JUDGMENT : K.S. Govinda Pillai, J. The plaintiffs 1, 2, 4 to 8, 10 to 22, 24 and 25 are the appellants. The plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 10 were members of an Ezhava Tarawad consisting of two main branches. Plaintiffs and defendants 6 to 10 belong to one branch and defendants 1 to 5 to the other. The plaint properties were said to be sub-tarward properties common to both the branches and the suit is for partition of these properties under the Ezhava Act on the per capita basis. The plaintiffs stated that in 1096, the properties of this sub-tarawad were allotted for maintenance under an Anubhava Udampady Ext. A, that the branch of defendants 1 to 5 was allotted one-half of the properties, that the other half went to the branch of the plaintiffs, that defendants 15 and 16 had obtained some of the plaint properties on mortgage from the branch of defendants 1 to 5, that since these mortgages were executed to discharge the debts mentioned in Ext. A the plaintiffs admitted the same, that the plaintiff's branch had also executed a mortgage for Rs. 4,300/- to discharge a prior debt of the sub-tarward, that the plaintiffs admitted these debts, and that they were entitled to get their share from the plaint properties. Defendants 3, 6 to 13 and 16 filed written statements. The 3rd defendant while admitting the relationship between the parties contended that Ext. A was an outright partition, that the subsequent conduct of the branches also would show that Ext. A was considered an outright partition, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to claim any share from the one-half of the properties allotted to the branch of defendants 1 to 5, and that the plaintiffs wee not entitled to any relief so far as the properties that came to his branch. The 6th defendant a member of the plaintiff's branch adopted the contentions of the 3rd defendant and resisted the suit. Defendants 7 to 13 also supported defendants 3 and 6. The 16th defendant stated that he got a mortgage from the 3rd defendant for some of the plaint properties, and that the same was valid as it was executed by the 3rd defendant who had got himself divided from the plaintiffs under Ext. A. The plaintiffs filed a replication stating that Ext. The 16th defendant stated that he got a mortgage from the 3rd defendant for some of the plaint properties, and that the same was valid as it was executed by the 3rd defendant who had got himself divided from the plaintiffs under Ext. A. The plaintiffs filed a replication stating that Ext. A was only a maintenance allotment, that subsequently the properties obtained by the plaintiffs' branch were again allotted among the members of that branch for maintenance under Ext. VII, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to the reliefs claimed in the plaint. 2. At first, one of the plaintiffs alone had filed the suit and on the objection of the defendants that such a suit for partition was not maintainable the remaining plaintiffs were also added, and the suit amended by paying court fees on the market value of the share which all the plaintiffs claimed. The lower court held that the suit as amended was maintainable, that proper court fee had been paid, that Ext. A was only an allotment for maintenance and not an outright partition deed, that after the execution of Ext. A the two branches became divided by course of conduct and that, therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to any reliefs. The suit was, dismissed with costs. 3. The defendants 3 and 6 who contested the suit in the lower court had not entered appearance here. The 5th defendant (2nd Respondent) and defendants 8 and 10 (Respondents 5 and 7) alone appeared and opposed the appeal. Respondents 5 and 7 filed objection to the findings regarding the nature of Ext. A and the maintainability of the suit. 4. The main question argued in this case related to Ext. A. The plaintiffs stated that it was only an allotment for maintenance whereas the respondents contended that it evidenced an outright partition. Ext. A was executed on 4.5.1096. There were 19 adult members then in both the branches of whom 17 took part in Ext. A. Two of the adult members Sankaran Raghavan (7th defendant) and Madhavan Ponnan (21st plaintiff) were then employed in foreign countries, and so they did not join in Ext. A. Cl. 1 of Ext. A dealt with the relationship between the parties and the reason why two of the adult members did not join in Ext. A. Cl. 2 stated how the plaint properties were acquired. A. Cl. 1 of Ext. A dealt with the relationship between the parties and the reason why two of the adult members did not join in Ext. A. Cl. 2 stated how the plaint properties were acquired. The existence of some mortgages over portions of the plaint properties was mentioned there and provision had been made for redeeming the same. In Cl. 3, some decrees charged on the plaint properties on account of Devaswom dues are mentioned. It was stated that in execution of one of the decrees two items of properties had been sold and that the sale amount was to be deposited within 30 days from the date of sale. These 30 days had not expired when Ext. A was registered. It was apprehended that if the properties are enjoyed as was done before, the taxes and dues would accumulate resulting in loss of the properties to the tarawad. To avoid the same the properties were intended to be allotted into two shares for purposes of enjoyment according to their right:- XXX In the 4th and 5th Clauses the properties allotted to each branch were stated to have mentioned in the A and B schedules attached. Provision was also made for the payment of tax and the Devaswom dues charged on the properties thereby allotted. The sixth Clause dealt with the modes to be adopted to discharge the debts charged on the properties. The 7th Clause provided for the redemption of the mortgages already mentioned. The 8th Clause allowed any one of the branches to discharge the admitted debts mentioned already and for realising the excess paid by that branch. In the 9th Clause the renewal of Kanom deeds to be taken as regards Madam Vaga properties was provided for. It was stated that any one branch could advance the necessary funds for the same and realise the excess amount from the defaulting branch. After realisation of the same the right obtained under the renewals would be kept in common. XXX Cl. 10 mentioned that there were no debts charged on the properties other than those mentioned in Ext. It was stated that any one branch could advance the necessary funds for the same and realise the excess amount from the defaulting branch. After realisation of the same the right obtained under the renewals would be kept in common. XXX Cl. 10 mentioned that there were no debts charged on the properties other than those mentioned in Ext. A, that the plaint properties would not be liable for anything more than that specifically admitted, that no further debts were to be incurred, that this arrangement for enjoyment was made with the intention of improving the properties, and that no provision had been made as regards the properties of the original tarawad. The executants 1 and 2 were allowed to be in possession of the A schedule properties till their death. Similarly executants 7 and 8 were to enjoy the B schedule properties. After the death of these people, the others in each branch were to enjoy the same without alienating any of the properties. XXX These were the provisions in Cl. 11. In Cl. 12, powers were given to any one member of the tarawad to question the acts of any other who did anything contrary to the provisions in Ext. A. It was then stated that on no account Ext. A or the provisions in it were to be changed. 