JUDGMENT Das, J. - This Rule was obtained by the Plaintiff against an order passed by Mr. K. N. Ray Chowdhury, Munsif of Midnapore. It appears that the Defendant Opposite Party was originally a tenant in respect of a room under the Plaintiff Petitioner. That suit ended in a compromise, on the 23rd April, 1948. Under the terms of the compromise, the Defendant expressed his willingness to vacate the said room and time was granted to him till the 1st October, 1948. The Defendant agreed to pay rent till the 30th September. 1948, at the old rate. Thereafter the Defendant did not vacate the said premises and made an application under sec. 47 of the CPC raising an objection to the validity of the execution proceedings on the ground that the compromise decree was without jurisdiction as no permission of the Rent Controller had been taken prior to the institution of the suit. That application was dismissed. Thereafter on the 15th January, 1949, the Defendant made an application under sec. 18 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act. The Munsif seems to be of the opinion that as the Defendant had paid all the arrears and that the " solenama was covered by a general term and good intention of the Defendant" an order should be made vacating the compromise decree " in the interest of justice." Mr. Pal appearing for the Petitioner has contended broadly that sec. 18 of the West Bengal Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act has no application to consent decrees. Sec. 18 runs as follows: Where any decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises has been made before the date of commencement of this Act, but the possession of such premices has not been recovered from the tenant by the execution of such decree or order, the Court by which the decree or order was made may, if it is of opinion that the decree or order would not have been made If this Act had been in operation at the date of the making of the decree or order, rescind or vary the decree or order in such manner as the Court may think fit for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act 2. It would appear therefrom that the section refers to any decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises. There is no qualification that the decree or order for possession should be on contest or ex parte. A decree on consent possesses all the requirements of a decree passed on contest or ex parte as regards the binding effect thereof and as regards executability of the decree. A decree passed on consent is so made under Or. 23, r. 3 of the CPC and before the Court records the consent of the parties it has to be satisfied judicially that the compromise was a lawful one. It is true that a consent decree records the agreement of the parties, to which is superadded the command of the Judge. Nevertheless I fail to see why a consent decree which satisfied the requirements of sec. 2, cl. (2) of the CPC should not come within the purview of sec. 18 of the Act. This contention of Mr. Pal must be overruled. I may point out that in construing an analogous provision of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order a Bench of this Court in the case of Manick Chandra Pal v. Haripado Roy 53 C. W. N 280 (1848) was of the opinion that a consent decree satisfied the requirements of sec. 9B (3) of the said Order. 3. Coming to the merits of the application, the learned Munsif was not right in setting aside a decree passed on consent between the parties. The order was made not on the ground that sec. 18 applies but on the ground that the interest of justice requires that the consent decree should be re-opened. In my opinion this is a position which cannot be sustained. Sec. 18 of the Act has given the parties a right to vary or" rescind a decree or order for possession already passed by the Court, only if that decree or order was such as could not have been made if the present Act was in operation at the date of the passing of the consent decree or order. In this case if this Act had been in operation in 1948 when the consent decree was passed, there was no bar to a decree being passed for eviction of the Defendant. On this ground the order of the learned Munsif must be set aside. 4. Mr. In this case if this Act had been in operation in 1948 when the consent decree was passed, there was no bar to a decree being passed for eviction of the Defendant. On this ground the order of the learned Munsif must be set aside. 4. Mr. Ghose appearing for the Defendant Opposite Party has invited me not to interfere in this matter because the order made by the learned Munsif in dismissing his objection under sec. 47 in Judicial Miscellaneous Case No. 169 of 1948 is obviously a wrong order and that justice has been done by the learned Munsif in maintaining the possession of the Defendant. If the order passed in the aforesaid Judicial Miscellaneous Case is one which is erroneous in law, the remedy of the Defendant Opposite Party is to move the appropriate Court for relief. Nothing which I have said in this judgment will preclude him from pursuing that remedy. 5. The result, therefore, is that this Rule is made absolute, and the order of the Munsif is set aside. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court and in the Court below.