Nanda Lal Haldar v. Dilendra Nath Chatterji — 1949 DIGILAW 39 (CAL)

JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - The Petitioners made an application u/s 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, obtained an award from the Debt Settlement Board and thereafter obtained an order from the civil court, setting aside the sale and directing restoration of the property concerned. The latter order was made by a learned Munsif, but it has been modified on appeal by the learned District Judge. The Petitioners contend that no appeal lay to the District Judge at all and that, in any event, assuming that an appeal lay, the District Judge had no jurisdiction to go behind the award and consider the matters upon which he based his decision. The facts are as follows: In 1935, the landlords of the Petitioners obtained a decree against them for rent and in 1936 put that decree into execution by Rent Execution Case No. 964 of that year. In execution of the decree, the holding was sold on September 12, 1936, and possession was delivered to the decree-holders, who had themselves purchased the holding, on May 29, 1937. On January 7, 1943, the judgment-debtors made an application u/s 37A of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act and the Board disposed of the case on April 30, 1946. It held that nothing was due on account of the decretal debt from the Petitioners to their landlords, the decree-holders. On June 25, 1946, one of the decree-holders applied for a review of the order of the Board on the ground that no notice had been served upon the decree-holders and that a certain amount was still due under the decree. That application was rejected on September 9 following and an award was in due course drawn up. The award was signed on December 7, 1946. 2. On March 28, 1947, the Petitioners made an application before the Third Munsif, Diamond Harbour, u/s 37A(5) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, praying that the sale be set aside and that they be restored to the possession of the auction-sold properties. To that application, fourteen of the co-sharer decree-holders filed a petition of objection, in which they stated that the award, not having been made after notice to them and they not having been made parties to the proceedings before the Board, the sale could not be set aside, inasmuch as the award was plainly invalid. To that application, fourteen of the co-sharer decree-holders filed a petition of objection, in which they stated that the award, not having been made after notice to them and they not having been made parties to the proceedings before the Board, the sale could not be set aside, inasmuch as the award was plainly invalid. It was stated, in the second place, that, in any event, the award could not affect their interests, inasmuch as they were not parties thereto. The learned Munsif was not quite sure that it was open to the decree-holders objectors to take the grounds which they had raised, but he went into the merits of the question and examined the soundness or otherwise of their contentions. The whole record of the Board was placed before him. He did not find any evidence that notice had been served upon the objecting decree-holders or that they had been made parties, but he thought that he could not give effect to the objection in the absence of any affirmative evidence that the objectors had not been made parties to the original application and had not been served with notices. In that view, he dismissed the petition of objection on the merits and made an order in favour of the Petitioners, setting aside the sale and directing restoration of the properties to them. 3. From the decision of the learned Munsif, the objecting decree-holders preferred an appeal to the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge pointed out that the learned Munsif not having found anything on the file of the Debt Settlement Board to show that any notice had been served on the objecting decree-holders and the award, as also the application u/s 37A, themselves showing that the objecting decree-holders had not been made parties, it was not open to the learned Munsif still to presume that the proper procedure, had been complied with and to hold that "positive proof", as he called it, was necessary to prove the objector's case. The learned Judge pointed out the nature of the application made before the Board as also the nature of the award made and he held that, as no award had been made against the objectors, the application under Sub-section (8) of Section 37A was bound to be rejected as against them. The learned Judge pointed out the nature of the application made before the Board as also the nature of the award made and he held that, as no award had been made against the objectors, the application under Sub-section (8) of Section 37A was bound to be rejected as against them. In that veiw, he allowed the appeal and directed that the application as against the objecting decree-holders should be rejected. It is against that order that the Petitioners moved this Court and obtained the present Rule. 4. The first ground taken in the Rule is that no appeal lay to the District Judge at all. The argument of Mr. Dhar, who appeared on behalf of the Petitioners, was simple; an appeal is a creature of statute and Section 37A did not provide for an appeal from any order made under Sub-section (8). It was, accordingly, contended that Section 37A being a special provision of law, conferring special powers upon the civil court by Sub-section (8) and there being no provision for an appeal from an order made under the