these three Rules. 10. I may state that no question of limitation has been argued in these Rules and indeed, no such question can arise in the circumstances of these cases, as no notices of the sales were given to the parties and the applications for pre-emption have all been made within three years of the transfers. 11. 10. I may state that no question of limitation has been argued in these Rules and indeed, no such question can arise in the circumstances of these cases, as no notices of the sales were given to the parties and the applications for pre-emption have all been made within three years of the transfers. 11. The argument of learned advocate for the Petitioner is this : Although Mahadeb purchased on October 23, 1946 and Dwarka purchased later on, October 31, 1946, Dwarka's right to preempt Mahadeb has precedence over Mahadeb's right to pre-empt Dwarka, as Dwarka's kabala was registered on February 5, 1947 on a date earlier than February 18, 1947, when Mahadeb's kabala was registered. It was argued that the right to pre-empt arose, not on the date of the execution of the kabala, but on the date of the registration thereof, when the transfer was completed. Reliance was placed for this proposition on three cases, namely, Gobardhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar ILR (1940) Cal. 270; Jatindra Nath De v. Jetu Mahato ILR (1946) Cal. 235 and Debendra Nath Sen v. Ganendra Nath Bera (1948) 53 C.W.N. 107. On this ground it was urged that Dwarka's application for pre-emption, having been registered first, should have been allowed. 12. Next, it was argued that, even if it be held that Mahadeb's kabala, being earlier than that of Dwarka, Mahadeb's right to pre-empt Dwarka accrued earlier than Dwarka's right to pre-empt Mahadeb, nevertheless Dwarka, the subsequent co-sharer by purchase, could pre-empt a prior co-sharer by purchase so long as the application for pre-emption by the subsequent co-sharer by purchase was not barred by limitation. Dwarka could, therefore, pre-empt Mahadeb. -Reliance was placed for this proposition on the case of Hirendra Lal Sarkar v. Kanaklata Choudhurani (1942) 46 C.W.N. 849, 851. 13. On behalf of the opposite party the contentions are as follows : Although Mahadeb's purchase was registered on February 18, 1947 by reason of Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, the purchase will be deemed to have been made on October 23, 1946 which was the date of the execution of Mahadeb's kabala and which, was prior to the date of the execution of Dwarka's kabala and therefore, Mahadeb's right to pre-empt accrued earlier than Dwarka's right and should be given effect to in preference to Dwarka's right. 14. 14. Next, it was argued that Mahadeb, having applied for preemption first, his application should have been decided first. If this had been done, Mahadeb's application to pre-empt Dwarka would be allowed and Dwarik would cease to be a co-sharer by purchase and consequently, his application would have to be dismissed on this ground. 15. Before dealing with these arguments, I propose to set forth certain propositions of law, which, in my opinion, either flow from the wording of Section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act or are established by the case-law regarding pre-emption or arise from well-established general principles. 16. Section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act lays down that a co-sharer tenant of an occupancy holding is entitled to pre-empt a vendee from another co-sharer. There is an exception to this rule and it is this: If the vendee himself is a co-sharer otherwise than by purchase, he cannot be pre-empted. Next, the right to pre-empt is not limited to a co-sharer who is a co-sharer otherwise than by purchase. A co-sharer by purchase has the right to pre-empt a vendee, who is a stranger, or who is himself a co-sharer by purchase, but he cannot pre-empt a co-sharer who is a co-sharer otherwise than by purchase. For the purpose of these Rules, it is enough to bear in mind that one co-sharer by purchase can pre-empt another co-sharer by purchase. This view point has been accepted in the case of Hirendra Lal Sarkar v. Kanaklata Choudhurani (supra). In the present case, both Mahadeb and Dwarka are co-sharers by purchase and each has the right to pre-empt the other. The question for decision will be whose right is to prevail over the right of the other? That is a matter which I shall discuss later. 17. The next proposition I would like to set forth is this : The right to pre-empt a vendee u/s 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not arise until transfer is completed by registration. The date of the registration and not the date of the execution of the kabala is the material date, notwithstanding provisions of Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, which provide that once transfer is registered, the transfer shall take effect from the date of execution : Gobordhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar (supra) and Debendra Naith Sen v. Ganendra Nath Bera (supra). The reason for this view is this : The transfer of a share of an occupancy holding cannot be effected except by a registered instrument and no title would pass to the transferee until registration is effected. He would not be a transferee by purchase till registration took place and there would be thus nothing and no one to pre-empt. Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act has no relevancy. That section deals with the case where the transferor transfers the same property to different persons on different dates and the transfers are registered on different dates in a competition between such transferees, the transferee in whose favour the transfer was executed first will get priority over the others, although he may have registered his transfer later. The section relates to a competition between transferees of the same property. It does not affect the rights of a third party, who is not such a transferee. Now, what would be the position of a co-sharer by purchase who seeks to pre-empt a transferee? Is he permitted to pre-empt the transferee as soon as the transferee's transfer has been registered, although he himself has not perfected the transfer to him by registration? Having regard to the principles laid down in the case of Gobardhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar (supra), I am of opinion he would not. He can only pre-empt, if he is a co-sharer and he is not a co-sharer until he has perfected his title by registration. Thus, as between co-sharers by purchase, there can be no pre-emption until both have completed their title by registation. In the present case, although Dwarka registered his purchase on February 5, 1947, prior to Mahadeb's registration on February 18, 1947, Dwarka could not pre-empt Mahadeb till February 18, 1947, as Mahadeb was not a transferee till then, nor could Mahadeb pre-empt Dwarka before February 18, 1947, because he (Mahadeb) had not become a co-sharer by purchase till that date as he had not completed his title till that date by registering his purchase. 18. The only other proposition of law which need be adverted to is this : One co-sharer by purchase may pre-empt another co-sharer by purchase, even though the transfer in favour of the former is on a later date than the transfer to the latter. In other words, a subsequent co-sharer by purchase may pre-empt a prior co-sharer by purchase. 18. The only other proposition of law which need be adverted to is this : One co-sharer by purchase may pre-empt another co-sharer by purchase, even though the transfer in favour of the former is on a later date than the transfer to the latter. In other words, a subsequent co-sharer by purchase may pre-empt a prior co-sharer by purchase. This is subject to the condition that the subsequent co-sharer purchaser's vendor's right to preempt the prior co-sharer's purchase is not barred by limitation. The reason for this proposition is this : A co-sharer by purchase acquired all the rights of his vendor. One of these rights is the right to pre-empt. This right is not a mere personal right. It is a right exercisable by a co-sharer by reason of his ownership of a share in the tenancy and where the share of the tenancy to which it is attached is transferred, the right goes along with it; Hirendra Lal Sarkar v. Kanaklata Choudhurani (supra). This proposition pre-supposes that the prior co-sharer by purchase stands by and does not exercise his right of preemption first. I shall now deal with the arguments raised in the light of the propositions laid down. 19. The contention on behalf of Dwarka that he has a prior right to pre-empt Mahadeb because his kabala was registered first is not sustainable. I have held that Dwarka could not pre-empt Mahadeb until the latter had perfected his title by registration, that is, until February 18, 1947. On this date, Mahadeb could also pre-empt Dwarka as both kabalas were registered by this time. The result is that Dwarka and Mahadeb's right to preempt each other arose on the same date, that is, February 18, 1947. 20. The second contention on behalf of Dwarka to the effect that, even if Dwarka be considered to be the later co-sharer by purchase, even if Mahadeb be considered the prior co-sharer by purchase, nevertheless he could pre-empt Mahadeb, the prior co-sharer by purchase, does not help Dwarka, as Mahadeb had already applied to pre-empt Dwarka before the latter had done so. Obviously, a later co-sharer by purchase does not take precedence over an earlier co-sharer by purchase. The case of Hirendra Lal Sarkar v. Kanaklata Choudhurani (supra) deals with a case, where the earlier co-sharer by purchase had taken no steps to enforce his right of pre-emption. Obviously, a later co-sharer by purchase does not take precedence over an earlier co-sharer by purchase. The case of Hirendra Lal Sarkar v. Kanaklata Choudhurani (supra) deals with a case, where the earlier co-sharer by purchase had taken no steps to enforce his right of pre-emption. Here Mahadeb had taken steps to enforce his rights before Dwarka had done so. 21. The two contentions urged on behalf of the Petitioner are thus disposed of. 22. The contention on behalf of the opposite party that, by reason of Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act, Mahadeb's right of pre-emption accrued earlier than Dwarka's right is of no substance having regard to the decision in the case of Gobordhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar (supra) where it was held that Section 47 of the Indian Registration Act had no application to a case like this where the purchasers were not purchasers of the same property. 23. The second contention on behalf of Mahadeb, namely, that, as Mahadeb's application for pre-emption was made earlier than Dwarka's application, Mahadeb's right to pre-empt should prevail is of substance. 24. As I have pointed out before, on February 18, 1947, both Mahadeb and Dwarka had the right to apply for pre-emption. Mahadeb applied first to have his right established. Dwarka applied later. Mahadeb had the right to have his right declared, first on the principle vigilantibus non dormientibus lex adjuvat. The court below should have first decided Mahadeb's application and thereafter, considered Dwarka's later two applications. The trial court was wrong in trying the three applications together and consolidating them. It should have disposed of Mahadeb's application first. Now, Mahadeb's application for pre-empting Dwarka should undoubtedly have been allowed, having regard to the facts established and to the propositions of law hereinbefore laid down. If Mahadeb's application is granted, as it should have been, then he would be allowed to pre-empt Dwarka. Once Dwarka was pre-empted he would no longer remain a co-sharer by purchase or otherwise. Once he ceased to be a co-sharer, his right to pre-empt would be extinguished and his applications for pre-emption would have to be dismissed. 25. Having regard to this view of the law, Mahadeb's application for pre-empting Dwarka must be allowed and Dwarka's applications must be dismissed. The decision of the lower appellate Court is, accordingly, upheld and these Rules are discharged with costs.