Judgment Manohar Lall, J. 1. This is an appeal by the defendants who are aggrieved by the concurrent decisions of the Courts below by which they have decreed the plaintiffs suit. The question for decision is whether the appellants as raiyat have a right to grow lac on the trees standing on their holding. 2. The facts alleged are that the plaintiff is the patnidar of village Damda from before the time of the survey settlement operations which took place about the year 1922. No palas trees fit for lac rearing were found on the lands belonging to the plaintiff which were recorded as khewat No. 2 under the Gorabadi khatian No. 117; but subsequently some palas trees grew up on those lands. On 9-6-1924, the plaintiff settled all the trees standing in village Damda by a registered kabuliat with certain lessees who relinquished the settlement on 6-10-1933 and surrendered all the trees with the lac thereon in favour of the plaintiff. 3. The appellants held in that period some lands in this village as ordinary tenants; but owing to a dispute between the appellants and the landlord, Mukunda Majhi, the predecessor of the appellants, claimed some khas lands of the plaintiff as within the ambit of his jote, and thereupon Title Suit No. 493/503 of 1928 was instituted by the appellants in the Court of the Munsif of Purulia, but that suit was compromised on 6-3-1929, and a compromise decree was drawn up on the terms that the lands in suit were recognised to be tenancy of the appellants at Rs. 5 a year. This compromise decree having been found to be unregistered has not been relied upon by the Courts below, or before us. 4. The cause of action for the present suit instituted on 8-4-1944, was that in the year 1934 the appellants forcibly cut away the lac standing on the palas trees on their holding and the plaintiff was unsuccessful in the criminal Court in a case which he had instituted against the appellants for theft. The plaintiff states that since 1935 he has been dispossessed from the trees. 5. The plaintiff states that since 1935 he has been dispossessed from the trees. 5. The defence to the action was that the plaintiff was never in possession of the trees in suit, that the story of the settlement of those trees with a third person is not true and the defendants had all along been in possession of those trees and their possession was affirmed by the compromise decree. 6. It should be stated that the plaintiffs case that there was a custom in the village by which the tenants had no right whatsoever on the self-grown palas trees standing on his holding has not been established on the evidence. The only question for decision, therefore, is whether in the circumstances of the present case the right to rear lac on the trees. and the title to the trees are with the defendants or with the plaintiff. 7. If Sec.21A, introduced in the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 , by Bihar Act xxv [25] of 1947, is held to be retrospective, then the plaintiff has no case whatsoever, because by Sub-clause. (a) (iv)of that section the raiyat is expressly given right to rear lac and cocoons on the trees standing on his land and appropriate the same provided that there is no specific entry in the-record of rights to the contrary. In the present case there is no specific entry in the record of rights to the contrary, and the allegation of custom has been already found to be non-existing. The terms of this new Sub-clause appears to be retrospective, otherwise no references would have been made to the entry in the record of rights. 8. But it is unnecessary to have recourse to the retrospectivity of this new section, because on the facts found the plaintiff has no title or subsisting title to the trees in suit. 9. It is admitted that the trees are on the lands in possession of the defendants, and" therefore, prima facie in their possession. The solitary act of possession which the plaintiff alleges is that he reared lac on the trees which was removed by the defendants in 1934. The finding of the appellate Court is not clear or satisfactory. 9. It is admitted that the trees are on the lands in possession of the defendants, and" therefore, prima facie in their possession. The solitary act of possession which the plaintiff alleges is that he reared lac on the trees which was removed by the defendants in 1934. The finding of the appellate Court is not clear or satisfactory. All he says at p. 14 is: "The plaintiff has adduced evidence that in 1341 B. S. he reared lac on the trees standing on the disputed lands but the defendants cut and removed the same in Kartik 1341 B. S. . . . I have no reason to disbelieve this evidence of the plaintiff as he would never have allowed the defendant to set lac on the trees-which were never settled with them along with the lands. The defendants have failed to prove that they have any right in the trees." This finding of possession by a solitary act in. 1341 B. s. is based materially upon the finding; that the title was with the plaintiff and not with the defendants. I have perused the evidence adduced in this case, and I am of the opinion that the Courts below should not have accepted the plaintiffs evidence of possession. But as there is a finding of fact, however unsatisfactory it may appear to be, I must assume that the possession was somehow with the-plaintiff in 1934. 