Judgments Kania, C.J.- I have read the judgment prepared by Mahajan, J. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the judgment and have nothing to add. Mahajan, J.-This is an appeal under section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, against an order of the Allahabad High Court releasing one Abdul Majid of Ghaziabad under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The facts are these. On the nth August, 1948, the District Magistrate of Meerut ordered the detention of Abdul Majid of Ghaziabad, for a period of fifteen days under section 3(2) of the United Provinces Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947. He was arrested on the 12th. The Governor of the United Provinces then on the 21st August, directed that he be detained in custody for a period of six months. The grounds of detention furnished to the detenu under section 5 of the Act were in these terms:- "1. That on return from Pakistan you have been indulging in false and malicious propaganda against the Indian Union Government to the effect that (a) the Indian Union want to annex the Hyderabad State, (b) the accession of Kashmir State to the Indian Union was an act of injustice on the part of the Indian Union, and (c) the living conditions in Pakistan are much better than in the Indian Union; 2. That you are exhorting the Muslims to leave the Indian Union for Pakistan to lead prosperous and happy life there; 3. That the above malicious propaganda is responsible for creating panic in the town; and 4. That it is considered absolutely essential to prevent you from carrying on the malicious propaganda which may result in a breach of the peace and prove prejudicial to the life and property of the law abiding citizens. Hence you are detained." On the 13th September, 1948, Abdul Majid moved the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1854 of 1948. He prayed that he be brought before the Court and ordered to be released after proper enquiry. It was contended that his arrest was due to some malicious persons’ information about his activities. This application was granted by Bind Basni Prasad, J., on the 20th September, 1948, and it was directed that Abdul Majid be set at liberty at once as his detention was illegal. It was contended that his arrest was due to some malicious persons’ information about his activities. This application was granted by Bind Basni Prasad, J., on the 20th September, 1948, and it was directed that Abdul Majid be set at liberty at once as his detention was illegal. A certificate was also granted under section 205(1) of the Government of India Act for preferring an appeal to this Court. The terms of the order granting the certificate are these: "The case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935. The question is whether or not the first three grounds of detention supplied to the applicant fall within the scope of the United Provinces Maintenance of Public Order (Temporary) Act, 1947, made under entry No. 1 of List II of the Seventh-Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1935." The question formulated by the certificate is not that on a proper construction of the Constitution Act, the Provincial Legislature in enacting the United Provinces Act IV of 1947, has acted outside the ambit of its legislative powers and has trespassed on the powers possessed by the Central Legislature, i.e., that it has legislated under cover of Entry 1 of List II on a subject covered by Entry 1 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. The question as worded is whether the grounds of detention furnished to Abdul Majid fall within the four corners of U.P. Act IV of 1947, i.e., the question is whether the Act has or has not been correctly applied to this particular case. In this situation it is apparent that on the face of the certificate no substantial question or any question at all of the interpretation of the Government of India Act arises. U.P. Act IV of 1947 does not deal with preventive detention in British India for reasons of State connected with defence, external affairs, etc. It concerns itself with preventive detentions for reasons connected with the maintenance of Public Order. That being so, it cannot be said that in making this law, the United Provinces Legislature was not minding its own business but was encroaching on the powers of the Federal Legislature. Mr. It concerns itself with preventive detentions for reasons connected with the maintenance of Public Order. That being so, it cannot be said that in making this law, the United Provinces Legislature was not minding its own business but was encroaching on the powers of the Federal Legislature. Mr. Banerjee, the learned Advocate-General of the Government of the United Provinces, when faced with the situation, frankly conceded that the real question to decide in the case was whether the local Act had been rightly applied to the case of Abdul Majid and whether the grounds given for his detention fell within the ambit of that Act, and that no question really arose as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935. In these circumstances, the High Court should have clearly refused to grant any certificate. The learned Advocate-General of India, who also appeared in the ease, pointed out (though not without some hesitation) that a question of the interpretation of the Constitution Act may be considered to arise in this case inasmuch as the High Court has held that the grounds of detention fall within Entry 1 of List I and not within Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. In my opinion, the fallacy of the argument is that the Lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act mark the field of legislation for the Provincial and the Federal Legislatures, they do not concern themselves with the validity of the grounds of detention of a particular person. Mr. Banerjee therefore rightly conceded