JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - The only point raised in this appeal on behalf of the Plaintiff Appellant is whether, in a suit brought for the recovery of the money-value of produce-rent, the amount due is to be calculated on the market-value as on the date when such rent falls due or on the date when the claim is preferred. The courts below have held that the amount is to be ascertained with reference to the market-value ruling on the date when the rent falls due. 2. The suit as framed is one under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act as a suit for rent. u/s 3(13) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, "rent" means whatever is lawfully payable or deliverable in money or kind by a tenant to his landlord on account of the use or occupation of the land held by the tenant. There is no doubt that the amount payable by the tenant, whether as cash, rent or in cash in lieu of stipulated quantity of paddy is rent. 3. Under the ordinary law of contract as laid down in Section 73 of the Contract Act, the measure of damages to which the promisee is entitled in a, case of a breach of contract is the difference between the contract rate and the market rate on the date of the breach of contract : Jamal v. Moolla Dawood Sons and Co. ILR (1915) Cal. 493 : L.R. 43 IndAp 6. A suit for rent brought by a landlord against the tenant is for the recovery of the amount which is payable by the latter to the former by a particular date or dates and if such payment is not made, the landlord is also entitled u/s 68 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to damages. There is no reason why the amount assessable by a court in lieu of rent payable in kind should not be recoverable on the basis that such amount was so recoverable on the due date. 4. Mr. Sen, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, contends that whenever a provision is made in a contract either written or otherwise, for delivery of paddy in lieu of rent, that quantity of paddy is required by the landlord for his own consumption. 4. Mr. Sen, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, contends that whenever a provision is made in a contract either written or otherwise, for delivery of paddy in lieu of rent, that quantity of paddy is required by the landlord for his own consumption. If the court were to assess the amount payable on the market-value ruling on the due date, the landlord may not, on a subsequent date, be able to get the same quantity of paddy with the amount decreed in his favour. It may also be that if the rate has been marked down, the landlord will recover more than what he would have actually got on the date when the rent was payable in kind. Mr. Sen further contends that the court should pass a decree in such a way so that the land-lord may get the same quantity of paddy as he would have got from the tenant if he had delivered the paddy on the due date. This test is not the proper one to be applied. If the court were to be influenced by such extraneous facts, it may land us in an impossible position and in any view, this would introduce an uncertainty which ought to be avoided. If this principle were to be accepted, why should we limit the calculation upto the date of the decree and that also of the trial court? Why should not the calculation be left undetermined until the court is in a position to recover the same from the party? It may be argued that the amount is to be fixed by the final court of appeal when the suit is finally disposed of, or, in an extreme case, it may be contended that the amount is to be left undetermined until the execution stage. These are considerations which a court of law can never take into account. 5. The ordinary rule is that, if under an arrangement or contract, certain payments have to be made by one to another on or before a particular date, on the failure of the one to act in accordance with those terms, the defaulter should be compelled to pay the same amount as he would have been bound to pay on the date when the amount was payable together with such damages or compensation as may be payable. The provision for damages or for interest on the amount claimed makes ample provision for the extra loss which the Plaintiff might have suffered by lapse of time. 6. In one of the earliest decisions on this point, Luchmun Pershad v. Hoolas Mahtoon (1869) 2 B.L.R. 27, Norman and Jackson JJ. Held that, in a suit to recover bhowli rent, the value of the crops. is equal to the value of the crop at the time when it was the duty of the Defendant to have handed it over to the Plaintiff. If, after that time, prices had fallen, it is clear that the Defendant would have had no right to inflict on the Plaintiff the loss by giving him anything less than the equivalent of that which he would have received, if the Defendant had done his duty and handed the bhowliat rent when it became due. On the other hand, the Plaintiff has no right to make the Defendant responsible for the possible profit which he might have made by the rise of the market price if he had kept the grain. 7. In a later decision, Krishto Bundhoo Bhuttacharjee v. Rotish Shaik (1976) 25 W.R. 307, Morris J. followed the decision referred to above and further observed that-- this has been the rule recognised by our courts in dealing with suite like the present one brought for the money value of produce when the rent is payable on the matayer system. 8. It is not necessary, on the facts of the present case, to refer to those decisions where the court was called upon to interpret the terms of any written contract. In such cases, the effect of the actual provision made has to be considered. There has been a divergence of judicial opinion as to the effect of the provision in a written contract stating a definite amount being payable in lieu of a particular quantity of paddy if and when such paddy was delivered. N.R. Chatterjea and Duval JJ. held in Gurudas Sen v. Govinda Chandra Sinha (1919) 24 C.W.N. 85 that on the tenant making default in paying the landlord's share of the paddy the latter was not entitled to recover the market-value of the paddy at the time but only the fixed amount stipulated in the kabuliyat. See also Saroj Bandhu Simlai Vs. Mati Lal Ghose and Others, AIR 1928 Cal 112 . See also Saroj Bandhu Simlai Vs. Mati Lal Ghose and Others, AIR 1928 Cal 112 . In spite of a provision in the contract indicating alternative cash amount for the quantity of paddy to be delivered, it had been held in a series of decisions that the landlord was still entitled to demand the actual paddy and not the equivalent thereof as stipulated in the contract : Sohobut Ali v. Abdool Ali (1898) 3 C.W.N. 151, Akbar Alt v. Durga Kripa Sen (1900) 12 C.L.J. 589; Sheik Isaf v. Gopal Chunder Dey (1910) 12 C.L.J. 593 Hem Chandra Jelia v. Satya Kinkar Sen (1925) 43 C.L.J. 171. 9. In the present case, however, the decision must rest not on provisions contained in any written contract but on considerations of general legal principles. 10. In Juran Mandal v. Ram Mandal ILR (1927) Cal. 808, although there was a written engagement, the Kabuliyat provided the delivery of a certain quantity of paddy as rent and on failure "be dealt with "according to law". At p. 816 of the report, Suhrawardy J. stated-- It is not necessary for me to say that damages must be the market-price of the paddy at the time when the contract is sought to be enforced, for there may be other considerations which are likely to influence the court in assessing damages, though ordinarily the market price is the measure of damages. I accordingly agree in allowing the appeal and making the order which my learned brother has made. 11. Graham J. on the other hand, at p. 820 of the report simply directed that the case should go back to the court below for rehearing with the observation that-- the rent was to be payable in paddy and not in cash and that, in the event of failure to deliver it, the Plaintiff would be entitled to damages by recourse to the court. 12. As to how the amount is to be ascertained, Graham J. did not give any indication. This case, accordingly, cannot be considered to be a decision by the court on the general question now before us. 13. 12. As to how the amount is to be ascertained, Graham J. did not give any indication. This case, accordingly, cannot be considered to be a decision by the court on the general question now before us. 13. Whether the question now in issue is considered to be one of first impression or one which is covered by a Bench decision of this Court, as in the case of Luchman Pershad v. Hoolas Mahtoon (supra), it must be held that the value of the paddy is to be determined as on the date when the paddy rent became due and payable. 14. This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. S.A. No. 1246 of 1945. 15. The facts in this case are similar to those in S.A. No. 1247 of 1945, which has just been disposed of. For the reasons given in that judgment, this appeal also stands dismissed, but there will be no order for costs, as there is no appearance on behalf of the Respondents. 16. In view of the order passed above, it is not necessary to pass any order on the applications u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.