5. The provisions, read together, would indicate that Ext. A was intended to be a maintenance allotment and not a partition deed. Because of the mention in Cl. 12 that no change in Ext. A or its provisions was to be made, it was argued for the respondents that the same indicated a permanent arrangement, and so Ext. A was a partition deed. In construing documents of this kind all the provisions are to be read together so as to know what the intentions of the parties were. As observed in Velayudhan v. Lakshmi Pillai (3 T.L.T. 160) and Atchuthan v. Mathevan (23 T.L.J. 1031 F.B.) it may not be profitable to rely upon other documents which, themselves ambiguous in their nature had become the subject matter of judicial decisions, though the legal principles enunciated in such pronouncements may be of utility for the purpose of guidance. As observed in Velayudhan v. Lakshmi Pillai (3 T.L.T. 160) and Atchuthan v. Mathevan (23 T.L.J. 1031 F.B.) it may not be profitable to rely upon other documents which, themselves ambiguous in their nature had become the subject matter of judicial decisions, though the legal principles enunciated in such pronouncements may be of utility for the purpose of guidance. It was also pointed out there that the intention of the parties to a document must be gathered from the words and when such words are definite and unambiguous, the courts should not travel outside the words. The document which was the subject matter of interpretation in the Full Bench ruling in 23 T.L.J. 1031 was also practically like Ext. A. Under that document which was styled as a Nischayapatrom, properties were allotted to the different branches of an undivided tarawad separately, such allotments being more or less of an enduring nature. Limited powers of alienations were conferred on some of the members; but at the same time care was taken to see that the properties were not frittered away by independent dealings and the hold of each branch over the properties given to the other branches was maintained intact in order to prevent them from being lost to the tarawad. Provision was also made for averting revenue sales of the properties from negligence of the branches in possession. All alienations not expressly authorised by the documents were declared invalid. Rules were also laid down for the maintenance of a common Kalary and the performance of the ceremonies connected therewith by all the branches and also for conducting Thalikettu in the Tarawad. Their Lordships unanimously came to the conclusion that the document read as a whole constituted only a maintenance allotment and not a deed of partition. In Karthyayani Pillai v. Govindan, 19 T.L.R. 178, one of the earliest decisions of this court in interpreting documents, it was stated that in documents allotting properties for maintenance it was usual to find a prohibition against alienation of tarawad properties. The absence of such a prohibition in the document dealt with there as well as the omission to use the word "Nnehn\mbn" were considered to be two indications to treat the document as a partition deed. The absence of such a prohibition in the document dealt with there as well as the omission to use the word "Nnehn\mbn" were considered to be two indications to treat the document as a partition deed. Some of the general principles that were to guide a court to interpret a document to know whether it evidenced an outright partition or an allotment for maintenance are laid down in 13 T.L.J. 432, 21 T.L.J. 652, 22 T.L.J. 40, 26 T.L.J. 235, 27 T.L.J. 404, 28 T.L.J. 72, 32 T.L.J. 709 and 16 T.L.T. 139. In 21 T.L.J. 652, though the learned Judges agreed to the decree to be passed in that case, they came to diametrically opposite conclusions as to the nature of the document interpreted there. Mr. Justice P.K. Narayana Pillai held that the provisions in the document evidenced only an allotment for maintenance, whereas Mr. Justice K. Parameswaran Pillai came to the conclusion that it evidenced a partition deed. If it was possible to conclude definitely that the parties to the document intended the arrangement to last for ever, it has to be held that it evidenced a partition deed. If the intention is short of this, it has to be held that it is only an allotment for maintenance, though some of the provisions in the document are not against those we find in an outright partition deed. With these observations, I shall examine the provisions is Ext. A. 6. In the case of a partition deed, the parties are to give the market value of the property and to execute the document on the necessary stamp paper prescribed for such market value. Ext. A, certainly is for some valuable properties in this City. It is written using a stamp paper of half a rupee. From this, it is evident that the parties never intended Ext. A to be an outright partition deed. The document itself is called an Anubhava Udampady and not a partition deed. The allotment is made for XXX . This expression is used throughout the document. The renewal deed for the Madomvaga properties is to be taken duly in the names of both the branches. If any one branch defaulted in the same, the other branch is to spend the necessary amount and take the renewal deed in the name of that branch. This expression is used throughout the document. The renewal deed for the Madomvaga properties is to be taken duly in the names of both the branches. If any one branch defaulted in the same, the other branch is to spend the necessary amount and take the renewal deed in the name of that branch. The excess amount paid by that branch was allowed to be realised from the defaulting branch. After realising the same, it was stated that the right obtained under the renewal deed would remain in common. (Vide the expressions in Cl. 9):- XXX The parties are allowed to encumber the properties only for discharging the admitted common debts which were specifically mentioned in Ext. A. Any further alienation or encumbrance was definitely prohibited. In Cl. 12, it was provided that if anyone of the parties acted against the provisions mentioned in Ext. A, any one of the members of the tarawad was competent to question the same and to set right the mischief done. This provision give any one member of the tarawad the right to protect all the properties of his branch as well as of the collateral branch. The provision that on no account Ext. A or the provisions in it were to be altered has to be considered with reference to the law governing the parties then. No compulsory partition was allowed in 1096. Thus, as long as Ext. A remained as an allotment for enjoyment, the parties were strictly to obey the terms mentioned therein. This does not, in my opinion, indicate that the allotment was intended to last for all time to come. The several provisions, read as a whole, would, in my opinion indicate that Ext. A was only an allotment for maintenance and not an outright partition deed. I would therefore confirm the finding of the learned Munsiff that Ext. A is only an allotment for maintenance. 7. The learned Munsiff then entered a finding that by the subsequent conduct the parties became divided. In this, his view was incorrect. Ext. A was on 4.5.1096. The present suit was filed on 13.2.1108, i.e., within 12 years of Ext. A. It is open to the plaintiffs to ignore any document that came into existence subsequent to Ext. A, and to ask for the necessary relief provided the persons who took the document had also been made parties to the suit. Ext. A was on 4.5.1096. The present suit was filed on 13.2.1108, i.e., within 12 years of Ext. A. It is open to the plaintiffs to ignore any document that came into existence subsequent to Ext. A, and to ask for the necessary relief provided the persons who took the document had also been made parties to the suit. The learned Munsiff thinks that within 12 months of Ext. A the plaintiff's branch itself divided properties under Ext. VII. Ext. VII is clearly an allotment for maintenance. In it are included the properties obtained by the plaintiffs' branch under Ext. A as well as separate properties belonging to that branch. It is called an Anubhava Udampady, and all the provisions therein are only in accordance with a maintenance allotment. By no stretch of imagination could Ext. VII be called a partition deed. It was stated that one of the members of the plaintiffs' branch had executed a hypothecation bond Ext. IV on 23.7.1104. In the first place it is within 12 years of the suit. What was hypothecated was the executant's interest in the hypotheca. It is stated thus in Ext. IV:- XXX He had only a right to enjoy the property, and coming to the worst, it was only against that right that the hypothecatee could proceed. There is no other document in the plaintiffs' branch. The branch of defendants 1 to 5 had treated Ext. A as an outright partition deed and executed, on 9.12.1102, Ext. XI partition deed. This was shortly after the Ezhava Act, sanctioning partition, was passed. This suit was within 12 years of Ext. XI, and the plaintiffs could very well ignore Ext. XI and claim their share in Ext. A properties. There is, however, one document Ext. V dated 19.6.1107, a Kettotti executed by the 3rd defendant to the 15th defendant. The 3rd defendant, there, stated that he got the property absolutely under Ext. XI, that he was mortgaging 13 cocoanut trees for Rs. 120/- for the purpose of the trade he was conducting then. The plaintiffs, in paragraph 9 of the plaint, admitted this mortgage. They stated that the mortgage to the 15th defendant had been executed by the 3rd defendant to discharge the debt admitted in Ext. A, and that, therefore, they had no objection to admit the consideration for the mortgage. 