JUDGMENT Seth, J. - The parties to this case belong to the same family, being descendents of common ancestor, Kewal Ram, who had three sons Bishnath Sundar Lal and Surajbali. The Plaintiff is a grandson of Surajbali, and this Defendants are sons of Bishnath. There are certain houses, which at one time belonged to this family, and which are now in exclusive possession of either one branch or the other. There is a chabutra adjoining the house in exclusive possession of Plaintiff Bam Kishen, and it is also adjoins the house in exclusive possession of Defendants Babu Lal and Ram Narain. According to the findings recorded by the courts below, the Defendants have opened two doors in the wall which adjoins this chabutra. One of the doors is in the ground floor and the other door is in the first floor. The door in the first floor was opened during the pendency of the suit. 2. The Plaintiff brought the suit giving rise to this appeal praying that the door on the ground floor be ordered to be closed and that the Defendants be prevented from opening any further door. The door in the first floor having been opened during the pendency of the suit, the Plaintiff got his plaint amended and prayed for relief that door be also ordered to be classed. The Plaintiff alleged that he was in exclusive possession of chabutra, and that it appertained to the house which was exclusively in his possession. He complained that by opening this door, the Defendants have started infringing his right to exclusive possession by walking over the chabutra. As regards the door on the first floor, the Plaintiff alleged that its opening had infringed his right of privacy. 3. The trail court gave a decree directing the door on the first floor to be closed, but dismissed the suit with regard to the relief for closing the door on the ground floor. The Defendants appealed against the decree granted in favour of the Plaintiff filed cross objections in respect of the portion of his claim that was dismissed. The lower appellate court has found, in agreement with the court of first instance, that the door recently opened in the first floor infringes the Plaintiff's right of privacy. It has, thereof, confirmed the decree of the trial court directing that door to be closed. The lower appellate court has found, in agreement with the court of first instance, that the door recently opened in the first floor infringes the Plaintiff's right of privacy. It has, thereof, confirmed the decree of the trial court directing that door to be closed. It has further found that the chabutra was in exclusive possession of the Plaintiff and that door on the ground floor has been recently opened and that the Defendants have started coming out and getting in through that door by walking over the disputed chabutra. It has held that the Plaintiff has no right to get the door closed, but that he has a right to protect his exclusive possession and to have an injunction against the Defendants restraining them from coming over to the chabutra through that door or going over that chabutra for the purpose of reaching that door, Aggrieved by this decision of the lower appellate court, the Defendants have come up in second appeal to this Court. 4. The first contention put forward by the learned Counsel for the Appellants is, that the lower appellate court could not have granted the relief for injunction in respect of the door in the ground floor without deciding whether there has been a partition in the family or not,. His contention is that, unless it could be proved that the Plaintiff was the exclusive owner of the chabutra, the injunction granted by the lower appellate court could not be granted. In my opinion this contention is not well founded. It has not been found, and I do not, therefore, express any opinion on the point, whether there has been a partition in the family or not, for the purposes of this decision I shall assume that the parties are still joint owners of the two houses and of the chabutra as well. But in spite of that, the fact remains that according to the finding of the lower appellate court the Plaintiff has been in exclusive possession of this chabutra for a considerably long time. But in spite of that, the fact remains that according to the finding of the lower appellate court the Plaintiff has been in exclusive possession of this chabutra for a considerably long time. Whenever a co-sharer takes up exclusive possession of some joint property peacefully and without any connection on the part of the other co-sharers and has remained in such peaceful possession for a considerable time, showing that such possession has been acquired in by the other co-sharers, the co-sharers who have acquisced in such possession have no right left to disturb that exclusive possession except by seeking a partition of the joint property; The Plaintiff was thus entitled to defend his right to exclusive possession and to obtain the injunction granted in his favour against the Defendants. 5. Learned Counsel contends that this is not the correct view of law, and that an injunction can be granted only when the disturbance created by a co-share amounts to nuisance or to an ouster. In support of this contention learned Counsel has relied upon three decided cases. 6. The first case relied on is a decision of the Calcutta High Court in The Shamnugger Jute Factory Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Ram Narain Chatterjee and Ors. ILR 14 Cal. 189. All that was decided in that case was that an injunction is a matter in the judicial discretion of a court, and that it cannot be affirmed as a matter of law that one co owner is entitled to an injunction restraining another co-owner from exceeding his rights, absolutely, and without reference to the amount of damage to be custained by one side or the other from the granting or with holding of the injunction. This case is therefore, an authority only for the proposition that in such a case the co-owner who was in exclusive possession, cannot claim as a matter of right that an injunction must be granted in his favour. It does not support the proposition that an injunction in such a case cannot be granted. This case is therefore, an authority only for the proposition that in such a case the co-owner who was in exclusive possession, cannot claim as a matter of right that an injunction must be granted in his favour. It does not support the proposition that an injunction in such a case cannot be granted. It is not necessary for them decision of this case to repeal the contention of the learned Counsel that the granting of injunction in such a case is a matter of discretion, The learned Counsel however, does not succeed in this appeal on this ground, for I am quite satisfied that the court below has exercised a proper discretion in the present case by granting the injunction in favour of the Plaintiff. 