Judgement Ray, C. J. :- This is revn, directed against an order passed by the Subordinate Judge of Puri dispaupering the pltf. under O. 33, R. 9, Civil P. C. The pltf. admittedly is a member of a Hindu Mitakshara Joint family and his father is one of the defts. in the suit. The suit is for setting aside certain alienations, made by his father and for recovery of the properties so alienated. The attack on those alienations is based upon immorality and illegality of the transactions. The pltf. applied for leave to sue in forma pauparia. Of his appln. due notices were given to the Crown as well as, to the defts. opposite party. They filed their objections challenging the plea of pauperism but none of the contesting parties appeared at the date when the matter was heard by the Ct. The Ct. purporting to act under O. 33, R. 7 granted the pltf. leave to sue as a pauper on which his appln. for leave was registered as a suit and was to proceed, as such, in the ordinary way except that he should be exempted from paying any further Ct.-f. on his appln?. to be filed in course of the suit. At a later stage, the opp. party filed an appln. under R. 9 (b) of the Order alleging that the pltfs means were such that he ought not to be continued to sue as a pauper. The Ct. below, without making any enquiry as to whether the appcts. before him ware prevented, by any sufficient cause, from appearing at the date of hearing of the pltfs. appln. for leave to sue as a pauper, and without making any sort of enquiry whatsoever which would, as a matter of principle, entitle the appcts. to reopen the order passed under R. 7, entertained the appln. and enquired into its merits. After such enquiry, be has believed the opp. partys case and has come to the conclusion that the pltf. is possessed of means, such as would enable him to pay the requisite C.-f. and that, therefore, he has no right to continue to sue as a pauper. 2. The pltf. has come up in revn. against this order and his point is that the Ct. had no jurisdiction to entertain the appln. is possessed of means, such as would enable him to pay the requisite C.-f. and that, therefore, he has no right to continue to sue as a pauper. 2. The pltf. has come up in revn. against this order and his point is that the Ct. had no jurisdiction to entertain the appln. so far as it did not disclose that the means referred to were such means as came into the pltfs possession later than the disposal of his leave appln. under R. 7; in other words, the contention is that the matter could have been urged before the Ct. at the stage when the leave was granted and could not be the subject-matter of discussion at a later stage. This contention is based on the principle that any order, either interlocutory or final in its nature, passed in presence of the parties, should be taken as closing the controversy once for all for the purposes of the proceedings or the suit in which it is passed and so far as it goes. The order may or may not be such on which a plea of res judicata can be based, but in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings some sort of finality, limited with in the scope of the suit or the proceedings in which it is passed, has to be attributed to it. In the present case, the means that were alleged to have been in pltfs. possession were the family properties which admittedly were not acquired subsequent to either his filing the appn to leave or to the registration of that appln. as a suit. Reliance, in support of the order, is placed upon the terms of R. 9 which, so far as material for purpose of this revn. read: "The Ct. may, on the appln. of the deft., of which seven days clear notice in writing has been given to the pltf. order the pltf. to be dispaupered if it appears that his moans are such that he ought not to continue to sue as a pauper." 3. Mr. Mohanty, appearing for the opp. party, says that there are no such words of limitation as will compel the interpretation that "the means", referred to in cl. (b), must be "the means" that should have been acquired by or otherwise come to the possession of the pltf. after adjudication of the patn. for leave. Mr. Mohanty, appearing for the opp. party, says that there are no such words of limitation as will compel the interpretation that "the means", referred to in cl. (b), must be "the means" that should have been acquired by or otherwise come to the possession of the pltf. after adjudication of the patn. for leave. But such limitation inheres in the word continue. If we assign the plain grammatical meaning to the word continue, I will appear evident that it assumes the fact that be was an adjudged pauper at the date of commencement of the suit and the question arose if he should be allowed to continue as such. This rule is framed to operate not in derogation of the finality or validity of the order already passed as between the parties but enabling the Ct. to dispauper the pltf. on the basis of events happening subsequently. This view appears to us to be very clear and convincing. When pushed to its logical conclusion, Mr. Mohantys contention, if accepted, would lead to what is absurd on the face of it. That is, throughout the progress of the suit, the deft, may go on without any rest whatsoever agitating and re-agitating the question of pltf.s pauperism for times without number. This could never be the intention of the framers of the Rules. 4. Mr. Mohanty contrasts the provisions of R. 9 with the one appearing in the same Order of the Code giving finality to an order disallowing leave to sue as pauper. That is because the pltf.s liability for c.-f. is a continuing liability and he can be ordered to pay whenever he comes by means to pay. On the other hand, if he had means enough to pay the requisite c.-fs. at the commencement of the suit, he should be liable to pay, notwithstanding subsequent change of his financial position reducing him to poverty. 