JUDGMENT : K.T. Koshi, J. The suit giving rise to this appeal, was commenced by a child-less Ezhava widow. The suit was to set aside a deed of settlement executed by her deceased husband, one Kunjukunju, with respect to his separate and self-acquired properties, and to recover the one-half share due to her under the Travancore Ezhava Act, III of 1100. The settlement deed purports to have been executed on 3.10.1111 and it was registered on the 16th of that month. The document is Ext. C1 in the case and under it the plaintiff gets nothing. No provision is made even for her maintenance. The bulk of the properties are given to the members of Kunjukunju's tarwad while 64 cents of wet lands are given to the 1st defendant in the suit who appears to be a natural son of Kunjukunju. The 2nd defendant is Kunjukunju's brother, 3rd defendant is their sister and defendants 4 to 9 are the children of the 3rd defendant. The 10th defendant is a distant nephew in whose favour the 2nd defendant transferred a portion of the property he obtained under the impugned settlement deed. There were three other defendants in the suit but we are not concerned with them in this appeal. 2. The plaintiff's case with reference to the settlement deed, is that it is a huge fraud. According to her, the document is a forgery and its registration a farce. She would also have it that in case the document is found to have been executed by her late husband, it must be held to be invalid as vitiated by coercion and undue influence. Kunjukunju died on 17.2.1122 and it would appear he was in failing health for at least 6 or 8 months preceding that event. The plaint averments would even go to the length of saying that for the said 6 or 8 months he was not in his senses and that, in any event, he was not of sound disposing mind or rather disqualified by his infirmities from understanding what he was doing. Defendants 2 to 4 were the main contesting defendants and they joined issue with the plaintiff on all relevant points raised by her attacking the validity of the settlement deed. Defendant 1 filed a written statement supporting the plaintiff but afterwards withdrew from contest. Defendants 2 to 4 were the main contesting defendants and they joined issue with the plaintiff on all relevant points raised by her attacking the validity of the settlement deed. Defendant 1 filed a written statement supporting the plaintiff but afterwards withdrew from contest. Defendant 13, from whom some chitty money was claimed, had also filed a written statement and he like the 1st defendant did not continue the contest till the end. The suit was filed before the District Munsiff's Court at Karunagappally on 4.8.1113 and the trial lasted very nearly eight years. The learned Munsiff who disposed of the suit declared the settlement deed Ext. C1 invalid and inoperative as against the plaintiff and passed a preliminary decree for partition of the plaintiff's one-half share by metes and bounds. The decree also awarded past and future mesne profits to the plaintiff. Defendants 2 to 4 have preferred this appeal against the learned Munsiff's judgment and decree. 3. The learned Munsiff has, if I may use a familiar expression, gone the whole hog of accepting the plaintiff's case in all its details. The evidence, the plaintiff let in the case, especially the oral evidence is not only voluminous but also conflicting and confusing. After a careful study of that evidence, I do not find my way to accept the Munsiff's finding that Kunjukunju was out of his senses for about 7 months prior to the date of his death nor am I in a position to accept that the document was not executed by Kunjukunju or that it has not been validly registered. The plaintiff made all sorts of wild allegations in her plaint and the learned Munsiff suspects every body; he suspects everything. Every one who took part in the transaction, not only the donees who derived benefit under the document, but all those who had anything to do with its preparation or execution and even the Sub-Registrar of the place who registered the document in due discharge of his official duties, are alike involved in general and indiscriminate suspicion. Every one who took part in the transaction, not only the donees who derived benefit under the document, but all those who had anything to do with its preparation or execution and even the Sub-Registrar of the place who registered the document in due discharge of his official duties, are alike involved in general and indiscriminate suspicion. As I am, however on certain broad and admitted facts and circumstances of the case, compelled to take a view confirming the Munsiff's decision without at the same time concurring in the reasons on which the decision is founded, I think it unnecessary to discuss the evidence on which the Munsiff came to his conclusions on the matters mentioned above or to state my reasons for differing from him on those matters. It must at the same time be stated that aspect of the case on which I propose to dispose of this appeal finds mention in the Munsiff's judgment towards its concluding part. To me it looks clear on facts admitted or proved that the 2nd defendant was in a position to dominate the will of Kunjukunju and that he used that position to obtain an unfair advantage for himself and others in whom he felt interested. In other words, when full play is given to the provisions of S. 16 of the Contract Act to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Munsiff's decision declaring the settlement deed Ext. C1 invalid and inoperative and granting the plaintiff reliefs consequential thereto, has to be affirmed. To found a decision on that aspect one has not in my opinion, to go beyond the admissions made by defendants 2 to 4 in their written statement and the evidence these defendants have themselves adduced viz., the testimony of D.W. 1 (father of 10th defendant) and D.W. 2 (2nd defendant.) 