JUDGMENT Chatterjee, J. - This is an appeal from a judgment and order of Sinha J. dated September 30, 1948. 2. On January 12, 1946, the Respondents agreed to sell to the Appellants 1,50,000, yards of hessian to be delivered in the months of April, May and June, 1946. In each month 50,000 yards were to be delivered and the price was settled at Rs. 26-10 per 100 yards. It is admitted that no delivery was given of the April portion of the goods. On May 25, 1946, the Respondents wrote to the Appellants asking them to purchase the April portion. Obviously the sellers were not in a position to supply, and therefore, they wanted the buyers to send their difference bill for payment. They took that step, because, at that time, the Jute Price Control Order was in existence and ceiling prices of jute had been fixed and the damage would be very small. 3. In the month of May, no delivery was given and on June 1, 1946, the sellers offered to the buyers to pay the amount of difference between the contract price and the maximum price fixed under the Control Order for the May portion of the jute in question. 4. Thereafter the parties did nothing for about a year. On August 5, 1947, the Appellants wrote to the Respondents a letter reminding them of the contract of January 12, 1946. In that letter, it was stated that, in spite of requests, no goods had been delivered and they were not going to wait any further. They demanded delivery of the goods by August 8, failing which steps would be taken. On August 21, 1947, a difference-bill was sent to the Respondents for Rs. 7,312-8. Difference was claimed on the basis of the contract rate and the rate fixed by the Gunny Traders Association. Thereafter, there was a reference to the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on September 26, 1947, because the difference bill had been returned promptly and nothing had been paid by the Respondents. 5. In their statement of case filed by the Appellants before the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, there was no case made of any extension of the due dates of delivery. Reference was made to the difference-bill and a claim was made for the said sum of Rs. 7,312-8. 5. In their statement of case filed by the Appellants before the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, there was no case made of any extension of the due dates of delivery. Reference was made to the difference-bill and a claim was made for the said sum of Rs. 7,312-8. A reply was filed by the Respondents, wherein they admitted the contract, but they pointed out that the buyers' demand for delivery after failure to supply the goods came one year one month and five days after the expiry of the last due date of delivery under the contract, when the price had gone up more than hundred per cent. They admitted that they had received the difference bill, but they had returned the same as the contract was then not subsisting and the due dates under the contract had never been extended. 6. Two other statements were filed by the parties, but at no stage before the arbitrators had the case been made that there was any extension of the due dates of delivery under the contract. 7. As award was made by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce on January 16, 1948, for Rs. 7,312-8 together with interest and costs. An application was made by the Respondents for setting aside the award and Sinha J., by his judgment held that the award was vitiated by the misconduct of the arbitrators and set aside the same with costs. 8. I am of opinion that the learned Judge was right in the view that he took. It is common case, as is apparent from the statements filed before the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, that there was no extension of time for delivery under the contract. It is clearly stipulated in the contract that each month's delivery was to be considered as a distinct and separate contract. With regard to the months of April and May, it is undisputed that, on or about the last dates when deliveries ought to have been given, the sellers pointed out that they were not in a position to give delivery and offered to pay damages or difference immediately. With regard to the June portion, although there is no correspondence, the position is the same. The price of jute was controlled during the relevant period, April to June, 1946 and the control prices operated until the expiry of the month of September, 1946. With regard to the June portion, although there is no correspondence, the position is the same. The price of jute was controlled during the relevant period, April to June, 1946 and the control prices operated until the expiry of the month of September, 1946. 9. In this state of facts, was the Bengal Chamber of Commerce justified in awarding damages for Rs. 7,312-8, which was admittedly in excess of the ceiling prices in vogue during the relevant period under the Jute Price Control Order? In the absence of any extension, this award of damages on the basis of rates exceeding the maximum rates fixed by the Control Order is clearly illegal. To allow the arbitrators to award such damages would be to legalise an act which has been declared to be an offence under the relevant statute and cannot possibly be permitted by a court of law. This point is covered by a judgment which has been delivered by the learned Chief Justice and Sinha J. in Khusiram Banarshilal v. Girdharilal Dharamchand (1949) A.O.O. 80 of 1948, decided on March 8. It is impossible for the court in such a case to accept the contention that, at the most, the arbitrators are guilty of an error of law and as the error is not apparent on the face of the award, it is not open to the Court to set aside the award. An award can be set aside on the ground of error of law, when it is manifest on the face of the award. It is, however, open to the court to look into the relevant statement filed before the arbitration tribunal. If the court is satisfied that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, then the court should set aside their award. The expression "legal misconduct" is an ambiguous term. It means and includes some honest though erroneous breach of duty causing a miscarriage of justice. If there has been a mishandling of the arbitration-proceedings or serious neglect of duties on the part of persons vested with judicial authority to determine the rights and liabilities of parties, which is likely to lead to substantial miscarriage of justice, then the court is justified in setting aside the award. 10. If there has been a mishandling of the arbitration-proceedings or serious neglect of duties on the part of persons vested with judicial authority to determine the rights and liabilities of parties, which is likely to lead to substantial miscarriage of justice, then the court is justified in setting aside the award. 