120/- for the purpose of the trade he was conducting then. The plaintiffs, in paragraph 9 of the plaint, admitted this mortgage. They stated that the mortgage to the 15th defendant had been executed by the 3rd defendant to discharge the debt admitted in Ext. A, and that, therefore, they had no objection to admit the consideration for the mortgage. This was only a qualified admission made by the plaintiffs, and this would not, in any way, show that they admitted the partition deed of 1102 in the branch of defendants 1 to 5. Apart from this, there is no other document to show that by the subsequent conduct after Ext. A, the parties had attained a status of division. The finding of the learned Munsiff on this point is wrong and hence set aside. 8. Even if the finding of the lower court that the two branches had attained a status of division is upheld it was wrong to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit, for the plaintiffs could be allowed their share in the sub-tarawad properties belonging to that branch. The decree passed, could not, however, be supported. But as I have already found that the parties had not attained a status of division, the decree of the lower court has to be reversed and the case sent back for further enquiry and disposal. In the result, the decree of the lower court is set aside. The case is sent back with the direction to restore the suit to file and to pass a preliminary decree for partition, and to proceed with the case. The costs of this appeal will be paid by the respondents 2, 8 and 10. 24th Kumbhom 1124. Sankaran, J. Plaintiffs and Defendants 1 to 10 are members of two branches in a common Tarawad. These parties are Ezhavas and are governed by the provisions of the Ezhava Act. Plaintiffs and defendants 6 to 10 are members of one branch and defendants 1 to 5 belong to the other branch. The plaint properties are stated to be properties belonging to the sub-tarawad of these two branches and it is on that basis that the plaintiffs have sued for partition and recovery of their share in these properties. The contesting defendants maintain that the two branches have attained a status of division by virtue of Ext. A anubhava udampady (A\p-`h DS-¼-Sn). The plaint properties are stated to be properties belonging to the sub-tarawad of these two branches and it is on that basis that the plaintiffs have sued for partition and recovery of their share in these properties. The contesting defendants maintain that the two branches have attained a status of division by virtue of Ext. A anubhava udampady (A\p-`h DS-¼-Sn). of the year 1096 and also by the subsequent conduct of the parties. Plaintiffs on the other hand would contend that Ext. A evidences only a maintenance allotment as between the two branches. The real question for decision in this case is whether under Ext. A there has been only a maintenance allotment or there has been a complete severance of interest between the two branches in respect of the plaint properties. On a consideration of all the provisions contained in Ext. A, my learned brother Mr. Justice Govinda Pillai has come to the conclusion that Ext. A evidences only an allotment for maintenance. I regret that I am unable to agree to this conclusion. I shall state my reasons for differing from him in this respect while discussing the relevant provisions of Ext. A. Since the facts necessary for the purpose of this case have already been stated in the judgment of my learned brother, I do not propose to reiterate them. I shall content myself by referring to the important provisions of Ext. A and also to the other evidence adduced in the case in proof of the conduct of the parties. Before proceeding to construe Ext. A, I shall briefly refer to certain reported decisions of this Court which have laid down the general principles to be kept in view while construing documents like Ext. A. Cases where similar documents executed by members of Marumakkathayam Tarawads came up for construction are numerous and those reported in 14 T.L.R. 212, 19 T.L.R. 198, 3 T.L.T. 160, 21 T.L.J. 652, 22 T.L.J. 40, 23 T.L.J. 1031, 26 T.L.J. 235, 27 T.L.J. 404, 28 T.L.J. 72, 30 T.L.J. 433 and 32 T.L.J. 739 are only some of them. Since the documents construed in these cases were of varying types containing different sets of provisions, a reference in detail to these cases will not be of much help for determining the true purport of Ext. A in the present case. Since the documents construed in these cases were of varying types containing different sets of provisions, a reference in detail to these cases will not be of much help for determining the true purport of Ext. A in the present case. But certain fundamental rules of guidance as laid down in the above mentioned rulings have to be kept in mind in construing a document like Ext. A. These principles are: (1) the nomenclature of the document may not by itself afford a safe or decisive indication as to whether the arrangement under it is an outright partition or is only a maintenance allotment; (2) for a proper construction of the document all the provisions in it must be read as a whole and the intention of the parties to the document has to be gathered primarily from the document itself; (3) where the expressions used in the document are definite and unambiguous and are such as would clearly indicate the intention of the parties, the court should not travel outside such expressions in construing the document; (4) due weight has to be given to the evidence as to how the parties to the document understood it and acted upon it; and (5) if the provisions in the document clearly or by necessary implication indicate that the allotment of properties is made for all time to come without any liability to readjustment to suit the altered circumstances of the family in future, the document has to be accepted as a partition deed. This court has been consistently upholding the position that the permanency of the arrangement is a decisive test in favour of the construction of the document as a partition deed (Vide 22 T.L.J. 652, 22 T.L.J. 40, 26 T.L.J. 235, 27 T.L.J. 404 and 32 T.L.J. 739). The nature of the arrangement made under Ext. A may now be examined. Plaintiff's claim for partition of Ext. A properties can be sustained only if it is found that the properties are their Tarawad properties and that a maintenance allotment alone was made under Ext. A. Ext. A shows that two items of properties have been dealt with under it. A half share of each of these items has been included in the A schedule in Ext. A and has been set apart to the branch of defendants 1 to 5. A. Ext. A shows that two items of properties have been dealt with under it. A half share of each of these items has been included in the A schedule in Ext. A and has been set apart to the branch of defendants 1 to 5. The other half share of each of the two items has been included in the B schedule of Ext. A and has been set apart to the branch of the plaintiffs. The total extent of item 1 is seen to be 2 acres and the extent of item 2 is seen to be only 40 cents. It is further clear from the nature of the acquisitions of these items as described in Cl. (2) of Ext. A that the second item alone could be treated as the Tarwad property belonging to the two branches in common. That item is stated to have been an acquisition in the name of deceased Narayanan Mathevan who was a common Karnavan of the two branches. Naturally on his death this property devolved on the tarwad as a whole. Regarding item 1 it is stated that it was acquired in the joint names of four female members who were only junior members in the Tarawad. It is also stated that the acquisition was made with their separate