4. Paragraph 6 of the written statement filed by defendants 2 to 4 clearly states that for several years prior to his death the deceased was staying with the 2nd defendant and others and that he was under their protection and that they were looking after him and attending to all his needs. Both D.Ws. 1 and 2 admit that at least 2 or 3 years prior to his death Kunjukunju became almost totally blind and that he was not able to move about without some assistance. Both D.Ws. 1 and 2 admit that at least 2 or 3 years prior to his death Kunjukunju became almost totally blind and that he was not able to move about without some assistance. From his birth Kunjukunju was rather hard of hearing and as he advanced in years that infirmity became more pronounced. Kunjukunju was 59 years of age when he died. The Munsiff has found and it is also the evidence that for some years prior to his death the plaintiff or the 2nd defendant was taking him from place to place for medical treatment. He was a victim of acute rheumatic complaints and in Medom 1111 he had a severe paralytic stroke. D.W. 1, a Medical man, then in State service and who had married Kunjukunju's divided sister's daughter was called in to attend on him. His evidence is to the effect that the stroke was due to high blood-pressure and that it rendered him senseless for hours, if not for days together. The plaintiff's case and the evidence she let in on her side is that Kunjukunju never recovered from that senseless or semisenseless state till his death. The 2nd defendant also admits in his evidence that the stroke rendered Kunjukunju senseless and he looked almost dead. It would also appear that his death was due to a similar stroke. Reading the evidence of the two defence witnesses themselves, one would not be far from wrong in stating that 2 or 3 years prior to his death, if not earlier, Kunjukunju had become a confirmed invalid. The 2nd defendant, as D.W. 2, swears that at least from 1108 he was looking after Kunjukunju's affairs and attending to all his needs. Kunjukunju's properties were looked after and managed by him. He was fed and clothed by him and even housed along with him. He also swears that after Kunjukunju's eye-sight became bad, which was round about 1108, he had even the custody of, Kunjukunju's cash chest. In 1109 when their Tarwad partition took place, Kunjukunju made a gift of one of the items he got in partition to the 2nd defendant. It is, in these circumstances, difficult to say that at or about the time Ext. C1 happened to be executed the 2nd defendant was not in a position to dominate the will of Kunjukunju. 5. In 1109 when their Tarwad partition took place, Kunjukunju made a gift of one of the items he got in partition to the 2nd defendant. It is, in these circumstances, difficult to say that at or about the time Ext. C1 happened to be executed the 2nd defendant was not in a position to dominate the will of Kunjukunju. 5. It may be convenient to set S. 16 of the Contract Act out in full here. (1) A contract is said to be induced by 'undue influence' where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another, (a) Where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or (b) Where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness or mental or bodily distress. (3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a contract with him and the transaction appears on the face of it or on the evidence adduced to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other. "Nothing in this sub-section shall affect the provisions of S. 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872". S. 111 of the Evidence Act enacts:- "Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the other in a position of active confidence, the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is on the party who is in a position of active confidence". It is settled law that no strict or technical fiduciary relationship is needed to establish that one person is in a position to dominate the will of the other. It is settled law that no strict or technical fiduciary relationship is needed to establish that one person is in a position to dominate the will of the other. In Tungabhai v. Yeswant Jog (A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 8) Lord Goddard observed:- "Equally it is not necessary in order to establish the presumption that the parties should stand in some particular category of relationship to each other. The presumption no doubt can be more easily established and indeed may be assumed in such cases as transactions