JUDGMENT : Mathew Muricken, J. Appellant is defendant No. 1 in O.S. 354 of 1119 of Adoor Munsiff’s Court. The suit is for cancellation of Ext. 1 sale deed for plaint property dated 29.11.1117 executed by defendant No. 2, to defendant No. 1, for declaration of title and recovery of property with mesne profits. The following is the gist of plaintiff’s case. The plaint property 9 cents in extent belonged to defendant No. 3 a Seshakaran of plaintiff and defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 3 received Rs. 12 from plaintiff on the agreement that he would sell the property to him and in pursuance to the agreement executed Ext. B sale deed on 9.8.1117. When defendant No. 3 took the sale deed to plaintiff, he found out that the name of defendant No 2 his cousin was mentioned in the sale deed as the vendee and therefore he declined to accept it. Hence defendant No. 3 executed a second sale deed in favour of plaintiff Ext. A on 26.10.1117 and put plaintiff in possession of the property. While so, some differences arose between defendant No. 2 and plaintiff and defendant No. 2 on the strength of Ext. B executed Ext. 1 sale deed to defendant No. 1 on 29.11.1117 and defendant No. 1 trespassed on the property. The plaintiff therefore sues for cancellation of Ext. 1, for declaration of title and recovery of property. Though all the 3 defendants have filed their written statements, defendant No.1 alone contests the suit. Defendant No.1 contends that Ext. B was not brought about by mistake, that it was executed by defendant No. 3 to defendant No. 2 for consideration, that defendant No. 2 was put in possession of the property, that he was also paying Sirkar tax and subsequently defendant No. 2 executed Ext. 1 sale deed on 29.11.1117 to him for a consideration of Rs. 18, that he was put in possession of the property, that the trespass alleged is false, that mutation of names has also been effected his favour, that defendant No. 3 had no right to execute Ext A sale deed on 26.10.1117 to plaintiff after the execution of Ext. B sale deed on 9.8.1117 to defendant No. 2, that Ext. A is invalid, that plaintiff gets no rights over the property under Ext. A and that the suit has to be dismissed. B sale deed on 9.8.1117 to defendant No. 2, that Ext. A is invalid, that plaintiff gets no rights over the property under Ext. A and that the suit has to be dismissed. Defendant No. 2 supports defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 supports plaintiff. The trial court decreed the suit. In appeal by defendant No.1 the decree of the trial court was only confirmed. Hence the second appeal by defendant No. 1. On hearing the counsels on both sides we do not find our way to interfere with the decree of the lower court. The lower courts find that Ext. B was executed in the name of defendant No. 2 through mistake, that the real intention of defendant No. 3 was to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff, that consideration for Ext. B passed from plaintiff and not from defendant No. 2, that plaintiff got possession under Ext. A on 26.10.1117, that defendant No. 1 is a trespasser, that Ext. 1 has therefore to be set aside and that plaintiff is entitled to the decree prayed for. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that defendant No. 3 is the seshakaran of plaintiff and defendant No. 2 and that therefore there is no scope for the mistake in the name of the vendee in Ext. B. No doubt there is some force in the argument. But, it has to be remembered that plaintiff was not present at the time of the execution of Ext. B, and that defendant No. 3 is an illiterate man. This apart, if as a matter of fact defendant No. 2 paid the consideration for Ext. B and if the document was intended to be executed in his favour one fails to see why defendant No. 2 allowed defendant No. 3 to retain possession of Ext. B. Ext. B is produced in court by plaintiff along with the plaint. Defendant No. 1 has not chosen to examine his vendor defendant No. 2. In the circumstances of the case his evidence is material and his non-examination raises an adverse inference against the case set up by defendant No. 1. All things considered, we do not feel persuaded to upset the concurrent findings of fact entered by the lower courts. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that he is entitled to protection under S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. All things considered, we do not feel persuaded to upset the concurrent findings of fact entered by the lower courts. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that he is entitled to protection under S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section reads thus - “Where, with the consent, express or implied, of the persons interested in immovable property, a person is the ostensible owner of such property and transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it, provided that transferee, after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the transferor had power to make transfer, has acted in good faith”. For the application of S. 41, 2 conditions must be satisfied - (1) the ostensible owner who has no real title must be clothed with the igsignia of ownership with the consent express or implied of the real owner, (2) the person purchasing for value from the ostensible owner should take reasonable care to ascertain that his transferor has authority to transfer. We have therefore to see how far the evidence on record helps defendant No. 1. The counsel for the appellant contended that mutuation has been effected in his favour, that plaintiff has not objected to it and that the conduct of the plaintiff must have induced defendant No. 1 to believe that defendant No. 2 had the power to transfer. P.W.1 swears that he objected to the mutation as soon as he came to know of it. This apart, we do not think it right to hold in favour of defendant No. 1 on the ground that mutuation has been effected in his name. We find support for the position we take, in the decision in Khwaja Afzal v. Mohammad Saheb, 1936 Nag. 214 at 216. The following is the gist of the decision - “Where an ostensible owner transfers the property, in order to give valid title to the purchaser as against real owner, consideration and good faith alone are not sufficient. He must also establish that he made reasonable enquiries; an entry in the revenue papers in itself is not sufficient to constitute the basis of enquiries”. We have already adverted to the fact that defendant No. 1 did not get Ext. B sale deed in favour of his vendor defendant No. 2 along with his sale deed Ext. He must also establish that he made reasonable enquiries; an entry in the revenue papers in itself is not sufficient to constitute the basis of enquiries”. We have already adverted to the fact that defendant No. 1 did not get Ext. B sale deed in favour of his vendor defendant No. 2 along with his sale deed Ext. 1; defendant No. 1 when he is examined as D.W. 3 admits that at the time of the execution of Ext. 1 the document writer demanded the title deeds and that the 2nd defendant said it was missing "ssItamiw hp-t]mbn" This apart, if he made an enquiry in the registry office he could have easily found out the sale deed Ext. A dated 26.10.1117 in favour of plaintiff. The facts aforesaid do not indicate good faith in defendant No. 1. There is also the concurrent finding of the lower courts that defendant No. 1 did not get possession under Ext. 1 and that his possession is only through trespass. For the reasons stated above we do not think that defendant No. 1 is entitled to any protection under S. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. All the grounds raised by the appellant fail. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.