JUDGMENT Das, J. - This appeal is at the instance of the Defendant and is directed against the judgment and decree, dated March 29, 1945, passed by Mr. P.P.I. Vaidyanathan, learned District Judge, Malda, affirming on appeal the judgment and decree,, dated November 17, 1944, passed by Mr. S.C. Chakrabarti, learned Subordinate Judge, Malda, decreeing the Plaintiff's suit. 2. The Plaintiff's case was that the disputed property-appertained to two jamas held by the Defendants under Sadek Reja. The latter instituted a suit for rent and recovered a decree. In execution of the decree, the property was put up to-sale and was purchased by Charu Chandra Sarkar, pleader of the decree-holder, on March 26, 1940. The judgment-debtor's application for setting aside the sale failed. The auction-purchaser, Charu Chandra Sarkar, took possession through Court on December 31, 1940 and later sold the property to the Plaintiff on December 16, 1942. The Plaintiff, having failed to get possession, instituted the present suit for declaration of title and for possession. 3. The Defendant No. 2, who contested the suit, pleaded that the Plaintiffs vendor did not acquire any title by his auction, purchase in view of the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Both the courts below overruled the defence and decreed the Plaintiff's suit. 5. The Defendant No. 2 has preferred this appeal. 6. Mr. Baksi, appearing on his behalf, has reiterated the ground taken in the courts below and has contended that the prohibition contained in Order XXI, Rule 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter called the Code, applies to a pleader of the decree-holder and makes the sale a nullity. 7. I may point out at the outset that no case of fraud on the part of the decree-holder has been proved in this case. 8. The validity of the contention depends on the interpretation of Order XXI, Rule 73 of the Code, which runs as follows: No officer or other person having any duty to perform in connection with any sale shall, either directly or indirectly, bid for, acquire or attempt to acquire any interest in the property sold. 9. The corresponding Section 292 of the Code of 1882 did not contain the words "other person". 10. The old Section 292 was construed in the case of Alagirisami v. Ramanathan ILR (1886) Mad. 9. The corresponding Section 292 of the Code of 1882 did not contain the words "other person". 10. The old Section 292 was construed in the case of Alagirisami v. Ramanathan ILR (1886) Mad. 111 to exclude a vakil, on the ground that a vakil cannot be regarded as an officer having any duty to perform in connection with the sale. 11. As a legal practitioner is an officer of the court only in a limited sense, the view taken in the Madras case may be supported on that ground. 12. The further question, viz., whether a pleader has any duty to perform in connection with the sale, has to be carefully considered, bearing in mind the principle underlying the section and the intention of the legislation. 13. In the Transfer of Property Act, which was also enacted in 1882, we find in Section 136, an express prohibition as regards legal practitioners buying or trafficking in actionable claims. 14. The principle underlying both the sections is that persons contemplated therein should not be even exposed to the suspicion that, in the discharge of their duties, their conduct might be influenced by any personal consideration. 15. In construing any Act of the legislature, the verbal construction of the particular section in question, if it be plain and simple, must govern the court in arriving at its conclusion. If there be any doubt or difficulty in the wording of the particular section in question, an enquiry is permissible into the history of the enactment and any supposed defect in the former legislation on the subject which it wanted to cure : The Queen v. Bishop of London (1889) 24 Q.B.D. 213, 224-225. 16. I now proceed to construe the section bearing in mind the principle underlying the section and the above rule of construction. 17. The main question is whether a pleader is a "person who has "any duty to perform in connection with the sale". These words were construed in Shiam Lal v. Girraj Kishore ILR (1926) All. 292, 295 to be-- intended to prohibit all those who have anything to do with the machinery of the sale or having any interest in the result of the sale. 18. This view is consistent with the collocation of the rules preceding rule 73. 19. These words were construed in Shiam Lal v. Girraj Kishore ILR (1926) All. 292, 295 to be-- intended to prohibit all those who have anything to do with the machinery of the sale or having any interest in the result of the sale. 18. This view is consistent with the collocation of the rules preceding rule 73. 19. If this be the correct view of the relevant words in Rule 73, it is difficult to say that the duty of the pleader of the decree-holder ends with the obtaining of the order for sale, as was supposed in In re A Pleader ILR (1946) Mad. 521. 20. Even after the order for sale is made, the pleader has to see that the sale proclamation is duly served, that the sale is held on a day when the bids may be favourable to the decree-holder. He has to apply for and obtain leave to bid on behalf of the decree-holder. He may pray for a re-sale under certain circumstances. In cases under Chap. XIV of the Bengal Tenancy Act, he has to exercise the option given to the decree-holder u/s 165 of the Act. He is, therefore, not wholly unconnected with the machinery of the sale. 21. It has been suggested that the words "any person who has "any duty to perform in connection with the sale" refer to the persons entrusted with the holding of the sale, e.g., an auctioneer, bailiff, etc. This would have the effect of narrowing down the scope of the rule and would be inconsistent with the purpose of the rule and would not prevent the mischief the rule was intended to guard against. The decree-holder has been put under a limited ban from bidding at sale under Rule 72. If his pleader is left unrestricted, it would leave the door wide open for evasion of Rule 72. Moreover, the decree-holder's pleader is in a fiduciary position towards the decree-holder and the principles enunciated in Nugent v. Nugent (1908) 1 Ch. 546 which was applied by this Court in Jiteswari Dasi v. Sudhakrishna Mukherji ILR (1931) Cal. If his pleader is left unrestricted, it would leave the door wide open for evasion of Rule 72. Moreover, the decree-holder's pleader is in a fiduciary position towards the decree-holder and the principles enunciated in Nugent v. Nugent (1908) 1 Ch. 546 which was applied by this Court in Jiteswari Dasi v. Sudhakrishna Mukherji ILR (1931) Cal. 956, viz., that a person in a fiduciary position, having special means of knowledge actual or probable, ought not to be allowed to buy or bid for the property without the leave of the court and that nobody ought to be allowed to get into a position where his interest conflicts with his duty, should be kept in view in construing the section. 