between parent and infant child, solicitor and client, or spiritual adviser and penitent, but it will arise in any case in which the facts show that the circumstances are such that influence can fairly be inferred". In Shivagangawa v. Basengenda (A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 304), it is seen observed at page 306 of the report thus:- "It is not proper to contend that the rule of equity is restricted in cases where strictly or technically fiduciary relationship is established. In 10 All. 525 a passage from the Notes to (1867) 2 W & T.L.C. in Equity, Edn. 4, page 592 was referred to by that eminent Judge (Straight) wherein the following observations of Lord Cottenham in (1839) 4 My & Cr. 269 at p. 276 were quoted (p. 545). "I will not narrow the rule or run the risk of in any degree fettering the exercise of the beneficial jurisdiction of the court by any enumeration of the description of persons against whom it ought to be most freely exercised." The rule has been, and I may say so with respect, rightly extended to cases where the possibility of exercising influence exists from confidence created or established by the relation between the donor and donee". 6. I have said that the case has to be decided with reference to S. 16 of the Contract Act. In commenting upon the section Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said in Raghanath Prasad v. Sarju Prasad (A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 60) as follows:- "By that section three matters are dealt with. In the first place the relations between the parties to each other must be such that one is in a position to dominate the will of the other. Once that position is substantiated the second stage has been reached namely, the issue whether the contract has been induced by undue influence. In the first place the relations between the parties to each other must be such that one is in a position to dominate the will of the other. Once that position is substantiated the second stage has been reached namely, the issue whether the contract has been induced by undue influence. Upon the determination of this issue a third point emerges which is that of the onus probandi. If the transaction appears to be unconscionable - then the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence is to lie upon the person who was in a position to dominate the will of the other. Error is almost sure to arise if the order of these propositions be changed. The unconscionableness of the bargain is not the first thing to be considered. The first thing to be considered is the relations of these parties. Were they such as to put one in a position to dominate the will of the other?" I think I have said enough to indicate that old and infirm as Kunjukunju was, his brother the 2nd defendant was in a position to dominate, the will of Kunjukunju and the question next to be examined is whether the transaction was unconscionable. 7. In discussing the question of unconscionableness, it has to be remembered that under the statute law governing the parties, the plaintiff would have got a half share in Kunjukunju's estate were he to die leaving the same undisposed of. No doubt he had absolute powers of disposition over the same but in order that the disposition must be valid, it must be one made by him of his free will and as a free agent. Whatever the appellants might say regarding Kunjukunju's relations with the plaintiff, they themselves concede that the marriage was subsisting when Kunjukunju died and that but for Ext. C1 the plaintiff would have got a half share in the suit properties. But it is said that even though legally the marriage tie continued, the husband and wife had long parted from each other. That however does not appear to be true. D.W. 1 and 2 admit that the plaintiff had accompanied Kunjukunju to some of the places where he was taken for medical treatment and that she was staying with him in more than one of such places. That was within 2 or 3 year-prior to his death. That however does not appear to be true. D.W. 1 and 2 admit that the plaintiff had accompanied Kunjukunju to some of the places where he was taken for medical treatment and that she was staying with him in more than one of such places. That was within 2 or 3 year-prior to his death. The plaintiff's case is, that she was married to Kunjukunju while she was 15 and they lived together as man and wife until a few months prior to Kunjukunju's death. It is common ground that in Medom 1111 Kunjukunju was staying at Kuttiyil house and according to the plaintiff, when Kunjukunju's illness was taking a bad turn he was removed to Kalikka Vadakkethil which is 2nd defendant's wife's house. The 2nd defendant does not admit that and according to him from Kuttiyil Kunjukunju was taken to the Nedumtharayil house which is 2nd defendant's own house. Whatever that be, from the trend of the cross-examination of the plaintiff, it is more or less clear that the plaintiff was living in Kuttiyil house along with her husbanduntil a few days before the latter was removed from there in Medom or Edavom 1111. Apprehending that 2nd defendant and others might bring some document into existence to her prejudice purporting to have been executed by Kunjukunju, the