sub-section, there was no source from which a right of appeal could be derived. On behalf of the opposite party, reliance was placed upon a recent decision of the Privy Council in the case of R.M.A.B.A. Adaikappa Chettiar v. Rule Chandrasekhara Thevar ILR (1948) Mad. 505 : L.R. 74 74 IndAp 264. The question decided by the Privy Council was whether an appeal lay from an order made u/s 19 of the Madras Agricultural Relief Act or an order made u/s 20 of the same Act. The contention of Mr. Banerji, who appeared on behalf of the opposite party, was that, on the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case cited, there was a clear right of. appeal in the present case. 5. Section 19 of the Madras Act provides that where a court has passed a decree for re-payment of a debt, it shall, on the application of any judgment-debtor, who is an agriculturist, apply the provisions of the Act to such decree and shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, amend the decree accordingly or enter satisfaction, as the case may be. The provision clearly is a provision for re-opening a decree and scaling it down or declaring it satisfied as the case may be. The provision clearly is a provision for re-opening a decree and scaling it down or declaring it satisfied as the case may be. Section 20 of the Act provides that the court executing a decree passed against a person entitled to the benefit of the Act, shall, on application, stay the proceedings until the court which passed the decree has passed orders on the application made or to be made u/s 19. There is a proviso to the section laying down a certain time-limit to which it is not necessary to refer. This provision, it will be seen, merely provides for an order staying proceedings in execution of a decree in order that the decree may be dealt with u/s 19. 6. What happened in the case before the Privy Council was that the decree had been put in execution and the debtor made two applications before the executing court, one u/s 19 and another u/s 20. The executing court was the same court as had passed the decree. The court dealt with the application u/s 20 first and held that the Applicant -was not an agriculturist, as defined in the Act. In that view, it dismissed the application and refused a stay. Dealing next with the substantive application u/s 19, the court dismissed that application as well, because of the decision as to the status of the Applicant already arrived at on the other application. The question before their Lordships of the Judicial Committee was whether these orders passed by the executing court were appealable and they had cited before them a decision of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court, where it had been held that an order passed u/s 19 was not appealable and which had been followed by the High Court in the case before them. In the case dealt with by the Full Bench, there were no proceedings in execution of the decree pending, but the Court had expressed the view that the existence of executing proceedings would not make any difference. The Privy Council dissented from the Full Bench decision and overruled it. In the case dealt with by the Full Bench, there were no proceedings in execution of the decree pending, but the Court had expressed the view that the existence of executing proceedings would not make any difference. The Privy Council dissented from the Full Bench decision and overruled it. "The true rule" their Lordships said: Is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country seized of such dispute, the courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwith-standing that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal.... The question, therefore, to be considered in the present case is whether a right of appeal from the orders in question was conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. Their Lordships next proceeded to consider whether the orders made under Sections 19 and 20 were of such a character as would he appealable under the CPC and they came to the conclusion that the order u/s 19 would be appealable, because it amounted to a decree and that u/s 20 would be appealable, because it related to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree within the meaning of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. The principle laid down by the Judicial Committee, which, I may observe in passing, had been laid down in certain earlier cases as well, is that, if after certain preliminary proceedings before the special tribunal, set up by special statute, a dispute between the parties is, under the provisions of that very statute brought before a civil court, the further proceedings before the civil court must be governed by the normal judicial procedure obtaining in that court. Once the civil court is reached, the special tribunal and the special Act are both left behind. The matter goes over, as it were, to the ordinary law and the ordinary law will apply and prevail. Since Section 37A brought the proceeding before a civil court, the enquiry in the present case must, therefore, be whether the order made by the learned Munsif was of such a character as would be appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion, the answer must be in the affirmative. 9. Since Section 37A brought the proceeding before a civil court, the enquiry in the present case must, therefore, be whether the order made by the learned Munsif was of such a character as would be appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure. In my opinion, the answer must be in the affirmative. 