that in truth no question as to the construction of the Constitution Act could be argued before us. It was rightly observed by the learned Judge below that if the activities of any person in respect of matters connected with defence or external affairs lead to communal disharmony or breach of peace, his case would come within the purview of the United Provinces Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947; he, however, was in error when he proceeded to find that the detention of Abdul Majid in this case was illegal because the grounds given for it fell outside the scope of the Act. The matters stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the statement furnished to Abdul Majid under section 5 relating to his activities were merely the particulars of the propaganda carried on by him, the ground of his detention, however, was the likelihood of a breach of public peace in the United Provinces as a result of such propaganda. The learned Judge fell into this error as the statement given to Abdul Majid under section 5 was not properly worded inasmuch what was stated in the earlier paragraphs was really subsidiary to the concluding portion of the statement. That being so, the detention of Abdul Majid was stated to be for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order and was not for reasons of State connected with defence, external affairs, etc. It may be observed in passing that a particular ground may have reference to or connection with public safety or maintenance of order in the Province and may at the same time have reference to consequences or repercussions outside the Province but that effect cannot necessarily oust the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government to pass an order under the Act provided the grounds alleged or the prejudicial act has connection with or reference to the public safety or maintenance of order in that Province. It was next argued that once a certificate had been issued, under section 205(1) of the Constitution Act, the appeal should be taken to have been properly lodged in this Court, and that in that event, even if the ground covered by the certificate is not sustainable, the appeal may be heard on other grounds. It is true that under sub-section (2) of section 205 with the leave of the Federal Court any other ground can be urged once an appeal has been admitted on a certificate, but this Court has laid down rules regulating the procedure in that respect. It is true that under sub-section (2) of section 205 with the leave of the Federal Court any other ground can be urged once an appeal has been admitted on a certificate, but this Court has laid down rules regulating the procedure in that respect. Rule 5 of Order 11, of the Rules of this Court which relates to civil appeals and has been extended to criminal Appeals by rule 8 of Order 17, runs thus: “When a party desires to appeal on grounds which can be raised only with the leave of the Federal Court the petition of appeal shall be accompanied by a separate petition indicating the grounds so proposed to be raised and praying for special leave to appeal on those grounds.” No such separate petition was made along with the petition of appeal in the present case. When the learned counsel felt that he could not argue the so-called constitutional question, he verbally asked for leave to argue the appeal on the ground that the decision of the High Court that the case fell outside the purview of the local Act was erroneous and should be set aside. It was said that this Court under Order 40, rule 1 of the Rules could, for sufficient cause, excuse the appellant from non-compliance with any of the requirements of the Rules and could allow other grounds to be urged. It is unquestionable that this Court has such a power, but it can only be exercised in exceptional cases and for sufficient cause shown for non-compliance with the Rules. Mr. Banerjee could not suggest any valid grounds for excusing non-compliance with the Rules in this particular case, and the Court is ordinarily reluctant in criminal matters, where the question concerns the liberty of a person, to waive the procedure prescribed by the Rules, and particularly when entry to this Court has been obtained on a certificate which should not have been granted All that Mr. Banerjee said on this part of the case was that a separate application for special leave was not made along with the petition of appeal, because the certificate under section 205(1) declared that the ground which was the basis of the decision was one which concerned the interpretation of the Constitution Act and that itself was the only other ground which could be urged in this case independently of the certificate. In my opinion, this is not a sufficient cause for relaxing the Rules. A separate application should have been made in the alternative in the very first instance. It could have been clearly discerned that the real question to be urged in the appeal was the one that fell within the scope of sub-section (2) of section 205 of the Act. Moreover, relaxation of the rule would prejudicially affect the respondent and in the circumstances we are not prepared to waive the procedure laid down under rule 5 for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. The oral prayer of the appellant’s learned counsel under sub-section (2) of section 205 having been refused and it being apparent that no question of the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935, falls for decision, this appeal is bound to fail and has to be dismissed, even though it seems to me that the respondent was released under a misconception of the scope and application of the local Act. The result therefore is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. S. Fazl Ali, J.-I agree. M. Patanjali Sastri, J.-I agree. B.K. Mukherjea, J.-I agree. V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.