plaintiff sent a number of petitions to the neighbouring Registry Offices to acquaint the officers concerned with the state of Kunjukunju's health and in cross-examination it is put to her whether those petitions were not sent while she was staying in Kuttiyil house. These petitions are Exts. D, E, H and J in the case and they were sent between the dates 29.9.1111 and 10.10.1111. This is almost conclusive on the point that even while Kunjukunju was in failing health and it was suspected that his end was nearing the plaintiff was with him. I cannot therefore accept the argument that Kunjukunju had long before his death ceased to treat the plaintiff as his wife. All that appears from the evidence is that he had got a house constructed for her at a cost not exceeding Rs. 1000/- or Rs. 1500/- and that a promissory note for Rs. 1000/- executed in his favour was endorsed to her. All that appears from the evidence is that he had got a house constructed for her at a cost not exceeding Rs. 1000/- or Rs. 1500/- and that a promissory note for Rs. 1000/- executed in his favour was endorsed to her. The plaintiff swears that she had to sue on the note and that nothing was realised there from even at the time of her examination in 1119. There is no mention made in Ext. C1 about the plaintiff or that any provision was already made for her. Under normal circumstances it is difficult to believe that a husband would treat a wife in the manner Kunjukunju is seen to have behaved towards the plaintiff under Ext. C1. Though there is no reliable evidence as to the exact value of the properties disposed of there under, it cannot be denied they are valuable and really very extensive. Further, Ext. C1 relates to all his separate and self-acquired properties and all that was left behind is the undivided share in certain properties which he in common with his brother and sister acquired through their father. Though the document provides for Kunjukunju to continue to enjoy the income of the properties until he dies, it is in my view an improvident act on his part to have brought into being such as self denying ordinance. Though it may not be strictly relevant for out present purpose, it may, in passing, however, be mentioned that a subsequent document was brought into existence on 23.12.1111 concerning the Makkathayam properties and there Kunjukunju was given no separate share. He and the 2nd defendant were to remain joint. It was however not possible for Kunjukunju to put his signature to that document. There also the wife is completely ignored. In this context it would be helpful to refer to an early Privy Council decision reported in Mahomed Buksh Khan v. Hosseini Bibi (I.L.R. 15 Cal. 684) where Their Lordships discuss the various questions to be considered in dealing with cases of undue influence. There also the wife is completely ignored. In this context it would be helpful to refer to an early Privy Council decision reported in Mahomed Buksh Khan v. Hosseini Bibi (I.L.R. 15 Cal. 684) where Their Lordships discuss the various questions to be considered in dealing with cases of undue influence. The tests suggested by Their Lordships were:- (1) Whether a transaction is a righteous transaction i.e. whether it is a thing which a right minded person might be expected to do; (2) Whether it was provident, that is to say, whether it shows so much improvidence as to suggest the idea that the donor was not master of himself and not in a state of mind to weigh what he was doing; (3) Whether it was a matter which required legal advice; and (4) Whether the intention of making the gift originated with the donor. The foregoing discussion must, in my opinion, show that the transaction was not a righteous one and that it was improvident. On the question whether the idea originated with Kunjukunju, the only evidence is that of P.W. 10, a cousin of 2nd and 3rd defendants (also of Kunjukunju) and in the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to believe him when he says that he got the draft prepared at Kunjukunju's suggestion. His deposition leaves no doubt in my mind that he was a willing tool in the hands of defendants 2 to 4 to bring this document into existence. The Privy Council decision last mentioned is referred to and followed by a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in Narayana Pillai v. Lekshmi Pillai (15 T.L.J. 440) 9. Having shown that the 2nd defendant was in a position to dominate the will of Kunjukunju and that the gift evidenced by Ext. C1 is an unconscionable one, I shall proceed to consider the legal effect of those two circumstances. In so doing I shall first quote certain passages from the decision of Lord Hailsham, Lord Chancellor in Inche Noriah v. Shaik Allie (A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 3). At page 6 of the report the Lord, High Chancellor observes: "The principles upon which this case falls to be decided have been the subject of a series of decisions in the English Court of Chancery; and it was not disputed between the parties that the principles of English law must be applied. At page 6 of the report the Lord, High Chancellor observes: "The principles upon which this case falls to be decided have been the subject of a series of decisions