5. The question can be viewed from another aspect, namely, that R. 9 makes it not obigatory but discretionary on the Ct. to dispauper a pauper pltf. In exercising this discretion, the Ct. certainly will not be indulgent to the party who chose at his own risk not to appear on the date when he was called upon to appear and contest, if he liked but to come at any moment and compel the Ct. to reopen the matter. to dispauper a pauper pltf. In exercising this discretion, the Ct. certainly will not be indulgent to the party who chose at his own risk not to appear on the date when he was called upon to appear and contest, if he liked but to come at any moment and compel the Ct. to reopen the matter. The rule, in matters of procedure too, that orders passed or deemed to have been passed in presence of the parties will not ordinarily be reopend for the mere asking of them, is fundamental. The party asking for such indulgence must lay a foundation of sufficient grounds so as to entitle him to ask the Ct. to recall his order. Under the circumstance, we are bound to hold that in the circumstances of the present case as the alleged means have not been acquired later, deft. 1 should not have been heard to say what he ought to have said much earlier at the stage when the order under r. 7 was to be passed. We have no direct authority on the point either way. There are soma observations here and there which may, to some extent, lend support to our view. In the case of Mumtazan v. Rasulan, 23 all. 364, it was laid down that the validity or finality of an order granting a petn. for leave to sue as pauper could not be challenged in an appeal from the decree passed in the suit. The learned Judges who decided the case have observed that order passed at that stage is not an order affecting the decision of the suit and is an independent order prior to the suit and, therefore, nod challengeable collaterally in the manner in which it was sought to be done in that case. The case of Agent, B. N. Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Venkateswami, 49 C. W. N. 551, by implication, supports our view. It says that mean? coming to the possession of the petnr. subsequent to his filing of his appln. for leave can be considered in a proceeding initiated under r. 9. Here, in the present case, it is not said that the means, referred to in the deft.s petn. were acquired later than the filing of the leave appln. It says that mean? coming to the possession of the petnr. subsequent to his filing of his appln. for leave can be considered in a proceeding initiated under r. 9. Here, in the present case, it is not said that the means, referred to in the deft.s petn. were acquired later than the filing of the leave appln. These cases do attribute finality to the order so far as it embraces adjudication of matters that could be urged by the parties at that stage. 6. Mr. Mohanty, as a last recourse, relies upon the case of Sanker Bharati v. Narasimha Bharati, 47 Bom. 106 : (a. I. r. (9) 1922 Bom 383), with a view to bringing the case within cl. (a) of r. 9. He contends that the pltf. is, at any rate, guilty of vexatious and improper conduct in the course of the suit for deliberate concealment of his means from the Ct. The clause, standing by itself, would refer to guilty conduct in course of the suit, that is, after the appln. is registered as a suit. Whether the suit will have the extended meaning so as to include the proceedings based on the leave appln. is a question which is not free from difficulty. Had the Bombay case, referred to, decided the point, we might have taken any other views. But that question has there been left open. That case is no authority for the proposition urged. Over and above, the plea was never advanced in Ct. below. Some omission of certain properties from the inventory submitted by the pltf. will not necessarily amount to active concealment and thus to vexatious and improper conduct in the course of! the suit. Whether it is a concealment as distinguished from mere omission is a question of fact. It appears from the facts of the present case that the pltf. is but a junior membar of the family and a wireless-operator, his father being alive. We do not know whether the father has any sympathy with his launching of this litigation. Under the circumstances, it is not necessarily probable that he had knowledge of the properties. Besides, it may be consistent with the honesty that as a junior member of the joint Mitakshara family, he did not consider that he had such disposing power over the joint family properties as to constitute means in his hands. Under the circumstances, it is not necessarily probable that he had knowledge of the properties. Besides, it may be consistent with the honesty that as a junior member of the joint Mitakshara family, he did not consider that he had such disposing power over the joint family properties as to constitute means in his hands. For the purpose of a speculative suit involving a protracted course for recovery of properties wrongfully alienated by a Hindu father is hardly a justifiable ground for alienating joint family properties over which a members power of disposition is very limited. I shall not be understood to say that in my view a member of a joint family shall be always considered a pauper even if he has interest in substantial family property. I am considering whether omission thereof from the inventory attached to an appln. for leave to sue as pauper is necessarily vexatious. In these circumstances, we cannot take notice of this plea as one available to Mr. Mohanty under cl. (a) of R. 9 of the Order at this stage. 7. We, therefore, hold that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was without jurisdiction and should be set aside. In the result the Civil Revn. is allowed with costs. Hearing is assessed at one gold mohur. 8. Narasimham, J. :- I agree. Revision allowed.