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1949 DIGILAW 359 (ALL)

Mst. Ram Piari v. Nand Kumar

1949-12-23

KIDWAI

body1949
JUDGMENT Kidwai, J. - This appeal arises out of an application made by Mr. Nand Kumar for amendment of a decree passed against him and Mr. Sheoraj Bahadur. The application was made under the provisions of Sections 8, 9, 10 and 11. The decree-holder objected to the amendment, being allowed of several grounds which were as follows: (1) that she had made a declaration u/s 4 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act that she would not proceed to execute the decree against the land, agricultural produce or person of the agriculturists, (2) that the transaction was not a loan within the meaning of Section 2, Sub-section (9), and (3) that the position of the applicant judgment-debtor was only that of a surety. 2. It appears that the original loan was taken on the 20th of June, 1929, for Rs. 1,000/- and that the pronote was signed for four persons, namely Bhagwati Prasad, Kusumbhi Dayal, Nand Kumar and Sheoraj Bahadur. This pronote was renewed on the 13th of September, 1931 but one of the signatories Kusumbhi Dayal dropped out. It was again renewed by the same three persons on the 1st of June, 1934 on which date the previous pronote was endorsed as being paid up. On the 14th of March 193(sic), an endorsement was made on the pronote in question stating that the interest upto the end of February 1937 had been paid. Bhagwati Prasad died in July, 1937. On the 1st of October, 1937, there was a reference to arbitration with regard to the loan to which Nand Kumar, Sheoraj Bahadur and the Appellant were parties. Bhagwati Prasad's widow was not impleaded. It appears that she is the sister of Nand Kumar and that Sheoraj Bahadur is the husband of Bhagwati Prasad's sister. In the course of the arbitration proceedings it was made clear that nothing could be realised from the widow of Bhagwati Prasad and, therefore, Nand Kumar and Sheoraj Bahadur admitted that they had received consideration. A decree was passed on the basis of the award given by the arbitrator on the 8th of January, 1940. 3. In 1940 the decree was put in execution by the sale of some groves belonging to Nand Kumar in the Rae Bareli district. This application was pending when the U.P. Debt Redemption Act came into force on the 1st of January 1941. 3. In 1940 the decree was put in execution by the sale of some groves belonging to Nand Kumar in the Rae Bareli district. This application was pending when the U.P. Debt Redemption Act came into force on the 1st of January 1941. The decree-holder got it consigned to the records on the 6th of January, 1941. She made a second application for execution on the 10th of February, 1941, and filed a declaration u/s 4, Clause 3 of the U.P. Debt Redemption Act along with this application. The first point to consider is whether this was sufficient because the declaration is governed by the provisions of Section 4, Sub-Section 3, proviso 3 which states that where a creditor has already applied for execution of the decree against the land, agricultural produce or person of the agriculturist no declaration can be made. These words are sufficiently wide to cover the case of applications for execution made even before the enactment of the Debt Redemption Act, vide Mohammad Abdul Razzak v. Parvati Devi 1942 A.W.R.(H.C.) 319 and Rameshwar Dayal v. Amir All 1944 A.W.R. (C.C.) 290. In the present case the first application that was made was for the sale of under-proprietary groves. The application did not seek to sell only the grove-holder's rights but sought to sell the groves themselves. The right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in the groves extended to the land also when an application was made for the sale of the groves it included the land also. Thus in the present case, an application was made for execution against the land of the agriculturist debtor and the proviso would make the declaration filed by the decree-holder u/s 4 infructuous. 4. The second question is whether the transaction is a loan. Section 2, Sub-section (9) refers to an advance in cash or kind. It is not necessary that the advance should have been made to the person from whom it is sought to recover it. The transaction would only cease to be a loan if liability is transferred by an agreement between the debtor and a third person. In the present case there was no such transfer of liability but by reason of the award Nand Kumar and Sheoraj Bahadur were alone made liable to repay the debt due under a pronote which they themselves had signed. In the present case there was no such transfer of liability but by reason of the award Nand Kumar and Sheoraj Bahadur were alone made liable to repay the debt due under a pronote which they themselves had signed. It is agreed that Nand Kumar is an agriculturist and that the loan was taken before the 1st day of June, 1940. In these circumstances the transaction comes within the purview(sic) of the definition of loan as given in Section 2, Sub-section (9). 5. With regard to the question of surety this was a point which should have been taken at the time of the award. At that time it was not pleaded by the decree holder-that Nand Kumar was only a surety and the decree was passed against him and Sheoraj Bahadur making them both jointly and severally liable. In these circumstances the question of suretyship does not arise. 6. Another plea was taken that the account had been incorrectly calculated. The lower appellate Court has noticed that there was a mistake in the calculation made by the trial Court and it has reduced the amount due from the judgment-debtor to Rs. 302-12-0/-. Thus the error has been rectified. 7. The result is that this appeal ails and is dismissed with costs.