funds. The aquireres were parties 1, 7 and 8 of the Ext. A and deceased Adicha who was the sister of the first party to Ext. A. From the geneology given in Ext. A it is clear that Adicha and the first party to Ext. A (same as the first defendant in the case) belonged to the branch of defendants 1 to 5 while parties 7 and 8 of Ext. A belonged to the branch of the plaintiffs. The sixth party to Ext. A who was the eldest male member and who was 57 years of age on the date of Ext. A was the common karnavan in the Tarawad. All the same it is admitted in Ext. A itself that patta for item 1 was issued in the names of the four ladies who had acquired it in their names and that it had not become a common Tarawad property on the date of Ext A. In Cl. (10) of Ext. A was the common karnavan in the Tarawad. All the same it is admitted in Ext. A itself that patta for item 1 was issued in the names of the four ladies who had acquired it in their names and that it had not become a common Tarawad property on the date of Ext A. In Cl. (10) of Ext. A it is expressly stated that the surviving three acquirers were making certain provisions regarding this property in the interests of themselves and also of their descendants. Thus there cannot be any basis for the contention that item 1 was a Tarawad property and that a maintenance allotment in respect of this item was made under Ext. A. In fact the acquirers of this item were making a settlement in respect of that property in favour of the members of their respective branches. It is not open to the members of these branches, who have acquired a right to this item by virtue of such a settlement to impeach the validity of the same. Even if the settlement is to be set aside, the property has to revert to the acquirers or in their absence to their legal representatives. The result of such reversion will be that each of the two branches claiming under two of the acquirers of the property would be getting one half share out of it. This will make no alteration in the allotment already made under Ext. A. It is also significant to note that plaintiffs have not questioned the validity of the allotment made under Ext. A. On the other hand they have accepted Ext. A as it stands and have only claimed a partition of the properties as being tarawad properties dealt with under Ext. A by way of maintenance arrangement. Since the basic claim in respect of item 1 as Tarawad property fails, the question of any maintenance allotment in respect of that item does not strictly arise for consideration. If no maintenance allotment could have been made in respect of item 1, it is not likely that there has been any such arrangement in respect of item 2 which has only a comparatively smaller extent of 40 cents and which was also taken into account in making the settlement in respect of item 1. If no maintenance allotment could have been made in respect of item 1, it is not likely that there has been any such arrangement in respect of item 2 which has only a comparatively smaller extent of 40 cents and which was also taken into account in making the settlement in respect of item 1. Assuming that the acquirers of item 1 allowed that property also to be dealt with as a common Tarawad property under Ext. A it has to be seen whether the parties to the document intended the arrangement to be permanent or only provisional. The closing portion of Cl. (12) of Ext. A is as follows: XXX In view of such a clear and unambiguous expression that Ext. A Udampady or any of the provisions of it should not be altered on any account whatever there can be no doubt that the parties intended the arrangement under Ext. A to last for ever. Thus the decisive test of permanency is unmistakably satisfied by Ext. A. All the same it may be seen whether the other provisions in the document would support the case of maintenance allotment as put forward by the plaintiffs. It is seen from Ext. A itself that on the date of the document there were 19 adult members in the two branches together. Fourteen of these members belonged to the plaintiffs' branch and the other five members belonged to the first defendant's branch. Besides these persons there were minor members also in the two branches. Calculated on the basis of the age of the parties as given in the plaint it is seen that there were 14 minor members in the plaintiffs' branch and one minor member in the first defendant's branch at the time of Ext. A. The common Karnavan also belonged to the plaintiff's branch. If the arrangement under Ext. A was really intended to provide for the maintenance of the members in the respective branches, one would naturally expect the allotment of properties to bear a reasonable proportion to the number of members in each of the branches. Since the number of members in the plaintiffs' branch was more than four times the number of members in the first defendant's branch, the properties allotted to the plaintiffs' branch should normally have been considerably larger in extent than the properties allotted to the first defendant's branch. Since the number of members in the plaintiffs' branch was more than four times the number of members in the first defendant's branch, the properties allotted to the plaintiffs' branch should normally have been considerably larger in extent than the properties allotted to the first defendant's branch. But as a matter of fact it is seen that the properties were equally shared by the two branches. It is also significant to note that the continuance of a common Karnavan was never contemplated by Ext. A. The equity of redemption of the properties outstanding on mortgage could not yield any income available for the maintenance of the members of the tarawad until those properties were redeemed by the Tarawad. Hence it is not usual to allot specific shares out of such equity of redemption also to the different branches in an ordinary arrangement for maintenance. But Ext. A shows that even the equity of redemption of the properties outstanding on mortgage was set apart to the two branches in equal shares. Ext. A states that two of the adult members of the plaintiffs' branch could not join in the execution of the Udampady because they were employed in a foreign country. No such explanation was necessary if only a maintenance allotment was being made under the document. The fact that the parties to Ext. A thought it necessary to explain the non-participation of two of the adult members of the Tarawad in the execution of Ext. A indicates that the executants were conscious that they were making a permanent division of the properties. The circumstances that prompted, them to effect such division are explained in Cl. (3) of Ext. A. After enumerating certain court decrees and sales affecting Ext. A properties it is stated that it was deemed necessary to divide the properties into two equal shares and to allot a share to each of the branches so that each branch may enjoy and deal with the properties included in that share without incurring any further debts or liabilities. In the several clauses in Ext. A repeated reference is made to a division of the properties as between the two branches. In Cl. In the several clauses in Ext. A repeated reference is made to a division of the properties as between the two branches. In Cl. (4) it is expressly stated that the properties have been divided by metes and bounds and items 1 and 2 in the A schedule have been allotted to the share of parties 1 to 5 and that items 1 and 2 of B schedule have been allotted to the share of parties 7 and 8 of Ext. A. Even though it is not specifically stated that the different sharers should obtain separate pattas in respect of the properties allotted to them, it is expressly provided in Cl. (5) that each sharer should pay the tax due in respect of his property separately. It is also stipulated that the properties outstanding on mortgage should be redeemed separately by the tow branches on payment of the proportionate mortgage amount due in respect of the respective shares. It is seen from Cls. (6), (7), (10) and (11) that the Special rights of parties 1, 2, 7 and 8 over the properties included in Ext. A have been recognised by the other parties also. In the latter part of Cl. (10) it is stated that the persons other than the acquirers of the properties have also been allowed to join in the execution of Ext. A so that it