Judgment Order of Reference (17th December, 1948).-This petition raises an interesting question of court-fee. The petitioner is a plaintiff who sued for a declaration that an assessment order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer requiring him to pay a sales-tax of Rs.2,165 was illegal. He also sued for two consequential reliefs: (1) to restrain defendants from collecting this sales-tax on his commission business; (2) to restrain the defendants from assessing sales-tax in future on his commission business. The 1st defendant is the Government of Madras represented by the Collector of East Godavari, and the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Rajahmundry, is impleaded as the 2nd defendant. The District Munsiff treated this plaint as coming within the scope of section 7(iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act and directed ad valorem court-fee to be paid at Rs.2,165. The plaintiff valued his declaratory relief under Article 17-A(i) of the Court-Fees Act and paid a court-fee of Rs.15. The two injunctions he valued at Rs.10 each and paid ad valorem court-fee on these sums paying in all a court-fee of Rs.17-4-0. It is quite clear that Article 17-A(i) cannot apply as it governs suits for declarations only when no consequential relief is asked for. There is a difficulty in applying section 7(iv-A) to this plaint in view of the decision of Venkataramana Rao, J., in Govinda Chettiar v. Uthukottai Co-operative Society1. That was a suit for a declaration that an order passed by the liquidator of a co-operative society requiring the plaintiff to pay a contribution of Rs.8,000 under section 42(2)(b) of the Co- operative Societies Act was “illegal, void and of no effect, and unenforceable against the plaintiff.” It was held that the liquidator’s order was not a decree within the meaning of section 7(iv-A) and that this suit was correctly valued under Article 17-A(i) on which a court-fee of Rs.100 was rightly paid. The learned District Munsiff took the view that this order for payment of sales-tax was a decree for payment of money. The precise meaning to be attached to the word decree in section 7(iv-A) is open to some doubt; whether the ordinary dictionary meaning should be applied to it or the definition of a decree in section 2(2) in the Civil Procedure Code which gives the word a special meaning for purposes of the Civil Procedure Code. The dictionary meaning of the word varies in dictionaries to which I have referred. The dictionary meaning of the word varies in dictionaries to which I have referred. In the Universal Dictionary of the English Language by Henry Wyld the meaning given to ‘decree ‘is decision, judgment, pronouncement, formal order of a Court of justice, tribunal, high authority. There appears to be from the fiscal standpoint and from the point of view of the plaintiff no difference in substance between a decree in a suit inter partes by which he is made liable to pay a sum of money and an order by a competent tribunal or a tax levying authority by which he is similarly bound in law. In view of the decision in Govinda Chettiar v. Uthukottai Co-operative Society1, which appears to make section 7(iv-A) inapplicable, there is difficulty in bringing this plaint within any of the other provisions of the Court-Fees Act. The learned Government Pleader has taken up another position which I am also unable to accept. Conceding on the strength of Govinda Chettiar v. Uthukottai Co-operative Society1, that section 7(iv-A) cannot apply he urges that the governing section is section 7(iv)(c) which gives the plaintiff a right to value his own relief in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree or order where consequential relief is prayed for. He however argues that under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act the value of such a suit for purposes of jurisdiction must be adopted for purposes of the Court-Fees Act also. Section 8 applies to cases only where court-fees are payable ad valorem.. His argument, as I understand it, is that in a plaint of this kind the plaintiff cannot but value his suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs.2,165 on the amount of taxation which he seeks to avoid, and that it is not open to him to fix any valuation less than this for his relief under section 7(iv)(c). There are difficulties in the way of applying section 7(iv)(c). As I understand it, it gives a plaintiff a right to value his relief for a declaratory decree or order as he pleases, but not the consequential relief which depends on its nature. The consequential relief may be for a fixed sum of money or property in which case he will have to pay ad valorem court-fee if he desires to recover it. The consequential relief may be for a fixed sum of money or property in which case he will have to pay ad valorem court-fee if he desires to recover it. The consequential relief may be for an injunction in which case he appears to be entitled under section 7(iv)(d) to value it as he pleases. There are therefore difficulties in the way of applying any of the possible provisions of the Court-Fees Act to a plaint of this kind, viz., section 7(iv)(c), section 7(iv-A) or Article 17-A(i). Of these section 7(iv-A) seems to be the provision substantially applicable but for the interpretation of the word “decree” in Govinda Chettiar v. Uthukottai Co-operative Society1. For these reasons the Civil Revision Petition will be placed before the Chief Justice for reference to a Bench if he thinks fit so that there may be an authoritative decision as to the court-fee payable on such plaint. This petition coming on for hearing this day in pursuance of the Order of Reference of the High Court dated the 17th December, 1948, and made herein, the Court delivered the following judgment:- Satyanarayana Rao, J.