9. The order can be looked at from two points of view. It will be re-called that the section requires the application to be made before the court at whose order the property was sold and requires the court to set aside the sale and to direct restoration of the property. The application must, therefore, be made before the executing court which had held the sale and what that court, in substance, does under Sub-section (8) of Section 37A, is that it reopens as it were the execution proceeding, sets aside the sale and dismiss the execution case. If that be so, the order is clearly an order relating to the execution of a decree, although the effect is to refuse execution and an appeal would clearly lie as from an order made u/s 47 of the Code. 10. The other point of view from which the order may be regarded is that the decree having been re-opened and scaled down or declared to have been satisfied, the executing court sets aside the consequential sale and, on setting aside the sale, directs restitution of the property. It is provided by the Code itself that an order for restitution made u/s 144 of the Code is a decree and consequently appealable as such, although a qualification has been added by decided cases that the order must comprise some decision on the rights of the parties, that is to say, it must not be an order relating merely to formal matters. If the test of dealing with the rights of parties or containing some pronouncement on the merits be satisfied, an order for restitution made u/s 144 of the CPC will, by the language of the Code itself, operate as a decree. If so, there can be no question that an appeal would lie. If the test of dealing with the rights of parties or containing some pronouncement on the merits be satisfied, an order for restitution made u/s 144 of the CPC will, by the language of the Code itself, operate as a decree. If so, there can be no question that an appeal would lie. It must, however, be pointed out that the order in the present case did not come strictly within the language of Section 144, but, in substance it is an order for restitution and this Court has always held that, although an order directing restitution of properties may not come within the strict language of Section 144 of the Code, an appeal from such an order will nevertheless lie. Among numerous decisions in which that view has been taken it will be sufficient to refer to only one, namely, the case of Sasikanta Acharjee v. Jalii Boksha Munshi (1930) 35 C.W.N. 105. The order in the present case did deal with the rights of the parties on the question of restitution and, having regard to the view consistently taken by this Court, I am of opinion that, although the order could not be said to come strictly within the language of Section 144 of the Code, an appeal would lie. If that be the position, then, on the principle laid down by the Judicial Committee, an appeal would lie from the order passed by the learned Munsif in the present case, although the special statute does not in terms confer a right of appeal. The first ground taken by Mr. Dhar must, accordingly, be overruled. 11. The second ground taken on behalf of the Petitioners raises a question of some difficulty. The ground, it will be recalled, is that the civil court, on an application being made before it under Sub-section (8) of Section 37A, cannot enquire into the legality or propriety of the award and can only set aside the sale and direct restoration. 11. The second ground taken on behalf of the Petitioners raises a question of some difficulty. The ground, it will be recalled, is that the civil court, on an application being made before it under Sub-section (8) of Section 37A, cannot enquire into the legality or propriety of the award and can only set aside the sale and direct restoration. The section, to quote only the material portion, reads as follows: The debtor may present a copy of the award made under Sub-section (5) to the civil court or Certificate Officer at whose order the property was sold, and such court or Certificate Officer shall thereupon direct that the sale be set aside, that the debtor together with any person who was in possession of the property sold or any part thereof at the time of delivery of possession of such property to the decree-holder as an Under-raiyat of the debtor and who has been ejected therefrom by reason of such sale be restored to possession of the property... and that any person who is in possession of the property other than a person who was in possession of the property or part thereof as an under-raiyat of the debtor at the time of delivery of possession of such property to the decree-holder shall be ejected therefrom with effect from that date. 12. Mr. Dhar pointed to the words "thereupon" and "shall... "direct that the sale be set aside". His contention was that the directions contained in that section were mandatory and absolute. The only pre-requisite to any action being taken by the civil court was that a copy of the award should be presented before it, and if such a, copy was presented, the only course open to the civil court was to set aside the sale, and direct restoration of the property. It was not open to the civil court, so it was contended, to go behind the award and launch upon an enquiry as to whether the award had been properly passed, or as to whether it was an award to which effect could be given. If there was an award before the Court, and if that award referred to a sale, that sale was bound to be set aside and persons in possession of the property, other than one class excepted, were to be expelled. Mr. If there was an award before the Court, and if that award referred to a sale, that sale was bound to be set aside and persons in possession of the property, other than one class excepted, were to be expelled. Mr. Dhar re-enforced this argument by submitting that, if some of the decree-holders had not been made parties to the proceedings before the Board and the decree held by them had been interfered with in their absence, the proper remedy for them lay before the Debt Settlement Authorities, by whom they could have the award revised. They could not come before the civil court and invite it to sit in judgment upon the award. 