in the English Court of Chancery; and it was not disputed between the parties that the principles of English law must be applied. The question to be decided is stated in the judgment of Lord Justice Cotton in the well-known case of Allcard v. Skinner at page 171 as follows: "The question is: Does the case fall within the principles laid down by the decisions of the Court of Chancery in setting aside voluntary gifts executed by parties who at the time were under such influence as in the opinion of the Court, enabled the donor afterwards to set the gift aside? These decisions may be divided in two classes; first, where the 'Court has been satisfied that the gift wasthe result of influence expressly used by the donee for the purpose; secondly, where the relations between the donor and the donee have at or shortly before the execution of the gift been such as to raise a presumption that the donee had influence over the donor. In such a case the Court sets aside the voluntary gift, unless it is proved that in fact the gift was the spontaneous act of the donor acting under circumstances which enabled him to exercise an independent will and which justifies the Court in holding that the gift was the result of a free exercise of the donor's will. The first class of cases may be considered as depending on the principle that no one shall be allowed to retain any benefit arising from his own fraud or wrongful act. In the second class of cases the Court interferes not on the ground that any wrongful act has in fact been committed by the donee, but on the ground of public policy, and to prevent the relations which existed between the parties and the influence arising there from being abused. In the second class of cases the Court interferes not on the ground that any wrongful act has in fact been committed by the donee, but on the ground of public policy, and to prevent the relations which existed between the parties and the influence arising there from being abused. "In Their Lordships' view the relations between the appellant and respondent are correctly summarised in the judgment of the trial Judge, and they are amply sufficient to raise the presumption of the influence of the respondent over the appellant and to render it incumbent upon him to prove that the gift was the spontaneous act of the appellant, acting under circumstances which enabled her to exercise an independent will, and which justified the Court in holding that the gift was the result of the free exercise of her will." "At the hearing before this Board there was much discussion upon the questio whether the presumption can be rebutted in any other way than by proof of independent legal advice, and also as to what constituted sufficient independent legal advice for this purpose. A number of cases were cited containing expressions of opinion by various learned Judges, some of which are not easy to reconcile unless they are treated as governed by the particular facts of the case then under discussion." After referring to cases bearing on the last point raised in the discussion, His Lordship went on to observe: "The decision in each of these cases seems to Their Lordships to be entirely consistent with the principle of law as laid down in Allcard v. Skinner (supra). But their Lordships are not prepared to accept the view that independent legal advice is the only way in which the presumption can be rebutted, nor are they prepared to affirm that independent legal advice, when given, does not rebut the presumption unless it be shown that the advice was taken. It is necessary for the donee to prove that the gift was the result of the free exercise of independent will. It is necessary for the donee to prove that the gift was the result of the free exercise of independent will. The most obvious way to prove this is by establishing that the gift was made "after the nature and effect of the transaction had been fully explained to the donor by some independent and qualified person so completely as to satisfy the Court that the donor was acting independently of any influence from the donee and with the full appreciation of what he was doing, and in cases where there are no other circumstances this may be the only means by which the donee can rebut the presumption. But the fact to be established is that stated in the judgment already cited of Lord Justice Cotton, and if evidence is given of circumstances sufficient to establish this fact, Their Lordships see no reason for disregarding them merely because they do not include independent advice from a lawyer. Nor are their Lordships prepared to lay down what advice must be received in order to satisfy the rule in cases where independent legal advice is relied upon, further than to say that it must be given with a knowledge of all relevant circumstances and must be such as a competent and honest adviser would give if acting solely in the interest of the donor." His Lordship then proceeded to apply the above principles to the facts of the case before the Board and the discussion is concluded thus: "In their Lordships' view the facts proved by the respondent are not sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence which is raised by the relationship proved to have been in existence between the parties; and they regard it as most important from the point of view of public policy to maintain the rule of law which has been laid down and to insist that a gift made under circumstances which give rise to the presumption must be set aside unless the donee is able to satisfy the court of facts sufficient to rebut the "presumption". 