Judgment 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs who are aggrieved by the decision of the appellate Additional District Judge of Gaya, dated 21st August 1947 by which be dismissed their suit which was instituted on 2nd January 1946 for recovery of damages on account of ejectment from a ferry leased to them before the expiry of its term of three years, and also for refund of security. 2. It is established that on 1st April 1944, the plaintiffs were granted a lease by the defendants from 1st April 1944 to 3lat March 1947, at the rate of 3,800 per annum to run a ferry. The lease is evidenced by the contract, EX. 1, which contains a number of terms which the plaintiffs had to carry out, and also contains a stipulation that if some or any of the terms are not complied with, the lease will be liable to be forfeited. The allegations of the defendants upon which they cancelled the lease on 13th July 1945, are that the plaintiffs were charging higher rates of tolls, not providing the approach road and not keeping the landing ground of the ghat in order. All these allegations have been found to be established by the Court of fact, and accordingly the appellate Court has dismissed the suit. 3. Mr. Rajkishore Prasad argues, in the first place, that the lease could only be cancelled in accordance with the provisions of Sections 13, 24 and 26, Ferries Act, I [1] of 1885. The argument as to the applicability of Sec.13 is that the lease of the tolls of a ferry shall be liable to be cancelled at once by the Magistrate of the district only if the lessee has failed to make due provision for the convenience or safety of the public within fifteen days after being required to do so by a notice in writing from such Magistrate. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to consider the correctness of this argument because in the view we take the lease has been rightly determined on account of the finding that the plaintiffs were guilty of charging higher rates of tolls against the stipulation in the lease. 4. The question to be considered then is whether Sections 24 and 26 apply in the present case as argued by Mr. Rajkishore Prasad. 4. The question to be considered then is whether Sections 24 and 26 apply in the present case as argued by Mr. Rajkishore Prasad. Now Sec.24 inter alia only says that every lessee who takes a sum higher than the lawful tolls shall be punished with fine, and Sec.26 says that if any lessee having been convicted of an offence under Sec.24 is again convicted of an offence under Sec.23 or 24 or 25, the Magistrate of the district may cancel the lease of the tolls of the ferry. In our opinion, these two sections provide criminal liability of the lessee who breaks the conditions which make him liable to convictions under Sec.24, and do not at all abrogate the rights and obligations of the parties which have been already entered into by the agreement under which the lease was granted. In the lease itself there is a clear stipulation that the lease is liable to be determined or cancelled if the lessee charges tolls higher than be is lawfully entitled to. This has exactly happened in the present case, and the lessee was called upon to show cause on or about 13th July 1945, and the lease was cancelled and the lessee was ejected one week later. 5. We cannot accept the correctness of the contention regarding Sec.26 aa put forward by the learned advocate. It is conceivable that the Magistrate of the district may have no information as to the fact that the lessee has been charging tolls higher than the lawful tolls, and he may come to know of it after he has been informed of this by going through the judgment of the criminal Court. He then gets power under Sec.26 to cancel the lease, but he may not cancel it and he may wait till the lessee is again convicted. This right of the lessor (Magistrate of the district?) to cancel the lease is independent of the right of the lessor to cancel it according to the terms of the lease. In our opinion, the argument based upon any of the sections of the Ferries Act has no application in the present case in view of the finding that the plaintiffs had been guilty of charging higher rates of tolls. 6. An argument was advanced before us that the plaintiffs should have been granted a decree for recovery of Rs. In our opinion, the argument based upon any of the sections of the Ferries Act has no application in the present case in view of the finding that the plaintiffs had been guilty of charging higher rates of tolls. 6. An argument was advanced before us that the plaintiffs should have been granted a decree for recovery of Rs. 825 being the amount of security, which they had deposited with the defendants. This argument would have been entitled to succeed if it had not been disclosed to us that the defendants had already realised a sum of Rs. 1900 said to be due to them from the plaintiffs after making a deduction of this Rs. 826 by means of some certificate proceedings. The cause of action for the recovery of Rs. 825 is soldered up with the cause of action for the alleged illegal recovery of Rs. 1900. That cannot form a subject of decision before us in this appeal. 7. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.