13. It seems to me that this argument was based upon a misconception of what the objecting decree-holders contended in the present case. It is true that their petition of objection contains the extreme contention that the award was invalid and utterly void. But that contention was not in any way entertained by the learned District Judge, nor has effect been given to it. The more moderate contention of the objectors was that, assuming the award could not be questioned before the civil court, the court had a right and a duty, to see what the award was and if, on the face of the award, it did not affect their interests, the sale, so far as they were concerned, could not be set aside on the strength of the award, nor could they be dispossessed from the property. In my opinion, at least so much jurisdiction must be conceded to the civil court, if Sub-section (8) is to be satisfactorily worked at all. It may be perfectly correct to say that a civil court could not sit in judgment upon the award, but when invited to give effect to an award as against certain persons, the court had certainly jurisdiction to see whether the order, on the strength of which it was being invited to act, was in fact an order which touched those persons who said that they were not touched. As regards the larger proposition too, namely, the jurisdiction of the civil court to look into the legality of the award, it cannot be said that no jurisdiction at all exists. As regards the larger proposition too, namely, the jurisdiction of the civil court to look into the legality of the award, it cannot be said that no jurisdiction at all exists. The question was dealt with by the Judicial Committee in the well-known case of Secretary of State for India v. Mask of Company ILR (1940) Mad. 599 (614) : L.R. 67 67 IndAp 222 (236), where the following observations were made: It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 14. There is no question of the statute excluding the jurisdiction of the civil court in the present case. In fact, the civil court acts under jurisdiction conferred by the special Act itself. Nor is it laid down anywhere in the Act, as is done by Section 20 in the case of certain questions, that the Board shall be the exclusive authority and, impliedly, that the civil court shall have no power to deal with those questions at all. If, therefore, a civil court is asked under Sub-section (8) to take action upon an award, the court in my view, has jurisdiction not only to examine the extent of the award, but also to see whether the award was passed by the special authorities in full compliance with the special procedure laid down in the special Act. That question, however, as I have pointed out, does not strictly arise in the present case, inasmuch as all that the learned District Judge has decided is that the award, as it is. does not affect the objecting decree-holder. 15. This leads me to an enquiry into what happened before the Debt Settlement Board. The application u/s 37A is on the record and so is the award. An application u/s 37A has to be made in Form No. XIXA, prescribed by Rule. 77A and 136. The third column of Sch. A to the form is headed "Name and address "of the decree-holder, or certificate-holder". The application u/s 37A is on the record and so is the award. An application u/s 37A has to be made in Form No. XIXA, prescribed by Rule. 77A and 136. The third column of Sch. A to the form is headed "Name and address "of the decree-holder, or certificate-holder". In the application in the present case, the entry made in column 3 was "Sri Akshay "Kumar Haldar ding", that is to say, Akshay Kumar Haldar and others. Column No. 10 of the same Schedule is headed "Name and "address of the present occupier of the land". The entry made in that column was possession of the decree-holder himself. The 11th column is headed "Name and address of the landlord of the "Applicant" and the entry made in that column was "Benimadhab". Who he is, is not very clear. It will be remembered that the decree was a rent decree and all the decree-holders were auction-purchasers. The landlords of the Applicants, as also the persons in whose possession the auction-sold properties were, must, therefore, have been the whole body of the decree-holders. 