may be in the future interests of themselves and of the acquirers. Cl. (II) shows that the descendants of the acquirers did not derive any present or immediate right over the properties included in Ext. A. That clause states that the properties included in the A schedule were to be enjoyed by parties 1 and 2 of Ext. A during their lifetime and only after their death the other members of their branch were entitled to enjoy those properties. Similarly the properties included in the B schedule were to be enjoyed by parties 7 and 8 during their lifetime and only thereafter the members of their branch could obtain possession of these properties. This provision is totally inconsistent with plaintiffs' case that the arrangement under Ext. A was for the maintenance of the members of the two branches. Cl. (10) makes a reservation to the effect that no provision is made under Ext. A in respect of the ancestral properties belonging to the executants of the document. This provision is totally inconsistent with plaintiffs' case that the arrangement under Ext. A was for the maintenance of the members of the two branches. Cl. (10) makes a reservation to the effect that no provision is made under Ext. A in respect of the ancestral properties belonging to the executants of the document. No such reservation was called for if Ext. A was only intended to be a maintenance allotment. The anxiety to expressly reserve the right over the ancestral properties suggests that the parties were making a permanent division in respect of the properties dealt with under Ext. A. The provision in Cl. (8) of Ext. A lends considerable support to this inference. That clause provides that, in case any branch fails to discharge the debts set apart to the share of that branch, it will be open to the other branch to discharge such portion of the debts also and then to realise the amount of such debts from the members of the defaulting branch and also from the properties set apart to the share of that branch. If there was only a maintenance allotment under Ext. A, the properties would have continued to be common tarawad properties and the items set apart to one branch could not be proceeded against and sold for realisation of any debt which that branch was obliged to pay. The right given to one branch to proceed against the properties set apart to the share of the other branch is a conclusive indication that the arrangement under Ext. A was an outright partition with no further common interest surviving in favour of both the branches in respect of the properties dealt with under the document. As against all the above mentioned outstanding features of Ext. A, which are decidedly in favour of the conclusion that a permanent partition arrangement was made under the document, only circumstances that could be urged in support of the case that only a maintenance allotment was made under Ext. As against all the above mentioned outstanding features of Ext. A, which are decidedly in favour of the conclusion that a permanent partition arrangement was made under the document, only circumstances that could be urged in support of the case that only a maintenance allotment was made under Ext. A are the statement in the document itself that the division is effected for the separate enjoyment of the properties by the two branches, the provision that even if one branch is to redeem the entire property outstanding on mortgage the share of the other branch is liable to be surrendered to that branch on payment of the proportionate mortgage amount due from that branch, the provision that even if renewals are taken in respect of the Devaswom properties by one branch alone the right will enure to the benefit of both the branches subject to the liability of the other branch to pay their share out of the amount paid to the Devaswom for obtaining the renewal, and the absolute prohibition regarding the alienation of the properties except for the payment of the debts specified in the Udampady, and the right conferred on the members of both the branches to question all such unauthorised alienations. I think that these provisions are not inconsistent with the dominant idea of the permanent settlement underlying Ext. A. On the other hand, the stipulation that the branch taking a renewal of the Devaswom properties or redeeming the entire property outstanding on mortgage is bound to surrender one-half share out of such properties to the other branch on receipt of the proportionate amount due from that branch is in conformity with the position that each branch has acquired a separate and permanent right over the properties set apart to the share of the branch. Coming to the provision regarding restraint against alienation, it is seen from Cl. (11) of Ext. A that an absolute restraint is imposed on all kinds of alienation. Cl. (10) prohibits the incurring of any debt other than those expressly provided for in the document. Such an absolute restraint against alienation in general is opposed to public policy and is void. (11) of Ext. A that an absolute restraint is imposed on all kinds of alienation. Cl. (10) prohibits the incurring of any debt other than those expressly provided for in the document. Such an absolute restraint against alienation in general is opposed to public policy and is void. These provisions were inserted in the document evidently as a result of the anxious wish and vain hope of the executants of the document to prevent the dissipation of the assets set apart to the respective branches and to conserve such assets for the sole benefit of the members of these branches for ever. In spite of such provisions there is nothing to indicate that the parties to the document intended to disturb the allotments already made and make any readjustment on any future occasion. The idea of the parties that the properties allotted to the two branches should never be alienated by the members of the branches appears to have promoted them to describe the arrangement as an allotment for enjoyment (A\p-`-hw) and to call the document an Anubhava Udampady (A\p-`-h DS-¼-Sn). No greater significance can be attached to the nomenclature of the document. It is also significant to note that there is no mention at all anywhere in the document that the allotment is for the maintenance of the members of the two branches. It cannot be that the significant word "Nnehn\mbn"' was unknown to these parties. This word appears to have been deliberately and scrupulously avoided from Ext. A, evidently because the arrangement was not meant to be a mere allotment for maintenance. The next aspect to be considered is how the parties themselves understood the arrangement Ext. A. Since the plaintiffs have brought the present suit within twelve years from the date of Ext. A udampady, it cannot be said that, if the allotment under the document was only a maintenance allotment to start with, the two branches have attained a status of division by long course of conduct. The time for impeaching the documents executed by the members of the respective branches, which would indicate that they had attained a status of division, had not elapsed on the date of the suit. All the same the conduct of the parties would be strictly relevant and helpful for ascertaining how the parties to Ext. A understood the arrangement made under it. Ext. All the same the conduct of the parties would be strictly relevant and helpful for ascertaining how the parties to Ext. A understood the arrangement made under it. Ext. VII dated 15.4.1097 is the earliest document that was brought into existence after Ext. A. Ext. VII is an udampady executed exclusively by the members of the plaintiff's branch within one year from the date of Ext. A. This udampady was executed in respect of all the properties which belonged to that branch exclusively. Items 2, 3 and 4 of Ext. VII are the properties which this branch got under Ext. A udampady. Cl. (2) of Ext. VII refers to these properties as the properties set apart to the share of the plaintiffs' branch under Ext. A. It is also significant to note that under Ext. VII these properties were put on a par with the other properties over which the plaintiffs' branch had absolute and exclusive rights and were treated alike in making the allotment under Ext. VII. On 23.10.1104 one of the members of the plaintiffs' branch hypothecated the properties which he got to his share