-This civil revision petition was referred to a Bench by Mack, J., as he felt that there was a necessity for an authoritative decision as to the correct Court-fee payable on plaints like the one before him. The petitioner filed the suit in the lower Court (in the Court of the District Munsiff, Rajahmundry) (a) for a declaration “that the order of assessment of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated 24th March, 1946, was illegal so far as it related to the plaintiff’s commission business for the year 1944-45(b) and for an injunction restraining the defendants from collecting sales-tax on the plaintiff’s commission business for 1944-45(c) and for a further injunction restraining the defendants from levying sales-tax for the subsequent years on the plaintiff’s commission business.” In respect of relief (a) he paid a Court-fee of Rs.15 under Article 17-A (i) and in respect of reliefs (b) and (c) he paid a Court-fee under section 7(iv) valuing the subject-matter at Rs.10 each. In other words, he paid a Court-fee in respect of relief (b) Rs.1-2-0 and for relief (c) Rs.1-2-0. In other words, he paid a Court-fee in respect of relief (b) Rs.1-2-0 and for relief (c) Rs.1-2-0. When the matter came up before the learned District Munsiff, he was of opinion that Court-fee should be paid under section 7(iv-A) as he thought that the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer was practically a decree and called upon the plaintiff to pay Court-fee on Rs.2,165 on the ad valorem basis. When the revision petition came on for hearing before Mack, J., the petitioner contended on the strength of the decision of Venkataramana Rao, J., in Govinda Chettiar v. Uthukottai Co-operative Society1, that the view of the District Munsiff that the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer was a “decree” was wrong and the learned Judge thought that the word “decree” used in the section was capable of a wider meaning and is not restricted to the meaning given to it by Venkataramana Rao, J. In Govinda Chettiar v. Uthukottai Co-operative Society1, Venkataramana Rao, J., held that the word “decree” in the section connotes “a final order of a Court, whether civil or revenue, in a suit, and an order passed by an officer or a body which is not a Court but is invested with judicial powers in pursuance of which a liability is fixed on a person to pay a sum of money, will not come within its purview.” The case before the learned Judge was a case in which the plaintiff instituted a suit for a declaration that an order of a liquidator of a co-operative society determining the amount of contribution payable by him under section 42(2)(b) of the Co-operative Societies Act is null and void. There was no prayer in the plaint, however, asking for a consequential relief. The amount of contribution determined was a sum of Rs.8,000. The plaintiff paid a Court-fee in respect of the declaration under Article 17-A(2) of Schedule II to the Court-Fees Act of Rs.100. When the matter came before the learned District Judge who heard the matter in the first instance, he was of opinion that section 7(iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act introduced by the Madras Amending Act of 1922 applied to the case. When the matter came before the learned District Judge who heard the matter in the first instance, he was of opinion that section 7(iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act introduced by the Madras Amending Act of 1922 applied to the case. The learned Judge Venkataramana Rao, J., disagreed with the view of the trial Court and held that as the order of the liquidator was not a “decree” the Court-fee paid by the plaintiff on the plaint as one for declaration was correct. The new section 7(iv-A) was introduced by the Amending Act in the year 1922 and the Legislature must have been aware when enacting the amending section that the word “decree” had acquired a special significance and does not bear the dictionary meaning referred to by Mack, J., in his judgment. A decree always connotes as understood in law a final order of a Court in a suit, whether in a civil or revenue Court. As the proceeding before the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer was not a suit the order passed by him cannot be treated as a decree, and section 7(iv-A) does not apply to the present case. We respectfully adopt the reasoning of Venkataramana Rao, J., coming to the conclusion that an order like the one in question is not a “decree” and therefore section 7(iv-A) does not apply. In the present case, besides the declaration, there were also two consequential reliefs asked for by the plaintiff in the plaint. The plaintiff was certainly responsible for the present trouble as he valued these reliefs independently instead of valuing the reliefs under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act which clearly applies to the facts of the present case. He asked for a declaration and as consequential to that declaration prayed also for two injunctions to prevent the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer from enforcing his order in any manner. If section 7(iv)(c) applies, as we hold it does, the plaintiff is entitled to value the relief under that section and to pay Court-fee on the value so fixed by him. The value fixed by him for the purpose of section 7(iv)(c) will also be the value for purpose of jurisdiction under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. If section 7(iv)(c) applies, as we hold it does, the plaintiff is entitled to value the relief under that section and to pay Court-fee on the value so fixed by him. The value fixed by him for the purpose of section 7(iv)(c) will also be the value for purpose of jurisdiction under section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The argument of the learned Government Pleader that as the plaintiff in the present plaint valued the suit for purpose of jurisdiction in paragraph 8 of the plaint at Rs.2,165, the same should also be the value for purpose of Court-fee under section 7(iv)(c) cannot be accepted. The plaintiff valued the plaint on a particular basis and that basis is now found to be erroneous. If section 7(iv)(c) is the proper section applicable to the plaint, the plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation for purposes of Court-fee and that value will also be the value for purposes of jurisdiction in respect of suits of that kind. The plaintiff will be given liberty to amend his plaint for valuing the reliefs in paragraph 10 of the plaint under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act. That value will also be the value for purposes of jurisdiction and he will be given liberty also to amend the valuation which he has already given for purposes of jurisdiction. It is unnecessary for us at this stage to consider the question that was raised by the Government Pleader that if the plaintiff puts an arbitrary valuation which is grossly inadequate, the Court would be entitled to ask him to place a proper valuation. The question does not arise for consideration at this stage and we therefore do not propose to consider the same. In the result, this civil revision petition is allowed and the order of the District Munsiff set aside and the plaintiff will value the claim in the manner indicated in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs in this civil revision petition. K.S. ----- Petition allowed.