16. Coming now to the award, an award has to be made in Form No. XIXB. Schedule B of the form relates to description of decree-holder. The first column is headed "Serial number". The second column is headed "Name". The fourth column is headed "Name of father or husband". The entry made in the present case, in column No. 1 was "1". In column No. 2, "Akshay Kumar Chattopadhyay and others". In column No. 4, "Rajendranath Chattopadhyay, deceased". It is quite clear that, although the words "and others" were used in column No. 2, really only one decree-holder was named and intended to be named, inasmuch as in column No. 1 only the figure 1 was inserted and in column No. 4 a single name was given as the name of the father. The decree-holders were a multitude and Rajendra Nath seems to have been the father of only Akshay Kumar and, in any event, certainly not the father of all of them. Again, columns Nos. 10 and 11 of Sch. D to Form No. XIXB require entries of the name and status of the decree-holder to whom the payment has to be made. The entry made in those columns in the present case was simply "Akshay Kumar Chatterji", even the words "and others" being dropped. Again, columns Nos. 10 and 11 of Sch. D to Form No. XIXB require entries of the name and status of the decree-holder to whom the payment has to be made. The entry made in those columns in the present case was simply "Akshay Kumar Chatterji", even the words "and others" being dropped. Lastly, column No. 3 of Sch. E to the form requires the name of the landlord to be given and there again in the present case the single name of Akshay Kumar Chatterji was given. 17. Having regard to these entries, which I have collected in some details, it is not disputable that neither in the application, nor in the award was any decree-holder other than Akshay Kumar Chatterji ever thought of, or dealt with. As the learned Judge has pointed out, the learned Munsif, who had the advantage of having the entire records of the Debt Settlement Board before him, was unable to discover any order directing issue of notice to the remaining decree-holders, or any return of service of any notice upon them. Section 37A, by Sub-section (4). requires the Board to give an opportunity to the decree-holder in the manner prescribed. The manner is prescribed by Rule 77BB, which lays down that the Board shall issue a notice in Form No. V to the decree-holder, the landlord of the Applicant where he is not the decree-holder and persons of several other categories who may have an interest in the land. It is thus clear that the statute, by an imperative provision, requires that notice shall be given to the decree-holder, and it need hardly be said where there are more decree-holders than one notice is required to be given to all the decree-holders. Indeed, the form of the notice, namely, Form V, makes clear the importance of the notice given. By it the decree-holder, as also various other classes of persons, are given notice of the application, are asked to file their objection, if they have any, and also asked to file a written statement, giving full particulars of all debts owed by the Applicants to them. By it the decree-holder, as also various other classes of persons, are given notice of the application, are asked to file their objection, if they have any, and also asked to file a written statement, giving full particulars of all debts owed by the Applicants to them. Having regard to these provisions, to which I have referred above, it seems beyond argument that, if an application is made only as against one of several decree-holders and an award is made only as against him without any notice to the remaining decree-holders, the Board disregards completely the mandatory provisions of the special Act and the award it produces can by no means be called a valid award. 18. Mr. Dhar contended that it was not necessary that the decree-holders should be made parties to the application and that all that was necessary was that notice should be given to them. The headings of the various columns in the form, to which I have referred, negative, in my view, that contention of Mr. Dhar. The form clearly requires all the decree-holders to be named and that is clearly a requirement that they should be made parties. Mr. Dhar pointed out that the column dealing with the Applicants was headed "Name of each Applicant", whereas the column dealing with the decree-holder was simply "Name and address of "the decree-holder". His contention was that, having regard to that difference of language, the name of all the decree-holders were not intended to be given. The reason why the heading of the column relating to the Applicants is in that form clearly is that all the debtors need not necessarily join in an application u/s 37A and it is, therefore, of importance to the Board to know which of the debtors are making the application. No such consideration applies in the case of the decree-holders, all of whom have an interest in the decree, as also in the land purchased in execution and all of whom must be named. It is not of the slightest consequence that the singular number is used in the heading-, for, as is elementary, the singular always includes the plural. 19. It is not of the slightest consequence that the singular number is used in the heading-, for, as is elementary, the singular always includes the plural. 19. As I have indicated in an earlier part of the judgment, it was not necessary for the civil court to hold in this case, nor has the learned District Judge held, that the award, so far as it goes, is invalid. The larger question as to whether the civil court enquired into and pronounced cm the legality of the award need not, therefore, detain me further. 