under Ext. VII udampady. Ext. IV is the copy of that hypothecation bond and it shows that the executant dealt with the property as belonging to him absolutely as per Ext. VII udampady. It is also seen that some of the members of the plaintiffs' branch had leased out the properties which they got under Ext. VII. Ext. II is the copy of the plaint in O.S. 803 of 1111 instituted for recovery of the properties on the strength of such a lease deed. The plaintiffs in that case have stated in Ext. II that the properties belonged to them absolutely. The conduct of the members of the plaintiffs' branch as evidenced by Exts. VII, IV and II clearly indicates that they understood and accepted the arrangement under Ext. A as an outright partition. Exts. XI and V show that the members of the branch of defendants 1 to 5 also understood Ext. A in the same light. Ext. XI dated 9.12.1102 is a partition deed executed by the members of this branch in respect of the properties which were allotted under Ext. A. Ext. A as an outright partition. Exts. XI and V show that the members of the branch of defendants 1 to 5 also understood Ext. A in the same light. Ext. XI dated 9.12.1102 is a partition deed executed by the members of this branch in respect of the properties which were allotted under Ext. A. Ext. XI is styled as a partition deed and, in view of the clear provisions in it, there is no scope for any doubt that it is an out and out partition deed. One of the sharers under Ext XI executed Ext. V otti deed in respect of 13 cocoanut trees standing in the property which he got to his share under Ext. XI. He has described the property as belonging to him absolutely and exclusively and the consideration under the document is stated to have been received for the purpose of his own trade. Plaintiffs have not impeached this document. On the other hand, the validity of this document is admitted by them in paragraph (9) in the plaint. No doubt, they have stated that Ext. V was executed for discharging a common debt recognised in Ext. A and that therefore they are willing to contribute their share of Ext. V debt. There is no basis for these statements. Ext. V itself makes it clear that it was not executed for the discharge of any common Tarwad debt, but that the debt under the document was incurred for the sole benefit of the executant himself. Plaintiffs' admission that Ext. V is valid virtually amounts to an admission of the validity of Ext. XI partition deed executed by the members of the branch of defendants 1 to 5. The wife and children of deceased Narayanan Govindan who was a member of that branch have been impleaded in this case as defendants 11 to 14. Plaintiffs have not stated that these defendants have been impleaded as persons in possession of any portion of the plaint properties. It appears that these defendants have been impleaded as the heirs of deceased Narayanan Govindan in respect of the properties which fell to his share under Ext. XI. If the properties continued to be common Tarwad properties, deceased Narayanan Govindan could not be said to have had any definite share in them and defendants 11 to 14 could not have been impleaded to represent any such separate share. XI. If the properties continued to be common Tarwad properties, deceased Narayanan Govindan could not be said to have had any definite share in them and defendants 11 to 14 could not have been impleaded to represent any such separate share. It may also be mentioned in this connection that plaintiffs have not impeached Exts. VII, IV, XI and V and have not sought to get these documents set aside. On a consideration of Ext. A Udamapady in all the above mentioned aspects, I am clearly and definitely of the opinion that the arrangement under it was not intended to be a maintenance allotment but was meant to be a permanent partition under which each of the two branches obtained absolute rights in respect of the properties set apart to that branch. The lower court's finding that Ext. A is only an allotment for maintenance is therefore set aside and to that extent the objection memorandum filed by respondents 5 and 7 is allowed. The other points raised in the objection memorandum were not pressed at the time of hearing. These points relate to the findings on issues 1, 7 and 9 dealing with the maintainability of the suit and the jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain the suit. The findings on these questions in favour of the plaintiffs do not call for any interference. The only other point that remains for consideration is whether the present suit could be treated as a suit for partition of the properties which fell to the share of plaintiffs' branch under Ext. A. The suit was framed on the basis that the plaint properties belonged to the common Tarwad of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 10. Such a suit cannot be treated as a suit for partition of some of the items as belonging exclusively to the branch of the plaintiffs. As already pointed out, Ext. A was followed by another Udampady Ext. VII by the members of the plaintiff's branch. The question whether under Ext. VII the members of the plaintiffs' branch have attained a status division can be agitated only in a proper suit as between the members of that branch. As already pointed out, Ext. A was followed by another Udampady Ext. VII by the members of the plaintiff's branch. The question whether under Ext. VII the members of the plaintiffs' branch have attained a status division can be agitated only in a proper suit as between the members of that branch. Even defendants 6, 8 and 10 who are members of the plaintiffs' branch and who have resisted the present suit, had no occasion in this case to join issue with the present plaintiffs on the question whether the members of the plaintiffs' branch have attained a status of division or not. All the properties exclusively belonging to that branch have not also been included in the present suit. Under these circumstances the present suit cannot be treated as a suit for partition of the properties of the plaintiffs' branch. For any such relief plaintiffs have necessarily to institute a fresh suit in respect of all the properties belonging to that branch and with necessary parties on record. In the result I reverse the finding of the lower court that Ext. A is only an allotment for maintenance and hold that under Ext. A the two branches attained a status of division with no further community of interest as between them in respect of the plaint properties. It follows therefore that plaintiffs' suit for partition and recovery of their share out of the properties set apart to the branch of defendants 1 to 5 under Ext. A is not maintainable. The lower court's finding that the two branches have attained a status of division is confirmed. Accordingly the lower court's decree is upheld and this appeal is dismissed with costs. The objection memorandum is allowed only to the extent already indicated and is dismissed in other respects. 24th Kumbham 1124. Koshi, J. This appeal has been referred to me for decision by the learned Chief Justice, as the two learned Judges who heard it in the first instance differed in their conclusions as to its disposal. The appeal arose from a suit for partition instituted by certain members of an Ezhava family before the District Munsiff's Court at Trivandrum. That Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the family was already divided and the suit not maintainable. The plaintiffs' appeal against that decision was heard by a Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. The appeal arose from a suit for partition instituted by certain members of an Ezhava family before the District Munsiff's Court at Trivandrum. That Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the family was already divided and the suit not maintainable. The plaintiffs' appeal against that decision was heard by a Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. Justice Govinda Pillay and they delivered separate and differing judgments. The case was therefore referred for decision originally to Mr. Justice Habeeb Mohammad. All these took place while the case was on the file of the Travancore High Court. Since the integration, as Mr. Justice Habeeb Mohamed is on leave, the learned Chief Justice directed the case to be placed before me. The case was very elaborately argued by Mr. T.R. Subramania Iyer for the appellants and Mr. Kayalam Parameswaran Pillay and Mr. M. Madhavan Nair for the respondents. However, in view of the elaborate and, if I may say so, the exhaustive judgments delivered by Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. Justice Govinda Pillay I shall content myself with a short judgment setting out my conclusion and the reasons therefor. 