7. The second case relied on by the learned Counsel is a decision of the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Sind in Girdharidas Radhakishandas v. Tirathdas Gokuldas AIR 1930 Sind 34. That was not a case in which peaceful exclusive possession of a co-sharer was disturbed. It was decided in that case that where a property is jointly owned each one of the co-owners has a right as a co-owner to use the property in a manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners, and that each co-owner has the right, irrespective of the quantity of his interest, to be in possession of any part and parcel of the property jointly with the others and that he is not liable to an action if the use is legitimate and does not constitute an invasion of rights of other co-sharers. Inasmuch as there was no question of the disturbance of the possession of a co-sharer or co-owner, who had been in peaceful exclusive possession for a sufficiently long time, in the Sind case, it has no bearing on the question which I have to decide in this appeal. The right of a co-sharer, defined in his Sind case, has been made conditional on the ground, that it does not constitute an invasion of a right of other co-sharers. In the present case, the Plaintiff, as a co-owner, has a right that his exclusive possession should not be disturbed. The claim put forward by the Defendants constitutes an invasion of that right. In the present case, the Plaintiff, as a co-owner, has a right that his exclusive possession should not be disturbed. The claim put forward by the Defendants constitutes an invasion of that right. In this view of the matter this decision of the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Sind goes against the contention of the learned Counsel rather than in favour of it. 8. The last case-relied upon by the learned Counsel is a decision of the Lahore High Court in Khota Ram and Anr. v. Timhu Ram and Anr. AIR 1988. Lah 487. That was a case in which there was a joint court yard in the use of the co-sharers. One of the co-sharers opened an extra door and began to use the courtyard through that door also. The other co-sharer complained that by opening the new door the co-sharer who had opened the new door had began to use the court yard more excessively. This claim of the co-sharer was rejected and it was held under these circumstances, that where a person opens a door way in the wall of his own house abutting on a courtyard which is joint property of the parties and each one has a door to his house opening in the courtyard the opening does not amount to an ouster of the other co-owners from the courtyard and the other co-owners cannot bring a suit for an injunction to restrain him from opening the door unless an excessive user or a user inconsistent with that to which it has been put before, has been proved. In my opinion this case also has no bearing upon the decision of the present appeal, for in the present case the Defendants have started a user inconsistent with that to which the chabutra was being put for a considerably long time before the new door was opened. It would thus appear that none of the cases relied upon by the learned Counsel militates against the view which I have expressed in an earlier part of this judgment to the effect, that where a co-sharer has been in peaceful exclusive possession of a piece of joint land for a sufficiently long time, the other co-sharers have no right to disturb that exclusive possession except by mean of a suit for partition. 9. 9. The next contention of the learned Counsel with regard to the order of the lower appellate court directing the door in the ground floor to be closed is that no such relief was specifically asked for in the plaint. He points out that the only relief claimed in the suit was that the door be ordered to be closed, and the court below, having rightly found that the Plaintiff has no right to get that door closed, was not justified in granting an injunction which was never asked for. 10. It is obvious that the complaint of the Plaintiff in the plaint and throughout the trial in the court of first instance as well as in the lower appellate court was that the Defendants had started disturbing his exclusive possession of the chabutra. He wanted the closure of the door in order to protect his right to the exclusive undisturbed possession of the chabutra and for no other purpose. The lower appellate court found that the Plaintiff had opened his mouth too wide and that there was no reason why the Defendants should be ordered to close the door if the Plaintiffs right could be protected without such an order being made. The lower appellate court rightly thought that the Plaintiffs right could be protected by granting an injunction against the Defendants, prohibiting them from passing over the chabutra. No authority has been shown to me in support of the contention that under such circumstances the court had no jurisdiction to grant this relief of injunction. Any technical difficulty that might have existed in the way of the granting of an injunction like this when it was not specifically prayed for, is removed by the fourth relief contained in the plaint, which is to the effect that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, any other relief to which the Plaintiff might be found entitled be granted in his favour I, therefore, find that there is no force in this contention of the learned Counsel also. 11. As regards the door on the first floor, the finding of the lower appellate court is that it has been recently opened and that it does infringe the right of privacy enjoyed by the Plaintiff. These findings of facts are binding upon me in a second appeal. They have not been shown to be vitiated by any error of law. As regards the door on the first floor, the finding of the lower appellate court is that it has been recently opened and that it does infringe the right of privacy enjoyed by the Plaintiff. These findings of facts are binding upon me in a second appeal. They have not been shown to be vitiated by any error of law. In view of these findings, the decree of the lower appellate court with regard to the closing of the door on the first floor is not open to any legitimate attack. 12. For the reasons indicated above; this appeal is dismissed with costs. 13. Appeal having been dismissed, the stay order, dated February 18, 1949, is vacated.