22. The decree-holder's pleader settles the terms of the sale proclamation and conducts the entire litigation on behalf of the decree-holder, he has special means of knowledge. He is in a position of confidence and should not allow himself to be placed in a position where his personal interest may conflict with his duty towards his client. 23. In my opinion, a purchase by a pleader of the decree-holder is hit by Order XXI, Rule 73 of the Code. 24. Coming to the decisions, we have a decision in Kamakhya Dutt Ram v. Shyam Lal ILR (1929) Luck. 635, where the purchase by a decree-holder's pleader was upheld. No reasons are given for the conclusion. On the other hand, the decision in Sunderbai v. Bapuna AIR (1929) (Neg.) 305 seems to prefer the opposite view. The decision in Shiam Lal v. Girraj Kishore (supra) did not decide the position of a pleader. The decision in In re A Pleader (supra) following the earlier case in Alagirisami v. Ramandthan (supra) takes a contrary view. The judicial decisions are thus not uniform. 25. In Subbarayudu v. Kotayya ILR (1892) Mad. 389, the decree-holder successfully challenged a secret purchase by his pleader. The point now under consideration did not require a decision. Their Lordships quote with approval the following passage from Greenlaw v. King (1840) 3 Beav. 49 (61) : 49 E.R. 19 (24). The question...is not whether there was fraud or no fraud...but...whether this Court will permit a person standing in the fiduciary and confidential situation in which B then was, to make himself an interested party in the very transaction which he was bound as trustee most vigilantly to superintend. 26. 49 (61) : 49 E.R. 19 (24). The question...is not whether there was fraud or no fraud...but...whether this Court will permit a person standing in the fiduciary and confidential situation in which B then was, to make himself an interested party in the very transaction which he was bound as trustee most vigilantly to superintend. 26. The case of Roy Nandipat Mahata v. Alexander Shaw Urquhart (1870) 4 B.L.R. (A.C.) 181 on which Mr. Baksi relied was a case of a joint purchase by the decree-holder and a pleader of the judgment-debtor under suspicious circumstances and does not touch the present question. The case of Aghore Nath Chukerbutty v. Ram, Churn Chukerbutty ILR (1896) Cal. 805 was one where a purchase by a pleader for the judgment-debtor was held to enure for the benefit of the judgment-debtor on the principle that-- it would be acting in violation of all rules of equity and good conscience if we were to hold that the Defendant is entitled to maintain his purchase to the detriment of the Plaintiff. 27. The above cases illustrate the anxiety of the courts to maintain the purity of the sales in auction. On similar grounds Section 66 of the Code forbids benami purchases at court sales. 28. The effect of the above decisions supports the view taken by me that a purchase at the auction-sale by a pleader of any of the parties is liable to be set aside, as being in contravention of Order XXI, Rule 73 of the Code. 29. This leads us to consider whether an auction-purchase, which is hit by Order XXI, Rule 73, makes the sale void or voidable. 30. Mr. Baksi contends that the use of the word "shall" makes the prohibition mandatory and renders the sale a nullity. 31. This broad contention is supported neither by principle nor by authority. It cannot be affirmed as a proposition of universal application that non-compliance with every imperative provision of law renders the proceedings a nullity. The question depends on the nature, scope and object of the particular provision which has been violated. In Holmes v. Russel (1841) 9 Dowl 487, 489, which was quoted with approval in Ashutosh Sikdar v. Behari Lal Kirtania ILR (1907) Cal. The question depends on the nature, scope and object of the particular provision which has been violated. In Holmes v. Russel (1841) 9 Dowl 487, 489, which was quoted with approval in Ashutosh Sikdar v. Behari Lal Kirtania ILR (1907) Cal. 61, 72, Coleridge J. observed as follows: it is difficult sometimes to distinguish between an irregularity and a nullity; but the safest rule to determine what is an irregularity and what is a nullity, is to see whether the party can waive the objection. If he can waive it, it amounts to an irregularity; if he cannot, it is a nullity. 32. The rule now in question is intended for the benefit of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor and may be waived by them without any infringement of public right or policy. 33. Judged in the light of the above principles, the purchase by a pleader of the decree-holder is not a nullity, but is merely voidable. 37. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that a purchase by the decree-holder, whose position cannot be worse than that of his pleader, is only voidable in the absence of a leave of the Court under Rule 72. 38. In this view, the purchase by Charu Chandra Sarkar, which was unsuccessfully challenged by the judgment-debtor, is binding on the Defendant and the Plaintiff has acquired a good title by his purchase from Charu Chandra Sarkar. 39. The only contention raised in the appeal fails. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed with costs. Guha, J. 40. I agree.