2. The question in this appeal turns on the construction of Ext. A, the point for decision being-whether it is a family arrangement for maintenance or an out and out partition. Ext. A was executed on 4.5.1096 by all the then members of the sub-tarawad of the plaintiffs and defendants except two who had gone abroad and have since returned. The plaintiffs who regarded the document as merely an arrangement for maintenance, instituted this suit to obasin partition and separation of their shares. The contesting defendants contended that Ext. A was an out and out partition and had been acted upon as such. While holding that Ext. A amounted only to an arrangement for maintenance the Court below dismissed the suit on the ground that the parties had, by their subsequent conduct and dealing with the properties, established a status of division. In the appeal both Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. Justice Govinda Pillay agreed that as the suit was instituted on 3.6.1111, well within 12 years of Ext. A, no subsequent conduct or dealing with the properties could bring about an effective or enduring divided status between the parties and that the decision of the case must depend upon the true construction of the document. Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. Justice Govinda Pillay agreed that as the suit was instituted on 3.6.1111, well within 12 years of Ext. A, no subsequent conduct or dealing with the properties could bring about an effective or enduring divided status between the parties and that the decision of the case must depend upon the true construction of the document. Mr. Justice Sankaran took the view that Ext. A is, to all intents and purposes, a partition arrangement and not a mere arrangement for maintenance. His learned Colleague took the opposite view. The argument before me was naturally confined to this aspect of the case and I need only decide whether Ext. A evidences a mere arrangement for maintenance or it amounts to an out and out partition. 3. The circumstances which brought Ext. A into existence as also other relevant facts necessary for the decision of the case and the various clauses of the document are clearly set out in the Judgments delivered by the learned Judges of the Division Bench and I shall not attempt to repeat them here. The learned Judges have also, with reference to the Travancore case law bearing on the subject, stated what the general rules to guide a court in the decision of the question involved are. It is unnecessary for me to refer to those cases again. I shall however add that decided cases in Cochin lay down more or less the same rules as guides, to decide whether a particular document is a mere allotment for maintenance or an out right partition. See Padmanabha Menon v. Sivarama Menon (6 C.L.R. 460), Chenu Amma v. Ramankutty Menon (16 C.L.R. 202), Kunjumenon v. Meenakshi Amma (18 C.L.R. 459), Kunchi Amma v. Achyuthan Nayar (19 C.L.R. 54), Madhavi Amma v. Kunji Amma (20 C.L.R. 221) and Thevunni Menon v. Komu Menon (25 C.L.R. 674). In the earliest of these cases Padmanabha Menon v. Sivarama Menon (6 C.L.R. 460), it was held that the true juristic nature of a transaction evidenced by a document was to be determined not by the name given to the document, but by the intention of the parties as gathered from its various provisions. To use the language of the decision itself the true nature of a document was to be determined not by the name given to it but by the operative and substantial portions thereof. To use the language of the decision itself the true nature of a document was to be determined not by the name given to it but by the operative and substantial portions thereof. That decision emphasises three features as indicative of an intention to divide. They are: (1) the absence of a provision for a common Karanavan, (2) a per capita distribution of the assets and liabilities among the several disintegrating units, and (3) the permanency of the arrangement. In Kunchi Amma v. Achyuthan Nayar (19 C.L.R. 54), it was held: "the question whether a family karar amounts to an outright partition or a mere family arrangement has to be decided with reference to the intention of the parties and that intention has to be gathered primarily from the express terms of the karar itself. Where the terms are conflicting they have to be construed with reference to their comparative merits in order to ascertain the principal intention of the parties. Where the terms of a karar transfer in favour of the various thavazhies into which the family is divided substantive rights arising out of ownership in property, viz., rights of possession, management and enjoyment, nothing substantial remains to be preserved in common and the arrangement evidences an intention to effect an out and out division. Terms providing for retention of common ownership partake of the character of restraints against alienation and do not extend, curtail or qualify the otherwise unrestricted rights and powers transferred to the various small independent groups." More or less the same principles are enunciated in the other cases as well and on analysis it would be found that in substance, they are practically the same rules, as laid down by the decisions of the Travancore High Court, referred to in the judgments of my learned colleagues. 4. I have carefully examined the provisions in Ext. A, in the light of both sets of decisions, and though a conclusion is by no means easy, keeping in view the wholesome rule that where the terms are conflicting they have to be construed with reference to their comparative merits in order to ascertain the true intention of the parties, I am inclined to agree with the view taken by Mr. Justice Sankaran that Ext. A is to all intents and purpose an out-right partition and that the present suit must fail on that ground. Mr. Justice Sankaran that Ext. A is to all intents and purpose an out-right partition and that the present suit must fail on that ground. Mr. Justice Sankaran has dealt with all possible aspects of the case and it would be presumptuous on my part to attempt to add to or to improve upon the grounds tending to the conclusion which he arrived at. Nevertheless, I must state my reasons. 5. The fact that the bulk of the properties dealt with under Ext. A did not form sub-tarwad property and the further fact that the branches as such are to start to enjoy the properties allotted to each of them only after the life-time of the surviving acquirers, influence me greatly to take the view that the parties did not intend the arrangement evidenced by Ext A to be a mere arrangement for maintenance. That the immediate occasion to bring such an arrangement into being, was the apprehended danger that the family might lose the entire property on account of the debts then existing, almost tends to the same conclusion. When the members of a family make an arrangement for maintenance, it is not natural or reasonable to expect they would postpone its operation until after the life-time of three or four living persons. It is the immediate needs that the parties will have in mind for a maintenance arrangement. 6. Another important factor which influences me in the decision of the case is the provision in the document that the arrangement made thereunder shall in no wise and on no account be disturbed. At a time when there was no right of compulsory partition among the members of the Ezhava community if the members of this sub-tarawad thought that they should make an arrangement which should endure for all time, to me the conclusion appears to be irresistable that the parties meant or intended a partition arrangement and nothing short of it. The Ezhava Act which allows the parties the privilege of partition is not intended, in my opinion, to disturb and unsettle such permanent arrangements, which, in the absence of the Act, the parties will admittedly not be entitled to do. The Ezhava Act which allows the parties the privilege of partition is not intended, in my opinion, to disturb and unsettle such permanent arrangements, which, in the absence of the Act, the parties will admittedly not be entitled to do. The liability to a revision is, if I may say so, the hall-mark of a maintenance arrangement and when the possibility of a revision is in express terms taken away, it is difficult for me to persuade myself to hold that Ext. A is a maintenance arrangement. When no revision or redistribution can be made in the event of changes in the circumstances of the family such as fluctuations in the numerical strength of the two dividing branches it is difficult to hold a mere maintenance arrangement alone was intended. 