10 But has the plaintiff established that he has any title to the trees in question? The trees were self-growing on the land in possession of the defendants. The plaintiff did not claim the right to such trees in the record of rights, nor can he rely upon the statements-made in the compromise decree, because that decree is inadmissible in evidence. The right to the trees would, therefore, go along with the land in possession of the defendants unless the plaintiff establishes that he at the time of the original settlement with the defendants had reserved the right to go upon the land in possession of the defendants and put lac on the trees that may come into existence later on. The right to the trees would, therefore, go along with the land in possession of the defendants unless the plaintiff establishes that he at the time of the original settlement with the defendants had reserved the right to go upon the land in possession of the defendants and put lac on the trees that may come into existence later on. As I have said above, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the terms of the compromise decree, and in the absence of any evidence whatsoever as to the terms upon which the original settlement of the land was made with the defendants, the plaintiff could only succeed on the question of custom which he had set up in the plaint. The custom having been found non-existent on the evidence, the plaintiff, in my opinion, has failed to prove that he has any title to the trees which admittedly stand on the lands rightly in the possession of the defendants. 11. I now proceed to consider some of the cases which have been placed before us. 12. The leading case is Rai Charan Mahanti V/s. Kanai Kumar, 24 C. L. J. 21 : (A. I. R. (4) 1917 Clause. 226). In that case the learned Judges were construing a kabuliat by which the lessor had reserved property in the trees growing on the leasehold land and the lessee was prohibited from taking them away although they were given enjoyment of the fruits and flowers of the trees only at the permission of the lessor. Nevertheless, it was held that this ownership in the trees did not carry with it a right to go on the land of the lessee to cultivate shellac on the trees reserved. In my opinion, this case exactly fits in the circumstances of this case. Moreover I cannot see any justification for the plaintiff to insist on going on the land of the defendants to cultivate lac on the trees. If this is allowed to be done it would mean unjustifiable interference with the right of the defendants to enjoy every portion of their land, and in view of the unhappy relations between the parties this would also lead to constant breaches of the peace. 13. This case was referred to with approval in Upendra Singh V/s. Surjan Singh, 8 Pat. 266: (A. I. R. (16) 1929 Pat. 13. This case was referred to with approval in Upendra Singh V/s. Surjan Singh, 8 Pat. 266: (A. I. R. (16) 1929 Pat. 328), the facts of this case, however, are distinguishable because it was found that the lease was both of the land and of the trees. The head-note states that in the district of Ranchi where a raiyat clearing land for cultivation conserves a tree, he is not liable by custom or otherwise to pay rent or a tax in respect of the tree if he cultivates lac on it, unless on a stipulation in the original settlement to that effect. This head-note correctly states the decision and supports me in the view that it is for the plaintiff to prove that there was a stipulation in the original settlement to the effect that if the raiyat cultivates lac on the trees, he must pay a tax or rent therefor. It will be observed that even in such a case the landlord has no right to go on the land to cultivate lac upon it, but the right to cultivate lac is with the raiyat. 14. Mr. Chatterji cited before us some cases including Nawagarh Coal Co. Ltd. V/s. Behari Lal, l Pat. L. J. 275 : (A. I. R. (3) 1916 Pat. 69), to support his argument that there is an implied reservation of incidental rights in the landlord. But those cases are cases of mining leases and have no bearing upon the facts of the present case. 15. For these reasons, I would reverse the decision of the Courts below and dismiss the plaintiffs suit. The plaintiff should pay half the costs to the defendants in all the Courts. Ramaswami, J. 16 I agree.