10. The decision in Neelarathi (A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 50) states that where a person stands in a position of active confidence to another onus is on him to prove the good faith of the transaction. In Abdur Rauff v. Avanona Bibi (A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 10. The decision in Neelarathi (A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 50) states that where a person stands in a position of active confidence to another onus is on him to prove the good faith of the transaction. In Abdur Rauff v. Avanona Bibi (A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 492) the Learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court (Guha and Bartley, JJ) said: "A person is in a position to dominate the will of another where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, specially in the case in which the other person is one whose mental capacity is effected by reason of age, illness or bodily or mental distress. If the transaction in question papers, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such transaction was not induced by undue influence lies upon a person in a position to dominate the will of the other. This is in consonance with the principles adopted by Courts in England and as it has been said, as no Court has ever attempted to define fraud, so no Court has ever attempted to define undue influence, which includes one of its many varieties. There are cases in which there has been some unfair and improper conduct, some coercion from intention, some over-reaching, some form of cheating, and generally though not always, some personal advantage obtained by one placed in some close an confidential relation to another. There may be cases also where it is necessary to show that the party concerned had independent advice and was removed from the influence of the other party; (1887) 36 Ch. D. 145 at P. 181 (Allcard v. Skinner). The decision in A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 304 has been referred to in another connection and extract quoted. What immediately proceeds the quotation I made there from may with advantage be quoted in this context. "The proposition is very clearly stated in Ashburner's Principles of Equity, Edn. 2, p. 299 thus: "When the relation between the donor and donee at or shortly before the execution of the gift has been such as to raise a presumption that the donee had influence over the donor, the Court sets aside the gift unless the donee can prove that the gift was the result of a free exercise of the donor's will." The corollary to that principle is contained in Cl. (3) to S. 16, Contract Act. That clause is as follows: 'Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other.' Far from laying down a rule of law, the burden is cast on the grantee of proving freedom of consent by reason of the fact that he is in a dominant position and has made a bargain. The principle has been well affirmed in several cases both of contract and of gift: See 81 I.A. 101 (A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 60), 47 I.A. 340 (I.L.R. 43 Mad. 546), 89 Bom. L.R. 720, (1937 R. 1937 P.C. 5), 14 Bom. L.R. 340 (15 I.C. 529). It was considered in all its bearing by Straight, J. in 10 All. 835 where upon a review of the authorities he expressed himself as follows (page 545). "But what the Courts in this country will do is to see that where one person is so situated as to be under control and influence of another, such other does not unduly or unfairly exercise that influence and contract over such person for his own advantage or benefit, or for the advantage or benefit of some religious object in which he is interested, and will call upon him to give clear and correct proof that the transaction contained of was such a one as the law would support and recognise." In Ahmad Ibrahim v. Meyyapa (A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 285) Varadachariar Pandrang & Row, JJ. observed as follows: "It was contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that while it is one thing to prove the existence of the relation ship making undue influence possible but it is another thing to ask the court to hold that undue influence has been exercised. 