7. One branch consisted of as many as 14 adults and 14 minors while the other had only 5 adults and one minor. It is a per stripes division or distribution that is made and not a per capita one. That again is an indication that a partition was intended. If it were a maintenance arrangement properties would have been distributed according to the numerical strength of the two branches and not an equal division into two. In a recent unreported decision of the Travancore High Court, Padmanabhan Gopalan v. Raman Narayanan (S.A. No. 607 of 1121) Krishnaswami Aiyer, C.J. remarked that prior to the Ezhava Act, Sakha or branch division was very much more prevalent according to usage than per capita division. That was also a suit for partition and like the case on hand, its decision depended on the true construction of a document which like Ext. A in this case the parties had named as an Anubhava Udampady. Analysing the various clauses of that document the learned Chief Justice, with whom Simon, J. concurred, held the document to evidence an out-right partition and not a mere maintenance arrangement. The following extract from that decision would be helpful in this context: "The division or distribution has to be according to the Sakhas. The parties being Ezhavas, Sakha division was very much more prevalent according to usage than per capita division. The Ezhava Act was passed in 1100 and this division was effected in 1095, five years before. The other terms of the document are definitely in favour of a partition rather than a temporary arrangement for distributive enjoyment. The parties being Ezhavas, Sakha division was very much more prevalent according to usage than per capita division. The Ezhava Act was passed in 1100 and this division was effected in 1095, five years before. The other terms of the document are definitely in favour of a partition rather than a temporary arrangement for distributive enjoyment. There is a provision for the making of improvements which is unusual in the case of an undivided tarawad. Karanavan ............................................The other branches are allotted different schedules of properties. They are asked to pay taxes separately ................................................................... Liability to pay the debts has been settled under Ext. A (the document concerned in that case). There is a provision that each branch may of its own accord by alienation or otherwise raise a sum of money not exceeding 2140 fanams. This is consistent with the divided status. Any borrowings beyond the amount is restrained by the requirement of consent from the other members. Such restraints in respect of alienations of an extravagant kind are conceived more in the interests of branches than an indication of an undivided tarawad." There is a provision for the contribution by all the four branches for the common ceremonies and for the recovery in case of default in respect of such contributions by resort to legal proceedings against the properties allotted to the defaulting branches. Taking all the surrounding circumstances regarding Ext. A it seems impossible to us to resist the conclusion that the Ezhava tarawad was divided according to the branches or Sakhas under Ext. A." It need hardly be observed that most of the features that induced the learned Judges in that case to interpret the document before them as evidencing a partition arrangement are present in Ext. A in this case as well and the view Mr. Justice Sankaran took in this case gains considerable support from that unreported decision. Earlier in that judgment the learned Chief Justice had said:- "The operative portion of the document explains why Ext. A came to be executed. The document states that it was found by the members of the tarwad, that it was better for the members of the tar wad and also for the preservation of the properties that they should divide the properties and enjoy the same. XXX The implication of these words is strong that the enjoyment was to follow on a partition........................". Cl. 3 of Ext. XXX The implication of these words is strong that the enjoyment was to follow on a partition........................". Cl. 3 of Ext. A, the relevant words of which are extracted in the judgment of Mr. Justice Govinda Pillay, contains almost similar ideas and words. The use of the words XXX are significant. A partition necessarily implies an arrangement as to enjoyment also. The implication of the words XXX is to my mind that the enjoyment was to follow on a partition. 8. The foregoing considerations together with such circumstances as the absence of a provision for a common Karanavan and that all available sub-tarwad properties and debts are dealt with under Ext. A compel me to take the view that the combined effect of all the relevant provisions of the document is to infer that the parties sought to effect thereunder an out-right division. Everything which makes property valuable has been transferred to the respective branches. Any restraint on the right of free disposal would be void for repugnancy if, but for it, there was a complete separation and the view I take in agreement with Mr. Justice Sankaran is that such a separation was brought about by the document. A provision such as that unauthorised alienations can be questioned by any member of the sub-tarwad is rather illusory and if anything has only a sentimental and not a marketable value. 9. No great reliance can be placed on the value of the stamp paper used for Ext. A. The point raised by the learned Advocates for the respondents that the stamp paper used is insufficient value even for a maintenance arrangement to be engrossed upon it was not sought to be controverted by the appellant's learned Advocate. The repeated use of the word ""A\p-`-h-¯n\mbn'' only shows that the members were anxious that the properties should not go out of the family. As stated earlier a partition necessarily implies an arrangement as to enjoyment also. It has repeatedly been held that the name the parties give to a document may at best help its interpretation and not determinate it. To quote Uthwatt, J. (as he then was):- "No label can create a fact; a label may accurately describe a fact or it may misdescribe it, or may help to the solution of a doubtful question of interpretation. To quote Uthwatt, J. (as he then was):- "No label can create a fact; a label may accurately describe a fact or it may misdescribe it, or may help to the solution of a doubtful question of interpretation. What the parties have done - not their description of it - is the determining consideration". Samuel v. Salmon & Gluckstein Ltd. (1946) 1 Ch. 8 at page 13. 10. When the terms of a document are capable of two constructions, it is relevant to look into how the parties understood those terms. In North Eastern Railway v. Hastings (Lord) (1900) A.C. 260 t p. 270 Lord Brampton said:- "I grant that if the clause were capable of two constructions, one of which would support, the other of which would defeat the claim, the omission would afford irresistible proof that the latter was the interpretation intended by the parties". Judged by that test, the conclusion I have arrived at receives added strength from the subsequent conduct and dealings of the parties. This aspect is fully discussed by Mr. Justice Sankaran in his judgment and I do not wish to travel over the same ground here. To conclude, I agree with the conclusion which Mr. Justice Sankaran reached in this case and the reasons therefore given in his judgment. I also agree to the decree proposed by that learned Judge to confirm the lower Court's judgment and decree and to dismiss the appeal with costs. Dismissed.