10. The only manner in which this award can be justified is to urge that the arbitrators must have held that there was an extension of the due dates under the contract and that they have awarded damages on the proper legal basis of the market-rate prevailing after the Control Order ceased to be operative. Even on that view the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct. It is a legal misconduct to decide that there was an extension when there was absolutely no evidence in support of it and really no material before the arbitrators to justify this finding or conclusion. The question here is not of mistake but of misconduct. To decide such an issue of fact without any evidence or material before the arbitrators is serious dereliction of duty. Ordinarily, the court will not review the arbitrator's conclusions or findings provided they act within their authority and according to principles of justice and behave fairly to both the parties. But the discretionary power to the arbitrators in the conduct of proceedings is never absolute and their decision would have to be reviewed by the court and their award set aside, if it appears that, in the course which they have pursued, they acted in a manner in which no person vested with judicial authority could possibly act. It is impossible for any arbitrator to hold in favour of extension without any evidence and without any material. It is not a matter which is within the special knowledge of the arbitrators as businessmen of experience and they can only decide that the due dates of the contract were extended provided there were some materials before them on the point. They may be right or they may be wrong, but they are entitled to come to a conclusion if there is evidence or if there is material on which they can determine the matter. They may be right or they may be wrong, but they are entitled to come to a conclusion if there is evidence or if there is material on which they can determine the matter. But, in the absence of any evidence, or any material or even any allegation to that effect, they are guilty of legal misconduct, if they come to any such finding or determine damage on the basis of extension. Therefore, take the award on either footing. If the arbitrators held that there was no extension, then they intentionally decided the matter and awarded damages contrary to law and they were guilty of legal misconduct. If they held that there was extension and they did not contravene the law, then there was no evidence of any extension and no material to support the same and even then, they were guilty of legal misconduct. 11. The award is sought to be justified on the ground that the members of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce Tribunal of Arbitration were commercial arbitrators and thus were in a position to know the situation in the market and as they were appointed because of their knowledge and experience of the trade, they were entitled to fix the damages without hearing any evidence. It may be that ordinarily commercial arbitrators, who are specially chosen for their skill and knowledge and experience of the trade, may determine questions like markets rates or damages without taking any evidence. But they have got to determine the matter judicially. They cannot override the law of the land and cannot abdicate their functions and accept a late fixed by an association like the Gunny Traders' Association and award damages on that basis. Under this contract, an order or circular or decision of the Gunny Traders' Association was not binding on the parties and in any event, that association had no authority or business to determine that parties should, in violation of the Jute Price Control Order, be liable to pay damages in excess of the maximum rates fixed under that order. 12. We agree with the learned Judge that the arbitrators had the duty to assess the quantum or rate of damages and it is difficult to appreciate under what authority the Gunny Traders' Association fixed the rate for settlement of contracts, or how its decision could possibly be binding on the parties to this litigation. 12. We agree with the learned Judge that the arbitrators had the duty to assess the quantum or rate of damages and it is difficult to appreciate under what authority the Gunny Traders' Association fixed the rate for settlement of contracts, or how its decision could possibly be binding on the parties to this litigation. If the arbitrators blindly accepted the rates fixed by that association and did not exercise their judgment and failed to apply their mind to the question of damages, which were to be assessed, then they would be equally guilty of misconduct and dereliction of duty. There was no other rate on the basis of which they could legally award this damage except the maximum rate fixed by the Jute Price Control Order. To circumvent the Control Order by awarding damages at a higher rate than the maximum fixed by the said Order would constitute "misconduct" and it cannot be justified by invoking the rule that an award cannot be set aside on the ground of mere error of law. This is not simply a mere mistake of law. It is a more fundamental question. No court or judicial authority could possibly award this damage in clear contravention of the law of the land and therefore, the award was rightly set aside. 13. Mr. Meyer urged that the Rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce do not make it obligatory on the Tribunal to take evidence. It was pointed out by this Bench in Mukhram Luchminarain v. Khusimm Benarshilal (1949) A.O.O. 2 of 1949, dated March 29, that the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce should not be construed as 'granting a charter to the Tribunal of Arbitration to decide all questions without taking any evidence. In this case, as I have already observed, there were no materials at all before the arbitrators on the question of extension of the due dates. 14. It is certainly the duty of the court in an application for setting aside an award to allow all possible latitude to arbitrators and to ignore technicalities. But this is not a question of technicality or mere irregularity. It is a question of illegality which vitiates the award. 14. It is certainly the duty of the court in an application for setting aside an award to allow all possible latitude to arbitrators and to ignore technicalities. But this is not a question of technicality or mere irregularity. It is a question of illegality which vitiates the award. We are satisfied that, on the facts of this case and on the admitted records substantial injustice was caused to the Respondents, because both the basis and the quantum of damages were not justified by the law which was then in existence and it is the duty of the court to interfere in order to prevent gross injustice to the parties. 15. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Harries C.J. 16. I agree.