20. The mere limited question is whether the civil court, having before it an award, which on the face of it was against one of several decree-hoders only, was yet bound to set aside the whole sale and to expel from the lands all the decree-holders. I am of opinion that, in spite of the language of Sub-section (5), on which Mr. Dhar relied and which, literally construed, might support his contention, the civil court has the right, and, I would add, the duty to see. that it does not travel beyond the limits of the award placed before it. It has not merely to set aside a sale, it has also to restore possession to the Applicant from persons, who are actually in possession at the date of the application. It has to make an order which affects the rights of certain parties. I do not see how it can be said, in the absence of any express prohibition, that the civil court, when asked to interfere with the rights of certain parties on the basis of a certain order of another tribunal, cannot enquire how far the direction of the other tribunal goes. It is true that the sub-section says that the sale is to be set aside, but a sale is always set aside, not in the abstract but as against certain persons, and the question who are the parties to the order, on the strength of which the sale is sought to be set aside, is not an irrelevant, but the only relevant consideration. It is true again that the sub-section directs the civil court to eject any person in possession of the property other than persons of a certain excepted class. It is true again that the sub-section directs the civil court to eject any person in possession of the property other than persons of a certain excepted class. But again it seems to me that if the civil court is asked to do so on the strength of a certain order of another tribunal, it can and ought to enquire whether that order extends as far as the person sought to be ejected. 21. Mr. Banerji drew my attention to an unreported decision of Mukherjea and Ormond J J. in Narayan Chandra Basu v. Bash Bihari Banerji Since reported in ILR (1948) Cal. 68. That was a case, not of want of notice by the Board, but a case where a certain third party, who was not a party to the award, was resisting delivery of possession. The question before their Lordships was whether the court might, on the strength of that absolute direction, namely, eject any person in possession of the property, pass an order for the expulsion of the person who was s, 37A(8) was to take appropriate proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 97 of the Code. Their Lordships held that the Applicant would have to make an application under Order XXI, Rule 97 and if, upon such an application being made, it was found that the party offering obstruction was doing so not on behalf of the party to the award but on behalf of himself, then the Applicant would be relegated to a title-suit for the purpose of asserting his rights. That ruling of a Division Bench is to my mind an authority for the proposition that a person who is not a party to the award cannot be ejected straightaway in spite of the absolute language of Section 37A(8). Indeed the ruling goes so far as to say that, if that person who is not a party to the award and who is offering resistance to the delivery of possession makes out that he is doing so on his own account, then Section 37(5) will not avail the Applicant debtor at all and it is he who must go to a civil court as a Plaintiff. If that be the true law and, sitting singly, I must accept it to be that the objecting decree-holders in the present case are precisely in the same position as the third party who was offering resistence in the case cited. I may add that, in my respectful opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench, by which I am in any case bound, was also the right view to take. Besides, it is against the "fundamental rules of judicial procedure" to which the Judicial Committee referred that anybody should be ejected from property of which he is in possession, or deprived of his rights in a decree, on the strength of an order which was passed in his absence and without notice to him and which does not purport to bind him at all. In my opinion, the civil court, in the present case, had jurisdiction to see whether the award affected the objecting decree-holders and, since it clearly did not, it had jurisdiction to hold that no order as against them could be passed under Sub-section (8). 22. The next question which arises is whether, in the circumstances above stated, the sale could be partially set aside as against the decree-holder who was actually before the Debt Settlement Board, or whether it is impossible to set it aside at all. I am relieved of deciding that question, inasmuch as the learned District Judge has only rejected the application u/s 37A as against the objecting decree-holders, but said nothing as regards the maintainability of the application as against Akshay Kumar Chatterji. The Munsif set aside the whole sale and directed restoration of the entire property. His decision has been modified by the learned District Judge only to the extent that the application u/s 37A will be rejected as against the objecting decree-holders, that is to say, as against them the sale will not be set aside and as against them delivery of possession shall not be made. No Rule was taken out by Akshay Kumar Chatterji or any other decree-holder against that part of the learned Judge's decision, which left the remainder of the learned Munsif's order unaffected. I must, therefore, leave it as it is. 23. No Rule was taken out by Akshay Kumar Chatterji or any other decree-holder against that part of the learned Judge's decision, which left the remainder of the learned Munsif's order unaffected. I must, therefore, leave it as it is. 23. In the result, subject to the observations made above as regards the remainder of the learned Munsif's order, the Rule is discharged, but, having regard to the importance and difficulty of the question involved, the parties will bear their own costs both here and below. 24. Although I am deciding against the Petitioners, I should like to express my appreciation of the force and ability with which their case was put by their learned advocate, Mr. Dhar.