285) Varadachariar Pandrang & Row, JJ. observed as follows: "It was contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that while it is one thing to prove the existence of the relation ship making undue influence possible but it is another thing to ask the court to hold that undue influence has been exercised. It is now well established that in a Court of equity when a person obtains any benefit from another, whether under a contract or as a gift, by exerting his influence which, in the opinion of the Court, prevent the grantor from exercising an independent judgment in the matter in question, the latter can set aside the contract or recover the gift. The Court of equity then imposes upon the grantee the burden, if he wishes to maintain the contract or gift, of proving that. But as observed by Lord Macnaghten in 1911 A.C. 120 at p. 137: "It is now well established that in a Court of equity, when a person obtains any benefit from another, whether under a contract or as a gift, by exerting his influence which, in the opinion of the court, prevents the grantor from exercising an independent judgment in the matter in question, the latter can set aside the contract or recover the gift. The court of equity then imposes upon the grantee or the burden, if he wishes to maintain the contract or gift, of proving that in fact be exerted no influence for the purpose of obtaining it. "It may well be argued that when there is evidence of over powering influence and the transaction brought about is immoderate and irrational proof of undue influence is complete." "The same principle is clearly impled in Cl. 3 of S. 16 Contract Act." It is unnecessary to multiply authorities but mention may be made of four other cases where the same rule is seen enunciated. See Mt. Anupa Bai v. Bhagavant Singh (A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 47); Sant Bux Singh v. Ali Hasa Khan (A.I.R. 1946 Oudh 129); Ram Chander Prasad v. Sital Prasad (A.I.R. 1948 Patna 130) and Hameed v. Abdulla 1124 (40) Cochin Law Reports 422). 11. The only question that remains to be considered is whether the appellants have succeeded to rebut the presumption of undue influence and establish that Ext. C1 evidences a free and voluntary disposition of Kunjukunju. 11. The only question that remains to be considered is whether the appellants have succeeded to rebut the presumption of undue influence and establish that Ext. C1 evidences a free and voluntary disposition of Kunjukunju. Admittedly at or about the time the document came into existence Kunjukunju was surrounded only by members of his own tarwad some of them divided and others undivided from him. Naturally their inclination and leaning will only be towards the present donees and they would not have liked the plaintiff to be benefitted by Kunjukunju's bounties. As D.W. 2, the 2nd defendant admits that no respectable neighbour or any independent person was called for advice or consultation. P.W. 10 is a first cousin of the 2nd and 3rd defendants and it has already been mentioned that he is very much interested in the appellants and that his testimony does not impress me. Any advice tendered by him cannot be regarded as disinterested or independent advice. It is also seen that the attesting witnesses are practically dependants or satellities and hangers on of defendants 2 to 4 and P.W. 10. Under Ext. C1 barring two or three small slices of wet lands given to defendant 1, the rest of Kunjukunju's separate and self-acquired properties all go to defendants 2 to 4 and of them, defendants 2 gets the lion' share. The removal from Kuttiyil house, whether it be to Kalikka Vadakkethil or Nedumtharayil, is also suspicious. The plaintiff swears that after that she was not allowed to go anywhere near Kunjukunju. After she sent intimations to the Sub Registrars of neighbouring places about the state of health of Kunjukunju (Exts. D, E, H and J) and the sinister design of the 2nd defendant and others to exploit the situation, it is not natural to expect that defendants 2 to 4 would have allowed the plaintiff to live with Kunjukunju or even to see him. In fact she swears that she was threatened with violence and that compelled her to leave Kuttiyil house for her own tarwad house. The learned Munsiff has after referring to the testimony of P.Ws. 9 and 11, the attestors to the document, P.W. 10, the identifying witness before the Sub-Registrar, and P.W. 13, the scribe of the document, said that he is not satisfied that Kunjukunju was made fully aware of what he was about in executing the document. The learned Munsiff has after referring to the testimony of P.Ws. 9 and 11, the attestors to the document, P.W. 10, the identifying witness before the Sub-Registrar, and P.W. 13, the scribe of the document, said that he is not satisfied that Kunjukunju was made fully aware of what he was about in executing the document. In view of the discrepant nature of their evidence and the infirmities Kunjukunju was subject to at that time that conclusion may not be far wrong. The evidence of P.W. 18, the Sub-Registrar, cannot be taken to carry the matter than satisfying the technical requirements as to execution and validity of registration. In my view, the facts proved by the appellants are not sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence which is raised by the relationship proved to have been in existence between the parties. Strictly speaking on the footing that it was for them to prove that the gift was the result of the free exercise of Kunjukunju's will the appellants made no attempt to establish its validity. The persons benefitted by the transaction have to bear the whole onus of proving that the transaction is good. See 15 T.L.J. 440 at 450. I would therefore confirm the lower court's decision and dismiss this appeal with costs. Krishna Pillay, C.J. I agree to the decree proposed by my learned brother. Appeal dismissed.