JUDGMENT 1. This is a Defendant's appeal in a suit for possession of a grove, a house, some trees in front of the house, a clump of trees called "a jungle" and some scattered trees within the abadi of village Dulahdepore. 2. The material facts are as follows: On the 5th of October, 1933, Defendant No. 1 Basant Rai, who was a riaya living in village Dulahdepore, and owner of the properly in dispute, transferred the same by way of gift to his guru Mahant Munish Bakhsh Das, Rajendra Bahadur Singh, Taluqdar brought a suit for possession of the property which was subject of the deed of gift against Basant Rai and his done. The claim was based on the allegation that under the village custom a riaya had no right of alienation in respect of any of these Properties. The claim was decreed by the trial Court in respect of the first three items viz., the grove, the house and the trees in front of the house. With regard to what was described as "the clump of trees" called a jungle and the scattered trees, the learned Munsif held that the custom which applied to groves, to houses in Dulahdepar and to trees which were planted in front of their house by Riayas did not apply to jungle trees or to scattered trees. The claim was accordingly dismissed with regard to these two items. Each party filed an appeal against this decision. Both the appeals were dismissed. The learned Civil Judge of Bara Banki, before whom these appeals came up for consideration, disagreeing with the trial court, held that was called the jungle was not actually so. That they were only scattered trees which were in no way different from other scattered, trees owned by the Defendants. Expecting for this difference in the view of the two Courts, the finding of the trial Courts was affirmed Rajendra Bahadur Singh preferred a second appeal which was heard by a single Judge of this Court. The learned Judge held that if under the Wajib-ul a-z a tenant has no right to transfer groves and trees situated in the house or at the door without the zamindar's permission, a forteori, he could not have any right of transfer in respect of trees which are scattered in the abadi. The learned Judge held that if under the Wajib-ul a-z a tenant has no right to transfer groves and trees situated in the house or at the door without the zamindar's permission, a forteori, he could not have any right of transfer in respect of trees which are scattered in the abadi. The learned Judge further observed: Prima facie everything that grows on the land must belong to the owner of such land unless it is shown to be otherwise by custom or some law in force. The trees in question which consist of 6 mango trees, 2 gular trees, 6 nim trees, 2 jamun trees 2 imli trees, 5 babool trees, 1 pipal and two shisham trees are such as can be of spontane growth, and to my mind the burden of proving that they were planted by the tenant lay upon the Defendants, which they have not discharged. I am therefore, of the opinion that having regard to the finding of the Court below in respect of the property mentioned in sub-paragraphs A, B and C of para. 2 of the plaint, to be consistent it must be held that the custom in the wajibularz is applicable to the remaining property, namely, the clump of trees called the jungle and the miscellaneous scattered trees in the abadi. 3. He accordingly allowed the appeal and decreed the entire claim with costs. Dissatisfied with this decision the Defendant has preferred the present appeal. It may be mentioned that Bajendra Bahadur Singh died since the present appeal was filed and is now represented by Thakur Raghvendra Bahadur Singh, his legal representative. It may further be mentioned that the original done, Mahant Munish Bakhsh Das died while the case was pending in the Court of first appeal, and the name of his legal representative Mahant Dhruva Das Was substituted on the record. It is Mahant Dhruva Das who has preferred the present appeal. 4. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties we are of opinion that the appeal should be allowed. It is well settled that a custom, must be established by clear and unambiguous evidence and the burden of proving the same lies on the party who relies on the custom, Sardat Nisar Ali Khan v. Mst. Fatima Sulan(sic) 68 I.A. 104. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties we are of opinion that the appeal should be allowed. It is well settled that a custom, must be established by clear and unambiguous evidence and the burden of proving the same lies on the party who relies on the custom, Sardat Nisar Ali Khan v. Mst. Fatima Sulan(sic) 68 I.A. 104. It is equally well settled that the custom being in derogation of the general law must be strictly construed, Rajah Velugoti Govinda Krishna Yachendra Bahadur Vaur, v. Raja Rajeshwara Rao AIR 1939 Mad. 614. Nor should a custom be extended by analogy, AIR 1944 62 (Nagpur) and Lala Gulab Chand v. Lala Munni Lal A.I. R. 1941 Oud 230 . Nor can deduce a custom by a process of logical reasoning from another custom; in other words it is not permissible to extend the custom on the ground that something logical follows therefrom (Mullapudi) Rangayya Vs. Emperor, AIR 1935 Mad 3 . 5. In the case before us the Plaintiff based his claim entirely on the custom. It was held by both the Courts below that the custom relied on applied only to a riaya's grove, to his house and to trees which were planted inside the house or in front of the riaya's house on land which is called Sehan darwaza. It was further held that it did not apply to scattered trees. It was franckly conceded by Mr. Akhtar Husain that he could not support the judgment appealed against on the ground relied on by the learned single Judge, namely that for the some of consistency the custom which applied to houses, groves and trees appertaining to the houses should be extended also to scattered trees owned by riayas. He tried, however, to persuade us to hold that taluqdar being the owner of the land, any riaya who claimed any right in trees standing on that land, must show that he had also the right of transfer of such trees otherwise the right of re-entry in case of transfer should be presumed. u/s 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, property of any kind may be transferred, except as provided by that Act, or by any other law for the time being in force. u/s 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, property of any kind may be transferred, except as provided by that Act, or by any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, unless there is shown to exist a custom or some law which prohibits alienation, any person, irrespective of whether he is a riaya or a zamindar, is entitled to transfer the trees owned by him. In the present case there can be no doubt that the scattered trees had all along been in possession of Basant Rai the donor, and his right of ownership of, those trees was never questioned. It was contended by Mr. Akhtar Husain for the Respondent that the right which he possessed was only a limited right. There is no material to support this contention. The whole litigation throughout the three Courts has been fought on the assumption that the scattered trees in respect of which the claim was dismissed by the first two Courts, belonged to Basant Rai. Whether the trees were of spontaneous growth or were planted by Basant Rai was a question which was never agitated, nor was any inquiry directed as to the origin of these. Under the circumstances we must proceed on the basis that the trees belonged to Basant Rai. 6. Reference was made by Mr. Akhtar Husain to the contents of paragraphs 6 and 13 of the wajib-ul-arz. It is unnecessary for us to examine the contents of these paragraphs in detail. It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in either of these paragraphs of the wajibularz which would apply to scattered trees, and we are clear that the custom which is applicable either to houses or to groves or to trees which stand inside the riayas' houses or in their sehan darwaza cannot, merely on the ground of consistency, be extended to scattered trees, 7. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the first appellate Court is restored. The contesting Respondent shall pay the costs of the Appellants in this Court, both before the single Judge and before this Bench.